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I 
Abstract 
Kenya and South Africa can be described as dominant party systems, under the 
dominance of the Kenya African National Union CKANU) and the African National 
Congress CANC) respectively. A dominant party system is in essence a democracy. The 
spirit of democracy may, however, apparently be contradicted by the weight of party 
dominance, thus questioning the content of and prospects for democracy under party 
dominance in both Kenya and South Africa. 
The study is a comparative analysis of party dominance in Kenya and South 
Africa. The main objective is to exan1ine the relationship between party dominance and 
democracy in both countries. It seeks to find out how party dominance is reproducing 
itself and surviving the post 1990 transition processes in Kenya and South Africa. More 
importantly, the study also seeks to find out how party dominance impacts upon 
institutions that support or uphold democratization and subsequently democracy. The 
findings of the study demonstrate that party dominance has reproduced itself and 
survived the post-1990 period, and is also impacting upon democratization and 
democracy. The dominant parties take a similar trajectory in pursuit of dominance over 
the state and its apparatuses. However, they differ when it comes to their relationship 
with the civil society. That between KANU and civil society is antagonistic, as the ruling 
party seeks to augment political power through authoritarian dominance of the latter to, 
while that of the ANC and civil society is responsive, as the former seeks to enhance 
political stability in the country. 
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The impact of party dominance upon institutions that support democracy takes 
similar and different trajectories in both countries. Similarities arise with respect to the 
detrimental impact upon institutions of the Executive that ensure accountability and 
transparency, evident in the increasing cases of corruption, nepotism and political 
patronage appointments. Similarly, there has been a detrimental impact upon the 
Legislature regarding parliamentary proceedings. Parliamentary committees and 
opposition parties are being rendered ineffective as organs of ensuring transparency and 
accountability, and are often subject to delegitimation. The impact of party dominance on 
the Judiciary, however, differs in both countries. In Kenya, the judiciary continues to 
suffer from excessive interference from the Executive and the ruling party, whereas in 
South Africa the judicial system remains largely independent with regard to the 
application of justice, despite constant criticisms from the dominant party. 
The study concludes that South Africa is, gradually, going the Kenyan way. If this 
condition is left unchecked there is the possibility that South Africa could eventually end 
up a psuedo-democracy like Kenya, where formal democratic political institutions such 
as multiparty elections, exist to mask the reality of authoritarian dominance. The thesis 
recommends that strengthening civil society organizations, opposition political parties, 
and state institutions in both countries to ensure greater accountability and transparency, 
will reverse this detrimental effect of party dominance. It also recommends meaningful 
constitutional reforms that will guarantee greater independence of these institutions, and 
the decentralization of governmental and political power to check and limit the powers of 
the dominant party. Also recommended are areas for further research. 
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1.0 Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Democracy denotes a system of government that meets three essential conditions 
viz, meaningful political competition between individuals and organized groups; political 
participation; and the existence of civil and political liberties, in the polity (Diamond, 
Linz and Lipsett, 1995 :6-7). Kenya and South Africa have undergone democratisation 
processes toward multi-ethnic and non-racial multi-party political systems respectively . 
..Democratisation basically involves the shift from an authoritarian regime to the 
installation and consolidation of a democratic regime (Huntington, 1991 :35). However 
for democratisation and subsequently democracy to occur, there must exist strong 
functional democratic and democracy-promoting institutions in society. Democratisation 
requires the careful and deliberate construction of democratic institutions. Political 
parties and competitive party-systems are, presumably such institutions and the one party 
dominant system is in effect a competitive system and democracy. For a party to be 
dominant, it must be dominant in terms of number of parliamentary seats; in bargaining 
position in order to stay in government continuously; chronologically with respect to 
electoral outcomes and also governmentally. It must also dominate the electorate, other 
parties, the formation of government and the public policy agenda (pempel 1990; 4-5). 
The history of modern African political organisations in Kenya and South Africa 
can be traced back to the early 1900s with the formation in 1912, of the African National 
Congress (then known as the South African Native National Congress) in South Africa, 
and the formation, in 1922 of the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA) in Kenya. Though 
not formal political parties at the time, these organisations nonetheless advocated specific 
African rights denied by the colonial authorities. Since then, both countries have 
witnessed the emergence of several political parties and the evolution of different party 
systems. This study, however, largely focuses on the post-1990 democratic transition 
process which re-introduced multipartyism in post-colonial Kenya and ushered in the end 
of apartheid in South Africa. 
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The post-1990 democratisation experiences have restructured and re-established 
party dominance in Kenya and South Africa respectively. During the early 1960's, Kenya 
was briefly a one-party dominant system under the party dominance of the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU). The immediate multi-party period following Kenya's 
independence in 1963 saw KANU briefly emerge as a dominant party. However by 1969 
and subsequently in 1982, Kenya was a de facto and de jure one-party state respectively 
with KANU as the sole political party. It was only in 1991, that KANU, as a result of 
mounting domestic and international pressure, repealed Section 2A of the Constitution, 
which declared the country a de jure one party state, paving the way for the re-
introduction of multipartyism. Section 2A stated that "There shall be in Kenya only one 
political party, the Kenya African National Union" (Kenya, 1987: 6). During the 1992 
multiparty elections contested by several political parties, KANU emerged as the 
dominant party, in terms of electoral plurality, by capturing 53.2 per cent of the 
parliamentary seats. The ruling party also emerged as the dominant party in the 1997 
elections when it obtained 50.1 per cent of the parliamentary seats. 
In South Africa, party dominance can be traced back to 1948 when the National 
Party (NP) won the elections and assumed office. However, this can be described as a 
psuedo-one party dominant system since it met the requirements of a dominant party 
system (discussed later in the Chapter), but nonetheless excluded a major adult social 
group, namely the black population, from political participation. South Africa was, 
therefore, an oligarchic democracy. The NP implemented a pernicious programme of 
apartheid and South Africa was to remain a one-party dominant system under the NP, 
until 1994, when the country held its first democratic non-racial elections, following the 
demise of apartheid. The year 1990 was crucial and significant for South Africa, as it saw 
the unbanning of liberation movements and the repeal of several apartheid laws. The 
post-1990 democratic non-racial elections saw party dominance re-establish itself under 
the hegemony of the African National Congress (ANC) when the party won 62.5 per cent 
of the votes in the 1994 elections and 66.36 per cent of the votes in the 1999 elections. 
Though the one-party dominant system is a competitive system and need not be 
undemocratic as demonstrated elsewhere, the spirit of democracy, may, apparently be 
contradicted by the weight of party dominance. The question thus becomes: what are the 
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nature of and prospects for democracy under conditions of party dominance in both 
Kenya and South Africa? 
1.1 Objectives 
This study is a comparative analysis of party dominance in Kenya and South 
Africa, under the dominance ofKANU and the ANC respectively. The main objective of 
the study is to examine the relationship between party dominance and democratisation in 
both countries. The study seeks to find out how party dominance is reproducing itself and 
surviving the post-1990 transition processes in Kenya and South Africa. Of more 
importance it also seeks to examine how party dominance impacts upon institutions that 
support or uphold democratisation and subsequently democracy. 
1.2 Justification and Significance 
The study involves a comparative analysis of Kenya and South Africa. The choice 
of these countries can be justified and is significant in several ways. Firstly, the countries 
share a similar historical background ranging from being settler economies to suffering 
under racial domination and oppression, particularly white minority rule, in the form of 
colonialism and apartheid respectively. Secondly, as a consequence, both countries 
experienced a similar liberation struggle characterised both by passive resistance and 
armed struggle. Thirdly, in both countries, the major liberation or anti-colonial movement 
captured political power legitimately during the first democratic elections following the 
end of white minority rule. Fourthly, the liberation movements in the post colonial and 
post-apartheid polities have in the post-1990s emerged as dominant parties shaping both 
countries as party dominant systems. This is a significant comparative analysis in that 
Kenya under party dominance has often been described as authoritarian, whereas South 
Africa under party dominance is often described as a democracy (Freedom House, 
1999:1). Finally, both countries can be described as deeply divided societies. Kenya is 
deeply divided along ethnic lines whereas South Africa is deeply divided along racial 
lines. This is made apparent, for example, in voting patterns as people vote along ethnic 
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and racial lines respectively. Though democracy is founded on the principles of 
"diversity in unity" and lor "unity in diversity", a deeply divided society is nonetheless 
prone to conflict and violence if its political institutions are generally weak. Some 
scholars have argued that democratisation and the party system are an integral part of 
conflict prevention and resolution and even more so of ensuring political stability in 
society (Sisks, 1999:1 ; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:1-45). 
This study is also of academic importance, in that it enhances the debate on the 
importance of political parties and party systems in the democratisation process in 
developing countries. Much academic debate and literature seems to place greater 
emphasis on the importance of civil society organisations, such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs), trade unions and 
professional associations as agents of democratisation, at the expense of political parties 
(Bratton, 1989:407-430; Ngunyi, 1995:121-130; Gibbon, 1994:11 -20; Brattton and 
Rothchild, 1992: 272-274; Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1995:27-31). This study is based 
on recognition of the fact that the debate on democratisation is now placing greater 
emphasis than previously on the study of democratic and democracy-promoting 
institutions. 
Though it is difficult to conceive of democracy in the absence of other institutions 
of civil as well as state society, it is even more difficult to conceive of democracy without 
political parties. Political parties are necessary for the organisation and structuring of 
political power at all levels, as well as providing a forum for political debate, 
participation and competition. Without effective parties, democracies cannot have 
' effective governance. The whole idea of a party system is based on the assumption that 
there exist stable structures of competition. Structures of competition can be viewed to be 
either closed or open, depending on the "patterns of alteration in government, the degree 
of innovation or persistence in the process of government formation, and the range of 
parties gaining access to government" (Mair, 1996:84; Linz, 1992:182-207; Diamond, 
Linz and Lipset, 1995:33-35; IFES, 1997:10-11). It is often assumed that the very 
existence of competing political parties is a guarantee of democracy. However, both 
countries demonstrate a tradition of party dominance and an analysis of these party 
systems will contribute to an understanding of the limits and extent of democracy under 
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party dominance whilst also indicating the role of and constraints of opposition in such 
systems. There is a need to stimulate and revive this debate, more so in the context of 
sub-Saharan Africa. The study therefore adds knowledge to the existing literature and 
identifies areas for further research. 
1.3 Literature Review 
This section adopts a thematic approach with respect to the review of literature. 
The themes covered relate to those of political parties, party systems, democratisation and 
democracy in Kenya and South Africa. 
1.3.1 Kenya 
The literature on democratization and democracy in post-1990 Kenya covers a 
wide range of issues. These include the elections and the electoral process; the role of 
civil society; issues of constitutionalism and human rights; governance issues; and to 
some small extent local government issues. 
Much of the literature in the area of democracy and democratization seems to 
focus on the elections and electoral processes of 1992 and 1997. The works examine a 
wide range of social, economic and political factors that significantly impacted upon 
these elections and electoral processes leading to what they term flawed elections or a 
flawed process. Much of the literature places emphases on the politico-administrative 
factors that saw the electoral processes, from constituency demarcation, voter registration 
and election campaigning to polling and the counting of ballot papers in the 1992 and 
1997 elections in Kenya as characterized by excessive use of fraud and force, in most 
instances, to the ruling party' s advantage. These factors include constitutional 
weaknesses because constitutional amendments placed the ruling party at an electoral 
advantage over opposition parties and the use of state apparatuses, instruments and 
patronage resources, such as positive and negative sanctions to influence electoral 
outcomes (Barkan, 1993:85-99; IR!, 1993; Throup, 1993 :371 -396; Holmquist and Ford, 
1994:5-25; Ogot, 1995; Ajulu and Fox, 1995; Fox, 1996:597-607; Nzomo, 1996:167-184; 
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IFES, ; Ajulu, 1998:275-288; Southall, 1998:101-111 ; Adar, 1999: 340-360; Southall, 
1999: 93-108) 
The literature also examines in depth and detail, the role of civil society in the 
political liberalization and democratization process in Kenya. Many of these works point 
out the important role of religious institutions, particularly, the churches, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media in pressurizing the government to 
restore mUlti-party politics in the country in the early 1990s. The literature also focuses 
on the input of such civil society groups to the constitutional reform and review process, 
in particular their role in ensuring that institutions and mechanisms that support and 
promote democracy are enshrined in the constitution. This literature argues that 
democratization in Kenya has largely been a function of civil society and recognizes the 
institutional weaknesses of civil society groups caused by leadership, doctrinal and 
resource problems, among others, arguing that such organizations need to be 
strengthened if democracy is to be institutionalized in Kenya (Kanyinga, 1994: 89-117; 
Ndegwa, 1994: 19-36; Ngunyi, 1995 : 121 -\35;Gibbon, 1995:7-30; Haugerud, 1995:15-
55; Aboum, 1996; Von Doepp, 1996; Wanyande, 1996: 1-20; Sabar- Friedman, 1997: 25-
52; Nzomo, 1998167-184). This literature, however fails to tackle adequately the 
question of how institutional weakness can also be a function of party dominance in the 
political process. 
Related are the issues of constitutionalism and human rights . The literature 
attempts to demonstrate how flaws in the democratization process are largely a function 
of a faulty constitution. Arguments put forward in this literature emphasize that though 
the country reverted back to a multiparty state in 1991 , the one-party constitutional 
structure nonetheless remained intact, in effect allowing the ruling party to retain its 
control of the instruments of political power and thus giving it an advantage over other 
parties. The literature also examines the actors involved in the constitutional review 
exercise, in particular civil society actors, emphasizing the need for more local level civil 
society groups to get involved in the process, particularly in areas such as civil education, 
as a way of raising political awareness: awareness with regard, to political, constitutional 
and legal issues (Galti, 1996; Kariuki, 1996:69-86; Kibwana, 1996; Barkan 1998:213-
226; Haberson, 1998:161-184; Holmquist and Ford, 1998 : 227-258; Kiai, 1998:185-192; 
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Ndegwa, 1998a:193-212; Mutunga, 1999:205-237). The literature does, however, 
acknowledge the dominant role of KANU in the legislative and constitutional review 
processes and emphasizes that such processes are to a large extent favourable to the 
ruling party. 
Governance issues are also covered in the literature upon transition. This literature 
predominantly focuses on the changes the ruling party and the regime have undergone 
during the transition process from single-party rule to multi-party rule, as well as during 
the multi-party period itself. It emphasizes how these changes have undercut the authority 
and power of the ruling party in recent years. Of particular significance are intra-party 
power struggles, which have led to the emergence of factionalism in the ruling party, 
namely KANU A and KANU B. The literature also points out that corruption and the 
declining performance of the economy has also had a negative impact on the regime's 
capacity to govern. Other factors that have affected the power and authority of the ruling 
party and regime, according to the literature, are ethnic politics because the ruling party 
has been unable to woo voters and win seats in the Kikuyu (the largest ethnic group) and 
Luo areas of the country (Okech, 1994; Holmquist and Ford, 1995 : 177-181; Khadiagala, 
1995: 53-73; Wanjala, 1996; Chege, 1997; Ndegwa, 1997; Haberson, 1998: 161-184; 
Holmquist and Ford, 1998:227-258; Southall, 1999:93-108). Governance issues have 
mainly centred on intra party struggles, the performance of the economy, corruption and 
declining patronage and administrative capacity, without paying much attention to the 
impact of party dominance upon democratization. 
Other works on issues related to democratization and democracy, though not 
extensive, cover areas such as opposition, local government, and the labour movement in 
Kenya. The literature on opposition looks at the nature of opposition parties in Kenya, 
and as with civil society groups, points out their ineffectiveness in the democratization 
process, caused their institutional weaknesses. The literature attributes their weaknesses 
to a number of facto rs, for example ethnicity, because such parties are said to be 
ethnically based or to represent narrow sectional interests and therefore to lack mass 
appeal. These works also emphasize the fact that opposition parties in Kenya are weak 
due to poor leadership, incoherent doctrines and prograrnmes, lack of resources, 
especially financial resources, and that they also lack effective societal linkages. 
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Opposition parties in Kenya are described as lacking autonomy from their leaders; being 
unable to adapt and respond easily to changing circumstances and emerging challenges 
such as factionalism, lack of finances, etc; lacking organizational coherence and 
discipline; and also lacking complexity. The literature, however, does not cover 
adequately their performance in parliament, nor does it adequately cover how party 
dominance impacts upon their performance especially with regard to delegitimisation. 
Other areas covered, although not by many works, include local government and the 
labour movement and how these are also responding to changing circumstances and 
emerging challenges under multi-party ism in Kenya (Muigai, 1993: 26-34; Okech, 1996; 
Southall and Wood, 1996: 501-528; AC, 1997; Murungi, 1997:9; Murungi, 1999:8; 
Ndegwa, 1997; Throup, 1997; Wanjohi, 1997: 208-253; Warigi, 1999:9). 
Although the literature upon democratization and democracy covers a wide range 
of issues, not much of it focuses on party dominance, as a party system, and its impact 
upon democracy in the country. Though some of the works do acknowledge that Kenya is 
a dominant party system, they nonetheless inadequately discuss how party dominance has 
emerged and how it is impacting upon democracy, particularly with respect to political 
pm1icipation and competition. This study attempts to fill some of these gaps in the 
existing literature. 
1.3.2 South Africa 
Unlike Kenya, the literature on democracy and democratization post-1990 South 
Africa covers a wide range of both general and specific issues. This literature pays 
particular attention to events and issues emanating from the unbanning of political 
organizations and the release of political prisoners in 1990, as well as the consequent 
repeal of several apartheid laws, the negotiations and negotiated settlement. The literature 
also covers the post -1994 period, with regard to issues such as the elections; the electoral 
system and process; party politics and the party system; state-civil society relations; 
governance and institution-building; constitutionalism; race and ethnicity; the labour 
movement and local government, among others. Due to the wide scope of the available 
literature on issues related to democracy and democratization, the literature reviewed in 
this section covers only what is of immediate concern to this study, namely the transition 
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period, elections, the electoral system and process, constitutionalism, state-society 
relations, and institution-building, political parties and the party system in post-apartheid 
South Africa. 
The transition literature pays attention to the socio-political and economic factors 
that lead to the dismantling of apartheid and its institutions. This literature covers a wide 
range of debates, which center on the reasons behind the dismantling of apartheid. Some 
works argue that it was primarily as a result of domestic and international pressure from 
the national liberation movements that the apartheid state yielded power, whereas other 
works point to economic reasons: that the apartheid state could no longer manage to 
sustain itself, economically due to poor domestic economic policies, and sanctions and 
conditionalities imposed upon it by the international community. Some works do, 
however, emphasize that it was a combination of domestic and international political and 
economic factors that impacted upon apartheid and the apartheid state in South Africa. 
There is also some literature that argues that pragmatism and intra-party conflicts within 
the NP were some of the reasons that led to the dismantling of apartheid (Giliomee, 1992; 
Alexander, 1993; McHenry, 1993; Dalal, 1994; Kitchen and Kitchen, 1994; Sisk, 1994; 
Guelke, 1997; Lansberg and Kamemba, 1998; Natrass, 1998; Seekings, 1998; Giliomee, 
1998; Seekings, 1998; Barber, 1999; Bond 2000). This literature is not so much interested 
in party dominance and its impact upon democracy or democratization, but more in the 
social, economic and political conditions that eventually lead to the dismantling of 
apartheid. 
The transition literature also pays particular attention to the early 1990s 
negotiations and negotiated settlement. This literature points out, with regard to the 
negotiations, the willingness on the part of the elite in South Africa to compromise by 
subscribing to democratic rules . The works emphasize that decisions were taken to come 
to terms with the situation by agreeing to peaceful competition for power and that this 
required the adoption of democratic rules, including appropriate checks and balances, and 
the protection of fundamental human rights. The literature points out that the idea of 
establishing such a framework, was also to bring previously excluded groups into the 
political process. Democracy or democratization emerges when elites in the political 
system agree to abide by the rules to the game, through compromises and settlements, 
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rather than risk national disintegration. This is precisely what happened during the 
negotiation process from 1990 to 1994. The two major antagonists, the ANC and the NP 
became the main protagonists, with the ANC emerging from the negotiated settlement as 
the leading and dominant actor (Slovo, 1992; Adam, 1993; Friedman 1993; Friedman and 
Atkinson, 1993; Sisk, 1994; Sparks, 1995; Buntman, 1998; Rantete, 1998; Bond, 2000). 
Although this literature pays attention to party politics, with regard to inter-party 
relations, dominance is examined, not in the context of party dominance within the party 
system, but rather in the context of dominant actors in the political process. 
Works that pay attention to the period after the negotiated settlement analyse and 
explain a number of issues. A key issue is that of the elections, the electoral system and 
process. This literature examines the nature of elections and their outcomes and seeks to 
identify and analyze factors that determine such electoral outcomes. Many works identify 
these factors as historical, racial and ethnic, and the nature of the electoral system. 
Commentators point out the nature and role of the national liberation movements and 
argue that as vehicles for the aspirations of the majority, such organizations received the 
majority of votes during the first and second non-racial elections in South Africa. They 
also point out that in both elections voting was carried out along racial and ethnic lines 
due to historical reasons, and also that the priorities or claims, of the various racial groups 
in the new dispensation are different. The majority of Africans identified with parties that 
would not only secure their traditional liberties and privileges, but more importantly 
parties that guaranteed them their socio-economic rights, such as the right to housing, 
education, sanitation etc. According to literature largely derived from opinion polls, 
Whites who preferred the protection of third generation rights, that is group rights such as 
minority language rights and the right to self-determination identified, with the National 
Party, whereas those who preferred the guarantee of individual rights identified 
themselves with the Democratic Party (DP). Many whites also preferred parties that 
espoused security issues, such as the need to address crime and violence. While also 
analyzing elections and their outcomes, these works focus on the nature of the electoral 
system. They also examine the nature of the list proportional representation system (list 
PR) by comparing it to other electoral systems, such as the first-past-the-post system 
(FPTP), and argue that, ironically, though the list PR system does not normally produce a 
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majority, it has contributed to the emergence of a one-party dominant system in the 
country. The literature emphasizes that during the negotiations, political parties were 
greatly concerned with the choice of the electoral system, as uncertainty and 
unpredictability surrounded the electoral outcome. It also points out that some parties, 
such as the ANC, initially preferred a constituency-based system and did not support list 
PR since it was feared that it would necessitate government coalitions by over-
representing minority interests. The assumption was that the ANC preferred a 
constituency-based electoral system on the basis that its wide electoral support would 
gain as other parties split across the left and right of the political continuum. However, 
the ANC adopted list PR partially as a compromise with the other political parties in 
favour of the system, knowing well that it would not lose by such a choice. Since it had 
long been committed to the ideology of non-racialism, the ANC opted for list PR rather 
than a constituency-based system, since drawing small, non-racial constituencies for a 
plurality system would have been counterproductive to racial identities and politics. The 
list PR system gave more than 60 per cent of the vote to the largest party and secured 
minorities representation in Parliament. According to the literature, this electoral system 
greatly contributed to the ANC's success in managing its constituency by making it 
possible for the organization to mobilize Africans as a compact majority. Other works on 
the elections and the electoral process pay attention the nature of fraud and force in the 
1994 and 1999 elections (Johnston, 1994; Lodge, 1994; Reynolds, 1994; Southall, 1994; 
Spence, 1994; Szeftel, 1994; Sisk, 1995; Faure, 1996; Seekings, 1997; Southall, 1997; 
Buntrnan, 1998; Mattes, 1998; EISA, 1999a; 1999b; Faure, 1999; Giliomee and Simkins, 
1999; Johnston, 1999; Lodge, 1999a; 1999b; Schlemmer, 1999; Pottie, 2001). This 
literature on elections and the electoral process is important to this study as it provides 
the necessary foundations for the analysis of the emergence of party dominance in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
The literature on state-society relations also covers a wide range of issues. These 
range from the role of civil society groups in the democratization process to the role of 
such groups in the public policy-making process. Much of the literature in this area 
emphasizes that civil society in South Africa is remarkable vigorous. However, it has its 
shortcomings. These works point out that during the apartheid era a strong civil society 
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emerged specifically to pursue the anti-apartheid struggle. It was assumed that these 
organizations would, in the post-apartheid era, be strong enough to impose limits on state 
power. However, as some of the literature emphasizes, their role in underpinning 
democracy has not always been guaranteed. Civil society in South Africa is proving to be 
too weak to offer many citizens alternative channels for social and political participation 
or aspirations. Some of the literature points out that the numbers of civil society 
organizations are in fact dwindling. According to the literature, NOOs in the country are 
declining due to the fact that many of them rely on donor funding, which is also 
declining. Since 1994, NOOs with political concerns have declined, as many donors 
withdrew their support as a result of the end of the apartheid struggle. The withdrawal of 
local and foreign funding has also affected NOOs with socio-economic concerns 
resulting in many of them either closing down or curtailing their activities. The literature 
seems to argue that in as much as civil society is vibrant in the future, there is the 
possibility that it might be institutionally weak due to a variety of economic and political 
reasons. While much of the literature focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of civil 
society vis-a-vis the state in relation to democracy and policy making, much of it fails to 
tackle the question of party dominance and its impact upon both formal and informal 
NGOs or CBOs (Friedman, 1995; Morris, 1995; Hirschmann, 1998; Lodge, 1999b). 
With regard to the labour movement as part of civil society, the literature does 
attempt to link it with party dominance. This is in the context of corporatism. The 
literature points out the historical role the labour movement played in the liberation 
struggle and illuminates its decision to form an alliance and corporatist arrangement with 
the main liberation movement, the ANC, in a bid to capture political power and 
subsequently govern as an alliance partner with the governing party. The literature points 
out that the labour movement in South Africa, namely the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) contributed toward the ANC's achievement of party 
dominance. This literature also analyses other forms of corporatism between government 
and civil society organizations such as the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NED LAC) and points out the achievements and shortcomings of the latter in the 
policy-making process in the country. Prominence is given to the labour movement as a 
mechanism for providing the necessary checks and balances and imposing limits on state 
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power (Adler and Webster, 1994; Orkin, 1995; Adler and Webster, 1998; Barchiesi, 
1998; Maree, 1998; CDE, 1999; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999; African Communist, 2000; 
Webster, 2001). 
The literature on governance and institution building in post apartheid South 
Africa also covers a wide range of issues. The literature reviewed, here, however 
examines the nature and performance of specific state society institutions namely the 
executive, legislative, judiciary, and the military bodies in post apartheid South Africa. 
These works examine the cause and effects of transformation in these institutions. They 
argue that since these institutions were primarily designed to serve the apartheid state, 
there was a need to restructure and redefine their role in the new political dispensation. 
The literature emphasizes that the transformation process has some shortcomings. 
Existing and new opportunities created as a result of the process have become sources of 
political patronage, thereby negatively impacting upon the performance of these 
institutions. These works stress that in as much as transformation can be justified on 
moral as well as political grounds, the process should not be politicized to serve party 
political interests at the expense of merit and good performance of these institutions 
(Cilliers and Mertz, 1993; Friedman and Reitzes, 1996; Schrire, 1996; Southall, 1997; 
ANC, 1998; Lodge, 1998; PRC, 1998; CDE, 1999). 
Finally, the literature reviewed in this section, covers the role of political parties 
and the party system in post apartheid South Africa. Works on political parties examine 
the nature of various intra and inter party relations as well as party-state relations and 
their efforts aimed at achieving democratic consolidation. These works pay attention to 
issues such as the racial and composition of such parties, voter attitudes toward various 
political parties and how these impacts upon their performance during elections. They 
also focus on issues such as party leadership, party doctrines, programmes, resources, and 
party linkages with society. In doing so, they point out the strengths and weaknesses of 
various political parties as electoral machines, agents of mobilization and socialization, or 
agents of social, economic and political development. The literature on the party system 
in post-apartheid South Africa pays particular attention to the dominant party system. 
South Africa has been characterized as a dominant party system. While acknowledging 
that the dominant party system is in effect democratic, works on party dominance under 
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the ANC revolve around two main traditions. On the one hand, there is the optimistic 
assessment of the ANC's dominance, which argues that dominance is likely to stabilize 
the new order and guarantee democracy, and, on the other hand, there is the diametrically 
opposite view, which argues that party dominance is rather more likely to close down 
opposition and, in effect, transform democracy into elective dictatorship. Most of the 
works adopt the latter view. The ANC's centralist policies are viewed as detrimental to 
democratic principles and procedures in the country. Some of the works have come to 
such conclusions by analyzing party dominance in South Africa from a comparative 
perspective (Southall , 1994; Jung and Shapiro, 1995; Booysen, 1996; Southall, 1997; 
Jacobs, 1998; Beukmann, 1999; CDE, 1999; Downs, 1999; Friedman, 1999; Giliomee 
and Simkins, 1999; Jozana, 1999; Lodge, 1999a, 1999b; Schlemmer, 1999; Southall, 
1999; Cherry, 2001 ; Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer, 2001; Habib and Taylor, 2001 ; 
Kotze, 2001; Maloba, 2001 ; Mare; 2001; Mckinley, 2001; Nijzink, 2001; Schrire, 2001; 
Southall, 2001a, 2001b). Not much attention is however, paid to a comparative analysis 
of party dominance in South Africa and other African countries that can be termed as 
dominant party systems. 
1.4 Conceptual Framework 
This study adopts TJ Pempel's (1990) approach to the study of party dominance. 
A dominant party system is a multi-party system in which one dominant party 
monopolises power. This system has been described by scholars in various ways. 
Maurice Duverger (1954) refers to it as a dominant party system, simply by looking at the 
number of parties, whereas Jean Blondel (1968) refers to it as a multi-party system with a 
dominant party, by comparing the relative size of the parties. Though Sartori's (1976) 
classification is based on the number of parties and the ideological distance separating the 
parties in the system, he terms it a pre-dominant party system when one particular party 
wins a majority of parliamentary seats. 
TJ Pempel (1990) argues that a one party dominant system is a competitive 
system where, firstly, a party must be dominant in number at in least parliamentary seats. 
It must win a larger number of seats than its opponents. It should receive a plurality to 
14 
qualifY as a dominant party. Secondly, the party must occupy a dominant bargaining 
position in order to stay in government on a continuous basis. It must hold a position 
within the party system that enables it to bargain effectively with other smaller parties in 
the formation of governments. Thirdly, the party must be dominant chronologically with 
respect to electoral outcomes. Finally, the party should be dominant governmentally. At 
the core of government, the dominant party carries out a historical proj ect, a series of 
interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give particular shape to the 
national political agenda. The dominant party, in summary, must dominate the electorate 
and gain at least an electoral plurality and hence dominate in socio-economic 
mobilisation. It must also have a bargaining advantage vis-a-vis other political parties so 
that it remains at the core of any coalitions that are formed. It must also remain in office 
long enough to implement its historical agenda. Whilst in office, it must be able to 
implement that historical program and use state apparatuses to isolate its opposition and 
strengthen its own electoral position (Pempel, 1990: 3-4). 
The condition of party dominance normally develops in countries where social 
stagnation and rule by a limited oligarchy prevail. It is also a product of liberation 
movements that controlled social diversities as a means of achieving national 
independence in various countries. To Pempel (1990), one of the greatest puzzles of party 
dominance lies in the fact that a condition of party dominance characteristic of 
developing countries actually exists in industrialised democracies in situations of social 
dynamics and political openness, which do not usually prevail in developing countries. 
What is important is that party dominance provides the dominant party the opportunity to 
reshape its following through the use of state resources and to enable it to pursue its 
historical agenda (Pempel, 1990:5-7) 
According to Steven Friedman (1999), some of the methods of achieving \ 
dominance are the use of patronage and delegitimation of opposition parties. However, as \ 
he points out, this is not automatic for dominant parties. Dominant parties cannot 
delegitimise the opposition by fiat: conditions must exist in which the electorate is open 
to delegitimation. Simkins argues that potentially dominant parties are usually, if not 
invariably, alliances of diverse interests. They often have formal ties with diverse 
interests and groups, which they usually reconcile, pacifY and reward, making it difficult 
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to maintain party cohesion by means of strict party discipline. Dominant or potentially 
dominant parties that seek to impose strict internal party discipline or that fail to maintain 
the often delicate balance between their varying interests, run the risk of ceasing to 
dominate. Internal pluralism does not, however, ensure continued dominance. While the 
dominant party is likely to lose sections of its support base as a result of making decisions 
that favour some interests over others, it is essential that the dominant party seek support 
from new interests to compensate for its losses if it is to maintain dominance. A dominant 
party cannot represent sectional or narrow interests. It must effectively spread out and 
mobilise support from all sectors of society to ensure continued dominance (Friedman, 
1999:101-103). 
Much of the theoretical literature on dominant party systems acknowledges that 
such party systems are actually democracies. Giuseppe Di Palma argues that, in dominant 
party systems, the degree of democracy is a function of the ideological distance of the 
dominant parties and their competitiveness. He emphasizes that in cases where the 
dominant parties are either on the extreme left or right of the ideological continuum, such 
parties are unlikely to combine dominance with competitiveness and hence such a 
dominant party system is likely to be less democratic. However, where the dominant 
party is moderate, the system is likely to be more democratic (Di Palma, 1990:164-166). 
Di Palma argues that, in transitional democracies, dominance should be favoured because 
a transition to democracy represents a critical moment of judgement, choice and decision. 
The politics of transition become less routine and thus offer the parties capable of seizing 
leadership an opportunity to hegemonize the political game, political culture and political 
economy, whilst possibly isolating and delegitimising contending parties and social 
formations. Within transition, establishing dominance also becomes a matter of 
reconciling dominance with a new competitive order (Di Palma: 162-164). 
Friedman (1999) also acknowledges that dominant party systems can be 
democratic. He argues that: l 
The essential point about "party dominant systems" is that they are 
democracies: there is regular and open electoral contest, opposition parties 
are free to organise and civil liberties are, at least in the main, respected. 
Within this context, however, one party monopolises power (Friedman, 
1999:99). 
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Friedman emphasises that insistence on this point is important for two reasons. Firstly it 
distinguishes between those systems in which, despite regular elections, party dominance 
is achieved in whole or part by undemocratic means and those in which it is an accurate 
expression of the will of the electorate, expressed in democratic procedures. Secondly, 
because it is won within democratic rules, party dominance cannot be achieved simply or 
predominantly by force or fraud. Even in the case of authoritarian party dominance, when 
electoral rules apply, the dominant party cannot ignore in its political calculations, the 
minority parties, since they are entities. It is therefore forced to take voter preferences 
more seriously than a military junta or one-party regime, but it applies far more so to a 
dominant party that is constrained by democratic rules . Friedman further emphasises that 
the fact that dominant party systems are democracies means that they remain vulnerable 
to inevitable changes within society and politics and must be flexible enough to 
manoeuvre for survival (Friedman, 1999:99-103). Citing Arian and Barnes on the 
dominant party as a neglected model of democratic stability, Herman Giliomee and 
Charles Simkins point out that the dominant party "is a much better stabilising 
mechanism than fragmented parties" and a "dominant party which combines its rules 
with political competition and a large measure of civil liberties can serve quite well as a 
necessary platform for a durable democratic system" (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:3). 
From studies of party dominance in several industrialised democracies, Pempel 
emphasizes that the study of party dominance should not be concerned with parties per 
se, but more importantly focus on the dominant party and its relationship to civil and state 
society, as well as the patterns of governance under party dominance. Pempel argues that 
party dominance need not be undemocratic. He points out that: 
The weightiest political consequence of long-term dominance lies in the 
ability of the dominant party to shape, over time, the nation's nexus of 
public policies, its rules of political conflict, and the benefits and burdens 
imposed on different socio-economic sectors of society ... the major 
consequence of one party dominance lies in the great leeway that the 
dominant party has in reshaping a nation's politics and policies to achieve 
its own historical project (Pempel, 1990:334). 
Pempel repeatedly emphasises that long-term domination or rule by a single party need 
not be undemocratic and argues that in a democracy, longevity of rule may be the most 
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valuable asset for a party, in reshaping a nation's society and politics (Pempel, 1990:352). 
The study of party dominance should, however, not confine itself narrowly to party-state 
society relations as the party seeks to achieve dominance over the state, but, more 
interestingly, should examine on a wider scale, its relationship with state and civil society 
as it strives to enhance dominance in the party and political system. 
It is in this context that this study adopts Pempel's approach. Party dominance 
need not be undemocratic if the dominant party adheres to and responds to democratic 
rules and operates within democratic order characterised by political competition, 
political participation and the existence of civil and political liberties. Though Pempel's 
approach largely focuses upon industrialised countries, this study uses it to examine 
developing countries, in particular Kenya and South Africa, showing its applicability and 
utility in such countries. 
1.5 Sources 
This study uses both pnmary and secondary resources of data. The type of 
primary data collected includes government documents such as annual reports, 
parliamentary reports, acts of parliament, constitutional documents, and minutes of 
meetings. These have been collected from various national archives, such as the National 
Archives of Kenya, government and public libraries, such as that of the National 
Assembly of Kenya, government websites, university libraries, such as Rhodes 
University, the University of Nairobi and the University of Port Elizabeth, as well as 
various research and university institute libraries, such as the Institute for Development 
Studies, University of Nairobi, Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape, 
African Studies Centre, Cambridge University, Centre for African Studies, University of 
Cape Town and IDASA. Other primary data is derived from newspapers and 
autobiographies of various notable political personalities in both countries, and various 
document produced by political parties. The latter have been acquired from political party 
offices and political party websites of the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU). Primary and secondary data have also been 
obtained from civil society organizations such as the National Council of Churches in 
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Kenya (NCCK) and the National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) in Kenya. 
Sources of secondary research have largely been journals, books and newspapers. 
Bibliographical infonnation has also been obtained from institutes such as the Govan 
Mbeki Resource and Development Centre, University of Fort Hare. 
1.6 Chapter Layout 
This chapter fonns the introduction. It has attempted to introduce the research 
problem, as well as the objectives of the study. The chapter has also attempted to justify 
the significance of the study and points out the conceptual framework within which the 
study is carried out. It has also carried out a review of literature that is considered 
relevant for the study and described the sources ofthe study. 
Long-tenn rule by a single political party is partly a product of the historical 
remnant of liberation movements that papered over social diversities as a means of 
achieving national independence. Long-term rule by a single political party under a single 
party system is, however, not the same as long-tenn rule by one party under a dominant 
party system. Dominance and domination are not the same. KANU, fonnedy the main 
liberation movement, has ruled Kenya for over thirty-five years, since the country's 
independence in 1963, under a single and multiparty system and its predecessors date 
back to the eady 1920s when the country was still under colonial rule. Chapter two 
attempts to demonstrate that KANU's long-tenn rule prior to the return of multipartyism 
in the eady 1990s in post-colonial Kenya is a function of the social diversities it 
controlled during the colonial and postcolonial pre-1990 period, as a means of achieving 
national independence and of maintaining political power as a single party respectively. 
Control and domination are examined with regard to state and civil society 
The African National Congress CANC) was the oldest liberation movement in 
Africa, dating back to the early 1910s. Subsequently, it came to playa dominant role in 
the liberation struggle in apartheid South Africa due to its ability to control, socialize and 
mobilize various socio-political forces in the country against apartheid and the apartheid 
state. Like chapter two, which focuses on the politics of control and domination in 
liberation struggles, chapter three attempts to demonstrate that the ANC's post-apartheid 
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dominance as a political party is partly due to its historical role as the dominant player in 
the liberation struggle in South Africa. The politics of control and domination are largely 
examined within the context of social forces involved in the armed struggle, re-
organization of the movement, civil society organizations, and the state, domestic and 
business sectors, as well as the international community. 
Kenya's post-1990 multiparty polity has been classified as a dominant party 
system (Freedom House, 1999:1). The ruling party KANU meets the criteria for what is 
referred to as a dominant party under a multi-party system. A one-party dominant system 
is in effect a competitive party system. The party system need not be undemocratic if the 
dominant party is democratic or pursues strategies aimed at enhancing democratization, 
or if the polity under such a system has well-developed democratic and democracy-
promoting institutions. However, in countries where the dominant party is authoritarian 
and political institutions are weak, such a system becomes undemocratic or a psuedo-
democracy. This is the case in Kenya. Although the restoration of multi -partyism is a 
significant step toward democratization and democracy in the country, KANU has, in the 
post-1990 period, consolidated its dominance largely by undemocratic means. Chapter 
four examines KANU's strategies aimed at achieving and consolidating dominance in the 
post-1990 period. It pays particular attention to the ruling party's strategies for 
establishing dominance in the party and political system by attempting to control both 
state and civil society by way of parliamentary, bargaining and governmental dominance. 
Chapter five , examines the ANC and party dominance in post-apartheid South 
Africa. This chapter examines the emergence of party dominance under the hegemony of 
the ANC in the post-1990 period. The party system under the NP during the apartheid era 
can be termed as a pseudo-dominant party system since although it was a mUltiparty 
system though it formally excluded an adult social group from meaningful political 
competition and participation in the formation of government. The fust section is a 
general historical account of the period from 1990 to 1994. It looks at the ANC's role in 
the negotiation and transitional processes that occurred during this period that eventually 
culminated in the drafting and ratification of an interim constitution in December 1993. 
The second section examines the consolidation of the ANC's dominance in the post-l 994 
democratic, non-racial multiparty elections. Particular attention is paid to the ruling 
20 
party's attempts to achieve electoral and parliamentary, bargaining, and governmental 
dominance through arrangements and processes such as consociationalism, 
constitutionalism, corporatism and the transformation of the public service, in order to 
implement its historical agenda by creating a democratic non-racial and non-sexist 
society in South Africa. 
Chapter six is a comparative analysis of the evolution of party dominance in 
Kenya and South Africa. It is divided into two sections. The chapter compares and 
contrasts the history of the dominant liberation movements in both countries, namely 
KANU and its predecessors in Kenya and the ANC in South Africa. It begins by focusing 
on the colonial and apartheid era with a view to demonstrating the trajectories each 
movement took in order to control social diversities with the aim of ending minority rule. 
Particular attention is paid to their transformation from elite organizations to mass 
movements; their role in the armed struggle and their dominant roles in the constitutional 
negotiations of both countries. The chapter also compares and contrasts the consolidation 
of party dominance in post-colonial Kenya and post-apartheid South Africa, with 
emphasis on the post-l 990 period by demonstrating, the similar and different routes each 
party has pursued in their attempts to enhance and maintain party dominance. 
Chapter seven sets out to compare and contrast party dominance and its impact 
upon democratization in Kenya and South Africa. This chapter compares and contrasts 
party dominance and its impact upon democratization in post-1990 Kenya and South 
Africa. It looks at how party dominance has impacted upon the institutional procedures 
and organizations established to support democracy in both countries. The chapter 
examines the impact of party dominance upon state and civil society institutions and their 
arrangements with regard to supporting or upholding democracy. 
Chapter eight forms the summary and conclusion of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE KENYA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION AND THE POLITICS OF 
CONTROL AND DOMINATION IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL 
KENYA,I921-1990 
2.0 Introduction 
Long-term rule by a single political party is partly a product of the historical 
remnant of liberation movements that papered over social diversities as a means of 
achieving national independence (Pempel, 1990:5). Long-term rule by a single political 
party under a single party system is, however, not the same as long-term rule by one party 
under a dominant party system. KANU, formerly the main liberation movement has ruled 
Kenya for over thilty-five years since the country ' s independence in 1963 under both a 
single and a multi-party system. KANU's predecessors date back to the early 1920s when 
the country was still under colonial rule. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that 
KANU's long-term rule prior to the return of multi-partyism in the early 1990s in post-
colonial Kenya is partly a function of the social diversities it controlled in the colonial 
period as a means of achieving national independence and thereafter the social diversities 
it controlled in the post-independence period as a means of maintaining political power as 
a single party. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part covers the colonial period 
while the second part covers the pre-1990 post-colonial period. The first part 
demonstrates KANU's and its predecessor's attempts at controlling a variety of social .J-
diversities, particularly the socio-economic classes, in a bid to mobilize such classes to 
participate in the liberation struggle against colonialism. This part is divided into three 
sections which focus on the inter war period from 1921 to 1940; the post-Second World 
War period from 1945 to 1954; and finally the formation and role of district-based and 
national African political parties from 1955 to 1963. 
The second part of the chapter pays attention to the pre-1990 post-colonial period. 
This part looks at the politics of control and domination in post-colonial Kenya under 
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KANU. It attempts to analyse KANU's efforts at controlling and dominating opposition 
parties, ethnic groups and civil society by means of the political process in a bid to 
achieve its historical and national agenda of creating national unity and integration. 
Thispart is divided into two sections that cover KANU's attempts at controlling intra and 
inter-party competition between 1963 and 1969, and the ruling party ' s attempts at 
controlling intra-party power struggles and civil society organizations between 1969 and 
1990. 
2.1 Political Organizations and Participation in Colonial Kenya, 1921 to 1963 
2.1.1 The Inter-War Period, 1921 to 1940 
Though the roots of colonial conquest and domination date back to 1895, a period 
that witnessed passive and violent resistance to colonial domination by various ethnic 
groups in Kenya, the first formal political organizations began appearing in the early 
1920s. Initially welfare associations, these organizations rapidly transformed themselves 
into political associations mainly agitating for the socio-economic and political rights of 
Africans infringed upon by the colonial state. Led by missionary-educated elites, these 
organizations emerged as a result of several grievances that were a product of the 
depression and more importantly because of the repressive measures imposed on the 
African people by the colonial authorities. Though the grievances were initially socio-
economic, they later transformed into political grievances (Bennet, 1957:1;Tignor, 
1976:221-229; Atieno-Odhiambo, 1985 :667; Maxon, 1989:79; Odinga, 1995:24-25). 
Notable among these during this period were the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA) 
formed in June 1921 and renamed the East African Association (EAA) a month later, the 
Young Kavirondo Association, and the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) formed in 
1924 (Howarth, 1967:36-49; Mutiso, 1975: 13-15). This section will pay attention to those 
organizations that are normally considered to be KANU's predecessors: the YKA, EAA 
and KCA, formed in June 1921, July 1921 and 1924 respectively. 
KANU's predecessors, the YKA, the EAA and the KCA, attempted to control 
wide social diversities by trying to articulate the grievances of the African population and 
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more importantly by trying to appear multi-ethnic. They attempted to acqUire a pan-
ethnic identity, ideally to build protest movements that would comprise and represent the 
interests of various African ethnic communities and present African demands as protests 
to the media, colonial authorities in Kenya, and directly to the authorities in Lon60n .•. 
However, they predominantly represented the interests and grievances of the Kikuyu, for 
whom land scarcity and security were a central concern. Most of these organizations 
combined traditional and western values in their approach to politics and sought to 
combine what they viewed as positive aspects of western and traditional Kikuyu cultural 
values in their approach to politics, without undermining the socio-cultural and political 
dignity and independence of the Kikuyu. As soon as they began posing a threat to the 
colonial authorities by undermining the authority and influence of indirect rule and 
administration imposed by the British in Kenya, their leaders were arrested and the 
organizations subsequently banned (Kariuki, 1963: 19; Rosberg and Nottingham, 
1966:86-87; Tignor, 1976:230; Maxon, 1989:80; Berman 1990: 199; Maxon, 1994:90)_ 
Though they did not achieve much with respect to reforms, they nonetheless had some 
impact on the colonial autllorities: for instance they were at least able to highlight the 
plight of the landless and squatters not only among the Kikuyu community, but also the 
entire country (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:47-55; Maxon, 1989:81; Maxon 1994:40; 
Berman, 1990: 199). 
In an attempt to achieve their objectives, these organizations adopted several 
political strategies and tactics. These were most often direct confrontation with the 
colonial state and in the initial stages also involved close collaboration with the state in a 
bid to influence government policy (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:87; Tignor, 
1976:239-250; Maxon, 1989:100). With time, however, organizations such as the KCA 
realized that the limited constitutional and legal charmels available to them were largely 
ineffective and began opting for more direct confrontational strategies and tactics to 
challenge the colonial state, such as questioning the colonial authorities' belief that 
Africans were incapable of handling their own affairs and demanding the direct election 
of African representatives to the Legislative Council. Moreover, the KCA went ahead and 
bypassed the colonial government in Kenya entirely by bringing its case directly to the 
attention of the metropolitan authorities through the British media and sympathetic native 
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rights lobby groups (Maloba, 1989:184; Berman, 1990:230-231; Odinga, 1995:95). The 
militant and confrontational approach of the KCA towards the colonial state, and its 
increasing popularity and influence among the urban and rural Kikuyu made it the target 
of hostility on the part of the colonial authorities and European settlers. As a result, the 
colonial government adopted a wide range of sanctions to curb the political activities of 
the KCA that included attempts to co-opt the KCA leadership and employing coercive 
measures through the Provincial Administration. Local Native Councils (LNCs) had been 
established after 1924, partly to meet the demands posed by the KCA and partly to co-opt 
the organization's leadership into the colonial system. Cooptation failed when the KCA 
leaders realized that the LNCs were ineffective agents of political change (Kenya, 
1925:20; Maxon, 1989:100). The government thereafter increased the powers of the 
colonial chiefs, enabling them to exercise extensive powers. Faced with increasing 
government hostility, the KCA leaders began administering oaths in 1925 to ensure party 
loyalty and unity. Oath taking was the traditional sanction of African society, and bound 
members in allegiance to their cause (Spencer, 1974:77; Tignor, 1976:248; Maxon, 
1989:99; Odinga, 1995:96). 
From the very beginning, the KCA solidly rejected racial domination and 
authoritarianism in Kenya. The organization and its members continued to be seen as the 
uncompromising opponents of colonial policies. The KCA entered the 1930s as the 
strongest and most influential African political organization formed in Kenya in the 
1920s (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:87; Kanogo, 1989: 131; Maloba, 1989: 184; 
Maxon, 1989: I 07). The proscription of the KCA in 1940 by the colonial government did 
not deter or curb African political activities or protest. Indeed political activity and 
protest intensified, yet, it became more covert than overt (Odinga, 1995:96). 
The YKA, the EAA and the KCA, however, were faced with several problems. 
First and foremost, they were elite organizations rather than mass movements. Initially 
they consisted of a small group of missionary- and Western Europe- and North 
American-educated elite who claimed to represent the interests of the African maj ority. 
As such they were unable to incorporate and involve a wider socio-economic class-base 
in the initial stages of the liberation struggle. Secondly they lacked organizational 
coherence and discipline. They were loosely structured and diffuse, consisting of the 
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older conservative moderates who believed in constitutional and legal channels as a 
means to change and younger radical militants who rejected the colonial government and 
missionary assault on pre-colonial Kikuyu traditions and emphasized the importance and 
significance of such traditions. The latter were primarily more interested in the land 
question, in particular the land tenure system and security of title in the Kikuyu reserves. 
The radicals in the KCA, for example, were apprehensive of European designs on 
Kikuyuland and articulated resentment against the threatened expulsion of Kikuyu 
families from land that had been earmarked for European settlers before the First World 
War (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:97-98; Tignor, 1976:239-240; Maxon, 1989:99; 
Berman, 1990:230). 
Despite their shortcomings these organizations managed to highlight the 
grievances of the poor, and more importantly, of the landless and squatters in the rural 
areas. It was also during this period that a new African bourgeoisie emerged. Though 
some political authority had been granted by the colonial state to the leaders of particular 
ethnic communities through chieftainships, by the 1920s a new class that had its basis in 
the sphere of business was superseding this traditional African leadership. While the 
traditional political class drew its support from socio-cultural and political relations, 
granted by custom and later by the colonial state, this new indigenous African 
bourgeoisie, had its basis in new forms of commodity production based on the direct 
employment of wage labour on farms in the rural areas, as well as salaried positions 
within the state apparatuses (Swainson, 1980: 173-174). This new indigenous bourgeoisie 
controlled these organizations and emerged as the moderate political elite that was later 
to playa key role not only in articulating grievances, but also in the formation of formal 
political parties, as well as in political socialization and mobilization in the post-Second 
World War Period 
2.1.2 The Post Second World War Period, 1945 to 1954 
Towards the end of the Second World War, overt African political activities and 
protest began to re-emerge. The intensity of political consciousness and activity were, 
however, uneven. The most significant formal political organisation to emerge during the 
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late war period was the Kenya African Union (KAU) formed in 1944. Later, during the 
early 1950s, colonial Kenya was to witness the emergence of the armed struggle, which 
was carried out by the Mau Mau Land and Freedom Army. 
The KAU was in essence a successor to the KCA, which had gone underground. 
Unlike its predecessors, KAU was able to attract and control a wider social diversity, 
particularly with regard to its ethnic and racial composition, in its attempts to achieve its 
objectives. Initially it was a support group for Eliud Mathu, the first African in Kenya to 
be nominated to the Legislative Council and was not very active during the war. The 
organization's activities were mainly concerned with trying to promote cooperation 
between the African and Indian communities, and addressing itself to the proposals for a 
central assembly for Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (Gertzel, 1969:2; Furedi, 1988:132; 
Zeleza, 1989:155; Odinga, 1995:67). KAU was initially a moderate party that opted to 
advance its struggle through constitutional and legal means. This was largely due to its 
educated moderate leadership, (such as Jomo Kenyatta, who became its president in 
1947), who were highly conscious of the power of the colonial state and the hostility of 
the European settlers. The KAU, had as one of its aims the unity of Kenyan Africans and 
the advocacy of their social and economic progress. It was a legal political body, 
expressing and trying to convey to the colonial government the grievances of the African 
people (Spencer, 1985:148-149; Maloba, 1989:185; Odinga, 1995:107). Its moderate 
leaders, however, lost to the younger radical militants at the party branch level in the June 
1951 party elections and the party was resuscitated to enter its most militant and active 
period. It began making social, economic and political demands with much more 
assertiveness (Spencer, 1985 :266-270; Zeleza, 1989:168). 
Following these elections, which ushered in the militants, the KAU constitution 
was amended to include, for the first time, the demand for independence. (Zeleza, 
1989:168;Odinga, 1995:111). Other political demands included the repeal of the kipande 
(pass) registration system, and the guaranteed rights to freedom of speech, assembly and 
movement for Africans (Berman, 1990:324). The KAU also called for land reform 
measures with the emphasis on tenure and security of title . Like the previous 
organizations, it was also concerned with the problem of land alienation to Europeans. 
KAU also place~ emphasis, among other things, on the need for more economic 
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development in the reserves with regard to agriculture (Zeleza, 1989: 168; Berman, 
1990:324). The KAU was initially seen as an elitist and Kikuyu party, yet after the war, it 
proved itself as Kenya' s first truly national African political movement. Its formation 
should be seen as the first serious attempt to organize a political party with nationalistic 
ambitions. Its tactics were to advance its position through written appeals and 
representations to the colonial authorities in both London and Nairobi; and to organize 
Kenyan Africans into a credible mass political movement. Its greatest task was to raise 
the national political consciousness of the people. The KAU attempted to pull together 
the disparate and often-contradictory political forces emerging out of an African 
population deeply divided on ethnic and class lines (Kinyatti, 1987:1; Maloba, 1989:185-
186; Zeleza, 1989: 156; Berman, 1990:323; Lonsdale, 2000: 113-122). It was with the 
formation of KAU, its take-over by the militants and its subsequent efforts to try to 
incorporate diverse socio-political forces, based on class, ethnicity, gender, and race that 
the liberation struggle in Kenya began to take on a national dimension. 
The KAU too, was characterized by structural weaknesses, lack of organizational 
coherence, and internal squabbles. It lacked sufficient funds and was unable to organize 
an effective and viable network of party branches. Within the KAU, there was a constant 
tussle between the moderates and the militants and at times this paralyzed the 
effectiveness of the organization. As the moderates continued to wage a largely 
ineffective rhetorical struggle through mass meetings licensed by the colonial 
government, discontent and frustration due to landlessness, harsh labour conditions, 
racial discrimination, and urban poverty increased. The militant ex-servicemen of KAU, 
loosely known as Forty Group, trade union leaders and some former KCA leaders who 
had lost faith in the effectiveness of the KAU's legalistic and constitutional struggles and 
who had also begun employing oathing effectively from 1950, soon began to organize an 
underground, extra-legal radical mass movement that later became known as Mau Mau, 
whose aims were to remove the colonial system through armed struggle (Kaggia, 
1975:112; Furedi, 1989:103-104; Maloba, 1989:110-111; Zeleza, 1989:155-156; Bennan, 
1990:324; Murungi, 1991 :28; Odinga, 1995:97). The young radical militant nationalists, 
such as Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, James Beuttah, Kung'u Karumba, JD Kali, and Paul 
Ngei, among others, believed that the process of political change in Kenya would be 
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delayed due to the compromising position the moderates within KAU had taken with the 
British (Furedi, 1973:275-290; Mazrui and Tidy, 1984:119; Odinga, 1995 :114-115). 
The growth of the Mau Mau was not only the result of squatter grievances. It was 
also a product of the repressive administrative and socio-economic policies and strategies 
pursued by the colonial government at the time. Between 1950 and 1952, the government 
pursued a strategy that sought to contain unrest with a minimal amount of change. The 
government was not willing to effect meaningful political changes and refused to develop 
strategies that could have extended its base of support among the Kikuyu. It continued to 
rely on its old tactic of co-opting individuals and isolating troublemakers. With the 
passing of time, this policy became less and less selective and as a result, preventive 
detention and evictions served only to strengthen the support for Mau Mau (Throup, 
1985:399-435; Furedi, 1989: 115-117). However, the assassination of Senior Chief 
Waruhiu, a colonial loyalist, in 1952, represented a blow against the colonial regime and 
it declared a State of Emergency on 20 October 1952. The Declaration of Emergency was 
a step aimed at destroying the leadership of the Mau Mau. It closed all avenues of protest 
other than that of an armed struggle and it also "signified official recognition of the 
evaporation of the legitimacy of the colonial state and the virtual collapse of its effective 
control in the Kikuyu reserves, the African locations in Nairobi and wide areas of the 
countryside in the settled districts of the Highlands" (Furedi , 1989:117-118; Berman, 
1990:347-348). Following this declaration, about 15,000 Africans and gathered in forest 
camps where resistance groups and a command structure began to develop in early 1953. 
This was eventually organized into the Land and Freedom Army under the principal 
leadership of Dedan Kimathi and Stanley Mathenge (Pavlis, 1975:253-273; Kinyatti, 
1987:2; Berman, 1990:349; Edgerton, 1990: 1 08-112). 
The emergence of the Mau Mau and its subsequent armed struggle actively 
incorporated a different social force in the post-Second World War liberation struggle. 
Unlike the previous organizations that were predominantly elitist, the Mau Mau 
insurgents were largely drawn from the desperate, dispossessed and impoverished 
Kikuyu squatters on settler farms, evicted squatters, peasants in the reserves and the 
unemployed poor in the urban centers and rural sectors of the White Highlands. The 
overwhelmingly majority of them came from the reserves of Central Province, many of 
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them being either landless peasants or peasants with smallholdings. The movement also 
drew some significant numbers from the Meru and Embu and a small number from the 
Kamba and Maasai ethnic groups. Most of these insurgents were young men (Kanogo, 
1987:129-136; Furedi, 1989:109-112; Maloba, 1993:115). This socio-economic class 
consisting of squatters, peasants, and the unemployed became the militant force behind 
the Mau Mau. Their opponents on the other hand included not only the colonial state and 
the European settlers, but also the moderate indigenous African capital class in the 
liberation movement that emerged from the 1920s onwards. The Mau Mau insurgents 
viewed this African class with suspicion and distrust, since they considered them to be 
beneficiaries of the colonial state and system. 
Initially, a Central Committee consisting of 12 men directed the Mau Mau 
movement. To avoid government detection, the Central Committee formed another group 
known as the "30 Committee". The 30 men in this Committee were directly responsible 
for directing oaths and coordinating the activities of local leaders in the reserves and 
townships. In addition, Mau Mau leaders were advised by the KAU Study Circle, a think 
tank composed of four or five KAU members and an equal number of outsiders who were 
sympathetic to KAU's aims and objectives. This advisory committee prepared 
background research on policy matters that the Central Committee might require 
addressing in Kenya, as well as international concerns, especially ways of enlisting 
foreign support. Initially, a War Council, primarily made up of civilians, was responsible 
for overall military planning, but as time passed, the military leaders became increasingly 
independent of the War Council. This was replaced by the Kenya Defence Council 
(KDC), which became Mau Mau's High Command (Kaggia, 1975:99-102; Edgerton, 
Kinyatti, 1987: 6-7; 1990:57). In 1954, Kimathi formed the "Kenya Parliament", which 
represented the ideal of a central political organization rather than an effective legislative 
and executive body. It discussed various matters such as organizational problems facing 
the movement and passed certain resolutions that illustrated the constant pressure towards 
fragmentation among the forest groups. In its first meeting, the "Kenya Parliament" 
decided among other things, to send emissaries to neighbouring ethnic groups for 
support, and to discredit the European settler claim that the struggle was strictly a Kikuyu 
affair. The "Kenya Parliament" and its Land Freedom Army represented a nationalistic 
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view with advanced and clearly stated political objectives centred on the question of land 
and the full independence of Kenya under an African leadership (Rosberg and 
Nottingham, 1966:300-301; Mazrui and Tidy, 1984:121; Odinga, 1995:118-120). 
By this time, the British Government was becoming increasingly impatient with 
the length and cost of the war, and in 1955, the new Commander-in-Chief of the colonial 
and British forces in Kenya, General Lathbury, opted for the use of Special Forces 
consisting of the police, the Kenya Regiment and "pseudo-gangs" as a different and less 
costly military strategy to defeat tlle Mau Mau. The "pseudo-gangs" comprised former 
Mau Mau soldiers who had been captured and converted and their task was to track down 
Mau Mau units where big battalions could not. This strategy finally paid off in October 
1956, when one of these "pseudo-gangs" wounded and captured Kimathi, subsequently 
ending organized resistance in the forests (Edgerton, 1990:100-103; Maloba, 1993:82-
113). Alongside military intervention, the British Government also undertook counter-
insurgency economic reform measures in Kikuyu areas. The Land Consolidation 
Programme conceived under the Swynnerton Plan was one such reform measure. This 
agricultural programme was aimed at creating a stable African land-owning class with 
access to capital and income, which would be derived from the growth and sale of cash 
crops, formerly the preserve of white farmers. It was hoped that this new rural-based 
middle class would have a moderating influence on African politics (Kenya, 1955:102; 
Sorrenson, 1967:99-109; Ogot, 1995:48;). 
The Mau Mau was from the outset plagued with major problems. The initial entry 
by the insurgents into the forests was not properly organized and was disorderly, since it 
was an immediate reaction to the harsh policies of the colonial state as well as repressive 
actions by the European settlers. The movement's subordinate groups lacked an 
organizational framework and coordination in the forests and as such could not formulate 
meaningful and short- or long-range political goals, which are essential for any effective 
political organization. This resulted in several months of uncoordinated and random acts 
of violence. As with previous organizations, the movement was also faced with 
leadership wrangles. These were largely based on personality differences, power rivalry 
and kinship ties and hindered the formation of a united front. Other problems included 
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among others, the lack of financial resources and equipment such as weapons (Furedi, 
1989: 118-125; Berman, 1990:348-352; Maloba, 1993: 114-125). 
Though the colonial and British goverrunents militarily defeated the Mau Mau, its 
historical and politico-military significance cannot be discarded. It was the first struggle 
by black Africans against white minority rule to take place in modem Africa (Edgerton, 
1990:x). Mau Mau was a success in the early 1950s due to the revolutionary fervour 
injected as a result of the participation of different social strata, trade unions and 
indigenous religious movements. Not only did the movement incorporate peasants, 
squatters and the unemployed, but it also managed to involve the urban and rural working 
class in the liberation struggle since it also had a significant influence over the trade 
union movement in the country. Several of its leaders and members detained, such as 
Fred Kubai and Bildad Kaggia, were officials of various trade unions. Other civil society 
organizations incorporated during this period included indigenous religious movements 
such as Dini ya Kaggia. The Mau Mau articulated a common ideology, not because it had 
a centralized leadership, but because its members had a corrunon experience of economic 
insecurity, land hunger, a feeling of frustration born of racial oppression and resentment 
of the Kikuyu establishment. Even the controversial report written by the British 
administrator FC Corfield, on behalf of the colonial goverrunent, entitled Historical 
Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, which portrayed Mau Mau negatively, 
acknowledged that the movement had a significant influence over other ethnic groups, 
trade unions and indigenous religious movements. The movement was also able to draw 
support from state institutions as was made evident by the detention of several district 
council officials who were its members. More than 10,000 people lost their lives in this 
war. The Mau Mau war was not only significant in that many lives were lost, but also 
significant in terms of financial costs. It cost approximately UK £ 60,000, in terms of 
grants and interest-free loans from the British Government, as well as financial costs 
borne by the Kenya Goverrunent (see Appendix 1) (Col. Office, 1960: 202-218 & 256-
258; Furedi, 1973; 282-285; Kaggia, 1975; Kaggia, 66&74-77; Wanjau, 1988: 213-218). 
The armed struggle was a product of the repressive policies and strategies pursued by the 
colonial government and the determination of the Mau Mau activists to fight for their 
future . Many whites in Kenya and also the British Government did not want the Mau 
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Mau to be perceived by the international community as a rational political organization 
fighting for land and freedom, so they set out to discredit it as a primitive "secret society" 
(Kaggia, 1975; 194-196; Kinyatti, 1980:1 -9; Furedi, 1989:140-142; Edgerton, 
1990:57,87-88; Murungi, 1991:28; Odinga, 1995). 
2.1.3 The. Formation and Role of District Based and National Political Parties, 1955 
to 1963 
The formation of the KAU and the emergence of the armed struggle under the 
Mau Mau was a turning point in the liberation struggle in Kenya. This period witnessed 
the active socialization and mobilization of broad social, economic and political forces in 
the struggle which were to have significant effects in the post Mau Mau period. The 
Declaration of the Emergency led to the banning of formal African political parties 
between 1953 and 1955. During this period, political participation revolved largely 
around trade union organizations such as the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade 
Unions, later renamed the Kenya Federation of Labour. Trade unions were mainly 
centred in urban areas and were at the forefront of industrial conflict and political action. 
Following the military defeat of the Mau Mau and the need to reduce rising political 
tensions in the country, under the terms prescribed in the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, 
which sought to introduce multi-racialism and at the same time regulate African political 
participation and consciousness, the colonial government eased the ban on African 
political organizations, allowing the formation of district-based political associations in 
1955. Consequently, more than ten district based political parties emerged between 1956 
and 1959 (Bennet and Rosberg, 1969: 1 05-1 06; Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:310; 
Odinga, 1993: 146; Maxon, 1994:50; Ogot, 1995:51-52; Wanjohi, 1997:49-50). Political 
reforms undertaken during this period led to the formation of a new political elite who 
were later to playa leading role in the formation of national political parties, a negotiated 
settlement in the constitution-making process, and in the formation of government at the 
end of colonial rule. 
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2.1.3.1 The Legislative Council and African District-Based Political Parties, 1955 to 
1960 
The government's framework for African political development was set forth in 
June 1955 when the ban on all African political organizations was relaxed. Their 
formation, however, had to be confmed to district level. The Lyttelton Constitution of 
1954, allowed the formation of district political associations in the country, except in 
Central Province, then still heavily under the Emergency regulations, where the 
government would only permit an advisory council composed of government loyalists. 
The colonial government believed that a connection between these district organizations 
through the area members of the Legislative Council would encourage the simple and 
orderly development of African political life and the growth of responsible opinion. From 
the perspective of the colonial government, Africans were to learn the complexities of 
government before ever aspiring to national politics. The objective was to engage African 
political energies at a local level, and at the same time permit the slow growth of African 
nationalism, tightly controlled by the administration. Using Emergency powers, the 
colonial government hoped to shape the development of African politics according to a 
pattern of their own making. These organizations and activities were supposed to produce 
"sensible and stable" persons working up from the local level, gradually assuming greater 
responsibility in the affairs of the country at a pace controlled by the government 
(Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:310-311; Bennet and Rosberg, 1969: 106; Maloba, 
1989:191 ; Odinga, 1995:146). As Kaggia put it, with regard to these political reforms: 
The colonial government was encouraged to accelerate the pace of 
constitutional advance so as to hand over to the new 'political generation' 
before the 'Mau Mau' fighters were released. In that way they could 
ensure that the reigns of the government would not fall into the hands of 
'MauMau' (Kaggia, 1975:182). 
Formal African political participation in the mid- and late 1950s was largely 
confined to the Legislative Council. The multi-racial constitution embodied the 
preservation of separate representation in the executive and legislative institutions by 
each of the three main racial groups. Non-European representation became equal to that 
of Europeans. It also established ministerial government with multiracial representatives 
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and a strong ruling majority III the Legislative Council. Final authority, however, 
remained with the Governor and ultimately with Britain, despite the fact that the Council 
of Ministers was the chief instrument of government. It was believed that these 
constitutional arrangements could endure until 1960 and that during those six years there 
would be no change in the racial basis of representation or in the proportion of unofficial 
representation of the three racial groups unless a consensus was achieved among all 
parties concerned. Moreover, no minister could propose or support legislation affecting 
the land rights of any community (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:311-312). Multi-
racialism was a political and economic philosophy meant to "take the steam out of the 
nationalist kettle" (Haberson, 1971: 243). It meant equal representation of all the races 
without regard to population size. 
In 1955, Walter F (later Sir Walter) Coutts was appointed to investigate the basis 
for an African franchise for selecting African members of the Legislative Council. In 
keeping with the liberal thinking on multi-racialism, Coutts produced a report 
recommending qualifications for the vote that would identifY and favour the new loyalist 
concept of the responsible African. Additional votes were to be introduced for those who 
had qualifications that made them more "responsible" than others. Among the Kikuyu, 
Meru and Embu, only those holding loyalty certificates would be eligible for any vote at 
all. It was a qualified franchise that gave up to three votes to persons of income, 
education or active government service while denying most Africans any franchise 
whatsoever (Rosberg, 1958:95-98; Odinga, 1995:137; Ogot, 1995:54). Following the 
Coutts Report, the franchise was granted, and African elections were held in March 1957. 
The objective of the Report was to ensure that the first elected African members of the 
Legislative Council would reflect the opinions of the 'middle class' elements towards 
whom multi-racialism was directed. However, this did not tum out as anticipated. African 
nationalists and opponents of multiracialism won the majority of the seats. A new 
generation of African politicians such as Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Masinde Muliro, 
Ronald Ngala, Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, among others, came to centre stage. They 
immediately formed the African Elected Members Organisation (AEMO), rejected the 
Lyttelton Constitution and refused to accept any ministerial post until Africans were 
granted fifteen more seats in order to give them a majority over the European and Asian 
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elected members. AEMO's objectives were to achieve team spirit and cohesion, 
coordinate its work in the council with African political activity in the country, to keep 
people informed of political developments, and to work for democratic government for 
Kenya in the shortest possible time. Multi-racialism in the context of this constitution was 
regarded as undemocratic since it was in essence disproportionate representation. AEMO 
sent a delegation to London to press for a new constitution. Within months of their 
election, the Lyttelton Constitution was discarded (Bennet and Rosberg, 1961; Ogot, 
1989:58-60; Maloba, 1993 :152-153; Odinga, 1995:143-144). 
In October 1957, the Secretary of State, Alan Lennox-Boyd, arrived in Kenya to 
seek approval and consensus among the three main groups, the Africans, Asians and 
Europeans, to new constitutional proposals worked out in consultation with the Governor 
and senior administrative officers in the colony. The 'Lennox-Boyd' Constitution, which 
recognized the imperative of greater African representation whilst at the same time 
endeavoring to preserve multi-racial government, provided for an increase in African 
representation in the Legislative Council from 8 to 14, giving them parity with the settlers 
and a second ministerial portfolio. In addition, 12 special seats, four for each of the major 
racial groups, were to be selected by other members of the Legislative Council, in 
essence favouring the selection of the most conservative and collaborationist Africans. 
The new arrangements also called for a ten-year halt to constitutional changes. The state 
authorities in London and Nairobi wanted a multi-racial formula that would hold off 
nationalism and preserve the dominant position of Europeans in the colony. Within a 
month of its publication, AEMO had rejected the new constitution, which was, however, 
supported by the Europeans and Asians. The African elected members also decided to 
boycott the elections for the Specially Elected seats (Col. Office, 1957: 2-4; Col. Office, 
1958:3-4; Kirkman, 1966:45-49; Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:315; Berman, 1990:399; 
Ogot, 1995:59-60). Candidates for election as Specially Elected Members were required 
to be British subjects or British protected persons who had attained the age of 21 years. 
For nomination, these candidates were required to have as proposers and seconders 
existing Members of the Legislative Council and be supported by three other Members. 
The election of Specially Elected Members was to be conducted by free and secret ballot 
under the auspices of the Speaker (Col. Office, 1958: 3-4). 
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From the first days of AEMO, and their entry into the Legislative Council, 
African elected members attempted to build national unity through political organizations 
that were only allowed to function at district level. By 1957, a few had been formed in 
various parts of the country and their numbers were to increase rapidly during the next 
three years. They represented many areas where KAU had not organized and therefore 
were new sources of support for African nationalism. Most important was the role of Luo 
leadership, which had come into prominence with the neutralization of the Kikuyu. Not 
only was Nyanza a significant base for a new rural nationalism, but also Luo leadership 
in the trade union movement and political organization in Nairobi came to the fore 
(Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:313; Ogot, 1995:51). One of the earliest and most 
important of the district organizations was the one led in Nairobi by Argwings-Kodhek 
who had been a member of KAU's committee in 1952. Drawing support from the large 
concentration of urban Luo workers, and reflecting the nationalist spirit of other urban 
groups, the Kenya African National Congress was formed in late 1955. However, it was 
only registered in April 1956, when it reduced its name and scope of activities to the 
Nairobi District African Congress (NDAC), due to the ban on national political parties. 
Argwings-Kodhek was its president. In the 1957 African elections for the Nairobi seat in 
the Legislative Council, the NDAC put Argwings-Kodhek up for election, but he was 
defeated by Mboya and his Nairobi Peoples ' Convention Party (NPCP), a splinter party 
of NDAC, in the elections. Following Argwings-Kodhek's defeat, the NPCP gradually 
came to dominate the African political scene in the city. By late 1958, it was the most 
dynamic expression of Kenyan nationalism, possessing a remarkable enthusiasm and 
buoyancy associated with the expectations of rapid political change. Uhuru (freedom) 
was its cry and Kenyatta, the father of Kenyan nationalism, its hero (Odinga, 1995 : 146-
147). In September, the same year, the NPCP called for 20 October, the day Kenyatta and 
other nationalists were arrested, to be observed annually as a fasting day. The NPCP 
emerged as the best-organized and disciplined party in Kenya, with Mboya attempting to 
turn it into a national political party. Despite all attempts by the colonial government to 
restrict the influence of Nairobi in mobilizing and coordinating African nationalism, new 
channels were developed in an attempt to build a countrywide movement and achieve the 
goal of an African-governed Kenya (Kenya, 1958: 2402 and 2406; Rosberg and 
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Nottingham, 1966:313-316; Odinga, 1995:146-147; Odinga, 1995: 153-166; Ogot, 
1995 :51-60). The organization and membership of other district organizations was, 
however, rudimentary, and their role in obtaining support for candidates in the 1957 
elections was almost negligible in many areas. Nonetheless, these organizations 
represented the new beginnings of politics, embracing an ever-larger number of major 
ethnic groups. The danger remained that the pace of political development between 
districts would continue to be uneven and that parochialism rooted in ethnic loyalties 
would be encouraged at the expense of African unity (Bennet and Rosberg, 1969: I 06; 
Odinga, 1995:147; Ogot, 1995 :52). 
In spite of these political gains, African nationalism in Kenya still lacked 
organizational focus and this was already apparent by the middle of 1958. The disparity 
between districts was already evident during the 1957 elections. The African members of 
the Legislative Council themselves were not elected under the umbrella of a national 
party which could enforce discipline. The March 1958 African elections held under the 
Lennox-Boyd Constitution brought in six more African members of the Legislative 
Council, further intensifying personality and leadership conflicts. In May 1958, African 
leaders attempted to form a Convention of African Associations to foster unity among 
district organizations and to develop a common policy with the African elected members. 
However, the colonial ban on national African political parties had not been lifted and 
therefore the proposed convention was denied registration (Bennet and Rosberg, 
1969: 107; Ogot, 1995:60-61). African members continued to demand a new 
constitutional conference and by January 1959, all the elected African and Asian 
members, including one European member, Michael Blundell, had walked out of the 
Legislative Council. They formed the Constitutional Elected Members Organisation 
(CEMO) and dispatched a delegation to London. Calls to have the Emergency lifted and 
veteran political leaders released became more strident. In the same year, the Secretary of 
State accepted demands for a constitutional conference. This found support in the 
Legislative Council from Michael Blundell's newly formed multi-racial New Kenya 
Group (NKG), shattering European unity. As progress toward an African majority 
became increasingly apparent, the African elected leaders also split into two groups. 
Leadership conflicts contributed to this disunity, but more fundamental were the growing 
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fears of the leaders of the pastoral and smaller agricultural ethnic communities of being 
dominated by a coalition of the larger agricultural ethnic groups on the achievement of 
self-government (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:317; Ogot, 1995 :61). 
As time progressed, leadership conflicts intensified, and these divisions were to 
express themselves, later, in the emergence of two short-lived parties: the Kenya National 
party (KNP) and the Kenya Independence Movement (KIM). The KNP was founded in 
July 1959 and was multi-racial in character until November the same year. It was backed, 
in the first instance, by ten African, one EW'opean and six Asian members of the 
Legislative Council (Bennet and Rosberg, 1961: 16). It attracted mainly the support of 
the smaller ethnic groups who were represented by eight of the fourteen elected members. 
Prominent among these members were, Masinde Muliro, who had a substantial following 
among the Luhya; Ronald Ngala, who had a following among the coastal ethnic groups; 
and the Kalenjin leader Daniel Arap Moi. In opposition to the KNP, stood the aggressive 
KIM. The KIM was founded in August 1959, but never registered, as the ban on national 
parties was still effective. It drew support among the rural Kikuyn, Luo, Kamba, Taita 
and the militant urban nationalists of central Kenya. Among its prominent leaders were, 
Mboya, Odinga and Julius Gikonyo Kiano. These two parties proved to be the precursors 
of the two national African political parties formed after the first Lancaster House 
Conference in 1960. The need for a united front at Lancaster House made it necessary for 
the African elected members to put aside their political differences and unite to present an 
effective case which would hasten the independence process (Rosberg and Nottingham, 
1966:317-318; Bennet and Rosberg, 1969: 107-108; Ogot, 1995 :61). 
2.1.3.2 The Formation of African National Political Parties: KANU and the Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU) 
During the Lancaster House Conference at London in January 1960, which for the 
first time charted the course for African majority rule in Kenya, unity among the African 
members was maintained. A new chapter in African politics was opened with the lifting 
of the ban on national African parties. However, following the conference, this fragile 
unity immediately began to disintegrate into the pre-conference basic divisions, resulting 
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in a shifting pattern of alliances that eventually crystallized into two national African 
parties: KANU and KADU (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966:318; Bennet and Rosberg, 
1969:108). 
The formation of KANU took place at a leaders' conference held at Kiambu on 27 
March 1960. Two days prior to this meeting, a policy statement signed by ten of the 
African elected members proposed the formation of the Uhuru Party of Kenya. Notably 
absent from the signatories was Mboya, who had been deliberately excluded by his 
political rivals who occasionally accused him of political arrogance and of receiving 
funds from American labour organizations to pursue his political interests. Old rivals 
such as Odinga, Argwings-Kodhek and Arthur Ochwada, a former deputy general 
secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labour, were particularly anxious to remove Mboya 
from leadership. More important was the challenge that emanated from some Kikuyu 
leaders who were trying to re-assert Kikuyu power in the post-Emergency colonial 
period. (Bennet and Rosberg, 1969:108; Odinga, 1995: 194). 
Mboya's political rivals and opponents, however, did not receive much support 
and some of them reconsidered their decision. The leaders ' conference attended by 
Mboya, a majority of the African elected members and delegates from thirty African 
political organizations, rejected the proposed Uhuru Party of Kenya and decided to form 
a mass political organization: KANU. This name, at that particular time, had its political 
advantages. Not only did it incorporate the title of the old KAU, its colours and symbols, 
but also looked forward to a greater East Africa, resembling the name of the dominant 
party in Tanganyika: the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Though Mboya 
was opposed at the conference, he, together with Ngala, Kiano, Odinga and Argwings-
Kodhek among others, was nonetheless appointed to the committee responsible for 
drafting KANU's constitution. James Gichuru, a former president of KAU, and Dr 
Njoroge Mungai were appointed to the committee, as chairman and secretary 
respectively. It was at a second meeting at Kiambu on 14 May 1960, that KANU held 
elections for its national officers. Mboya was elected general secretary; Gichuru was 
confirmed as acting president, while Odinga was elected vice-president and Ochwada as 
deputy secretary. Ngala and Moi were elected in absentia, as treasurer and deputy 
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treasurer respectively (Kariuki, 1963; 165-167; Bennet and Rosberg, 1969:108-109; 
Murungi, 1991:29; Maloba, 1993:159; Odinga, 1995:194). 
The Kiambu conferences and the formation ofKANU, however, did not appeal to 
all Mrican leaders. Several of them began to view and attack KANU as a party 
dominated and led by the Kikuyu and Luo. Other than Muliro, who had earlier refused to 
cooperate in organizing a single mass African party, the Kalenj in and Masai leaders, such 
as Moi, Justus ole Tipis and Taita Towett, regarded the objectives and leadership of 
KANU with great distrust and suspicion. This distrust and suspicion was further 
compounded when Towett, a newly appointed Assistant Minister for Agriculture and also 
a Kalenjin leader, was heckled at the second conference. Hence, a network of alliances 
between organizations, which felt their interests to be threatened and subordinated, began 
to take shape in opposition to KANU. (Kariuki, 1963: 165-166; Gerztel, 1969:8; Maloba, 
1989:192; Odinga, 1995:194). This was to culminate in the formation ofKADU. 
The formation of KADU was the result of the amalgamation of a network of 
alliances between organizations that felt their interests to be threatened by Kikuyu and 
Luo domination. A focal point in this movement was Muliro's Kenya Mrican People's 
Party, a skeleton of the former KNP. More significant was the formation of the Kalenjin 
Political Alliance in March and April 1960, which was a product the amalgamation of 
four district Independent Pal1ies from Baringo, Kericho, Nandi and Elgeyo-Marakwet. It 
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was Moi who had led the way in the formation of these parties between 1958 and 1959. 
The Alliance purported to represent about 900,000 Kalenj in speaking people. It aimed at 
providing determined and effective representation for the rural interests of the Kalenjin. 
The Alliance was determined to claim control of land in western Kenya, including 
European land in the Highlands, arguing that most of the land in the western highlands of 
Kenya originally had belonged to the Kalenjin in the pre-colonial period (Bennet and 
Rosberg, 1969:109). 
A meeting of the governing council of the Kalenjin Political Alliance at Eldoret 
on 21 May 1960, resolved not to join KANU, and invited other "gentle and well-
behaved" Africans to join them and develop a national organization (Odinga, 1995 : 195-
196). On 21 April 1960, at Kapkatet in Kericho district, Muliro, and Tipis, an elected 
member of the Legislative Council representing the Masai, joined the Kalenjin leaders, 
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Moi and Towett, in addressing a mass meeting on the formation of the Kalenjin Political 
Alliance. Alongside the emergence of the Kalenjin Political Alliance was the formation 
of the Masai United Front, which was also concerned about the future of Masai land, and 
Kikuyu and Luo domination. At a meeting at Ngong on 22 May 1960, Masai elders gave 
their consent to the younger leaders who had formed the United Front and were opposing 
KANU. By early June 1960, the Kenya African People's Party, the Kalenjin Alliance and 
the Masai United Front had already established links. At Mombasa, Ngala, who declined 
the post of KANU's treasurer on his return from the United States, formed the Coast 
African People's Union. On June 25, 1960, these newly formed parties, as well as the 
Somali National Association held a leaders' conference at Ngong, where united in 
opposition to KANU and fearful of ethnic dominance, they merged to form KADU. 
Ngala and Muliro became Leader and Deputy-Leader respectively (Bennet and Rosberg, 
1969:109; Murungi, 1991 :29; Maloba, 1993:159; Odinga, 1995:195-196). 
2.1.4 KANU and the Democratization Process, 1960 to 1963 
Decolonization is part of democratization as it involves a shift from an 
authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratic regime. Notionally, this process 
involves the dismantling and removal of repressive colonial structures in favour of the 
installation of sovereign democratic and democracy-promoting institutions. 
Democratization emerges when elites in the political system agree to the democratic rules 
to the game, through compromises and settlements, rather than risk national 
disintegration. This is precisely what happened during the Kenya Constitutional 
Conferences in the early 1960s at Lancaster House in the United Kingdom. The two 
major antagonists, KANU and KADU became the main protagonists. This section largely 
focuses on the role of KANU during these Constitutional Conferences, in particular the 
1962 conference. 
As noted previously, it was at the first Lancaster House Conference of January 
1960 that the British government finally made it clear that there would be an elected 
African majority in the next Kenya legislature. This was implemented at the elections 
held in February 1961, on a limited franchise and with some seats reserved for Europeans 
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and Asians (Leys, 1975:56). The 1960 conference was crucial for African political 
activity, in that it called for the unbanning and formation of national African political 
parties, which resulted, immediately thereafter, in the formation of KANU and KADU. 
Formal national African political parties per se were therefore not represented in this 
particular conference. The conference was primarily charting the course for African 
majority rule in Kenya. 
During the first multiparty elections of 1961 , KANU won by a landslide. 
However, the party refused to form the first African government calling fust for the 
release of Kenyatta (Kenya, 1961:1). Following refusal of this by KANU, the Governor 
of Kenya who from the outset was never comfortable with KANU, called upon KADU to 
form the Government. KADU, as a minority party accepted, and Ronald Ngala its 
president, became the fust African head of government as Prime Minister (Wanj ohi, 
1997: 63). Kenyatta was, thereafter, released from detention on 14 August 1961. The 
second Kenya Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House opened in February 14, 
1962 and was in session until April 6 1962 under the chairmanship of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies Rt. Hon Reginald Maudling (Kenya, 1962a: 7). 
The 1962 conference proved to be even more crucial as it had as its agenda a 
programme for political independence for Kenya, and it ultimately agreed the framework 
of a new Kenya constitution. The land and landownership question in Kenya and the 
Masai Agreements were key issues. Unlike the previous conference, this one drew a wide 
variety of participants, drawn from various Kenyan political parties and their 
constitutional advisors, as well as participants from the Governments of Kenya and the 
United Kingdom. As a party, KANU led by Jomo Kenyatta, who had entered the 
Legislative Council in a seat vacated for him by Kinyanjui Njiri from Fort Hall, had the 
highest number of participants who formed about 36 per cent whereas KADU 
participants were about 33 per cent of the total number. Others included the Kenya 
Coalition, Mwambao United Front and Cross-Benchers who formed about four, two and 
two percent respectively. Non-political participants from the Kenya and British 
governments, as well as the Constitutional Advisor to the Conference formed about 20 
per cent of the participants (see Appendix 3 for a list of the participants)(Kenya, 1962a: 
13-14; Maloba, 1993:160). In his opening statement at the 1962 Lancaster House 
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Conference, lomo Kenyatta, President of KANU, speaking on behalf of the party, 
reassured the participants on KANU's commitment to a successful Conference (Kenya, 
1962b: 2). 
In its detailed memorandum on constitutional and related matters presented to the 
conference on February 14 1962, KANU expounded its views on democracy. In the 
preamble, KANU re-affirmed its commitment to the democratic principles of the 
nationalist struggle with respect to genuine freedom and independence based on 
democratic rights; the freedoms, protections, privileges, and opportunities due to all the 
citizens of Kenya regardless of race, colour, sex, creed or tribe. The party stated that: 
KANU believes that the basic motive power behind every nationalist 
struggle is to secure for all people freedom from poverty, disease and 
ignorance, and to establish .. . a society in which there is political freedom, 
human dignity and economic opportunity for all without discrimination ... 
Such ideals and beliefs guide us in presenting the ideas that we now put 
forward (Kenya, 1962c: I) . 
KANU further went on to emphasize that the "proposals in this memorandum are 
intended to provide for maximum and practical constitutional guarantees consistent with 
the desire to establish a lasting democracy in a united KENYA " (emphasis added) 
(Kenya, 1962c: 2). 
The party proposed that the constitution be written in as much detail as possible 
so that all citizens could become fully aware of their rights and responsibilities. It also 
proposed that the constitution include a bill of rights to enshrine the fundamental rights of 
the citizen and that this bill of rights should provide constitutional guarantees against 
religious, racial or tribal discrimination, or segregation of any citizens or aliens resident 
in Kenya. The party also proposed that the socio-economic rights of all citizens and legal 
aliens resident in Kenya be guaranteed. The party pointed out that the constitution should 
establish and emphasize the democratic principle of majority rule, with recognition of the 
right of any minority to be heard without suppression consistent with the security of the 
nation. Other ideas centred on the right of the citizens to have recourse to a Supreme 
Court; the establishment of Local Government Authorities; and, provision for the 
machinery of constitutional amendment. The party emphasized that the constitution be 
clear so as to avoid unnecessary disputes over interpretation (Kenya, 1962b: 2-4). KANU 
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focused on the prOVISIOns for a head of state; the cabinet; legislature; franchise and 
delimitation of constituencies; the question of a unicameral or bicameral legislature; and 
citizenship. It also proposed fundamental rights, the nature and structure of the judiciary, 
the civil service and local government authorities. Other references related to the issue of 
an East African Federation. Finally the memorandum addressed itself to KANU's views 
on land and landownership in Kenya (Kenya, 1962c: 4-20). 
KANU's comprehensive memorandum on its views on the constitution and the 
land and land-ownership questions was a document of twenty pages whereas KADU 
views were expressed in a one-page memorandum and a similarly short statement by its 
leader Ngala. To KADU what was ofutrnost importance was the issue of regionalism and 
the party was not willing to compromise on this issue. It later submitted a paper on its 
views on this issue. Regionalism was primarily meant to serve the interests of the African 
minority leaders and settlers in Kenya. This adamant and uncompromising position taken 
by KADU on regionalism nearly derailed the Conference, forcing the intervention of the 
Secretary of State. To avoid further deadlocks, the Secretary of State suspended further 
plenary sessions and requested all parties to nominate a few of their members to serve on 
a working group that would try to resolve these issues. The Working Party resolved 
several of these disagreements through negotiated compromises and settlements. Finally 
it was agreed at the Conference that both parties KANU and KADU would form a 
coalition government to pave way for fresh elections under the new Constitution (Kenya, 
1962d: 1-6; Odinga, 1995:225). The coalition government remained in power until May 
31, 1963, when Kenya gained internal self-rule status under the premiership of Kenyatta. 
The democratic initiative at this Conference was arguably taken by KANU. Not 
only did the party and its elites present comprehensive and detailed views on a 
constitution that proposed the establishment of democratic and democracy-promoting 
institutions, such as a bill of rights, but it also accepted compromises through a series of 
negotiations and settlements, rather than risk national disintegration. From the outset, the 
party pointed out that it would be flexible not rigid during the proceedings of the 
Conference. The party also agreed to form a coalition government with KADU. Its 
leaders were arguably, more charismatic and more skilful negotiators than those of 
KADU. It was apparent that KANU was out to ensure that there was a smooth and stable 
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transition process towards independence. In a bid to control the political process and 
achieve national independence without delay, the party compromised and incorporated a 
diverse political elite in the formation of government 
2.2 KANU and the Consolidation of Power in Post-Colonial Kenya, 1963 to 1990 
KANU emerged as the majority party in the general elections of 1963 and formed 
the government at the end of colonial rule. Thereafter, through a process of party-state 
relations, electoral and constitutional engineering, the party was to remain in power 
largely as a de facto and de jure single party up to 1991, when the country 
constitutionally reverted back to multiparty politics. In the post-colonial pre-1990 period, 
the ruling party pursued its historical agenda of initially trying to create national unity 
and integration through an interrelated series of strategies of controlling and dominating 
various social, economic and political forces within both state and civil society. These 
included among others, state organs, socio-economic classes, political parties, ethnic 
associations, non-governmental organizations, and trade unions. As the ruling party 
sought to capture and control these forces , the party and political system degenerated into 
an authoritarian one. 
2.2.1 KANU's Control of Intra- and Inter-Party Power Competition in Post-
Colonial Kenya, 1963 to 1969 
The pre-1990 post-colonial period saw intense inter-party and intra-party power 
struggles as KANU sought to achieve its historical agenda of trying to create national 
unity and integration. During this period the country became a republic and opposition 
parties were dissolved, thereby turning the country into a de facto and de jure one-party 
state as the party sought to consolidate its political power and dominate the political 
process. Parties such as KADU and APP were dissolved, whereas the Kenya People 's 
Union (KPU) was proscribed. 
After almost seventy years of repressive colonial domination and intense 
resistance against such domination, Kenya marked the end of colonial rule in May 1963. 
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In preparation for internal self-government and ultimately independence, mUlti-party 
general elections were held the same month under the new Constitution, which had 
established a bicameral legislature, consisting of A House of Representatives and a 
Senate. It also established a political system based on regionalism. KANU, KADU, the 
African People's Party (APP) (a breakaway faction from KANU), and independent 
candidates contested the 1963 elections. KANU won overwhelmingly, with a triumphant 
majority of 66 per cent in the House of Representatives, while capturing 49 per cent in 
the Senate and a similar percentage in the regional assemblies. For KANU, this reflected 
the democratic and nationalistic political mood of the time. (Sanger and Nottingham, 
1964:1 -40; Leys, 1976:213 ; Adar, 1999:346-347). On the advent of internal self-rule in 
June 1963, KANU formed the government with Kenyatta as the Prime Minister. In line 
with the nationalistic fervour at the time, the Cabinet was carefully selected in a bid to 
give the new government a nationalistic outlook and to curb the possibilities of ethnic 
animosities that might arise out of electoral losses. It consisted of persons drawn from 
various ethnic communities as well as those who had been in the dock, in prison or in 
exile with Kenyatta (Odinga, 1995:237-8; Kyle, 1999: 177-178). 
However, once in power, the ruling party set out to capture and control social 
diversities in the country. JustifYing national unity and national integration as its 
historical and national agenda, KANU began the process by delegitimising opposition 
parties on various ideological and political grounds. Determined to contain and integrate 
different political opinions within its confines, the ruling party embarked on a systematic 
plan, through the use of power, authority and influence, to delegitimise and phase out the 
opposition parties, particularly KADU, on the grounds that they represented white settler 
and British interests with regard to constitutional issues. KANU wanted provision 
inserted for the easier amendment of the 1963 constitution. KADU and the British 
Government opposed this, arguing that such a provision could lead to civil war in Kenya 
and this would in effect lead to a delay to independence. The leaders of KANU saw this 
as blackmail (Kagwanja, 1991 :30; Odinga, 1995 :238-239; Wanjohi, 1997:66). Not 
willing to succumb to such arguments, KANU put forth two conditions to the British 
Government. The first was its proposed amendments to the constitution be effected 
immediately so as to avoid future changes to the constitution or, second that the British 
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Government only implement the required technical changes necessary for independence 
and leave out the major amendments for a future independent government. For KANU, 
these conditions were not negotiable. Later a statement signed and issued by the KANU 
parliamentary group emphasized that the KADU-British government conspiracy on 
regionalism threatened to undermine the economic and political stability of Kenya. This 
helped swing the balance of agreement in KANU's favour and it won its point on the 
constitutional amendment. The ruling party consequently achieved more highly 
centralized control of the police and the Public Service Commission, a key instrument 
that was to become an integral part of its scheme to consolidate and entrench its political 
power. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Rt. Hon Reginald Maudling, also sought 
written permission from Kenyatta that KANU would not amend the independence 
constitution and in response Kenyatta, on 19 October, 1963 stated that "It is not our 
intention to seek to make further amendments to the Constitution except in so far as 
subsequent experience shows these to be absolutely necessary" (Kenya, 1963: 11; 
Murungi, 1991: 30; Odinga, 1995: 239-240). The politics of KANU's control and 
domination of the political process in post-colonial Kenya thus began with these 
constitutional amendments. 
Political control and persecution of the opposition by KANU intensified with the 
attainment of full independence on 12 December 1963. Determined to transform Kenya 
into a unitary state with claims that it wanted "to promote national consciousness and 
unity", Kenyatta successfully used all the political and state apparatuses at the disposal of 
KANU and managed to persuade Paul Ngei, his APP followers and the Independents to 
rejoin KANU. (Kuria, 1990:30; Wanjohi, 1997: 66&130). Having done so, KANU 
focused ·its attention on the largest opposition party, KADU. Extensive use of the 
provincial administration was mobilized through a series of coercive administrative 
actions to treat KADU as a threat to state security. Consequently many KADU 
parliamentarians began to cross the floor as early as November 1963 (Kenya, 1964b: col 
3740; Mboya, 1993: 54; Oyugi, 1994: 159-160; Wanjohi, 1997:66). This continued 
throughout 1964. Under Prime Minister Kenyatta the KANU govemment dedicated all its 
energies to the destruction of the KADU opposition and the Majimbo (Federal) 
Constitution. John J. Okumu (1984), who views the consolidation process within the 
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context of party-state relations, observes that, a three-pronged strategy was used to 
achieve these objectives. Firstly it was done through the use of the state bureaucracy. 
This was the only national institution at the time, with effective links to the grassroots 
and as such could be manipulated by the KANU government to prevent the effective 
development of the regional administrative agencies provided for by the constitution and 
in the process. The KANU government also made use of the civil secretaries (provincial 
commissioners), at the regional level, to maintain more direct channels of communication 
between the central government and the regions than those specified by the constitution. 
Secondly, the KANU government refused to implement the financial provisions of the 
constitution. These required that the central government decentralize fmancial control 
among the regions by June 1964, when the regions would take over full financial 
responsibility. Finally, the KANU government refused to transfer certain social services 
to the regions (Okumu, 1984:51-52). This was a violation of the Constitution. 
In a further bid to integrate and control diverse ideological, ethnic and political 
differences during this transitional period, the ruling party and its leaders began to 
advocate a one party system, with KANU as the sole political party. Their arguments 
were based on the view that the one-party system was the most appropriate political 
system for deeply divided societies in Africa, as it enhanced nation-building and national 
integration. Kenyatta outlined his preference for a one-party system when he emphasized 
that: "Events have shown that not only was a one-party system inevitable but it was also 
the most prudent method of attaining those aims and objectives which our people hold 
dear". He rejected the Westminister model of a two-party system of government arguing 
that "we do not subscribe to the notion of the government and the governed in opposition 
to one another". He went on to express his views on the role of parties emphasizing that 
KANU was not prepared to justifY its preference for a one-party system of government 
by using the fragile and perennial argument that parties are the expressions of social 
classes and that, therefore, there must be only one party. To Kenyatta, the theory of class 
struggle had no relevance to the particular situation in Kenya. He emphasized that KANU 
was the vanguard of the nationalist struggle (Gertzel,1969:111-113). 
With regard to democracy and the one-party system, Kenyatta argued that this 
was dependant on the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual and 
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that the KANU government would uphold the four traditional freedoms, namely, the 
freedom of association, speech and assembly and respect for the rule of law and human 
dignity. He went further to emphasize that it was not the type of political system that was 
a threat to democracy, but rather the nature and organization of mass political parties and 
hence "all two-party States are not necessarily democratic and all one-party States are not 
necessarily authoritarian" (Gertzel, 1969:113 ; Finance, 16-30 June, 1990:38). Kenyatta 
summarized and concluded his argument by insisting on transforming Kenya into a de 
faCio one party state. His concluding remarks were: 
At this stage ... we have no choice to make. Through the historical process 
which has taken place since the last century we find ourselves with a 
myriad relevant grounds and conditions for a one-party State. It is 
inevitable ". Should relevant grounds for a multi-party State evolve in the 
future, it is not the intention of my Government to block such a trend 
through prohibitive legislation (Gertzel, 1969: 113). (emphasis added) 
In 10 November 1964, Ronald Ngala the KADU leader announced the voluntary 
dissolution of the party, citing national unity as the reason behind its move. KADU 
leaders had agreed to disband their party voluntarily, but this was in return for seats in 
Kenyatta's cabinet (Kenya, 1964c:cols 4414-4417; Bienen, 1974:67-68; Leys, 1976:213-
214). In his welcome statement to the opposition party, Prime Minister Kenyatta 
reaffirmed his commitment and by extension that of KANU to the independence, national 
unity and nation building of Kenya (Gertzel, 1969: 111). Thereafter, the country became a 
de facto one party state and the ruling party was now in a position to control the political 
process. As the sole political party, KANU secured a constitutional amendment lowering 
the proportion of each house needed to pass additional amendments to 65 percent. 
Constitutional manipulation had been made easy and over time it became clear that no 
amendments were barred, since everything depended on the concept of democracy held 
by parliamentary democracy. On 12 December 1964, the country became a Republic and 
adopted a Republican Constitution with Kenyatta as the President, a position that 
combined the functions of Head of State and Government. This point in history is 
important in that it signified the dissolution of KADU and the demise of the Majimbo 
constitution. This, to Kenyatta and KANU, was politically significant in that it speJt out 
the end of political divisions in the country, which according to the ruling party, had been 
50 
engineered by imperialists (Kenya, 1964a: 134-160; Emerson, 1966: 292; Gertzel, 
1969:114; Kuria, 1991: 30). 
The dissolution of KADU and the transformation of Kenya to a de facto one party 
state and subsequently a Republic in 1964 ironically did not immediately strengthen the 
ruling party KANU and enhance its domination over the polity. Existing intra-party 
power struggles continued to intensify. Since its formation in 1960, KANU had never 
really been a strong party in terms of organizational coherence and discipline. It was a 
party of patrons, with a decentralized structure formed from a loose coalition of district-
based political organizations, making it prone to factionalism. Furthermore, the party 
initially did not view itself as a political party per se, but rather as a national liberation 
movement whose primary goal was the independence of all Africans (Good, 1969:116; 
Bienen, 1974: 85; Leys, 1976:62; Oyugi, 1994:167; Odinga, 1995:270; Wanjohi, 
1997:26). Prior to 1964, there had been various attempts by the party leaders, chiefly by 
Kenyatta to, unite KANU. Kenyatta had for long been seen as a symbol of unity and 
dominance with respect to the nationalist movement. On assuming the leadership of the 
party in 1961 , he made some positive attempts to enforce cooperation among the various 
factions. With the exception of Ngei, who broke away from KANU and formed the APP, 
Kenyatta's dominant and unifying role became evident when he led the party to victory in 
the 1963 elections and consequently to power, managing to impose unity on KANU, APP 
and later KADU, and bringing all ethnic groups within a Republic under a de facto one 
party state in the first year of independence (Gertzel, 1969: 8-10; Leys, 1976:62). 
In as much as it was appealing to and trying to achieve national unity, KANU's 
factionalism revolved around ideological and ethnic differences. The party was 
comprised of conservative moderates such as Kenyatta, Gichuru, and Mboya among 
others, and militant radicals, such as Oginga Odinga, Kaggia, and Ngei, who constantly 
evoked ideological and ethnic animosities, in pursuit of parochial socio-economic and 
political class interests. The moderates were an indigenous capitalist class produced by 
colonial policies aimed at creating an African elite that was meant to oversee the 
transition to independence without disrupting radically, the existing colonial socio-
economic order. For them, the key independence issues were property rights and a market 
economy. Private property, to them was to be held and protected under individual or 
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group rights in a free enterprise or market economy system. The radicals, on the other 
hand, represented those who believed in the pursuit of socialist principles. These were 
advocates of nationalization and redistribution and believed that the pursuit of socialist 
principles would be the best way of reducing socio-economic inequali ties and attaining 
the ideals of the liberation struggle. The land and land-ownership question was of central 
concern to both. The moderates, on the one hand, believed that the land and land-
ownership issue should be viewed in the context of private ownership, whereas the 
radicals maintained that it be placed in the context of nationalization and redistribution. 
In essence, various factions were competing for political power in a bid to gain access to 
scarce socio-economic and political patronage resources. In the process, ideological and 
ethnic differences were aroused to achieve this (Kenya, 1966b: cols 879-884; Bennet and 
Rosberg, 1969:108-109; Haberson, 1971:243-246; Leys, 1976:212-221; Maxon, 1994:58; 
Oyugi, 1994:157-160; Wanjohi, 1997:67). Leys, for example captures this when he 
argues that: 
... the basic political cleavage in Kenyan politics at independence ... was 
between the groups and social strata which bore the brunt of exploitation -
the mass of unskilled workers and peasant farmers - and those in one way 
or another acquired material interest in the continuation of the colonial 
economy. This was very clearly revealed immediately after independence 
in the way the opposition between KANU and KADU was suddenly and 
painlessly dissolved and replaced by a much more irreconcilable and 
lasting opposition between the 'comprador' leaders of both KANU and 
KADU on the one hand, and a group of 'radicals' within KANU on the 
other (Leys, 1976:212). 
Ideological, ethnic and personality differences continued and the party realized 
that its efforts to achieve national unity were being frustrated by its institutional 
weakness. These differences delayed changes in the party structure and the battle for 
control of the party continued. Other than Kenyatta, no single leader was sure of retaining 
ultimate control and none was likely to accept a new rigid party machine that might be 
used against him or her. Hence, authority in the party remained dispersed and the formal 
party institutions unused. It failed to establish effective working machinery. KANU's key 
organs were not performing their expected roles and functions . The national executive 
and the governing council, for example, hardly ever met and no annual delegates' 
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meeting or conference, other than the initial ones, were called between 1960 and 1965. 
Likewise no party national elections were called during this period. Party leaders soon 
began flouting the party's constitution to suit their interests. Many of the party branches 
also became dormant and party membership recruitment dwindled. As an agent of 
political education and socialization, especially in popularizing and encouraging the 
discussion of public policy, the party was paralyzed (Good, 1968:125; Gertzel, 1969: 15; 
Bienen, 1974:82; Mboya, 1993:48; Odinga, 1995:271-272). 
To strengthen its control and role in the political process and thereby enforce 
national unity and integration, the ruling party decided to rely on other institutions such 
as the executive arm of the government rather than the party's weak machinery (Gerztel, 
1969:10-16; Good, 1968:123-124; Odinga, 1995:272;). The civil service, in particular the 
provincial administration, became a useful agent through which KANU and its leaders 
achieved their objectives. There was the urgent need to centralize the authority structure 
in the party immediately and contain and control those centrifugal forces within the 
country that were part of the colonial inheritance. The party machinery could not be used 
to enhance government control and ensure compliance in government' s decisions, but the 
existing civil service machinery could. It was a centralizing agency that had until then 
ensured the dominance of the central government. Though KANU leaders had initially 
questioned the dominant authority of the provincial administration and called for its 
abolition during the colonial period, once in power, they found it necessary to use it to 
solve a series of difficult situations they could not resolve through party political 
channels. Kenyatta avoided the party and instead chose the civil service as the primary 
instrument of his rule. Thus "in contrast to poorly organized KANU with its weak 
political centre because of severe leadership rivalry, the civil service was chosen as the 
"steel frame" for rule" (Bienen, 1974:15). 
KANU began to suffer from mild neglect as the executive branch of government 
began slowly and effectively strengthening becoming the fount and locus of public policy 
decisions. This was so, because, in the first place, Kenyatta was not a party man in the 
sense that he had never been personally involved in the formation of a political party, 
despite assuming the presidency ofKAU and KANU in 1947 and 1961 respectively. The 
decentralized nature of the party, with its district political bosses, deprived him of 
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effective access to the grassroots via the party medium and this situation was aggravated 
by the fact that the factions within KANU were district- and ethnic-based. To attempt to 
solve the problem of factionalism would thus have brought him into serious personal 
conflict with other district political bosses at the expense of his popularity and political 
prestige. Kenyatta therefore opted to remain above party political conflicts by assuming 
the role of Mzee, " the father of the nation", which permitted him to bypass the party 
apparatus by establishing indirect political control of the grassroots via a series of 
informal patron client hierarchies of which he was the head. It was also inevitable that 
Kenyatta would, sooner or later, establish and govern through a strong state 
administration that stood outside party control. Thus, once he became president in 
December 1964, Kenyatta slowly began to neglect and finally discontinue the monthly 
consultations with the KANU Parliamentary Group, which had been his practice during 
the preceding year. Consultations between cabinet ministers and backbenchers also 
became infrequent. Hence there was need to define the new role of the party in the 
independent state, and the relationship between party, civil service and government. This 
was important because, on the one hand there were those who believed the party should 
have control over government and on the other, because of the strong individualism 
within KANU, many members who showed themselves willing to question their own 
government (Bienen, 1974: 1 01 ;Okumu, 1984:53-54). 
According to Gertzel (1969), the upheavals in the party after 1964 and the major 
constitutional changes since independence are best understood as part of a process of 
defining that relationship between the party, parliamentary group and the government and 
to a large degree the country ' s institutional base. The legislature and the civil service 
became important agents through which the moderates, who controlled KANU, contained 
or phased out the radicals. Other than power struggles based on ethnic differences 
between the Kikuyu and the Luo elite, it became clear that as early as 1964, following the 
dissolution of KADU, the ex-KADU leaders' interests were not so very much different 
from those of the moderates within KANU as compared to those of the radicals. 
Following their defection from KADU, these leaders soon began playing a leading part in 
the struggle within KANU. They had earlier been attracted to European politicians since 
they shared the same commitment to private property and most of all the relative 
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abundance of land in their areas that they feared would be taken away under the guise of 
nationalization and redistributed to landless people from other ethnic groups. This was 
not the case, as they were soon to discover. KANU politicians, on the contrary, had 
similar interests in becoming large landowners and therefore sought to ensure that private 
property, especially land, would not be threatened. Though the principle of "willing 
seller, willing buyer" with regard to land in the Rift Valley caused some embarrassment 
to the ex-KADU leaders, as the Kikuyu were in a better position to buy this land in 
comparison with the ex-KADU ethnic groups, the convergence of interests between the 
ex-KADU and their KANU moderate counterparts in the cabinet was not threatened 
(Gertzel, 1969:8; Leys, 1976:213-214). 
The conflict between the moderates and radicals was a deep one. Initially, the 
conflict revolved around two main issues. By the end of 1965, when Kenyatta finally 
agreed to have the radicals removed from power, the conflict between these opposing 
sides had found a clear ideological expression, based on Kenya's development 
philosophy: African Socialism. The main features of African Socialism include: (i) 
political democracy; (ii) mutual social responsibility; (iii) various forms of ownership; 
(iv) a range of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interests of society 
and its members; (v) the diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration of economic 
power; and (vi) progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and 
income (Kenya, 1965a: 16; Barnett and Njama, 1966; Leys, 1976:214-215). The regime's 
ideology embodied in the policy statement, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African 
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya was introduced by Mboya and 
described by Kenyatta, as Kenya's economic 'Bible '. According to Leys (1976), it was a 
pure statement of ' bourgeois socialism' as it focused on redressing social grievances in 
order to ensure the continued existence of bourgeois society, in particular the interests of 
the comprador elements in a neo-colonial situation. The moderates described themselves 
as 'African socialists' , nationalists and pragmatists, who put the country's interests first, 
and branded the radicals as communist agents. The radicals on the other hand saw 
themselves as defenders of the nationalist movements' original socialist ideals, and their 
opponents as agents of western foreign capital. Though both may not have been fully 
convinced of the truth of what they said of each other, they came closer to the truth about 
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what they said of themselves. Kenyatta and Mboya worked closely together with foreign 
capital and their brand of African Socialism was a formulation of 'comprador' ideology. 
Odinga and Kaggia's socialism was of a petty-bourgeois nature and they aligned 
themselves with socialist countries, standing outside the symbiotic relationship between 
the rest of the KANU leadership and the western firms, experts and embassies (Leys, 
1976:221-222; Wanjohi, 1997:69). 
During this period, the KANU Government also sought to enhance its dominance 
in the executive by transfornling the state, particularly the civil service. As outlined in its 
Sessional Paper Number 10, the government pointed out that transformation of the civil 
service in order to achieve representativeness due to imbalances inherited from the past 
would be achieved through Africanization. Africanization was therefore to be placed high 
upon the agenda and it was to be implemented without breaching constitutional 
provisions that guaranteed equal treatment for all (Kenya, 1965a: 27-28). The 
government argued that the principal policies for achieving Africanization should be 
those that were consistent with growth and development. As such there were to be 
various programmes for Africanizing the economy. One of these programmes was to be: 
. .. Africanizing the Civil Service as rapidly as possible. This process is 
being accelerated through training of Africans, ... to qualify them for new 
positions and promotions. Here it is important to realize that since the 
public sector will be expanding more rapidly than other sectors, it will be 
an increasingly more important means for employing Africans (GK, 
1965a: 30). 
KANU had since then realized that one way of enhancing its dominance and 
control of the state and society was to capture the state and its apparatuses or ins!run1ents. 
This was achieved via Africanization programmes. The civil service became a source of 
political patronage as many Africans were appointed on ethnic and/or party political 
loyalty, replacing many whites who had occupied senior positions. By 1972, 45 per cent 
of the Pernlanent Secretaries, 50 per cent of the Provincial Commissioners, and 75 per 
cent of the Deputy-Permanent Secretaries and Under-Secretaries came from the Kikuyu 
ethnic community (Nellis, 1974: 15). 
56 
Soon after the release of Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965. Kenya' s Africanization 
programme, in particular that of the civil service began moving at a fairly rapid rate. For 
example whereas in March 1965, 83 per cent of the total number of officers in posts were 
Africans, this figure had risen to 96.88 per cent while the workforce had increased to 
72,204 by 1968 (See Tables 2.0, 2.1 and 2.2 below). 
Table 2.0 Kenya Civil Service: Summary of Posts and Strength by Scale as at 1 
March 1965 
Total Africans Non- Total %of % of Africans 
Establishment Africans Officers Africans to Total 
in Post to Total Establishment 
Strength 
I) Superscale 421 130 159 289 45 31 
and Lower 
Superscale 
2) 818 309 376 685 45 38 
Administrative 
and 
Professional 
3) Education 2,333 327 1,607 1,934 32 29 
4) Executive 2,418 1,259 958 2,217 57 52 
Grade 
5) Middle 1,990 864 925 1,798 48 43 
Grade Tech. 
Posts 
6) Junior 1,536 1,149 250 1,399 82 75 
Grade Tech. 
Posts 
7) Clerical 3,062 1,977 1,013 2,990 66 65 
81Nursing 635 440 162 602 73 69 
9) Police and 21,582 20,162 318 20,480 99 93 
Prisons 
10) Secretarial 771 263 433 696 38 34 
and Typing 
11) Chiefs and 2,896 2,701 - 2,701 100 93 
Sub-Chiefs 
Total 38,717 29,581 6201 35782 83 76 
Source: Republic of Kenya, High Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Kenya 1964-
1970 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965) p.34. 
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Table 2.1 Kenya Civil Service Job Category Breakdown as of January 311968 
Total Posts Total in Post % Citizens 
Clerical and Low Technical 17,973 17,140 94.4 
Minor Grades 1,825 1,746 100 
Administrative and Professional 2,960 2,453 37.6 
Executive and Technical 6,915 5,941 69.9 
Total in Post - 68,233 93.23 
Temporary 232 
Total All Staff 72,429 68,465 93.25 
.. Source: Complied from Hyden, G, Jackson, Rand Okumu JJ (eds) Development AdministratIOn: 
The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970) pp 341-342 
Table 2.2. Composition of Kenya's Civil Service By Race and Citizenship, July 
1967-0ctober 1969 
CITIZENS NON-
CITIZENS 
Month Total Total African Asian European Total Total % of 
Posts In Citizens 
Posts 
Ju1.l967 69,762 65,132 59,889 337 25 60,251 4,881 92.51 
Oct.l967 71,131 66,785 61 ,651 335 24 62,010 4,775 92.86 
Jan.1968 72,429 68,233 63,275 348 28 63,651 4,582 93.23 
Apr. 1968 72,517 68,766 64,054 362 33 64,447 4,317 93.72 
Ju1.l968 74,340 69,395 64,959 373 33 65 ,365 4,030 94.19 
Oct.l968 74,555 70,226 65,827 376 27 66,230 3,996 94.31 
Jan .1969 74,657 71,056 66,839 394 23 67,255 3,801 94.65 
Apr. 1969 74,777 71,703 66,563 384 27 67,974 3,729 94.40 
Ju1.l969 77,870 72,383 68,438 371 21 68,830 3,553 95 .09 
Oct.l969 76,999 72,204 69,555 377 20 69,952 2,252 96.88 
Source: Compiled from Hyden et al. ibid p. 345 
Sessional Paper No. 10 was introduced in April 1965 and passed unanimously by 
the National Assembly in May 1965, a month later, giving the radicals no chance to 
discuss and disagree with it. By the time they could do so, they had been manoeurved out 
of KANU and into the opposition by a series of moves planned and executed by Odinga's 
political and personal rival, Tom Mboya, who was at the time the moderates' main 
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strategist. Odinga, Kaggia and other radicals were progressively removed from positions 
of influence within parliament and government, and finally Odinga was publicly 
humiliated as party Vice-President at a highly manipulated party conference at Limuru in 
March 1966 (Leys, 1976:224). 
The Limuru Conference of March 1966 effectively removed Odinga from his post 
as KANU's Vice-President, culminating in his resignation from the ruling party and 
subsequently from government on 14 April 1966. Hurriedly and unconstitutionally 
summoned, the Limuru Conference adopted a new KANU constitution, which was 
approved not by the conference as required under the functioning constitution, but by the 
KANU Parliamentary Group. The new constitution abolished the post of the party's 
single national vice-presidency, held by Odinga, and replaced it with eight regional vice-
presidents. As a consequence, Odinga chose not to seek re-election as one of the eight 
vice-presidents (Good, 1968:125-126; Gertzel, 1969:145; Okumu, 1984:62; Odinga, 
1995:299; Wanjohi, 1997:69). Kaggia suffered a similar fate. During the elections for the 
vice-president of the Central Province, a majority elected Kaggia, defeating two senior 
cabinet ministers, Gichuru and Kiano. However, the election was declared null and void 
and a new election held in which more delegates arrived to vote, and Gichuru became the 
new vice-president. Mboya retained the post of Secretary-General. A conspicuous feature 
of the conference was the rise in power of moderates such as Ngala and Moi who had 
been used during the conference to hand-pick delegates to vote for candidates who were 
considered moderates (Good, 1968:126; Odinga, 1995:299). Consequently, Odinga 
resigned as Vice-President of the country and was replaced by Joseph Murumbi. Once 
again the ruling party had asserted its control by effectively purging the radicals within it. 
In his resignation statement to the country, Odinga cited ideological differences 
for resigning from KANU and the Government (Gertzel, 1969:145; Odinga, 1995:300). 
The formation of KPU was announced on 20 April 1966, with Odinga as the Leader and 
Kaggia as the Deputy Leader. The KPU leaders emphasized that they differed with 
KANU on ideological grounds and the nature of governance in the country. They argued 
that the ruling party KANU was leading the country towards the formation of a capitalist 
society, whereas they believed that the best way to achieve socio-economic progress was 
through the creation of a socialist society. They also pointed out that the ruling party had 
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abandoned its democratic ideals making it and the country undemocratic and 
authoritarian (Gertzel, 1969:148-149; Ochieng, 1989:208; Wanjohi, 1997:68&137). 
KPU's aims and objectives suggest that its leaders were dissatisfied with KANU's 
slow pace in making the country economically independent. In addition, the plight of 
workers and the general welfare of the people left much to be desired in the minds of 
KPU leaders, and as a result the party's constitution included the goals of moving faster 
to ensure economic independence, removing exploitation and oppression, securing full 
employment, and free and compulsory education. The party also indicated that the 
implementation of socialism would ensure the provision of cheap housing and free 
welfare services. Such were the indicators, but the KPU manifesto clearly demonstrated 
the party's commitment to socialism. KPU presented a populist manifesto that criticized 
the KANU government for creating a wealthy exploitative upper class among Africans. It 
believed that the only way to ensure that meaningful economic and political 
independence was achieved in the country was through a rapid rate of Africanization and 
the best means of attaining this was through nationalization and a complete overhaul of 
the country ' s administrative structure. KPU emphasized that it was committed to 
uplifting the standards of the African people. However, like KANU, the KPU never saw 
fit to develop a systematic blueprint articulating the party's understanding of the 
country's problems and how they could be tackled in the short and long terms (Anyang-
Nyong'o, 1983:160-161;Wanjohi, 1997:137-139). The KPU was less of an amalgamation 
of district and ethnic alliances than KADU and KANU. It had a solid base in Nyanza and 
received much support from the Luo based in the major urban areas in Kenya, such as 
Nairobi and Mombasa. It also received support from Kikuyu areas dissatisfied with the 
KANU government. The KPU tried to widen its political base beyond its Luo 
constituency by appealing to urban and agricultural workers and to landless people. 
Kaggia, who became its deputy leader, appealed mainly to the poorer Kikuyu. Moreover, 
he represented a pan-ethnic appeal and personified the KPU's attempt to create a class 
party (Bienen, 1974:69-70). 
By 25 April 1966 twenty-nine KANU members of parliament had already crossed 
the floor to join the KPU. Three days later, on 28 April, parliament was recalled and 
asked to amend the constitution so as to make it mandatory for members of parliament 
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defecting from the party that nominated them during elections, to seek fresh mandate. 
This was to result in what became known as the Little General Election of 1966 (Bienen, 
1974:70; Oyugi, 1994:161; Wanjohi, 1997:69; Kyle, 1999:200). During the Little 
General Election, the KPU contested 28 of the 29 seats declared vacant. KANU won 21 
Lower House seats to KPU's seven, and eight Senate seats to KPU' s two. The 29th was 
won by KANU against an independent candidate, giving KANU a 76 percent majority of 
the total number of seats contested. Only nine out of the 29 who had crossed the floor 
were re-elected to parliament (Koff, 1966:57-60; Gertzel, 1969:188; Bienen, 1974:71; 
Oyugi, 1994: 161; Wanjohi, 1997:70). 
Despite extreme governmental harassment and open manipulation, the KPU could 
not be defeated by KANU in its own Luo strongholds, where it won with majorities. 
Similarly, in a number of rural areas that were KANU's strongholds, the KPU won 
overwhelmingly. In such areas, the elections were, however, more competitive. These 
areas included those that had mixed ethnic groups or those areas that were not dominated 
by ethnic groups loyal to KANU, such as Kamba, Teso, and Luhya areas. Though the 
number of seats won by the KPU in the 1966 elections was too small to be accorded the 
official opposition, its presence in parliament gave it a clear forum from which to attack 
the government legitimately without restrictions or harassment (Okumu, 1969:9-17; 
Bienen, 1974:70-71; Leys, 1976:234; Alila, 1984:32-35; Wanjohi, 1997:70). 
The KPU's expansion in terms of political base and sphere became a potential 
challenge to the KANU government. As a result, the latter began to contain and confine 
the KPU within a few regions such as Nyanza and Nairobi, through various 
administrative-coercive methods as it had done with KADU (Gertzel, 1969:158-161; 
Mueller, 1984:411; Oyugi, 1994:161-162; Kyle, 1999:200). Between 1966 and 1969, 17 
of the 19 people detained were KPU members. The government as the dispenser of 
patronage resources also cancelled the appointments of KPU politicians to public 
enterprises, as well as other economic benefits such as loans from state financial 
institutions and preferential trade licenses (Kenya, 1966a:cols.158-168; Good, 1968:129-
130; Gertzel, 1969:162; Oyugi, 1994:162). 
The KANU government, also fearing the possibility that KPU radicals might 
establish a presence in Kenyan politics by gaining office through the local government 
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elections of 1968, directed the Provincial Administration to declare that, upon submission 
of their nomination forms, all KPU candidates be disqualified on the grounds that their 
nomination forms were not properly filled in. As a result, all KANU candidates were 
returned unopposed. After three years of almost complete political harassment and 
frustration, even the KPU leaders found the ideology of ethnicity difficult to resist. 
KANU officials could now claim that KPU was now a mere ethnic organization that 
could never have support anywhere in Kenya outside Nyanza Province (Bienen, 1974:71; 
Leys, 1976:237; Okumu, 1984:62; Orwa, 1984:4). The KPU was proscribed in October 
1969 following Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu in Nyanza Province, a stronghold of the KPU, 
supposedly to open a hospital, though on what was in effect a campaign tour. During his 
speech, Kenyatta launched a bitter and offensive attack on Odinga, angering the latter, 
and the crowd present. Following the speech, Odinga confronted Kenyatta in his 
motorcade, and the two exchanged bitter words. The tense crowd surged forward and 
pelted Kenyatta's motorcade with stones prompting his bodyguards to fire into the crowd, 
killing and wounding several people. The incident was blamed on the KPU leadership 
and the party was subsequently banned and the country reverted back to a de facto one 
party state. With the KPU out of the way, the long awaited KANU primaries were held 
without fear of the consequences (Meisler, 1970: 111-121; Leys, 1976:237; Alila, 
1984:39; Miller, 1984:46; Ochieng, 1989:208; Wanjohi, 1997:77; Sunday Nation (SN), 2 
April 2000:1). The ban was timely for KANU, as it was calculated to deny the KPU the 
opportunity of participating in the general elections, which ensued in December the same 
year. KANU was unsure of its own strength and popularity and therefore required 
government intervention to ensure its survival (Okumu, 1984:62; Wanjohi, 1997:139-
140). 
To the KANU government, the KPU was not only a potential threat to its political 
power, but also a threat to the economic development of the country. The government, 
whose leadership was engaged in a symbiotic relationship with western foreign capital, 
saw the KPU and its socialist ideals as a threat to this relationship and foreign 
investments. In its manifesto, the KPU claimed that it was committed to the 
nationalization of the means of production and the introduction of other radical socialist 
measures aimed at Africanizing the economy. This did not augur well for western 
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investors and it raised and confirmed their fears that the party and its leaders, particularly 
Odinga, were committed Communists. Foreign investors began expressing their 
suspicions that the country might turn to socialism and nationalize their investments, and 
as long as the KPU was active, they remained cautious in the amount of investments they 
brought into the country. Foreign aid meant for infrastructural development was thus kept 
at a minimum by most western donors, and it was not until the KPU was proscribed and 
KANU proved to be fully committed to a capitalist approach to socio-economic 
development, that much foreign aid started flowing into the country (Wanjohi, 1997:185). 
Though the KPU was short lived, it managed to challenge KANU to reassess its 
position and commitment to a number of social, economic and political issues facing it as 
a party as well as the country. When, in 1966, the KPU challenged KANU on the grounds 
that it had deviated from its original policies that had been set out in the KANU 1960 
constitution and manifesto, KANU responded by introducing in its constitution a 
preamble and some new aims and objectives in a bid to redefme its policies in the light of 
the prevailing situation. The ruling party now claimed to be both a political party and a 
mass movement and sought to establish its basis for the formation of government. The 
preamble stated that, "KANU is both a political party as well as a mass movement. As a 
political party, KANU will form the government .. . " (Wanjohi, 1997:127). The preamble 
went further to point out KANU's desire to control the government by emphasizing that: 
... KANU must be concerned with the need for stability, harmony, the rule 
of law and respect for the law and order .. . KANU will govern the country 
through the established structure of the civil service and administration. 
KANU' s policies will be reflected and implemented in the actions, 
administration, policies and legislation of the country... (Wanjohi, 
1997:127-128). 
Civil and political liberties became secondary to stability, harmony and the rule of 
law and respect for the law and order, and this was the only way KANU could acquire the 
amount of force it required to keep all other political elements permanently out of power 
(Wanjohi , 1997:128-129). The promises made by the KPU in its manifesto regarding the 
provision of free socio-economic services, such as education and welfare, popularized the 
party and also had significant effects on the KANU government. In the post-1969 general 
election period, the KANU government adopted some of these measures and made 
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primary and university education free and many government services free of charge, such 
as medical and veterinary services. In this respect, it can be argued that the KPU's 
challenge prompted KANU to more rapid measures to demonstrate that it, too, was able 
and willing to uplift the standards of living of the majority of the citizens (Wanjohi, 
1997: 187). Following its proscription, the country reverted back to a de facto one party 
state with KANU as the sole political party. Once again the ruling party had managed to 
control and purge the party system of other political parties. 
2.2.2 KANU, Intra-Party Power Struggles, and the Control of the State and Civil 
Society in the One Party State, 1969 to 1990 
Following the proscription of the KPU in 1969, Kenya remained a one-party state 
until 1991. The country was a de facto one-party state from 1969 to 1982, and thereafter a 
de jure one-party state following a constitutional amendment in 1982. The Kenyatta de 
facto one-party period from 1969 to 1978 saw the decline of the party and the rise of the 
executive as the dominant institution in the political process. During this period when the 
ruling party was dormant there was a resurgence of civil society organizations that came 
to provide alternative channels of political aspirations. In contrast, during the Moi era, the 
party emerged as the dominant force in the political process. During Moi's era, the party 
managed to dominate both state and civil society, to the extent that the party almost 
became the sole political actor in the political process. Civil society became increasingly 
stifled. While Kenyatta was a civil service man, Moi was a party man. 
The de facto one-party period, under President Kenyatta, saw the ruling party 
undergo a phase of internal confusion and dormancy. The party was largely moribund. It 
was a period characterized by the growth in power and independence of the executive, in 
particular with the rise of the presidency and associated with the decline of the party. 
KANU languished as "a loose, balloon-like system that could be activated in periods of 
crisis, for elections, or at times of national celebration" (Miller, 1984:41). The decline of 
KANU, at the expense of executive growth, during this period, was the result of two main 
factors: a series of constitutional amendments, and the fact that the party was reduced 
merely to an electoral party. Two important constitutional amendments affected the 
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growth of KANU during the Kenyatta era. These were the Constitution of Kenya 
(Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1966, which was a follow-up to the significant political 
decisions made at the Limuru KANU Conference, and the Constitution of Kenya 
(Amendment) Act, No. 45 of 1969 that changed the method of Presidential election, to 
direct popular election rather than election by Parliament. It also further relaxed the 
limitations by the Parliament on emergency powers, thus making it easier for the 
President to bring into force detention without trial (Ojwang, 1990:229-231). 
These amendments produced enormous snowballing effects that reduced the 
power and effectiveness of KANU as a policy-making institution. The net result was the 
emergence of government by an oligarchy of cabinet ministers and top state bureaucrats 
that became increasingly independent and occasionally defiant of the National Assembly. 
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, No.45 of 1968, for example, was used to 
detain without trial MPs who were critical of government policies or actions even when 
such criticism was constructive. Such severe disciplinary measures naturally inhibited 
MPs. These actions, coupled with the fact that the party's organs were rarely activated, 
reduced both the party' s and Parliament's abilities to question government policy, and 
subordinated the National Assembly to the executive. It also resulted in bouts of 
alienation between ministers and backbenchers (Okurnu, 1984:60-61). KANU was also 
weakened by the fact that it had been reduced merely to an electoral party. Its main 
functions were to facilitate the election of candidates to the National Assembly; to select 
candidates fo r parliamentary office; and to campaign on their behalf. This was supported 
by the fact that party activity regularly underwent resurgence during general or local 
government election years, with the printing of new membership cards, recruitment of 
new members, and exhortation of the achievements of the KANU government since 
independence. It also neglected its own party elections, thus weakening it further 
(Okumu, 1984:61; Miller, 1984:41; Berg-Schlosser, 1990:50). Consequently the ruling 
party became a vehicle for rallying support for some cause or to seek ways of containing 
political dissent in response to some political crisis (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980:88-106; 
Berg-Schlosser, 1990:50; Ogot, 1995: 189). 
The official view of KANU during Kenyatta's era was quite different from the 
reality. The ruling party was supposed to be a monolithic unified organization that 
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worked closely with the government. Kenyatta wanted the public to view the party as a 
unified and solid organization and opposition to the party as prohibited. In reality, 
however, KANU became a united front behind which political struggles were waged. The 
party was further marginalized following the resurgence of civil society organizations, 
particularly ethnic based socio-political organizations, which provided alternative 
political outlets and which competed with the ruling party for state resources. Ethnic 
organizations such as the Gikuyu Embu and Meru Association (GEMA), the Luo Union, 
the Abaluhya Association, New Akamba Union and the Kalenjin Association provided 
ethnic protection through solidarity in political lobbying for state patronage resources. 
Most significant of these was GEMA (Tamarkin, 1978:308-309; Miller, 1984:41-42; 
Oyugi, 1994: 173). 
GEMA, an ethnic investment company and political agency for the Kikuyu and 
associated ethnic groups, was formed in 1971 , when the Kikuyu governing elite was in 
the process of further consolidating its control of the state. It was a response to the 
political crises that followed Mboya's assassination, the proscription of the KPU, and the 
attempted coup of 1971, in which the Luo and Kamba were implicated. These crises were 
seen as a challenge to the regime and its major support base. GEMA was to become very 
powerful as almost to supplant KANU. In effect, through its control of state machinery 
and political power, GEMA came close to eclipsing the ruling party and one point the 
organization had to be reminded by Kenyatta that it could not be a substitute for KANU. 
It increasingly became the vehicle for ensuring the domination of national affairs by the 
Kikuyu ethnic group. The activities of GEMA and other ethnic organizations during 
much of the 1970s tended to undermine the standing of KANU in society (Nellis, 
1974:14-15; Miller, 1984:43; Ochieng, 1989: 216-217; Himbara, 1994:27&94-95; Oyugi, 
1994:171; Ogot, 1995:196; Wanjohi, 1997:78). 
During this period, when ethnic organizations served as alternative political 
outlets through which politicians channeled their political aspirations, the National 
Assembly became the realm for what remained of KANU's factional rivalry, especially 
after the 1974 General Election. In that year, a group of young radical leaders, such as 
George Anyona, James Orengo, Chelegat Mutai and Chibule wa Tsuma, among others 
were returned to parliament. During lively parliamentary debates they received support 
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from other government critics and from time to time, they decried the declining stature of 
the party and often challenged the regime on very sensitive issues. By 1975, they had 
constituted themselves into a force to be reckoned with, necessitating state intervention to 
contain them. The crisis that followed the assassination of Kariuki in 1975 provided the 
setting for the onslaught on the radicals. Not willing to allow any group to take advantage 
of the situation, the KANU government detained and imprisoned a number of radical 
MPs. Others fled the country to avoid imprisonment (Miller, 1984:53; Ochieng, 
1989:208; Himbara, 1994:119; Oyugi, 1994:171). Though Kenya continued to be 
nominally ruled by a party, by the time Kenyatta died in August 1978, the party was 
subordinate to the executive. Kenyatta realized from the outset that KANU, given its 
nature, was not strong enough to serve as an instrument of control. It was weak and did 
not control many resources. The state on the other had patronage resources at its disposal, 
which were used for regime consolidation. 
August 1978 saw the death ofKenyatta and the beginning of the Moi era. Moi had 
been the country's Vice-President since 1967, following the resignation of his 
predecessor Joseph Mururnbi. The Constitution of Kenya stipulates that the incumbent 
Vice-President assumes and exercises the functions of the President should the latter's 
office become vacant by reason of death, resignation, or physical or mental infirmity 
(Kenya, 1992:8-7). This made it relatively easy for Moi to assume power and by the time 
the KANU Delegates Conference was convened in October 1978 to nominate Moi as the 
presidential candidate, there was no effective opposition. Being the only political party at 
the time, its nomination of Moi was legally regarded as his election to a full term as 
president. His election was followed by party elections for other national officers, the 
first such since 1966. The November 1979 general elections saw the removal of many of 
the old Kenyatta guard, and the election to power, of many candidates loyal to Moi, 
effectively giving him a sweeping mandate and strengthening the regime (Okumu, 
1984:63; Miller, 1984:89; Berg-Schlosser, 1990:50). 
Throughout 1980, Moi continued to consolidate his power by strengthening the 
bureaucracy and gaining greater control in Parliament. He reshuffled his cabinet and 
expanded the number of ministers from twenty-four to twenty five. By also increasing the 
number of assistant ministers and exercising the right to nominate a few MP's, he raised 
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the number of government members in Parliament to more than 50 percent of the 
chamber, effectively curtailing opposition. Towards the end of 1980, Moi dissolved all 
ethnic organizations on the grounds of national unity, thereby curtailing other alternative 
formal channels of political expression. Consequently political discontent and tension 
continued to rise throughout 1980 and 1981 and subsequently, in May 1982, Odinga and 
George Anyona criticized Moi's government, suggesting it was time to form a socialist 
opposition party, and attempted to register, the Kenya African Socialist Alliance 
(KASA). Moi labeled Odinga's actions divisive and destructive and in June 1982, KANU 
rushed through parliament, a constitutional amendment making Kenya a de jure one-
party state. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 1982 introduced a 
new section, 2A, which stated that: "There shall be in Kenya only one political party, the 
Kenya African National Union" (Kenya, 1987:6). Subsequent to this amendment, all 
other sections of the constitution dealing with the election of the president and MP's or 
councillors were changed to provide for the nomination of KANU candidates only, in any 
subsequent elections. In addition all relevant sections of the National Assembly and 
Presidential Elections and Local Government Act were changed to make them consistent 
with the constitution in barring non-KANU members from being nominated and thereby 
being elected as president, parliamentarians or councillors. Meanwhile, Anyona was 
detained without trial, while Odinga was placed under house arrest (Currie and Ray, 
1984:581 ; Miller, 1984:89; Kenya, 1987:6; Ogot, 1995:202; Wanjohi, 1997:84; Adar, 
1999:350; Kyle, 1999:204). 
The effects of this constitutional amendment were felt almost immediately. 
Almost two months later on 1 August 1982, there was an attempted coup d'etat by some 
officers ofthe Kenya Air Force. During a radio broadcast to the country, the coup leaders 
cited the imposition of a de jure one-party state as one of their reasons for overthrowing 
the government. The coup was, however, quelled by forces loyal to Moi (African News, 
30 August, 1982: 12; Okumu, 1984:65; Ochieng, 1989:209; Kuria, 1991 :28;). Though 
Moi rejected this explanation advanced by the coup leaders, the political effects of the 1 
August coup attempt, forced the country to re-examine its organs of the state, including 
the role of KANU. Consequently, during his speech on Jamhuri (Independence) Day on 
12 December, Moi announced that the party would be revitalized and transformed into a 
68 
mass, disciplined and coherent party. To Moi's critics, however, the speech was merely 
an amateurish rationalization of political monolithism by KANU. The party was still 
poorly organized, especially at the grassroots level and it could not reach a consensus or 
hold party conferences and regular elections as stipulated in its constitution (Okumu, 
1984:63 ; Ogot, 1995:203-204). 
During this period, the party also made attempts to control internal factions in a 
bid to strengthen itself. Factionalism at the district, provincial and national levels, made it 
difficult for the party to come up with coherent and disciplined policy decisions and 
strategies that were in conformity with the one-party state. More important, the existence 
of strong factional leaders within KANU posed a serious threat and challenge to Moi' s 
position and that of his regime. To purge the system of such factional leaders, Moi called 
for a snap general election in 1983, a full year before they were due. Using state 
machinery, he successfully rigged out of Parliament, those who were disloyal, bringing in 
those loyal to him. The era of mass rigging of elections had effectively begun in post-
colonial Kenya (Miller, 1984:96-98; Okumu, 1984:63-64; Ogot, 1995:204; Wanjohi, 
1997:86-87). The 1983 general elections were of political significance in that they 
further consolidated Moi's power. Soon after, he began the task of strengthening KANU. 
Throughout 1984 and during the first half of 1985, Moi devoted his time to KANU's 
membership recruitment drive all over the country in which more than five million 
members were recruited. Party elections were also conducted the same year. These were 
followed by party reforms, which saw the implementation of controversial items, such as 
the establishment of the notorious disciplinary committee, primarily used to expel errant 
or rebel members from the party, and more importantly the introduction of the queuing 
system of voting (Ogot, 1995:205-206). 
The queuing system of voting was first used during the 1985 KANU grass-roots 
elections, even before it was formally endorsed as party policy. In 1986, KANU revised 
its constitution and formally incorporated queue voting as party policy. In April 1987, the 
ruling party announced that there would be preliminary elections in which voters would 
be required to queue behind candidates of their choice. In the February-March 1988 
general elections, this system was used as a nomination procedure, followed by secret 
ballot polls. The controversy was caused by the 70 percent rule, which spelt out that those 
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who obtained 70 percent and above ofthe votes cast at the queue-voting nomination were 
declared elected unopposed. Critics of the queuing system, who largely consisted of 
representatives of civil society, argued that the system was divisive in that several 
categories of Kenya citizens, such as the clergy, armed forces and some cadres of the 
civil service, could not participate in the lining-up nomination exercise for fear of being 
publicly identified with a particular aspirant. They also pointed out, that the 70 percent 
rule meant that non-K.ANU members registered as voters could not exercise their rights 
to vote in for MPs their constituencies as enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya. The 
party consensus, however, favoured the queuing system, arguing that the identification 
with candidates publicly during queue-voting nomination was not any more divisive than 
openly supporting a candidate during election campaigns. The 1988 general elections 
were to confinn the worst fears as predicted by critics. Party officials and the provincial 
administration manipulated the elections, rigging candidates in or out, according to 
political loyalty. The elections were transfonned into state controlled non-competitive 
elections, and the party became more important than the electorate thus solidifying Moi' s 
power and eroding democracy. The debate on the queuing system continued unabated 
until the system was abolished in 1991 (Ogot, 1995:207-208; Wanjohi, 1997:89; Adar, 
1999:35 1). 
In its pursuit of wider control of social diversities during the 1980's, KANU chose 
also to co-opt and affiliate key civil society organizations, such as the Maendeleo ya 
Wanawake and the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTV). In 1987, the party 
decided to affiliate the Maendeleo ya Wanawake organization, fonned in 1952, to 
KANU. This is a national women's organization, whose affiliation to KANU was aimed 
at strengthening the party in the rural areas, where the majority of the women are based. 
The modalities of this affiliation were, however, not clearly worked out. For instance, it 
was not clear whether KANU-Maendeleo ya Wanawake would remain an autonomous 
body, nor was it clear how the KANO Womens' League, the women's wing of the party, 
would coexist with KANU-Maendeleo ya Wanawake. According to some women leaders, 
this affiliation was a shrewd political strategy aimed at controlling and sidelining the 
political demands of Kenyan women. COTU, an umbrella organization for most trade 
unions in Kenya, was also affiliated to KANO, to widen the party's political strata. This 
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was also aimed at controlling the labour force and movement in the country (Ogot, 1995; 
208; AC, 24 May 1996: 6-7; Adar, 1999:350). Attempts to bring key civil society groups 
under the control of KANU, particularly women's groups and trade unions was a way of 
ensuring that the ruling party maintained its control over the largest number of the 
electorate, namely women and the workers, as well as to ensure firm control over 
potential areas of political discontent and extra-parliamentary opposition. 
By the end of the first decade of the Moi era, KANU had become the supreme 
political body in the country (Ogot, 1995 :208). In his speech to the nation 
commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Kenya's independence, on lamhuri Day, 
12 December 1988, Moi said: 
We have made strenuous efforts to strengthen the party . .. But we did not 
strengthen the party to give it dictatorial powers. KANU is the protector of 
the public against selfish and divisive interests of a few individuals in our 
society. It is the unifying force by which our people can fully participate in 
the democratic process, which is one of the most cherished goals of our 
freedom struggle (Kenya, 1988:12-13). 
Moi's speech was ironic in that it was true that KANU had become a powerful 
party in the political process, but the party had also become undemocratic and 
authoritarian, despite the fact that its leaders continued to call it democratic. KANU had 
closed up and usurped all alternative political outlets through which people could channel 
their political aspirations. The party also prohibited dissenting views. It is against this 
background of KANU's undemocratic and authoritarian nature that calls arose for the 
reintroduction of multi-partyism as a political system in Kenya in 1990. 
Conclusion 
Though the formation of formal political organizations dates back to the early 
1920s, meaningful political participation and consequently the politics of control and 
domination by the liberation movement began during the post-Second World War 
colonial period. During the 1920s and 1930s, many of these organizations began as 
welfare associations, and were mainly conservative, small and elitist, advocating socio-
economic grievances. As such they did not control broad social diversities and hence 
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could not be used for any meaningful socialization and mobilization in the struggle 
against colonialism. It was during this period that there emerged an indigenous African 
bourgeoisie or capitalist class that was to assume the leadership of these organizations 
and subsequent political organization. 
It was not until the post-Second World War colonial period that there was in 
essence meaningful political participation in the struggle against colonialism. It was 
during this period that KANU and its predecessors, KAU and the Mau Mau, emerged to 
playa dominant role in the liberation struggle, by incorporating new and diverse social 
forces. The struggle was no longer predominantly the preserve of the conservative or 
moderate elite, but now incorporated militant radical individuals and civil society 
organizations such as trade unions and indigenous religious movements. Peasants and the 
proletariat also became actively involved in the struggle as was evident in the Mau Mau 
movement. Both the KAU and the Mau Mau managed to enlist the support of, as well as 
control, civil society in order to mobilize the masses. The proscription of the KAU and 
the military defeat of Mau Mau led to economic and political reforms that saw the 
emergence of a new elite and subsequently an easing of the banning of African district-
based and later national political parties. This latter period saw the re-organization of the 
elite as a social force for democratization under KANU and KADU, through elite pacts in 
the constitution-making and electoral processes of the early 1960s. It was the former that 
was to dominate and control the processes, as was made evident by its electoral majority 
in the first post-colonial general elections of 1963. 
KANU's postcolonial dominance is, therefore, partly a consequence of its ability 
to control diverse social forces during the colonial period that were used for political 
socialization and mobilization against colonialism, and subsequently for electoral 
purposes. During the post-colonial pre 1992 period, the country was a de facto and de 
jure one-party state primarily as a result of the ruling party's authoritarian tactics of 
achieving single-party rule in a bid to maintain and augment its political power. The 
politics of domination during this period centered on the attempts by the political elite to 
control and dominate the political process, using the state and the party itself. Whereas 
during the Kenyatta era attempts to control and dominate the political process were made 
primarily thorough the state and its apparatuses, during the Moi era, this was achieved 
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through both the state and the party. In other words, whereas the state was supreme over 
the party during the Kenyatta era, it was the party that became supreme during the Moi 
era. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DOMINANT ROLE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN THE 
LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1912-1990 
3.0 Introduction 
In pursuit of their major aims and objectives of achieving independence from 
minority rule or any other form of domination, national liberation movements normally 
attempt to control wide social diversities, particularly to political socialization and 
mobilization. Where successful, they tend to dominate the pre-independence and post-
independent political process for a long time. The African National Congress CANC) was 
the oldest liberation movement in Africa, dating back to the early 1910s. After that, it 
came to playa dominant role in the liberation struggle in South Africa due to its ability to 
control, socialize and mobilize various socio-political forces in the country against 
apartheid and the apartheid state. This chapter attempts to demonstrate that the ANC's 
post-apartheid dominance as a political party is partly due to its historical role as the 
dominant player in the liberation struggle in South Africa. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines the ANC's politics 
of control and domination from its formation in 1912 to its barming in 1960. It looks at 
the growth of the movement from an elitist organization to a mass movement and its 
relationship with other organizations prior to its barming. The second part examines its 
new strategies of control, socialization and mobilization, from its barming in 1960 to its 
unbarming in 1990. Its politics of control and domination are largely examined within the 
context of social forces involved in the armed struggle, re-organization of the movement, 
civil society organizations, and the state, international and domestic capital. 
3.1 The Early Years, 1912 to 1940 
The emergence of territorial African nationalism in South Africa was primarily a 
response to the racial segregation system extended by the formation of the Union in 1910. 
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The Union of South Africa Act that was passed by the British House of Commons in 
1909 and ratified by the South African Parliament on 31 May 1910 constitutionalised a 
system of racial segregation and marked the beginning of the consolidation of white 
minority rule in South Africa. The new state immediately began passing a series of Acts 
many of which infringed on the fundamental rights and freedoms of non-whites, 
especially Africans (Luthuli, 1962:87-89; Barber, 1999:64; Meli, 1989:37). 
Consequently, sixty African delegates from all over South Africa, organized by people 
like Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, met at Bloemfontein on 8 January 1912 to inaugurate the 
South African Native National Congress (SANNC) (re-named the African National 
Congress (ANC) in 1925). The conference approved of the plan to form an organization 
for the unification of various ethnic groups along national lines. The Congress's aims and 
objectives centred mainly upon trying to advance African political rights within the 
existing South African constitution (Thema, 1953:2; Motlhabi, 1987:38-39; Tambo, 
1987:6-7; Meli, 1989:37-38). 
During its initial and early years, the Congress, like many other African liberation 
movements was in essence an elitist organization. Though it purported to advocate and 
advance African political rights, it consisted mainly of African elites whose educational 
backgrounds were mainly those of missionary institutions or institutions in Western 
countries. Other than these elites who believed in pursuing their objectives through 
constitutional means, it did not, therefore, control a variety of social forces. From the 
very beginning, the moderate SANNC leaders resolved to seek their aims by peaceful 
means and to encourage mutual understanding and unity across ethnic and racial groups. 
However, the passage of yet more racial Acts in the 1910s and 1920s that reinforced 
segregationist policies, and whose main impact fell on Africans, necessitated the 
establishment of national campaigns of protest (Stanbridge, 1980:67-68; Rich, 1996:16; 
Barber, 1999:67; Walshe, 1973: Rich, 1996:21-33;) 
However, between 1912 and the late 1930s, the ANC was, largely, inactive due to 
ideological differences between the moderates in leadership, and the emergent radicals, 
over the question of segregation. As a result, moderate leaders ran out of effective options 
and for a long time, the ANC lost its vigour and direction. It continued to view its tasks as 
those of furthering African rights through constitutional means and advocating 
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constitutional changes to achieve a multi-racial society through the provision of 
educational and social facilities for Africans and by opposing racial discrimination (Rich, 
1996:21; Meli, 1989:48; Barber, 1999:79; ANC, 2000a: 2). By the late 1920s, with the 
introduction of new racist laws such as the Native Administration Bill of 1927, and the 
election of militants into leadership positions, the ANC realised that it needed to set up 
links with other socio-political forces in a bid to achieve its objectives. The ANC hoped 
to broaden its social base so as to become functionally more effective. The passing of the 
Native Administration Bill of 1927 into law coupled with the election of the militant and 
radical Josiah Gwnede as its President in 1927, radicalized a conservative section of the 
ANC leadership and helped swing the movement to the left. Gumede tried to revitalize 
the ANC in a bid to fight racist policies more effectively by calling for a more militant 
and radical approach and hoping that the communists would make a contribution to this 
struggle by cooperating with the ANC. The moderates, however, unhappy with his 
militant and radical approach, voted him out of office in 1930, replacing him with the 
more conservative Seme. The election of Seme threw the ANC into a period of inactivity 
during the 1930s (Rich, 1996:33-34; Barber, 1999:97-98; ANC, 2000a: 2; Meli, 1989:74 
-78). 
The ANC' s inactivity during this period consequently led to the emergence of new 
movements to occupy the political space created. The most notable among these were the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) formed in January 1919 and the 
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) formed in July 1921. The ICU soon became a 
national African movement incorporating both urban and rural workers. Many Africans 
in South Africa came to view the ICU as an alternative vehicle for channelling their 
political aspirations, following the dormancy of the ANC (Wickens, 1978: 113; Meli, 
1989:66). The ICU was primarily concerned with the immediate day-to-day socio-
economic and political affairs of its urban and rural fo llowers. It also advanced broader 
political aims as the only way to achieve its ends (Rich, 1996:43-44; Roux, 1978:158; 
Barber, 1999:98-99). The ICU's impact was significant. Initially it managed to put aside 
political differences and difficulties and spread nationally, skilfully combining the 
strength of a trade union with the drive of a political party. Like the ANC, it was 
committed to a united South Africa based on the principle of equality of opportunity and 
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African political participation in a single society. Though there was no formal 
cooperation between the two organizations, one of the factors that facilitated the spread 
of the ICU, was the help and assistance it received from the ANC leaders (Barber, 
1999:99; Meli, 1989:66-67). The CPSA on the other hand, emerged out of the 
combination of a number of groups on the left in South Africa. Its origins lay with radical 
white workers and intelligentsia and it took some years to build up an African following. 
The CPSA was committed to the establishment of wide and close contacts among 
workers of all ranks and races (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:13-14; Rich, 1996: 51-521; 
Clingman, 1998: 127). 
However, despite their initial success, both organizations were soon riddled with 
problems. The ICU began to decline rapidly, as a result of several factors. It began facing 
threats from the government, and more importantly, a lack of organizational coherence 
and discipline. Leadership wrangles based on ideological differences as well as fmancial 
difficulties and scandals emerged. Frustrations among the rank and file soon set in and by 
the early 1930s, the ICU had fragmented into a number of small, ineffective bodies. 
Notwithstanding its short life, the ICU nevertheless, altered the political landscape of 
African politics in South Africa as it demonstrated the possibilities of mass political 
organization (Meli, 1989:68-72; Barber, 1999:100; Rich, 1996:46; Clingman, 1998:133). 
For the CPSA, political differences on how to achieve harmony between race and class 
began to emerge. As African membership increased, the CPSA also increasingly began to 
adopt the doctrine of national liberation, in as much as there was a Euro-centric view that 
the white working class were the main engine of revolutionary change. Party policy by 
the late 1920s tended to be increasingly shaped in a single direction by the Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow imposing a line that suited appropriately its general objectives of 
winning over the African working class and disparaging contending appeals from 
Garveyism and Pan-Africanism. Garveyism was based on Marcus Garvey's slogan 
'Africa for the Africans' and it was based on the 'Quit Africa' slogan and on the cry 
'Hurl the White Man into the sea'. Pan-Africanism, on the other hand, was based on the 
goal of winning national freedom for African people and the inauguration of a people's 
free society where racial oppression and persecution would be outlawed (ANC, 1948). By 
1929, the CPSA was riddled with factional differences concerning African leadership and 
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despite attempts by African members to correct these differences the party had lost 
considerable support in South Africa by 1935. Earlier in August 1931, some leaders had 
called for an alliance with the ANC, but the mainstream party hierarchy did not favour 
this (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:13-20; Rich, 1996: 52-56; Clingman, 1998:127). Unlike the 
ICU, the CPSA was never a mass party. Party commitment and not size, was its priority. 
Though it had a substantial number of African members, whites retained a powerful 
influence over it. Party members spread their influence both directly through party 
activity and by penetrating other movements. Yet despite all this, it continued to exercise 
a considerable influence in South African politics (Bundy, 1987:261; Ellis and Sechaba, 
1992:25; Clingman, 1998:130-132; Barber, 1999:101-103). 
With the collapse of the ICU, the factionalism of the CPSA, and the continued 
inactivity of the ANC in the 1930s, a new broad-based body, to coordinate African action 
on African issues soon emerged. This was the All-African Convention (AAC) formed, at 
Bloemfontein in December 1935, under the chairmanship of Professor D.D.T. labavu, as 
an umbrella organization within which all existing African groups, such as the ANC, ICU 
and CPSA, could be linked. It was not meant to phase out or replace any organization 
(Meli, 1989:84; Rich, 1996:57). The AAC intended to unite African opposition to the 
Native Trust and Land Bill of 1935. It also sought to encourage worldwide condemnation 
of imperialism in Africa. The AAC recommended that a common citizenship in a single 
state replace segregation. It sent a delegation to Pretoria to pursue its case, but this was 
rejected, placing the AAC moderate leaders in a dilemma. During the following 
conference of the AAC in 1936, labavu and other AAC leaders adopted a more militant 
position, whereby protest meetings were held, strong resolutions passed, new methods 
discussed and proposals made for action. There was, however, no body organized to take 
militant action nor were there any leaders willing to take up such action (Meli, 1989:86; 
Barber, 1999:112-113). The AAC, too, had its internal and organizational weaknesses. It 
was a consortium of diverse and contradictory forces, expressing both militancy and 
conservatism, and this made it inadequate to tackle the complex problems it faced. 
Moreover, it had no organizational bases apart from some splintered and weak factions 
and in the long run it was the ANC rather than the AAC that held hope for the future 
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(Meli, 1989:85-87; Simons and Simons, 1969:581 ; Karis and Carter, 1973:340-346; Gish, 
2000:133-134). 
Despite its relative inactivity during these early years, the ANC achieved some 
milestones, notably campaign protests, in pursuit of its aims (ANC, 2000b: 1). The ANC 
also made attempts to broaden its control and influence of social diversities in the country 
to help it achieve its aims and objectives. Seme continued to emphasize the need for 
cooperation between Africans and whites and among Africans themselves. However, he 
devoted little time to the ANC and political activity as a whole. As a result, the ANC 
went into decline and factionalism intensified. The ANC was, nevertheless, kept alive by 
leaders such Rev. Z.R. Mahabane who succeeded Seme in 1937, as president for the 
second time. Under his leadership, the ANC, from 1939, began a slow revival by 
appealing to established values and using the few legal channels open to Africans 
(Barber, 1999:113-114; Meli, 1989:87). 
3.1.2 The Resurrection of the ANC, 1940 to 1949 
The relative inactivity of the ANC during its early years was the result of a 
number of factors ranging from organisational weakness to a conservative leadership that 
usually believed in less militant and more constitutional approaches to the African 
question. It was not until the 1940s, with the election of Alfred B. Xuma as the President 
of the ANC, that the organisation began to resuscitate. This was a period that witnessed 
not only the resurrection of the ANC, but also the adoption of the Atlantic Charter and 
the African Claims, as well as the formation of the ANC Youth League, which played a 
leading role in the revitalisation of the party. 
Alfred B. Xuma assumed the presidency of the ANC in December 1940. This was 
a time of rapid change in South Africa due to the Second World War. There was a rapid 
increase in industrialisation, urbanisation and consequently the dramatic growth of a large 
urban African class that had a significant impact on African politics. It also witnessed the 
reorganisation and expansion of African trade unions, townships, and a higher frequency 
of clashes between township residents and the police. There was the reawakening and 
emergence of a new period of militant African protest (Luthuli, 1962:98; Karis and 
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Carter, 1973:79-81; Walshe, 1982:265; Lodge, 1983:11-12; Gish, 2000:110). The 
organisation Xuma inherited, however, lacked the organisational capacity to meet these 
challenges. The ANC's membership was small, numbering in hundreds. It was elitist and 
predominantly composed of professionals, thus lacking mass support. It also lacked 
adequate fmancial resources and normally confined itself to issuing periodic resolutions 
protesting government policy as well as drafting reports on conditions facing Africans. It 
was against this background that Xuma set out to reorganize and revitalize the ANC 
(Benson, 1963:95-96; Walshe, 1982: 249-265; Gish, 2000:110-111). To control and 
influence these new emerging social, economic and political forces in order to meet the 
new challenges, the ANC had to strengthen its institutional capacity. This required it to 
develop its leadership, doctrines, programmes, financial and human resources, and 
societal linkages to make it more effective as an agent of mass socialization and 
mobilization. 
Within six months of taking office as president, Xuma outlined his vision in a 
document entitled The Policy and Platform of the African National Congress, which 
called upon the movement to re-ignite the spirit of African political initiative (Gish, 
2000: 111). This vision was based on two main arguments. That, firstly there was an 
urgent need for improved organization. Secondly, there was also the urgent need for a 
clear programme. To him, no race could rise unless it expressed itself through a 
recognized organization for common action. Hence, Africans needed to unite and speak 
for themselves through their own national organization, one that would explore all 
constitutional means to gain their right of citizenship. It was only through a strengthened 
ANC that Africans could achieve their rights and establish harmonious coexistence with 
other races (Walshe, 1982:265; Gish, 2000: 111). To achieve his objectives, Xuma speIt 
out a wide ranging set of goals, such as secure African voting rights and direct African 
representation in all governing bodies, among other socio-economic rights (Gish, 
2000: 111). By the time his first term as president was approaching its end in 1943, the 
organizational machinery had grown in strength. Its revised constitution ratified at its 
December 1943 conference also streamlined and democratized the ANC's internal 
structure. It abolished the upper house of chiefs and established a working committee to 
administer the organization on a day-to-day basis and also extended equal membership 
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rights to women for the first time (Gish, 2000:114-115). Xuma also managed to secure 
grants totaling several hundred pounds from the relatively new Bantu Welfare Trust 
between 1942 and 1943. The Trust was established by a businessman, Colonel 
Donaldson, and run under the auspices of the South African Institute of Race Relations 
(SAIRR). The Trust awarded substantial amounts of money to organizations that 
promoted African welfare, and it became a steady source of funds for the ANC in the 
1940s (Rich, 1996: 103; Barber, 1999:126-127; Gish, 2000:117). 
The Second World War also had a significant impact on the ANC and South 
African politics in general as it provided the foundations for the Atlantic Charter of 1941 
and the African Claims. In brief, the Atlantic Charter reaffirmed faith in the dignity of 
each human being and propagated a host of democratic principles. Its cardinal points 
were freedom from fear, want and oppression. It clearly stated that a people should be 
free to determine the type of government under which they lived (Mandela, 1996: 11 0; 
Walshe, 1982:272; Barber, 1999:125-126). The War provided Xuma and other ANC 
leaders with the opportunity to argue that the participation of Africans in the war could be 
used as leverage to call for equal rights. By demonstrating African loyalty to the state, 
Xuma believed that the state would reciprocate in kind. He sought to base the African 
case on the moral principles for which the war was being fought (Gish, 2000: 118). 
Though little was done to change the existing legislative structure, the South African 
government, nonetheless, gave Xuma some cause for optimism. By 1942, the Smuts 
administration had indicated its intention to shift away from some of the harsh 
segregationist policies of the Hertzog government and it began to implement some 
modest socio-economic reforms (Gish, 2000:118-119; Benson, 1963:100-101; Lodge, 
1983: 12-14; Rich, 1984:74; Walshe, 1982:263-270). 
Despite few achievements, Xuma continued to maintain that the war provided 
opportunities for the reshaping of South African society. Consequently by mid-1942 he 
decided that the ANC needed to develop a major response to the war. Xuma presented his 
strategy at the ANC's December 1942 conference where he established a special 
committee to study the Atlantic Charter's relevance to South Africa from an African 
perspective, and to draft a Bill of Rights for South Africa for presentation at the peace 
conference at the end of the war. The Atlantic Charter Committee met at Bloemfontein 
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on 13-14 December and a document entitled Africans' Claims in South Africa was 
produced It represented the most comprehensive statement on African rights ever issued 
by the ANC (Gish, 2000:121; ANC, 1943). 
Africans ' Claims in South Africa was divided into two sections. The first section 
'The Atlantic Charter and the Africans' examined the Charter's eight points in an attempt 
to clarify their meaning and applicability in South Africa. The second section comprised 
a 'Bill of Rights' in which Xuma's earlier themes and those of the Policy and Platform of 
the African National Congress were repeated and elaborated. For Africans, the document 
was to be a challenge to organise and unite themselves under the mass liberation 
movement, the ANC, in a struggle that was to go on until freedom, right and justice were 
won for all races to participate in the political process in South Africa (Walshe, 
1982:274-276; Meli , 1989:94-95; Gish, 2000:121; ANC, 1943: Barber, 1999:127-128). 
Africans ' Claims in South Afi-ica was published as a pamphlet and was adopted by the 
Annual Conference of the ANC on 16 December 1945. The document became the basic 
policy statement upon which later ANC documents were essentially based. While it 
reflected past ideals, it was also supported by the newly formed pressure group within the 
ANC: the Congress Youth League (Meli, 1989:95; Walshe, 1982:274). 
The production of the document and its support by the younger generation was an 
indicator that the ANC was determined to incorporate new social forces to help turn the 
organization into a mass movement in preparation for militant action as a means to an 
end. As the war favourably progressed towards an end, militant black South Africans, 
such as the African Democratic Party (ADP), formed in 1943, began to question Xuma's \ 
leadership and the ANC's moderate constitutional strategies. However, his greatest 
challenge came from the younger generation within the ANC who eventually formed the 
African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) (Karis and Carter, 1973:110-1 12; R. 
Bernstein, 1999:199; Gish, 2000:126-130). Xuma, who had earlier recognised the need 
for independent initiatives and a militant and strong national organisation, encouraged 
young Africans to join and participate actively alongside the more established leadership 
consisting of intellectuals and professionals. In response, a new generation of educated 
young Africans began joining the ANC from 1941. These included among others, Anton 
Lembede, Nelson Mandela, A.P. Mda, Jordan Ngubane, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. 
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Many of them felt that the ANC had become the preserve of a moderate, privileged 
African elite more concerned with protecting its own rights than those of the masses. 
They saw the ANC's approach towards the government as regrettably inadequate and 
proposed that the organisation joins hands with the African masses and adopt new 
strategies of non-cooperation (Gish, 2000:130-131 ; Walshe, 1982:350; Mandela, 
1996:111-112; Karis and Carter, 1973:102). 
The general consensus among the younger generation was that some action had to 
be taken to rectify the situation. They, therefore, proposed the formation of a Youth 
League as a way of rekindling the fire under the leadership of the AN C (Mandela, 
1996: 112). Rather than forming a breakaway faction, the younger members opted to 
reform the ANC from within under the auspices of a youth league. This proposal was 
forwarded to the ANC, and in December 1943, the ANC conference formally endorsed 
the establishment of the ANCYL. In March 1944, the provisional committee of the 
ANCYL produced the League's manifesto (Benson, 1963 :102-118; ANC, 1944: 1). The 
formation of the ANCYL took place in April 1944 at a meeting in Johannesburg where 
Anton Lembede was elected president, Oliver Tambo secretary and Walter Sisulu 
treasurer. A.P Mda, and Nelson Mandela among others were elected to the Executive 
Committee (Mandela, 1996: 114). African Nationalism was their call and their creed was 
the creation of one nation out of many racial and ethnic groups, the overthrow of white 
supremacy and the establishment of a truly democratic form of government. Initially, the 
ANCYL adopted the philosophy of Africanism, developed by Lembede, which revolved 
around the concepts ofrace, pride, self-reliance and 'Africa for the Africans' (Karis and 
Carter, 1973 :103; Meli, 1989:131; Mandela, 1996:114; Gish, 2000:132). While 
acknowledging the criticisms and shortcomings of the ANC, the ANCYL, nevertheless, 
pointed out in its Youth League Manifesto 1944 that "The African National Congress is 
the symbol and embodiment of the African' s will to present a united national front 
against all forms of oppression" (ANC, 1944: 4). The ANCYL further stated in its 
Manifesto that its formation was an attempt to impart to the ANC a trnly national 
character. It was to be the brains trnst and power station of the spirit of African 
nationalism; the spirit of African self-determination (ANC, 1944:5). The ANCYL also 
emphasised national unity as a guiding principle in the liberation struggle. To that end, 
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Africanism was to be promoted, as it was the goal of all struggles (ANC, 1944:6-7; Karis 
and Carter, 1973:318; Motlhabi, 1987:41; Gish, 2000:132). In short the ANC was to be 
the vanguard ofthe liberation struggle. 
Following the death of Lumbede in 1947 and the appointment of A.P. Mda as 
president, the League began placing more emphasis on African Nationalism rather than 
Africanism, implying a reduced emphasis on racial peculiarities (Walshe, 1982:356-375). 
With the resumption to power by the Nationalist Party (NP) in 1948, the ideology of 
African Nationalism took on a different meaning and it became more pronounced and 
more widely accepted within the ANCYL. The 1948 election and thereafter the 
imposition of apartheid, was not only a triumph for the NP, but was also to usher in a 
period of Afrikaner Nationalism. To the Nationalists, South Africa was a white man' s 
country (Mandela, 1996: 127-128; Mbeki, 1996:5; O'Meara, 1996:43). As a reaction to 
the imposition of apartheid, segregationist laws and white supremacy, the ANCYL 
emphasised African Nationalism as the basis for its political, economic, educational, 
cultural and social programme in its ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document 1948 
(ANC, 1948: 1). Two streams of African Nationalism prevailed, which appeared to be in 
disharmony as was outlined in this policy document. One centred round Marcus Garvey's 
slogan on 'Africa for the Africans ' and was based on the ' Quit Africa' slogan. To the 
ANCYL, this brand of African Nationalism was extreme and ultra-revolutionary and 
hence it adopted the other more moderate brand, which advocated a multi-cultural and 
non-racial society (ANC, 1948:5). Initially, the ANCYL, being cornmitted to working 
from within the ANC, was restrained and influenced by the established ideology of the 
parent body's non-racial ideas and relative moderation. However, as the NP government 
began implementing its apartheid programme, the ANC decided to embark on yet more 
militant programmes (Walshe, 1982:352-353; Mandela, 1996:129-130). The ANC had 
now formally begun to recognise and accept multi-culturalism and non-racialism was an 
integral part of its ideology if it hoped to incorporate diverse interests in its struggle 
against apartheid. 
In 1948, the ANCYL presented a Programme of Action to the annual conference 
of the ANC, indicating clearly rising pressures that centred increasingly on its concept of 
African Nationalism. This ideological discipline was to be allied with mass support, 
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boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience and non-cooperation (Walshe, 1982:289; Tambo, 
1987:34). In accepting the Programme of Action in 1949, the ANC launched a landmark 
effort to tum itself into a truly mass organisation and it challenged the cautious and 
committed leadership of Xuma. The ANCYL leaders emphasised that the time had come 
for non-violent mass action. Its leaders asserted that the ANC had become docile in the 
face of oppression and pointed out that ANC leaders must be willing to sacrifice their 
lives, violate the law and if necessary go to prison for their beliefs. Xuma, though in 
agreement with the goals of the Programme of Action, adamantly opposed the methods of 
the programme, claiming that such strategies were fatal, premature and would merely 
give the govemment an opportunity to suppress the ANC. He also made it clear to the 
ANCYL leaders that he was not willing to jeopardise his medical career by going to 
prison (Benson, 1963 :173; Walshe, 1982:291; Mandela, 1996:130-131; Barber, 
1999: 146; Gish, 2000: 159-161). This angered the ANCYL leaders who sponsored Dr. 
1.S. Moroka as an alternative candidate for the presidency at the annual conference of the 
ANC in 17 December 1949. Xuma lost to Moroka who became the president of the ANC. 
Sisulu was elected the new secretary-general and Tambo was elected to the National 
Executive (Walshe, 1982:290; Mandela, 1994:132; Barber, 1999:146). It was at this 
conference that the ANCYL's Programme of Action was finally adopted. The ANC 
called for extra constitutional forms of mass action, which was a radical change as the 
ANC policy had always been to use constitutional and legal means (Walshe, 1982:288-
290; Mandela, 1996:130). To the ANCYL, the very process of attempting mass action 
would activate latent support for the ANC and provide the opportunity to attract a mass 
following (Walshe, 1982:291). The ANC, in its Programme of Action: Statement of 
Policy Adopted at the ANC Annual Conference 17 December 1949, stated that the 
fundamental principles of the Programme of Action were inspired by the desire to 
achieve national freedom from white domination and to attain political independence 
(ANC, 1949: 1). The Programme of Action accepted the Bill of Rights in Part II of 
African's Claims. Self-determination for Africans was to be achieved under the banner of 
African Nationalism. This did not imply any moves toward a vindictive black racialism, 
but meant accommodating minority groups, getting rid of foreign domination and white 
supremacy CANC, 1949:1-2; Walshe, 1982:291-294). 
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By committing itself to become a truly mass organization, the ANC began to set 
up links with other organizations involved in the liberation struggle. These organizations 
primarily represented other races oppressed under apartheid policies, reflecting the 
ANC's desire to broaden its social base and its commitment to non-racialism. The 
ANCYL leaders were now guiding the ANC to a more radical and revolutionary path, 
and the ANC, supported by the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the African 
People's Organisation (APO), resolved to stage a National Day of Protest on 26 June 
1950 against the government's murder of eighteen Africans who were on strike on I May 
1950. It was also a protest against the passage of the Suppression of Communism Act. 
The Day of Protest was the ANC's first attempt to hold a political strike on a national 
scale, and it was a moderate success. It boosted the ANC's morale, making the 
organisation realise its strength. Thereafter, there were a series of protest demonstrations 
that culminated in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 (Stanbridge, 1980:71-72; Walshe, 
1982:289-290; Meli, 1989:119; Mandela, 1996:132-136). 
3.1.3 The Growth of the ANC as a Mass Movement, 1950 to 1960 
The 1950's were a period that saw the ANC grow into a mass movement. This 
was due to a number of activities aimed at intensifYing the liberation struggle. The mass 
actions adopted a militant approach and involved mobilising the masses on a much higher 
scale than previously via such activities as the Defiance Campaign and the Congress of 
the People (which led to the drafting of the Freedom Charter and the establishment ofthe 
Congress Alliance). 
This period saw a variety of socio-political forces come directly and indirectly 
under the control and influence of the ANC, making it the dominant movement in the 
liberation struggle against apartheid and the apartheid state. The assumption of power by 
the NP in 1948 led to the enactment of several apartheid laws aimed at entrenching racial 
discrimination. Apart from the Suppression of Communism Act, two laws were also 
passed in 1950 that formed the cornerstones of apartheid. These were the Population 
Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. The following year, 1951, the government 
passed two more laws that directly infringed upon the rights of Coloureds and Africans. 
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The Separate Representation of Voters' Act, on the one hand, aimed to transfer 
Coloureds to a separate voters' role in the Cape, thereby diluting the franchise rights that 
they had enjoyed for more than a century. The Bantu Authorities Act, on the other, 
abolished the Natives' Representative Council, the one indirect forum of national 
representation for Africans, and replaced it with a hierarchical system of tribal chiefs 
appointed by the government. The government's aim was to restore power to traditional 
chiefs and mainly conservative ethnic leaders in order to perpetuate ethnic differences 
that were beginning to erode (Waishe, 1982:293; Meli, 1989:120-121; Mandela, 
1996:141; De Klerk, 1998:14-15; Gish, 2000:177). 
The enactment of the Separate Representation of Voters Act had a significant 
impact among the Coloured people. They rallied against the Act, organising a tremendous 
demonstration in Cape Town and a successful strike in March and April 1951 
respectively. It was in the context of this spirit of activism by Indians, Coloureds and 
Africans that Sisulu first broached the idea of a national civil disobedience campaign to a 
small group of people in the ANC. Sisulu outlined a plan under which, selected 
volunteers from all groups would deliberately invite imprisonment by defying certain 
laws (Mandela, 1996:141). 
The Defiance Campaign was organised by a joint planning council consisting of 
ANC and SAIC members. Although this campaign was primarily an ANC campaign, "it 
was all embracing and involved all the democratic forces within South Africa" (Meli, 
1989:120-121). Plans for the Defiance Campaign were approved at the ANC's December 
1951 annual conference. The Campaign was directed at all racially discriminatory laws, 
but its immediate targets were the Suppression of Communism Act, the Group Areas Act, 
The Separate Representation of Voters Act, the Bantu's Authorities Act, the pass laws 
and stock limitation laws. The ANC gave the government ultimatums to repeal these laws 
by 29 February 1952, failure to comply with which would lead to the ANC and SAIC 
launching a mass campaign of defiance of apartheid laws by way of protest. The object of 
the campaign was to deliberately violate the laws as an act of protest. Their demands 
were ignored and the executives of the ANC and SAIC announced that the Defiance 
Campaign would begin on 26 June 1952. The Campaign was intended to serve notice to 
the whole country that apartheid would no longer be submissively tolerated (Luthuli, 
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1962:115; Karis and Carter, 1973:413; Meli, 1989:121; Mandela, 1996:142; Barber, 
1999:146; R. Bernstein, 1999:134-135; Gish, 2000:177). In response, the apartheid 
govenunent introduced special legislation to deal with the defiance. In 1953, it 
implemented the Public Safety Act, which empowered it to declare martial law and to 
detain people without trial. The govenunent also introduced the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, which authorised corporal punishment for anyone breaking the law "by 
way of protest" (Meli, 1989:121). The latter Act posed critical decisions for the Defiance 
Campaign leaders and the ANC and SAIC acknowledged that continuing the defiance in 
such circumstances would be reckless. Both Congresses decided to call a halt to the 
Campaign (Resha, 1991 :90; R. Bernstein, 1999: 136). 
The ANC, as an initiator of the Defiance Campaign, managed to achieve the task 
of political socialization and consequently mobilization, by conscientizing other 
movements on the need to take up a more active role as a united front in the liberation 
struggle. The Defiance Campaign represented a new phase in the South African liberation 
struggle. It established two principles. Firstly, there could be no liberation of the 
oppressed without sacrifice and readiness to face imprisonment. Secondly, the liberation 
of the oppressed people in South Africa could only come about as a result of extra-
constitutional struggle. The Campaign left behind a new mood of black self-confidence 
and assertiveness. It also proved to be an effective form of training disciplined volunteers 
and mobilising the masses in non-violent action. It also transformed the character of the 
ANC, strengthened the leadership and attracted many new members. As a result of the 
Campaign, its membership swelled to 100,000 "with many times that number of 
politically conscious supporters" (Lodge, 1983:43-45; Meli, 1989:121; Mandela, 
1996:159; Barber, 1999:146-147; R. Bernstein, 1999:138). The Campaign also stimulated 
the growth of militancy within other black organisations, such as the South African 
Coloured People's Organisation (SACPO), successor to the APO, and the SAIC. The 
Campaign leaders also challenged liberal and democratic white South Africans other than 
those of the South African Communist Party (SACP) who occasionally collaborated with 
the ANC, to participate in the struggle to end injustice. This later initiated the emergence 
of the Congress of Democrats (COD), a white group of ANC-oriented persons committed 
to ANC policy. Many members of the COD were members of the SACP as well (Gerhart, 
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1978:106-107; Tambo, 1987:35; Meli, 1989:121-122; Mandela, 1996:159-160 &200; R. 
Bernstein, 1999:135-138). The Defiance Campaign saw many leaders of the ANC 
arrested, resulting in a leadership crisis within the organisation. Moroka was arrested and 
brought to trial with others, and was subsequently replaced by Chief Luthuli at the 
ANC's annual conference in December 1952. 
Luthuli's presidency was characterised by the spread of activity and radicalisation 
of the organisation. It was during his presidency that the ANC involved the masses in 
direct struggle, transforming it into a mass-based organisation (Meli, 1989:122-123). 
During the following year, plans to initiate the Freedom Charter were launched. At the 
1953 ANC annual conference, Professor Z.K. Matthews, articulated the idea of a 
Congress of the People (COP) to bring together representatives of all South Africans to 
draw up a people's charter of rights, the Freedom Charter. Within months, the ANC 
national conference accepted the proposal and a Council of the COP created. It was 
agreed that suggestions for a new constitution were to be people-driven and the ANC 
leaders from all over the country were authorised to seek ideas from the people (ANC, 
1953:1; Matthews, 1983; Meli, 1989:123; Mandela, 1996:199; Clingman, 1998:233; 
Barber, 1999:150). A wide range of organisations were invited to participate in the COP 
including the NP. However none of the white parliamentary parties responded. 
Nevertheless, the COP generated great enthusiasm and many civil society organisations 
gave their support. The COP was the beginning of the Congress Alliance, comprising the 
ANC, the SAIC, the SACPO, the COD, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU). There was overwhelming response to requests for suggestions on the Freedom 
Charter. The ANC branches also contributed a great deal to the writing of the Charter. 
The Freedom Charter itself was compliled by Rusty Bernstein and reviewed by the 
ANC's National Executive (R. Bernstein, 1999: 160-161; ANC, 1954:1;Meli, 1989:124; 
Resha, 1991:90-91; Mandela, 1996:199-201; Barber, 1999:150). 
In June 1955, more , than 3000 delegates consisting of all races, though 
predominantly Africans, assembled for the COP at Kliptown where, the Freedom Charter 
and was accepted by acclamation. The COP adopted the Charter, and various groups in 
the Alliance also subsequently adopted it at their annual conferences. The Freedom 
Charter became the common programme enshrining the hopes and aspirations of all the 
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progressive people of South Africa (Luthuli, 1962: 160; Meli, 1989: 124; Resha, 1991 :91-
93 ; Clingman, 1998:233-235; Barber, 1999:150). It was a statement of aims and ideals. It 
did not concern itself with the methods of achieving these aims and ideals. The methods 
of achieving these aims were speJt out in the Strategy and Tactics Document of the ANC 
1969 as outlined later in the chapter. The Freedom Charter extolled the abolition of racial 
discrimination and the achievement of equal rights for all. It welcomed all who embraced 
freedom to participate in the making of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South 
Africa (ANC, 1955:1-5). 
From the beginning, the Charter attracted much controversy with regard to its 
drafting, its interpretation, and its implications for the future. Debates revolved around 
three main issues: race, the role of communists and revolution (Luthuli, 1962:158-159; 
Kotze, 1993:1-38; Barber, 1999:151-152; R. Bernstein, 1999:160-161). Despite his 
doubts about communism, Luthuli was confident that the ANC was not under communist 
control, and he was not prepared to split the party in this matter (Luthuli, 1962: 156; 
Barber, 1999:152). To the government, the Charter was a revolutionary document whose 
aim could only be realised by violence and on 27 September 1955, the police made their 
largest raid yet searching properties and arresting up to 500 people, followed by 
restriction and barming orders. Subsequently the government made the Charter a central 
document in the Treason Trial, which started in 1956. The ANC rejected the claim that 
the Charter was revolutionary in that it was not an attempt to overthrow the government 
by violent means. For the whites, it was at best an unreliable wish list, and at worst a call 
to bloody revolution. For the ANC, the Charter helped to hold members together beneath 
a great umbrella under which all Africans could find shelter. In summary, the Freedom 
Charter contained a mixture of aims based on liberalism, egalitarianism, and socialism, 
leaving it open to a variety of interpretations. (Barber, 1999: 152-153). 
The Treason Trial, which began in December 1956, brought together people of 
different races and political beliefs. Their common experiences during the Trial forged a 
new sense of unity among them in opposition to the apartheid government. However, 
despite this new sense of unity, the ANC found itself fighting an internal battle in the late 
1950s: a challenge, which came from the Africanists (Barber, 1999:154). The rise of the 
Africanists from the mid-1950s posed the most serious threat to ANC unity in the 
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organisation's history. The Africanists, like the ANCYL, were militant young men, 
frustrated by what they thought was a lack of drive and initiative in the ANC leadership. 
They also claimed that the ANC leaders had failed to represent the true aspirations of the 
majority of the African people. The internal division was aggravated by the ANC's 
acceptance of the Freedom Charter. Reflecting on Garveyism, the Africanists objected to 
the Charter's claim that South Africa belonged to all who lived in it; its undertakings to 
protect the rights of all national and racial groups; and to the prominent role played by 
whites in drafting it, particularly the COD. The Africanists claimed that they were 
returning to the ANC's true principles, namely those of 1912 as revived in the 1940s by 
Lembede. They saw themselves as the rightful custodians of African Nationalism 
(Motlhabi, 1987:76-77; Mandela, 1996:267; Barber, 1999: 154-155; Gish, 2000:184). 
The Africanists initially hoped to reform the ANC from within, like the ANCYL 
before them. Unable to do so, they broke away from the ANC, at the organisation's 
Transvaal provincial conference in November 1958. During the conference, the ANC 
president, Luthuli not only criticized the government, but also those Africans who were 
emulating the apartheid government in claiming exclusive control of South Africa and 
thereby developing a dangerously narrow African Nationalism. Angered by this, the 
Africanists withdrew and were later followed by sympathisers in the Cape and Natal 
(Karis and Carter, 1977:310; Mandela, 1996:266-267; Barber, 1999:155). On 6 April 
1959, the Africanists founded the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Robert Sobukwe was 
elected President and Potlako Leballo National Secretary, both former members of the 
ANCYL. The delegates adopted a constitution, a manifesto and an oath of allegiance. 
Their organisational structure was similar to that of the ANC, with local branches and 
regional executives answerable to a national executive and an annual conference. 
However, it did not inherit an administrative structure thereby plunging the PAC, from 
the outset, into organisational problems, which it never fully resolved. The PAC tended to 
concentrate on grand causes rather than basic needs issues, thereby contributing to 
limited popular support (Karis and Carter, 1977:315; Mandela, 1996:266; Barber, 
1999: 155). 
The ANC and the PAC claimed to have the same broad goal of creating a non-
racial South Africa. Yet the organisations differed in a number of ways: over the means 
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to attain that goal, their interpretation of non-racialism, and the form of the state they 
desired. The PAC opposed the non-racialism enshrined in the Freedom Charter and it 
favoured more militant action against apartheid. It rejected communism in all its forms 
and considered whites and Indians ' foreign minority groups ' or 'aliens' who had no 
natural place in South Africa. South Africa was for the Africans and no one else. 
Sobukwe identified three basic PAC commitments. Firstly, that the movement must 
involve the African masses. Secondly, that an exclusive African Nationalism must be 
established to provide equality for Africans and to unite the masses in order to create a 
nation. Thirdly, that the struggle in South Africa was part of a continental struggle, with 
the ultimate goal of creating a United States of Africa. The Africanists were a small but 
vocal group and they managed to win a substantial following among the African 
intellectuals and students (Karis and Carter, 1977:500-513; Mandela, 1996:268-288, 
Barber, 1999: 155-157; R. Bernstein, 1999:161 ; Gish, 2000:184). 
The late 1950' s saw the PAC and ANC increase their mass protest activities 
against the apartheid government and its policies. Both organizations organized anti-pass 
campaigns for 21 and 31 March 1960 respectively. During the PAC's campaign, its 
leader Sobukwe was arrested and sentenced to three years imprisonment without the 
option ofa fine «Lodge, 1983:203 ; Mandela, 1996:279-280; Barber, 1999:164-165). The 
response to the PAC's call was minimal except at Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg and 
Langa, outside Cape Town. At Sharpeville, a crowd of about 5000 gathered outside the 
police station offering themselves for arrest. After a long standoff, the police fired into 
the crowd killing 69 Africans and wounding 186. In Langa, outside Cape Town, some 
30,000 people led by Phillip Kgosane gathered and were provoked into rioting by baton-
charging policemen. In the process, three Africans were killed and 50 wounded. The 
massacres drew international condemnation (Motlhabi, 1987:94-95; Mandela, 1996:280-
281 ; Barber, 1999:165; R. Bernstein, 1999:190-191 ; Goodman, 1999:151). Though it was 
not the first time that the apartheid police had killed demonstrators, the Sharpeville 
massacre stood out because of the scale of the tragedy. It was one of the worst massacres 
in the history of South Africa. Unlike others, the Sharpeville massacre continues to be 
remembered because it was seen as part of the struggle that was bringing Africans into 
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power elsewhere in the continent, and which, predicted Sobukwe, would bring freedom 
and independence to South Africa (Barber, 1999: 165; R. Bernstein, 1999: 190). 
This was also a time when the political climate in the country was grim and the 
government was threatening to ban the ANC (Mandela, 1996:279). Earlier, the British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had visited South Africa, where the government 
ignored his request to meet ANC leaders. He warned Parliament of 'winds of change' 
blowing across Africa and Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd responded by announcing 
that an all white referendum would be held in October 1960 calling for South Africa to 
become a republic and end its symbolic connection with the British Crown. Following the 
referendum in which the pro-republic sentiment won with 52 percent of the vote, the 
proclamation of the Republic was set for 31 May 1961 (Mandela, 1996:279; De Klerk, 
1998:34-35; Barber, 1999:163; R. Bernstein, 1999:220-221; Goodman, 1999:151-153). 
Sobukwe was hailed at the domestic and international level as the saviour of the 
liberation movement, overshadowing the ANC. The ANC responded irnmediately in a 
bid to restore its image as an active national liberation movement by calling for a nation-
wide burning of passes and a stay-at-home. On 26 March 1960, in Pretoria, Luthuli 
publicly burned his pass, calling on others to do the same. He announced a nation-wide 
stay-at-home for 28 March 1960, a National Day of Mourning and Protest in 
remembrance of the Sharpeville massacre. In Orlando, Nokwe and Mandela burned their 
passes before hundreds of people and the press (Motlhabi, 1987:97-98; Mandela, 
1996:281-282). On 28 March 1960, Africans responded overwhelmingly by staging a 
massive stay away Two days later, a mass march of 30,000 Africans into central Cape 
Town sent a wave of panic throughout white South Africa. Rioting broke out in many 
areas. The Nationalist government responded to the crisis with an unprecedented show of 
force. Verwoerd declared a State of Emergency on 30 March 1960 and ordered an 
irnmediate crackdown on all dissidents. In April 1960, the government banned both the 
ANC and PAC (Meli, 1989:140; Mandela, 1996:282; Gish, 2000:195). 
The Sharpeville massacre demonstrations organised by the ANC and PAC were a 
living testimony of African demands. Though they captured African enthusiasm they 
often ran into organisational problems. However, the greatest obstacles arose from the 
government' s response, which reflected both its concern and determination. Nevertheless, 
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the demonstrations had their impact. Only a truly mass organisation could have co-
ordinated such activities and the ANC did so (Mandela, 1996:282; Barber, 1999:165). 
3.2 The New Tactics and Strategies of the Proscribed ANC: The Armed Struggle, 
1960s to 1980s 
The banning of the ANC in 1960 did not deter it from its course and role in the 
liberation and democratisation process in South Africa. Though its proscription greatly 
hindered its operations inside South Africa, the ANC became a movement in exile from 
where it was to playa dominant and leading role in influencing and shaping the course of 
political events in apartheid South Africa. This section examines the ANC's attempts at 
controlling and influencing diverse social forces through the armed struggle, its re-
organization as a movement, and its relationship with civil society, the state, domestic 
and international capital. 
The banning of the ANC forced the movement to go underground and adopt the 
armed struggle as a new strategy, even though many Africans, including Luthuli, were 
committed to non-violence. The idea of the armed struggle was initiated by the younger 
and more radical, militant members of the ANC, many of who were initially associated 
with the formation of and were members of the ANCYL. Though for many ANC 
members, the final attempt at peaceful pressure on the apartheid government came as a 
result of the apartheid's government refusal to accept calls made at the All-In African 
Conference held at Pietermaritzburg on 25 to 26 March 1961, the debate on the use of 
violence as a tactic dates back to 1952 when Mandela and Sisulu first discussed this 
option. Both felt that the organisation needed to be set on a new course and they agreed 
that Mandela raise the issue of the armed struggle within the Working Committee. This 
was done at a meeting of the committee in June 1961. A month later Mandela, publicly 
acknowledged at a press conference that the time had come in the liberation struggle to 
adopt new tactics. Though criticised by the ANC for his remarks, it was abundantly clear 
that the ANC was already reconsidering its policy of non-violence. However, the 
committee initially rejected the proposal with Moses Kotane, the secretary of the SACP, 
arguing that it was not well thought out. At that time the SACP began organising its own 
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combat groups as well. Later, Kotane suggested that the proposal be forwarded to the 
secret ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting due to be held in Durban 
(ANC, 1961a: I; Mandela, 1961a: 1-2; 1961b: 1-4; 1996:301-321; Karis and Carter, 
1977:635; Barber, 1999:165; R. Bernstein, 1999:221-222) 
During the meeting, Mandela argued that the state had given the people no 
alternative to violence. It was wrong and immoral, he said, to subject the masses to state 
terrorism without offering them some kind of alternative. He emphasised that violence 
would erupt with or without the initiative of the ANC and soon this would be beyond 
their control and argued that it was necessary for the ANC to guide the violence 
according to the principle where lives were saved by acts of sabotage against symbols of 
oppression rather than attacks on people. The ANC had to take the initiative or face the 
consequences of becoming a latecomer and follower to a movement it could not control 
(Meli, 1989:147; Mandela, 1996:322; Barber, 1999:166). Luthuli initially offered 
resistance, but he finally agreed to the proposal following persuasion (Mandela, 
1996:322). The NEC decided that the ANC would not abandon its non-violent struggle. 
However it recognised that many of its members were willing to explore the possibilities 
of armed struggle. Luthuli and others suggested that this new resolution be treated as not 
emanating from the ANC, since they did not want to jeopardise the legality of the 
organisation's unbanned allies. His opinion was that a military movement should be a 
separate and independent organisation. It should be linked to the ANC and under the 
overall control of the ANC, but fundamentally autonomous. There would be two separate 
forms of struggle. The joint Executive of the Congress Alliance, despite some initial 
resistance, also authorised the formation of a new military organisation separate from the 
ANC. Mandela was given the task of forming such an independent organisation, but was 
to keep the National Executive Committee informed of developments (Mandel a, 
1996:322-324; R. Bernstein, 1999:225; Shubin, 1999:18). 
The new organisation formed in November 1961 was named Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(The Spear of the Nation) or MK for short. MK was formed as a special organisation 
formally separate from the ANC, but in practice subordinate to its political leadership. 
This meant that the apartheid government could not accuse the members of the ANC as a 
whole of direct involvement in the armed struggle. Unlike the ANC, it opened its ranks to 
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non-Africans. The initial members, drawn from the ANC and SACP, included Mandela, 
Walter Sisulu and Joe Siovo, who together were all appointed to the National High 
Command. Mandela became the chairman of the National High Command. Others 
included Raymond MhJaba, Govan Mbeki, Wilton Mkwayi, Jack Hodgson, Arthur 
Goldreich and Michael Harmel among others. Rusty Bernstein was involved in part, in 
the preparation of MK's Manifesto (Mandela, 1996:322-335&433; Bernstein, 1999:230-
231; Shubin, 1999: 18). The structure of MK mirrored that of the parent organisation. The 
National High Command was at the top. Below it were the Regional Commands in each 
of the provinces, and below that there were local commands and cells. Regional 
Commands were set up around the country. The High Command determined general 
targets and was in charge of training and finance . Within the framework laid down by the 
High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select local targets to be 
attacked (Meli, 1989:147; Mandela, 1996:336-337). 
The MK considered four types of violent activities: sabotage, guerrilla warfare, 
terrorism and open revolution. Sabotage was the best option since this form of violence 
inflicted the least harm on individuals. This type of activity did not involve much loss of 
life nor would it create civil war. It also had the advantage of requiring the least 
manpower. The strategy was to engage in acts of sabotage on carefully selected military 
installations, power plants, telephone lines and transportation links with the aim of 
hampering the military effectiveness of the state, as well as frightening NP supporters, 
scaring away foreign investors and consequently weakening the economy. This, it was 
hoped, would bring the government to the bargaining table (ANC, 1969b: 4-5; Lodge, 
1983:234; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:33; Mandela, 1996:336). 
MK carried out its first acts of organised sabotage against South African 
government institutions on 16 December 1961 (ANC, 1961b: I;Meli, 1989:145; 
Mandela, 1996:338-339). The acts which marked the beginning of organised, armed 
struggle, took the government by surprise and shocked the white South African 
community into the realisation that the political situation in the country was potentially 
explosive. Black South Africans too, realised that the ANC was no longer an organization 
of passive resistance, but a powerful movement that could propel the struggle to the heart 
of the apartheid regime. The government responded with a swift and violent counter-
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offensive aimed at cracking down on MK members (Meli, 1989:147; Mandela, 1996:339-
340). Between September 1961 and June 1963, at least 193 cases of MK sabotage came 
before the courts. At the same time, Mandela as the MK leader was rapidly gaining 
national and international repute for his articulate defence of the liberation struggle 
(Mandel a, 1996:316; Barber, 1999:167). In December 1961, the ANC received an 
invitation from the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern 
Africa (P AFMECSA) to attend its conference to be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 
February 1962. PAFMECSA, which later became the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), aimed to draw together the independent states and to promote the liberation 
movements on the continent. The conference provided an opportunity for the ANC to 
establish important links and for MK a chance to enlist support, funding and training for 
its members. Mande1a was chosen by the underground Executive to lead the ANC 
delegation. His mission also included visiting other African countries to establish 
political and economic support for MK and more importantly military training for MK 
members. In January 1962, Mandela secretly left South Africa to attend the conference, 
after which he visited Algerian liberation forces outside Algeria. Finally, he went to 
Europe (Mandela, 1996:342-359; Barber; 1999:167-168; Shubin, 1999:30-31). Later, the 
ANC acknowledged its links with MK at its consultative conference held at Lobatse, then 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) in October 1962. The Lobatse conference was convened with 
the aim of assessing and reviewing the organisation and the situation in South Africa 
(Meli, 1989: 150-154; Barber, 1999: 166; Shubin, 1999:50). 
Throughout 1962 and the first half of 1963, MK continued the armed struggle it 
had initiated, planning, recruiting, sending recruits abroad for training and continuing acts 
of sabotage. The MK High Command usually operated from Lilliesleaf Farm at Rivonia 
near Johannesburg (Meli, 1989: 154; Mandela, 1996:332-335; R. Bernstein, 1999:227-
228&248-249). However, on 11 July 1963, the police raided this farm and arrested most 
of the MK High Command, including Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Mhlaba, 
Bernstein, Arthur Goldreich and Bob Hepple. They seized documents outlining MK's 
plans, which were later used in court against the Rivonia trialists and others that were not 
present. Mandela had been arrested at a police roadblock earlier on 5 August 1962. He 
was serving a total of five years in prison for inciting people to strike and leaving the 
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country without a passport. The most incriminating document seized at Lilliesleaf Farm 
was that of Operation Mayibuye, a plan for guerrilla warfare in South Africa (ANC, 
1963:1-6; Meli, 1989:154; Mandela, 1996:374-395; Barber, 1999:169; R. Bernstein, 
1999:255; Shubin, 1999:55). Dennis Goldberg was also arrested. In one fell swoop, the 
police had captured almost the entire High Command of MK striking a devastating blow 
to MK and the ANC. All were detained under the new Ninety-Day Detention Law 
(Mandela, 1996:415; Mbeki, 1996:31 ; R. Bernstein, 1999:255-256). MK was, however, 
not the only organisation involved in the armed struggle at the time. Others included, 
Poqo, the PAC's armed wing, later renamed The Azanian People's Army or APLA, and 
much earlier the Armed Resistance Movement (ARM), a quasi-military faction formed 
by young militants from the ranks of the Liberal Party (Barber, 1999:166-168; R. 
Bernstein, 1999:233; Shubin, 1999:61). 
The Rivonia Trial began on 9 October 1963 at the Pretoria Supreme Court. Sisulu, 
Govan Mbeki, Kathrada, Mhlaba, Bernstein, Dennis Goldberg, Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew 
Mlangeni, and Mandela (brought from Robben Island) appeared in court on charges of 
193 acts of sabotage. These acts of sabotage were allegedly carried out by persons 
recruited by the accused in their capacities as members of the High Command of MK 
(Meli, 1989: 154-155; H. Bernstein, 1989: 122). The state summoned 173 prosecution 
witnesses. After a long and tedious procedure in which the prosecution presented its case, 
the defence case opened on 20 April 1964 with Mandela making a statement from the 
dock, rather than cross-examination (H. Bernstein, 1989: 144-183). In his statement, 
Mandela argued that his actions, both as an individual and leader of the African people, 
were not as a result of external influences, but as a result of his calm and sober 
assessment of the political situation and experience in South Africa and his pride as an 
African, hence the formation ofMK (Mandela, 1996:432-433). Mandela went on to point 
out and explain the differences among the ANC, MK and the SACP. He also pointed out 
that part of the struggle of the ANC was to create a society in which the wide socio-
economic inequalities between Africans and whites would be reduced (Mandel a, 1964). 
Defence witnesses who followed also refused to implicate those who had not been 
arrested (H. Bernstein, 1989: 198-207). The Rivonia defendants were political people. 
They set a new standard that would be followed by others in political trials in apartheid 
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South Africa's future, and as a result, in many subsequent political trials many of the 
accused refused to testify, thus facing months of imprisonment. All the accused spoke up 
in defence of their actions; of the movement and of the aspirations of their people. On 12 
June 1964, Judge Quartus de Wet passed the sentence of life imprisonment on all the 
defendants except Bernstein who was acquitted. All except Goldberg, who was 
imprisoned in Pretoria, were secretly flown to Robben Island (Meli, 1989:155-158). 
Despite the imprisonment of almost the entire leadership of MK, its activities 
resumed in the late 1960s. This time, however, the campaign was stepped up from 
sabotage to guerrilla warfare. The Wankie military campaign of 1967-1968 was the first 
attempt by ANC guerrillas to 'hit the enemy' at a time when the armed struggle was 
being adopted by liberation movements throughout Southern Africa (Meli, 1989: 161-162; 
Mbeki, 1996:32). As a result of these developments, coupled with the desire to co-operate 
and co-ordinate their efforts in the armed struggle, the ANC forged an alliance with the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in 1967. South Africa was heavily supporting 
the Ian Smith government and this provided a justification for armed co-operation 
between the two liberation movements, which were also ideologically close. The decision 
to operate jointly was approved by the ANC NEC in June 1967. According to Chris Hani, 
late MK Chief of Staff, the "whole concept of the Wankie Campaign was to build 
bridges, a Ho Chi Minh trail to South Africa . .. " (Hani, 1986:1 ; Meli, 1989:162; Mbeki, 
1996:32; Shubin, 1999:77). The plan for the execution of this operation had been 
proposed in April 1967. After consultations and lengthy debates, an order was issued to 
the effect that MK units were to cross the Zambezi River toward South Africa. The joint 
ANC-ZAPU unit was dispatched across the Zambezi River between July 30 and 3 August 
1967 (Hani, 1986:1; Meli, 1989:162; Mbeki, 1996:32; Shubin, 1999:77-78). A second 
detachment was dispatched in December 1967, and two further detachments in February 
and July 1968. A total of four groups attempted to infiltrate into South Africa, without 
success. There were also attempts, at the same time, to reach South Africa through 
FRELIMO units in Mozambique, as well as by boat from East Africa. All these 
campaigns failed (Mbeki, 1996:32). The Wankie operation was described by the ANC as 
tlle beginning of the armed struggle through guerrilla warfare. Prior to that, in the period 
1961-1963, actions by MK were purely sabotage operations. Though ZAPU leaders 
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wanted the ANC to continue joint operations, Tambo refused, fearing that further 
commitment of the already weakened capacity of MK might lead to its destruction. 
Wankie was a costly operation. The ANC, however, considered it a worthwhile 
experience, since it produced the first generation of battle-tested MK combatants who 
were to play important roles in the subsequent years. Hani later identified the main reason 
for the failure of these early military campaigns as lack of adequate logistical preparation 
(Hani, 1986:2-3; Mbeki, 1999:33; Shubin, 1999:78-80). 
Following the Wankie campaign, MK activities in South Africa resumed in the 
mid-I 970s. These actions helped consolidate what was later referred to in the ANC 
struggle as the phase of "armed propaganda". Its primary objective was to announce the 
resumption of an intensified armed struggle. Initially the South African authorities 
dismissed such armed actions as insignificant failures, but by late 1977, they were 
warning the public to be cautious of these armed activities. For Pretoria, the ANC had 
now become the main enemy (ANC, 1975; Shubin, 1999: 176-177). By 1977, the second 
phase of the armed struggle had begun, which produced a number of young persons who 
were not only a source of inspiration to others, but also glorified the activities of MK. 
Thereafter, there was an increase in successful MK armed activities in the country, which 
gained the ANC popularity among the local populace (Meli, 1989: 190; Mbeki, 1996:39-
40; Shubin, 1999:203). 
Despite these successes, the ANC still faced problems when it came to nurturing 
its underground structures, which had already been weakened and even destroyed in 
some regions. MK infiltration's also occurred without co-ordination and linkage with 
internal organized political structures. The absence of political mobilization also posed 
two questions for the movement, which assumed greater urgency in the post Soweto 
period. Firstly, whether armed action by small units operating far from home could ever 
stir up a full-scale political onslaught against the state. Secondly, whether the military 
activities were sustainable without an organized political presence inside the country. In 
order to boost the morale of the combatants, keep the movement going, and maintain the 
armed struggle inside the country, the movement chose hit-and-run missions (Mbeki, 
1996:40-41). The hit-and-run missions continued for some time, but at a certain stage, the 
movement realized that it had to advance beyond such tactics. Some of its leaders were 
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becoming increasingly frustrated, arguing that it was not going forward fast enough to 
secure a permanent presence in the country. Consequently the NEC organized a trip to 
Vietnam, in 1978, to study that country ' s struggle against US imperialism. The visit, as 
pointed out later in the chapter, was significant in that it was to provide an opportunity 
for the ANC to reassess its strategies in the changing South Africa of the late 1970s 
(Mbeki, 1996:41). 
3.2.1 The Re-Organization and Resurgence of the ANC as an External and Internal 
Movement, 1960 to 1985 
Following the banning of the ANC, the imprisonment of its leadership and that of 
MK, the underground machinery of the movement was almost completely destroyed. Its 
leaders were jailed, exiled, banned or placed under some form of restriction. Most of its 
structures were discovered and uprooted. Consequently, the ANC External Mission took 
over the running of the organisation as a whole. It fell to the External Mission to 
revitalise the ANC and take the struggle forward (Meli, 1989:160; Rantete, 1998:3-4). 
The ANC's External Mission, initially responsible for fund-raising, diplomacy 
and establishing a military training programme, was set up by the Deputy-President of the 
ANC, Oliver Tarnbo, in 1960. Shortly before the State of Emergency was declared in 
1960, Tambo together with a core group of senior officials left South Africa on 28 
March, on instructions of the ANC NEC, to establish an External Mission and co-
ordinate diplomatic and military support for the movement. The ANC suspecting a 
clamp-down on its leaders and subsequent banning, decided that certain members needed 
to leave the country to strengthen the organisation abroad in anticipation of its banning. 
The first missions were opened in London, Accra, Cairo, and Dar-es-Salaam. By 1980, 
the ANC had offices and representatives in 32 countries. The external missions worked to 
win support for the overthrow of apartheid by promoting the cause of the ANC and 
urging international economic pressure against the South African government. The 
missions also provided assistance to South African exiles. The External Mission faced the 
difficult tasks of creating an organisation in exile and trying to revitalise the underground 
ANC inside South Africa. It began to engage in vital international solidarity work and to 
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take over the onerous task of training people, infiltrating trained cadres, weapons and 
ammunition, and resuscitating underground units (Meli, 1989: 160-161; Mandela, 
1996:289&521 ; Mbeki, 1996:32; Rantete, 1998:3-4; ANC, 2001 : I). 
In 1965, a consultative meeting of the NEC was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
to assess the Rivonia Trial and the damage it had caused the ANC's internal underground 
organisation. Participants in the meeting were drawn from the senior ranks of MK, the 
Coloured People' s Congress, SAlC, SACP and SACTU. The purpose of the meeting was 
to review the political situation in South Africa, set new tasks and improve the ANC 
organisational set up for vigorously and effectively pursuing the objectives of the armed 
struggle, particularly the movement of MK units to the home front. The decisions reached 
at this meeting, presented as recommendations to the NEC, were to provide the basis for 
a steady recovery of the ANC's initiative. In November 1966, another meeting was held 
at the same place with participants drawn from the same organizations. The main item on 
the agenda this time was the role and status of the non-ANC members in the ANC's 
External Mission especially in its tasks of mass mobilisation in South Africa, 
preparations for the armed struggle and the building up international solidarity to advance 
its cause (Meli, 1989:160-161). 
At the same time in 1967, the ANC formed its own organisation on Robben Island 
Prison. Known officially as the High Organ, it consisted of the most senior ANC leaders 
on the island, the men who had been members of the NEC. These were Mandela, Sisulu, 
Govan Mbeki and Mhlaba. Mandela served as the head of the High Organ (Mandela, 
1996:525). From its inception, its members decided that the High Organ would not try to 
influence ANC external policy. The members realised that they had no reliable way 
evaluating the situation in the country, due to their confinement, and concluded that it 
would be neither fair nor wise for them to offer guidance on matters about which they 
were uninformed. The High Organ was therefore initially concerned with the welfare of 
political prisoners on the island. It operated a cell system, with each cell consisting of 
three members. In the first few years, it also acted as a representative committee for all 
the political prisoners in its section. By 1969, it was able to meet virtually whenever it 
wanted. Its meetings were not generally broken up, unless they were too conspicuous. 
The High Organ also took on the new responsibilities of organizing and conducting 
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academic and political studies on the Island. Links between the High Organ and the ANC 
in exile, usually through smuggled letters, were however maintained and from time to 
time the exiled movement would seek the advice of the High Organ on matters pertaining 
to the movement and the struggle (Mandela, 1996: 556-557). 
The ANC's future was the central question that confronted the ANC in the post-
Wankie period. The Wankie operation forced the ANC to reconsider its strategy, not only 
in terms of theory, but also with regard to practical changes in its organisational cadre 
work. It was not until 25 April to 1 May 1969 at the Morogoro Conference in Tanzania 
that the ANC finally put the pieces together and mapped out the way forward (Mbeki, 
1996:33; Shubin, 1999:84-85). The decision to convene the ANC conference was taken 
by the NEC at it 's meeting on 14 February 1969. This consultative conference had a 
special character in that it was larger in size, attracted wider participation and it also 
involved large-scale pre-conference discussions at all levels and centres of the ANC. It 
was the first national consultative conference of the ANC. Over seventy delegates 
attended it from various centres, representing ANC branches, units of MK, leaders of the 
Indian and Coloured peoples and "the revolutionary working class movement" (ANC, 
1969a: 1; Shubin, 1996:88). The main objective of the conference was to map and chart 
new strategies of victory in a democratic process. The ANC therefore decided to involve 
all its members at all levels and from all its centres in pre-conference discussions which 
took the form of professional and technical papers, objective analyses, discussions and 
critiques of the ANC. Proposals aimed at removing shortcomings and ensuring 
improvements were formulated, which provided a solid basis for future operations. The 
central issue discussed and partly solved was the problem of locating, for its armed units, 
a route back to South Africa and the means of communication between external centres 
and the home front (Meli, 1989:163-164; Mbeki, 1996:33). 
Several decisions were made at this conference. Mechanisms were created to deal 
professionally and effectively with internal reorganisation and propaganda, plans were 
made for the commencement of sustained armed operations and the injection back into 
South Africa of trained personnel to form the core of the armed force. These mechanisms 
were also meant to correct the imbalance between the work of the movement in exile and 
internally. They also aimed at correcting the priorities of the movement and to justify and 
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rationalise its existence in exile with respect to the needs of the situation back home. 
Another major decision taken at this Conference was that non-African political activists 
and cadres be integrated into the ANC External Mission, to reflect a policy of non-
racialism and offer the only real alternative to the policy of white supremacy. The 
decision also had a moral value in that it bound together, on equal grounds, people with a 
common cause and suffering, irrespective of race and nationality. Non-Africans, 
however, could only become members in exile structures and not members of the highest 
body the NEC (Meli, 1989:164-167; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 55; Mbeki, 1996:34; 
Shubin, 1999:93). The Committee was reduced to nine members as part of the re-
organisation. As part of the reorganisation also, the position of MK Commander was 
abolished and Joe Modise became Chief of Operations. He was later appointed to the 
NEe. The post of Commander was however restored almost 15 years later (Shubin, 1999: 
91 -92). The outcome of the discussions on the nature and character of the movement 
were published and adopted by the ANC in a document entitled Strategies and Tactics of 
the ANC 1969. This document became the guiding programme of the ANC in its struggle 
for political power. The programme was based on the belief that the struggle in South 
Africa was between the colonised majority, who were predominantly African and the 
colonisers, the white minority who dominated through the instruments of the colonial 
state. Apartheid was a colonialism of a special type, since the coloniser and the colonised 
shared the same geographical boundaries. The only solution, therefore, lay in the total 
destruction of the apartheid state. The document described the main political forces 
participating in the struggle and outlined the social and political changes to be made in 
post-apartheid South Africa (ANC, 1969b: 12; Mbeki, 1996: 33; Shubin, 1999:89). 
The Morogoro Conference was perhaps the most critical moment in the history of 
the proscribed ANe. The success of this conference was to a large extent due to the 
wisdom and flexibility of the most influential and respected ANC leaders who managed 
to handle efficiently and effectively a leadership crisis that threatened to split the 
movement. The crisis threatened to split the movement between the leadership and the 
rank and file, mainly the MK fighters. However, Oliver Tambo diffused this crisis, when 
he selflessly surrendered all powers to the delegates. He was, however reconfirmed as 
Acting President General. The conference also signalled the intention to work decisively 
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and covertly in South Africa. Due to increasingly total isolation of the external structures 
coupled with the prevailing internal repression, many more years were required to put 
this intention into practice. Though the ANC thereafter claimed in conference statements 
that the period of restoration and reconstruction was over, in reality the work had just 
began (Shubin, 1999:91-93). 
The escalation of the ANC's activities after the Soweto uprising also made it 
necessary for it to undertake major structural re-organization. Oliver Tambo, who had 
been Acting President-General of the organization since the Morogoro Conference, was 
finally confirmed President at the July 1977 NEC meeting (Shubin, 1999: 184). This NEC 
meeting also discussed the prospects for the armed struggle inside South Africa. It was 
concerned that the Military Command was moving ahead of the political organization at 
home and that the MK soldiers repeatedly acted on their own initiative (ANC, 1977). The 
following NEC meeting in January 1978 at Lusaka, primarily devoted itself to reviewing 
comprehensively, every aspect and department of the movement. The meeting confirmed 
the traditional structures of the top positions, namely President, Secretary General and 
Treasurer General. An important position, that of Political Secretary in the President's 
Office and Head of the Political Commission was allocated to Thabo Mbeki. This new 
structure had considerable responsibilities including studies of the overall political 
situation at the domestic and international level, recommending new political initiatives 
and training political cadres (Shubin, 1999: 185). New structures, such as the Regional 
Political Committees (RPC), subordinate to the Secretary General, were created. Apart 
from the conferences, the RPCs were the highest political organs of the movement in 
those countries where ANC members resided. They had the task of ensuring that all 
members of the organization were integrated in functioning branches and that members 
were actively involved in the work of the movement. The election of the RPCs was a step 
towards democracy, which was difficult to maintain in an organization operating under 
conditions of exile and semi-legality. The growing spirit of the ANC's non-racialism was 
demonstrated in the election of Eli Weinberg to the post of RPC Chairman in Tanzania 
(Shubin, 1999: 185). The ANC was unique among many liberation movements in that it 
managed to preserve its unity over more than three decades in exile. The defection and 
later expulsion of the Gang of Eight in October 1975, who included among others, 
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Tennyson Makiwane, was the sole exception, and even in their case the ANC leaders 
made every effort to keep them within the organization (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 64; 
Shubin, 1999:1 87). 
As part of its strategic re-organization and in particular that of the armed struggle, 
the ANC NEC in 1978, organized a trip to Vietnam to study that country's struggle 
against US imperialism. In October 1978, a delegation led by Tambo arrived in Vietnam. 
Two weeks later, the delegation returned to present its report to a joint meeting of the 
NEC and the RC in Luanda at the end of 1978. To assess the relevance of the Vietnamese 
experience to the struggle in South Africa, the Politico-Military Strategic Commission, 
chaired by Tambo, was requested to make recommendations on future strategies. Its 
report was based on wide-ranging consultations within the movement. These included the 
Coloured and Indian people, the leadership of Robben Island, SACTU, the London 
Research Unit, SACP, and the women and youth sections of the movement (Mbeki, 
1996:42). The report of the Politico-Military Strategic Commission, submitted to the 
NEC in March 1979, was summarized in a document known as the Green Book. It was in 
essence a codification and accretion of the collective experience of the liberation 
movement in South Africa. It was important in that it restated the movement' s priorities, 
which were drawn from broad-based consultations. Among other issues, it pointed to the 
formation of a broad-based mass organization and also stated the precise conditions under 
which a negotiated settlement might prove acceptable to the ANC (ANC, 1979; Mbeki, 
1996:43). 
From 1979, the ANC leadership decided collectively, to integrate the armed 
struggle with mass political organizations in South Africa. The movement had by now 
realized that military campaigns alone would not produce the desired and lasting results. 
The armed struggle was a necessary pre-condition for networking various pol itical 
revolutionary bases. Political mobilization came to be seen as the main thrust of the 
struggle in order to bring about a broad-based and nation-wide unity in the struggle. Most 
importantly, the Commission saw the ANC as the guiding light in this programme of 
mass mobilization. The Commission identified medium and long-term priorities. In the 
short term the Commission argued that it was not necessary to create a single, formal and 
publicly defined structure. It acknowledged that in the medium and long term, the 
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changing balance of forces would eventually lead to the creation of a formal , structured 
popular front in which the ANC would play the leading role (Mbeki, 1996:44). 
Unlike the 1970s, when there was an absence of organized structures and the 
ANC was relatively weak inside South Africa, the 1980s saw the ANC prepare fertile 
ground in which the ideology and campaigns of broad-based mass political organizations 
could take place. The revolt of the 1980s was therefore much more politically focused 
than that of the 1970s (Mbeki, 1996:69). It was during the turbulent 1980s that the ANC 
held its second and its final National Consultative Conference outside South Africa. The 
1985 Kabwe Conference in Zambia, was much larger than its predecessor at Morogoro in 
1969. It was attended by 250 delegates from inside South Africa and others representing 
the twenty-one missions abroad. The Consultative Conference was preceded by regional 
conferences, which discussed major problems facing the ANC and delegates to the 
national conference (Barber, 1996:247; Shubin, 1999:278-279). 
The conference strengthened the feeling of unity since it took place during the 
renewed struggle in South Africa. Oliver Tambo, Alfred Nzo and Thomas Nkobi were 
returned unopposed to their positions of President, Secretary-General and Treasurer 
respectively. Almost all members of the old NEC were re-elected. The conference 
decided to enlarge and open membership of the ANC NEC to South Africans of any race, 
reflecting the form of society the movement sought. The new NEC also had the right to 
co-opt five more members and later, this provision was used to co-opt Ronnie Kasrils. 
The opening of the NEC membership to all races resulted in almost the entire Politburo 
of the SACP entering the NEC (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 150-151 ; Barber, 1999:248). 
The leaders declared that they would not seek a settlement with the apartheid 
government, other than to negotiate a transfer of power when the white regime was 
defeated. Consequently, the conference decided to put greater emphasis on mass 
mobilization to promote an internal uprising so as to make the country ungovernable and 
apartheid unworkable. The ANC was now calling upon the masses not to leave the 
country as in the immediate post-Soweto period, but rather to remain in the country and 
intensify the struggle (ANC, 1985; Kane-Berman, 1993:41; Mbeki, 1996:69; Barber, 
1999:247-248). The conference agreed that the MK should intensify its activities inside 
South Africa to cover both 'soft' and 'hard ' targets. 'Soft' targets included civilians such 
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as prominent government supporters, anti-union officials, and border farmers among 
others (See Appendix 9 for the ANC and MK structures, camps and commanders from 
1985-1994). Other decisions made at Kabwe included the need for the ANC to work 
more closely with trade unions in South Africa such as COSATU (Barber, 1999:248; 
Shubin, 1999:280-281). The conference also decided that future ANC Conferences and 
NEC elections be convened and held every five years (Shubin, 1999:281). 
3.2.2 The ANC and its Relationship with Civil Society, 1969 to 1990 
The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a revival of militant political activity, 
particularly among the youth. It started with the formation of the University Christian 
Movement (UCM) by students in 1969. This was the beginning of what was later to 
become the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). Black Consciousness was not a 
centralized movement and ironically was in part nurtured by apartheid in that it gained 
much of its support in the universities established exclusively for African students. 
African student organizations of the early 1960s were a manifestation of the political 
divisions and ideological loyalties of the time. The rising political awareness and 
conscIOusness among African youth in the late 1960's and early 1970s led to the 
emergence of several youth, workers ' and journalists' organizations such as the South 
African Students Organisation (SASO), with Steve Biko as president, and the South 
African Students Movement (SASM). Others included the Black People's Convention 
(BPC), which had a wider social base than SASO. These were not covert organizations 
and although they challenged the government, they recognized that they had to do so by 
constitutional means. They stressed their commitment to non-violence as a means of 
achieving a free society based on universal suffrage (Meli, 1989:174; Barber, 1999:192). 
As an ideology, Black Consciousness fell within the broad Africanist stream. The concept 
of Black Consciousness was concerned with the condition of the black person in South 
Africa. According to Biko, blacks were subjected to two forces. Firstly, they were 
oppressed by the state through its institutions and laws. Secondly, blacks had become 
alienated from themselves because they associated superiority with whites and inferiority 
with blacks. Black Consciousness opposed both these forces. The aim of Black 
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Consciousness was, therefore, to infuse a new pride, to counter the image of blacks as 
appendages to white society (Biko, 1978: 48-53 ; Barber, 1999:194). 
With the ANC and other political organizations banned and their leaders and 
activists imprisoned, exiled or banished, the protest against the apartheid regime found 
expression in the BCM. The approach of the ANC to SASO and other structures of the 
BCM was one of constructive criticism and engagement. The ANC came to accept that 
the BCM had become a force to be reckoned with, as it was the only legitimate 
organization allowed to operate inside the country. As a result, some kind of working 
relationship had to be established with its members. Until that point, relations between 
the ANC and the BCM existed only at the clandestine individual level and some BCM 
members began debating ways in which they could progress beyond their non-violent 
position since they realized that non-violent means alone would not liberate the country. 
At the 1972 General Students Council, a section of the BCM, argued that the council 
should leave, en masse, for military training if it was serious about liberating the country. 
Though the conference did not take a position on this, many students, nonetheless, left 
the country to "follow the political logic of the armed struggle" (Mbeki, 1996:35-36; 
Mandela, 1996: 578; Shubin, 1999:128). The setting up of an official ANC presence in 
Botswana in 1973 facilitated the establishment of links between the ANC and the BCM 
and the first contacts were made early in the same year. Increasing number of BCM 
activists in exile in Botswana wanted, unconditionally, military training from the ANC. 
However the ANC refused to accept non-members of its movement for military training. 
Initial contacts between the two movements were frustrated because the BCM 
representative in Botswana was not primarily interested in forming closer ties (Mbeki, 
1996:36; Shubin, 1999: 128). The BCM was part of the broader liberation movement in 
the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and as such, by 1976, the ANC felt that it 
was time for it to meet the movement's leader, Biko. The ANC was of the opinion that 
Biko and his colleagues in the BCM believed in four issues with regard to the liberation 
struggle. Firstly, that the ANC was the leader of the revolution in South Africa. Secondly 
that the BPC should concentrate on mass mobilization. Thirdly that the BPC should 
function within the context of the broad strategy of the liberation movement. Finally, that 
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a meeting between the leadership of the BPC and the ANC was necessary (Meli, 
1989: 182). 
Though BCM leaders advocated non-violence, the government suppressed it as 
soon as it called for the formation of a broad political movement, forbidding its meetings 
and serving banning orders on its officials. Despite this, BCM protests, clashes and 
confrontation continued as the government adopted harsher measures. The government 
gave the movement no respite, banning, detaining and imprisoning its leaders, and 
charging them with endangering the maintenance of law and order and conspiring to 
transform the state by unconstitutional, revolutionary and violent means (Barber, 
1999:195-196; Shubin, 1999:128). Biko, already under a ban, was detained without trial 
in 1976 for 101 days under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act. He was arrested again on 18 
August 1977 under the same legislation and died on 12 September 1977, having been 
treated with extreme cruelty by his captors. An official investigation followed in which 
no one was found responsible for his death. Though the BCM was suppressed, the 
ideology of Black consciousness was not killed as it had already taken root and flourished 
among black youth (Meli , 1989:182; Barber, 1999:196). 
The revolutionary fervour of the early 1970s in South Africa exploded in the 
uprising by students in Soweto, Johannesburg in 1976. It was triggered by the instruction 
from the Minister of Bantu Education that half of the subjects in schools at Standard 5 
and 6 level be taught in Afrikaans. During the first half of 1976, there was mounting 
tension in the junior schools of Soweto. Students boycotted Afrikaans-medium lessons 
and refused to write their examinations in Afrikaans. Afrikaans was considered to be the 
language of the oppressor and oppression (Meli, 1989:186; Barber, 1999:211). SASM 
played a central role in the whole conflict deciding on 13 June 1976 to hold a mass 
demonstration against the imposition of Afrikaans. It formed an action committee 
consisting of two delegates from each school in Soweto, which became the Soweto 
Students Representative Council (SSRC) (Meli, 1989: 186). 
On 16 June 1976, the students in Soweto began their protest march and when they 
reached Orlando Junior Secondary School, they met and clashed with the police who 
opened fire, killing a thirteen-year old student, Hector Peterson, among many others. 
Rioting followed, sweeping across Soweto, with several deaths reported (Meli, 1989: 186; 
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Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:81; Barber, 1999:211-212). Though the ANC underground 
structures were not responsible for the Soweto uprising, the ANC called on the youth to 
join MK and advised against actions involving a large number of activists, but enjoined 
the new recruits to strike at the enemy in small groups (Shubin, 1999: 169). Thereafter 
thousands of young people left the country to join the ANC, through Swaziland and 
Mozambique (Meli, 1989:186; Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:84). The government reacted by 
imposing bans on organizations and individuals opposed to apartheid, a tactic that only 
served to drive people into covert organizations bent on continuing the struggle. The 
government also renamed the Bantu Educational Department calling it the Department of 
Education and Training, just as the Department of Native Affairs had been renamed the 
Department of Bantu Affairs and later the Department of Plural Affairs (Mbeki, 1996:27-
28). The Soweto uprising came as a surprise to the government. Though the imposition of 
Afrikaans was the immediate cause of the uprising, for many Africans, it was an outburst 
against the injustices and oppression of apartheid. The government accused agitators of 
responsibility, with Prime Minister John Vorster emphasizing that the uprising was a 
deliberate attempt on the part of certain organizations and people to bring about 
polarization between whites and blacks. To him, such disturbances would continue as 
they were instigated by communists (Mbeki, 1996:28; Barber, 1999:212). 
By 1978, the uprising was over, but the tide had turned against the government. It 
forced the government into reforms that caused deep divisions among whites and 
changed the political mood by weakening white confidence and giving hope to African 
nationalists. It also ushered in a period of sustained and brutal conflict (Barber, 
1999:214). Brutal conflict, however, did not crush the spirit of resistance among the 
students. The militant youth, who represented a new radical element in African society, 
dismissed leaders of organizations such as the ANC as too submissive. In 1979, they 
formed the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the Azanian Students 
Organisation (AZASO), which continued the struggle at school and university level. 
COSAS was the first youth movement in the post-Soweto period to align openly with the 
ANC. It was primarily concerned with maintaining the momentum of the student-led 
resistance of 1976-1977. However, it largely comprised of ex-students until 1982 and 
during this period it served more as a general youth organization, in close collaboration 
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with the ANC in exile, rather than being a student-based organization (Meli, 1989:187; 
Mandela, 1996:575-576; Seekings, 1993:31-32; Mbeki, 1996:28, Barber, 1999:213). 
The Soweto uprising radically changed the political situation in South Africa. 
Conditions had now become favourable for re-launching and sustaining the armed 
struggle. For exiled political organizations, the crisis provided new material with which 
to work and new hope (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:84; Seekings, 1993: 29; Shubin, 
1999: 171). The problem that now presented itself to the exiled political organizations was 
how to establish contacts with the student insurgents due to pervasive political repression. 
There was also the need to recruit such students into existing organizations so as to 
prevent them from channeling their energies into new bodies and thereby splitting the 
nationalist or revolutionary movement. The ANC was well organized and had a coherent 
strategy. It had set up MK offices in countries neighbouring South Africa and within a 
short time following the riots, MK offices in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had 
began establishing contacts with student activists, urging them to leave the country and 
join the ANC in exile (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:84, Seekings, 1993:34). By the end of 
July 1976, the ANC leadership was facing enormous logistical problems with regard to 
transporting, accommodating and training recruits . Vigorous efforts were made to place 
them either in MK or in training institutions in Africa or overseas. The ANC was gravely 
concerned about the newly recruited and inexperienced cadres, as it regarded them as 
insufficiently disciplined. This problem was, however, partially solved when in 1977 the 
government of Tanzania granted to the ANC 600 acres at Morogoro to set up a schoo!. 
The school was opened in 1979 and was named Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College 
(SOMAFCO). SOMAFCO became an important centre in the ANC's exile network. 
Later a vocational centre was set up in nearby Dakawa. Other than logistical problems, 
the ANC also needed to provide psychological and organizational sanctuary if it was to 
become a permanent home for the new recruits. This was catered for through political 
education. The Soweto exodus both stimulated and severely taxed the ANC. During the 
mid-1970s newly released political prisoners from Robben Island, such as Andrew 
Masondo, also played an important part in strengthening internal and external ANC 
structures (Shubin, 1999: 172-174). 
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The 1980's were turbulent times in South Africa. This period saw the emergence 
of several anti-apartheid broad-based mass political organizations such as the United 
Democratic Front (UDF). Other organizations that emerged during this period and were 
involved in the liberation struggle include the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) among others. Essentially, the UDF was formed following a call for a united 
front against the apartheid government's new constitutional proposals that were enacted 
in 1983. When PW Botha assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1978, he declared his 
commitment to efficiency and reforms (Geldenhuys, 1981 :3; Grundy, 1986: 11; 
Gutteridge, 1995:35-41; Barber, 1999:219-225). He was particularly committed to 
ensuring the survival of the white state and it was in this spirit that he approached reform. 
The Botha regime began introducing, gradually, the new constitution, whose new 
recommendations came before parliament in 1979. A committee, chaired by Alywn 
Schlebusch, the Minister of the Interior, proposed that the Senate be abolished and 
replaced by a President' s Council of 60 members drawn from the white, Coloured and 
Indian communities, but with a white majority. Later, the Minister of Co-operation and 
Development, Piet Koornhof, introduced a package of three bills comprising the Orderly 
Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, the Black Community Bill and the 
Black Local Authorities Bill. The latter two Bills later became the Black Local 
Authorities Act No. 102 of 1982 and the Black Communities Development Act No.4 of 
1984. The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, proposed new 
measures to control and regulate the presence of Africans in urban areas. The Black 
Communities Development Act provided for, among others, the purposeful development 
of black communities outside the national states (RSA, 1984: 3). The Black Local 
Authorities Act made provision for among others, the establishment of local committees, 
village councils and town councils for Black persons in certain areas (RSA, 1982: 3). It 
gave the government a range of new powers and responsibilities, while Coloureds and 
Indians were given limited powers in the tricameral parliament. This in effect co-opted 
most of them into the regime and the Nationalists, under the guise of reforms, introduced 
legislation aimed at plugging the holes in apartheid. The tricameral proposals gave an 
unexpected boost from Pretoria to resistance, culminating in the formation of the UDF 
(Mbeki, 1996: 56-57; Barber, 1999: 231-232; Shubin, 1999: 250). 
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The idea of a united front was mooted at an anti-South African Indian Council 
conference, convened at Johannesburg in January 1983 by the Transvaal Indian Congress 
(TIC). In his address, Reverend Allan Boesak, President of the World Alliance of 
Reformed Churches, called for an alliance against the President's Council. He stressed 
that there was no basis for co-operation with the apartheid government under the new 
constitutional proposals since they were based on ethnicity and as such, participating in 
such institutions was unacceptable. The conference endorsed this call and a steering 
committee was appointed to initiate the front and to consolidate the campaign against the 
President's Council and the constitutional proposals. Six moths later, UDF committees 
had been formed in the main urban areas and preparations were under way for a national 
launch (Meli, 1989: 192-193; Mbeki, 1996:57-58). 
The UDF was formally launched on 20 August 1983, a date considered necessary 
to pre-empt parliament's debate on the constitutional proposals due to resume on 30 
August 1983. Cape Town was chosen in a bid to reduce the divisions within the Coloured 
and black communities. About 12,000 people representing more than 600 organizations 
were present at the rally. Archie Gumede, an ANC veteran was elected President, and 
Mandela named as Patron (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:142-144, Mandela, 1996:618; Mbeki, 
1996:58, Barber, 1999:238; Shubin, 1999:250). Demanding full recognition of 
fundamental human rights and declaring as its aims, the unity of opponents of apartheid 
without regard for race, the UDF opposed the forthcoming elections and condemned 
British and United States (US) imperialism. It also declared its support for solidarity with 
the workers and attacked the migratory labour system (Lodge and Nasson, 1991 :51; 
Barber, 1999:238). 
In December 1983, the UDF held its first conference at Port Elizabeth, where it 
proceeded to plan strategies for future political mobilization. One of the programmes 
agreed upon was the 'Million Signatures Campaign' against the election of Coloureds 
and Indians. The success of the campaign, launched in January 1984, was limited as it fell 
short of collecting the required number of signatures. However, its tangible results were 
among others, the revival of the TIC and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC). The TIC and 
NIC organized communities against participating in the elections and the success of the 
UDF campaign was evident in the poor turnout for the elections. Within the African 
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community, campaigns against urban council elections resulted, in most cases, in the 
absence of candidates for election. In other cases, candidates nominated themselves to the 
councils, and where there were candidates, the poll was often below 20 per cent. The 
election boycott dealt a severe blow to the Nationalist government, which had counted on 
the support of Coloureds, Indians and black local authorities to legitimize the elections 
and the new apartheid institutions (Lodge and Nasson, 1991:61; Friedman, 1995:538; 
Mbeki, 1996:59-61). During the course of its struggle against apartheid, the UDF 
occasionally adopted the ANC tactic of calling workers to stay away from work. The 
government's response was to summon security forces to active duty in the townships in 
the hope of intimidating the masses and containing the situation. By the middle of 1985, 
the state had banned several organizations from holding meetings and declared a state of 
emergency (Mbeki, 1996:60-63). 
The UDF meant different things to different people. To the apartheid government, 
it was an ANC front. Even among its leaders and activists, there were conflicting views 
as to the real nature of the relationship between the UDF and the ANC. Though from the 
very beginning many ANC veterans and underground members took part in its formation 
and activities, the UDF was not a front organization for the ANC. It had a life of its own 
and independent decision-making structures based on a constitution. It is best seen as a 
response to the ANC's call for a united front against apartheid. Its leaders did not 
necessarily receive direct instructions from the ANC (Shubin, 2002). Its symbiotic 
relationship with the ANC is best explained by the ANC's 1978179 Strategic Review, 
which advocated mass mobilization and the creation of the broadest possible national 
front for liberation. The ANC concluded that all forms of opposition to apartheid should 
be recognized and mobilized into a united force with a common purpose (ANC, 1979; 
Mbeki, 1996:54; Shubin, 1999:250). 
The UDF, however, suffered from difficulties related to organization, 
communication, finance and regional differences. Yet, despite these difficulties, it 
became a major political force between 1983 and \990, in its highly visible role in the 
struggle against apartheid. Its membership was estimated at over two million people 
drawn from diverse groups, making it difficult for the apartheid government to clamp 
down on it. However, in the course of time, the government was to charge some of its 
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leading figures with treason on the grounds that they had conspired with the ANC and 
SACP to bring down the government (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992: 142-143; Friedman, 
1995:539; Mbeki, 1996:52; Barber, 1999:238-239). 
The 1980s also witnessed the emergence of COSATU, which became an ally of 
the UDF. COSATU emerged due to a number of reasons. Despite little encouragement 
from the apartheid government, trade union activity among Africans had increased 
steadily since the early 1970s. Unions were stepping up their campaigns for recognition 
and companies were losing production and profits in an effort to avoid union demands. 
Consequently, a few leading employers began calling for some accommodation. 
International pressure on both the state and employers was also growing. It was in this 
context that the government appointed Professor Nic Wiehahn to head an investigation 
into the country' s labour laws in 1977. Very few emerging unions expected anything 
meaningful to come from the Wiehahn Commission. The Commission released its first 
report on 1 May 1979. It recognized the right of black workers to form and belong to 
trade unions, which no South African government had thus far agreed recognize. The 
report noted that the unions were growing and that by leaving them outside tlle system 
they would escape control. There was need to capture black trade unions to control their 
political activities (Baskin, 1999: 24-24). The Commission also realized the need to 
harmonise the dualistic nature of industrial relations between African labour, and 
employers, into a unitary system of collective bargaining (Southall, 1995: 62). 
Following the implementation of the Wiehailan Commission recommendations, 
union activities increased and the resurgent trade union movement began its long march 
towards unity. The union unity talks took place between 1981 and 1985. Differences of 
interests, of political ideology, of personality and organizational techniques had to be 
overcome before COSATU could be born. Though informal discussions began as early as 
1979 among a few emerging lmions, unity talks began seriously during August 1981, 
when over 100 representatives from 29 unions met at Langa, Cape Town. This meeting 
convened by ilie General Workers Union (GWU), was attended by all the major emerging 
unions including the Cape-based Food and Carming Workers Union (FCWU/AFCWU), 
the newly-formed South African Allied Workers Union (SAA WU) and the affiliates of 
both the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSA TU) and the Council of 
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Unions of South Africa (CUSA) (Baskin, 1991: 34). The purpose of the Langa summit 
was to develop a united response to the newly introduced labour laws derived from the 
Wiehahn Report. The emerging lmions were conscious that these laws aimed to divide 
and control them while at the same time extending rights previously denied to black 
unions. The summit agreed, among others, to establish regional solidarity committees to 
coordinate solidarity action on a regular basis (Baskin, 1991: 35). The unity talks, 
however, broke down when unions belonging to the Federation of South African Trade 
Unions decided to register in order to take advantage of the legal space created by the 
Wiehahn dispensations. Three years later, unity had not been achieved and black trade 
unions were facing a number of predicaments regarding their role in the liberation 
struggle. Later in 1985, a decisive step was taken in tackling the predicament and 
achieving unity with the formation of COSA TU (Adler and Webster, 1994: 5-6; 
COSA TU, 1995: 1-4; Mbeki, 1996:55-56; Barber, 1999:242). Although the Langa summit 
ended with nothing more than the promise of future co-operation through the solidarity 
committees, it succeeded in placing unity on the agenda, and it was undoubtedly the 
beginning of the long process culminating in the launch ofCOSATU (Baskin, 1991 : 35) 
COSA TV immediately became the largest federation of unions in South Africa. It 
absorbed groups, which were mainly, but not exclusively black, such as the National 
Union of Miners (NUM), GWU, SAA WU, the Commercial, Catering and Allied 
Workers' Union (CCA WUSA), Paper Wood and Allied Workers' Union (PWA WU) and 
FOSATU among others (Baskin, 1991 : 55; Southall, 1995 : 284-285). In all, it embraced 
unions with about 500,000 members, the largest being the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) with 100,000. Some unions such as CUSA were not absorbed. 
Though CUSA stood for black worker control, industrial unionism and a loose federation, 
it was viewed by many other unions as not preaching the unity message with vigour. As 
such all not of its affiliates were expected to join a new federation. CUSA's leadership 
combined the apolitical, even the pro-IFP, with an influential number of people inclined 
toward Black consciousness (Baskin, 1991: 43). As Baskin adds : 
But there was a deeper political problem. The new federation would 
inevitably adopt political positions, and this required a relatively unified 
perspective. This had to take to account of the political and organizational 
dominance of the non-racial ANCIUDF tradition. Black consciousness and 
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to a lesser extent, Africanist views were common within . . . Cusa ranks, 
and they could not accept the dominance of the non-racial tradition 
(Baskin, 1991: 48-49). 
COSATU openly advocated political action. In his opening address to the initial 
congress, Cyril Ramaphosa, the General Secretary of NUM and convener of the 
COSATU congress, stated that the workers' struggle could not be separated from the 
wider struggle for liberty. He called for unity among workers and for COSATU to give 
firm political direction to the workers. At the congress, Elijah Barayi was elected 
COSA TU President. The congress agreed upon a set of principles and resolutions, which 
included non-racialism, one union for each industry and worker control of the 
organization. These resolutions were concerned with current political and security issues 
revolving around the call for the lifting of the state of emergency, the removal of troops 
from the townships, and the release of all political detainees. The congress also called for 
international action including sanctions and disinvestrnents and rejected Bantustans and a 
federal constitution for a future South Africa. COSATU committed itself to advancing 
the struggles of workers both in the workplace and in the community. 1987 saw the 
highest number of strikes ever, including a strike by over 300,000 mineworkers (Alder 
and Webster, 1994:6; COSATU, 1995: 1-4; Mbeki, 1996:56; Barber, 1999:242; ANC, 
2000a: 5). In 1989, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) emerged following the 
banning of the UDF and curtailment ofCOSATU's political activity by the govemment. 
An MDM leader explained that the new movement was designed to unite the masses and 
the working classes in the struggle for liberation. In August the same year, the MDM 
issued a statement saying that it considered all restricted organizations to be unbanned, 
and announced a countrywide defiance campaign against apartheid institutions (Mandel a, 
1996:655; Barber, 1999:265). Unlike the 1970s where there was the absence of organized 
structures and the ANC was relatively weak inside South Africa, the 1980s saw the ANC 
prepare fertile ground in which the ideology and campaigns of broad-based mass political 
organizations could take their place. The revolt of the 1980s was therefore, much more 
politically focused than that of the 19705 (Mbeki, 1996:69). 
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3.2.3 The ANC, the State, Private Sector, and the International Community, 1986 to 
1990 
In the mid 1980s, Mandela initiated private and secret talks with the apartheid 
government on the need to begin peaceful negotiations between the ANC and the 
government. Emphasizing that he was acting as an individual and not on behalf of the 
ANC, Mandela pointed out the need to begin such talks in order to achieve a peaceful 
transition in South Africa. During the talks, which lasted up to the late 1980s, not only 
did Mandela meet and hold talks with senior government officials such as cabinet 
ministers, but also met and held talks with Presidents Botha and Frederick de Klerk in 
1985 and 1989 respectively, to whom he conveyed his personal views and those of the 
ANC on a future non-racial and non-sexist South Africa. Mandela also met and held brief 
talks with prominent international personalities on the same subject matter during this 
period (Sparks, 1994:39; Mandela, 1996: 619-665; Barber, 1999:251-271; Shubin, 1999; 
297&351). 
As Mandela was engaged in talks about talks with the apartheid government, the 
ANC was also initiating similar contacts with the regime. Following the signing of the 
Nkomati Accord between the governments of Mozambique and South Africa on 16 
March 1984, the apartheid regime apparently felt that the ANC had become isolated and 
weak and therefore could be pressed into talks on the regime's terms. The Nkomati 
Accord was a non-aggression and good neighbourliness pact that obliged both sides to 
stop aiding each other's enemies and to set up a joint security commission to monitor the 
agreement. Part of Article 3 of the Accord stated that the contracting parties would not 
allow their territories, territorial waters or air spaces to be used as bases, thoroughfares, 
or in any other ways by other states, governments, foreign military forces, organizations 
or individuals to commit acts of violence or aggression against the territorial integrity or 
sovereignty of the other or threaten the security of its inhabitants (Jaster, 1992:28-30; 
Jaster et ai, 1992 162-163). In short, Mozambique was meant to stop providing sanctuary 
for the ANC, and South Africa would reciprocate by withdrawing its support for the 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) and its military attacks in 
Mozambique. The ANC retained its official mission in Mozambique while South Africa 
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continued to back RENAMO (Clough, 1992:121 ; Chan 1990:50; Hall and Young, 
1997: 192-194; Shubin, 1999:248-264; Mwangi, 2002: 124). 
The first open hint of the regime's position was a statement from the South 
African Ambassador to Paris, Robert du Plooy, in May 1984. It stated that, given the 
rapidly changing political situation in Southern Africa, anything was possible including 
rapprochement with the ANC. However, the preconditions for such a meeting were the 
immediate suspension of the armed struggle, the recognition of the sovereignty of the 
South African government, and that the ANC should break its links with the Soviet 
Union. The ANC leadership publicly rejected these preconditions, but it had to account to 
its members and supporters for why it was now engaging in talks about talks with the 
apartheid regime. In the same month, Tambo acknowledged that there were attempts to 
bring the AN C into discussions with the apartheid government and that both sides were 
under pressure to agree. He promised AN C members and supporters that no such action 
would be taken without consulting them. Two months later, in Gaberone, Tambo said that 
the question of talks was being discussed, declaring that the ANC would be ready to meet 
P. W. Botha only after it was sure that there would be serious dialogue aimed at bringing 
an end to apartheid. The precondition for such a meeting was the release of Mandela and 
other political prisoners and their participation in the talks. The ANC leadership was, 
however, skeptical that the apartheid government was ready for serious talks (Shubin, 
1999:267-268). 
There were mixed reactions from the regime to the very first mention of talks 
about talks. Prominent businessmen were openly calling for conditional talks with the 
ANC. By the mid-1980s, it was clear to South Africa' s friends and foes that no solution 
to the crisis in the country could be found that excluded the ANC. Several mediators, 
among them US Congressmen, were increasingly urging the ANC to accept Pretoria's 
preconditions for talks. The most important preconditions included the ANC's severance 
of links with the SACP and the Soviet Union. The first serious sign of concern was seen 
on 13 September 1985, when a delegation of South African businessmen led by Gavin 
Reily, Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, met the ANC leadership in Zambia 
at a meeting hosted by President Kenneth Kaunda. The businessmen were concerned 
about the upsurge of the popular struggle and the evident inability of the apartheid regime 
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to solve the crisis. Prior to this meeting, emissaries had been sent twice to Lusaka, but the 
ANC leadership had initially delayed the meeting. However, following, P.W. Botha's 
"crossing the Rubicon" speech, which dashed hopes for any meaningful changes and 
reforms from the NP, the ANC realized that the time was now ripe to go ahead (Shubin, 
1999:270-272 & 295-296; Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 506). Botha's famous 
"Rubicon" speech had received advance publicity as heralding a major policy change. 
Though expected to announce radical policy changes with regard to apartheid, Botha, 
during this speech, chose to defend the Afrikaners' position on apartheid (Davenport and 
Saunders, 2000: 511; Harvey, 2001: 93). The ANC agreed to the businessmen's meeting 
on condition that it should not be secret. The movement wanted to avoid speculation 
about the possible contacts with the regime (Shubin, 1999:295-296). 
At the meeting, the business delegation raised the issue of the ANC's relationship 
with the Soviet Union. The businessmen were also concemed about MK, which was 
targeting monopoly companies that had disputes with their workers. They agreed in 
principle that there was the need to abolish apartheid and create a united democratic 
South Africa. Later, during a visit to Moscow in October 1985, Thabo Mbeki's 
assessment was that South African business had drifted away from the NP leadership, but 
it was worried about the future as conceived in the Freedom Charter. South Africa 
business leaders hoped to transform the ANC into a moderate force and draw in other 
groups to achieve a moderate solution, thereby transferring power from the NP to 
moderate politicians and not to the ANC, at least initially. On 21 September 1985, the 
Alliance for a National Convention held its inaugural conference. It was hoped that the 
Alliance would unite all those who were against apartheid and revolution. A delegation of 
the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) led by Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, visited Lusaka to 
try and sell the idea of the Alliance to the ANC. However, the ANC refused to support it 
for two reasons. Firstly, one of the Alliance participants was to be Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 
leader of the IFP, whom the ANC considered a collaborator with the apartheid regime. 
Secondly, the Alliance would be in direct competition with the UDF, which was already 
successfully uniting democratic forces (Shubin, 1999:296). 
South Africa also came under extensive discussion at the Commonwealth Summit 
held in the Bahamas in October 1985. Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, 
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held out against the imposition of sanctions against Pretoria. A compromise was reached 
with the creation of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), whose aim was to mediate 
between the government and the liberation movement. The ANC leadership was unhappy 
with this decision as they saw it as a deliberate attempt on the part of Britain to abdicate 
and sideline its responsibility of trying to find a political settlement in South Africa. The 
ANC leadership was also worried that the EPG would become a permanent body like the 
Western "contact group" on Namibia, which would sideline the UN and OAU when it 
came to South African issues (Shubin, 1999:297). The fust concrete proposals for a 
political settlement in South Africa were put forward by the EPG. Their brand of shuttle 
diplomacy failed when the SADF attacked ANC targets in Gaberone, Harare and Lusaka 
on 19 May 1986 (Shubin, 1999:301). With the exception of the British representatives, 
the EPG was prepared to adopt a plan to impose sanctions against South Africa in a 
manner calculated to make it very difficult for the country to reject demands for the 
effective dismantling of apartheid (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 536-537). 
With pressure mounting for a political settlement in 1987, the ANC leaders began 
receiving questions from the membership with regard to its policy on current and future 
negotiations. The ANC reaffirmed that it was ready and willing to enter into genuine 
negotiations provided that they were aimed at the transformation of the country into a 
united and non-racial democracy. This and only this would be the objective of any 
negotiating process (ANC, 1990:10 Shubin, 1999:321). Leaders like Thabo Mbeki, who 
had all along been involved in international contacts, emphasized the need for early 
preparation for the talks, since the ANC NEC members felt that a number of questions 
had to be considered before the talks, for example, who would participate in and preside 
over such talks, and would there be a Constitutional Assembly? (Shubin, 1999:321-322). 
In May 1987, there was a serious step in bridge-building with the white community, 
particularly the Afrikaner community, at a meeting held in Dakar with academics and 
intellectuals from South Africa. It was organized by the ANC. After this meeting, the 
idea of a meeting between MK and the South African military establishment was also 
raised. It fmally occurred only in 1990 in Lusaka, though the ANC had since 1987, been 
receiving messages from influential people in the South African military establishment 
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claiming that an agreement would have to be reached by 1990 or the country would be 
destroyed (Shubin, 1999: 325). 
The beginning of talks about talks was of grave concern to the ANC. Some of its 
leaders such as, Joe Nhlanhla, the ANC Head of Intelligence and Security, and Chris 
Hani were seriously concerned that the process lacked proper guidance and direction. An 
important step in preparing for a political settlement was made by the ANC in 1988, 
when it published Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. By that time, 
many organizations in South Africa had acknowledged the ANC's role in the liberation 
struggle and were trying to contact its headquarters in Lusaka, looking for guidance 
(Shubin, 1999:326-350). With regard to the government, President De Klerk honoured 
his commitment to reforms and changes. On 2 February 1990, in his first address as State 
President De Klerk, announced the lifting of bans on the ANC, PAC, the SACP and 
thirty-one other illegal organizations. He also announced the unconditional release of all 
political prisoners incarcerated for non-violent activities; the suspension of capital 
punishment; and the lifting of various restrictions imposed by the State of Emergency. De 
Klerk also declared the start of negotiations for a new political dispensation to embrace 
everybody. Though he received international commendation for his bold actions, the 
ANC objected to the fact that he had not completely lifted the State of Emergency or 
ordered troops out of the townships (Mandel a, 1996:666; Mbeki, 1996: 108; Barber, 
1999:273). On 11 February 1990, Mandela was released, unconditionally from prison 
after more than 27 years (Mandela, 1993:18; 1996:667-668). 
Conclusion 
Party dominance is partly a product of the historical remnant of liberation 
movements that papered over social diversities as a means of achieving national 
independence. In the late 1940s, the ANC embarked on a programme aimed at 
controlling diverse social forces in a bid to end white minority rule and create a non-
racial and non-sexist democracy. This was a difficult task that required mass political 
mobilization and the need to control such diverse forces that cut across class, ethnic, 
racial and professional lines, in a society already deeply divided. 
123 
Prior to 1940, the ANC was relatively inactive, since its membership, was small, 
elitist and largely composed of professional thus lacking mass support. It also lacked 
adequate financial resources and so lacked the capacity to initiate and effect any 
meaningful change, let alone mass mobilization. However with the rapid changes 
emerging in South Africa as a result of the Second World War, the ANC decided to 
strengthen its institutional capacity in order to control and influence new emerging social 
forces. The ANC began developing its leadership, doctrines, programmes and financial 
and human resources, and societal linkages to make it more effective as an agent of mass 
mobilization and socialization. 
It was during the 1940s and 1950s that the ANC began incorporating new social 
forces into the liberation struggle. The ANC became more militant by mobilizing the 
masses on a much larger scale than previously, via such activities as the Defiance 
Campaign and the Congress of the People. This period represented a new phase in the 
liberation struggle, since the oppressed majority were willing to sacrifice their freedom 
and lives, and furthermore they realized that meaningful change would only come as a 
result of extra-constitutional means. The ANC's membership grew in numbers. Its 
activities influenced other social forces by stimulating the growth of militancy within 
other black organizations. It was also during this period that the ANC adopted the policy 
of non-racialism and began incorporating all races into the liberation struggle. 
Consequently by the time it was banned in 1960, the ANC was already a mass 
movement. 
The banning of the ANC forced it to go underground and into exile. However, this 
did not deter its commitment to end white minority rule. Nor did it deter its desire to 
broaden its social base and its commitment to non-racialism. By adopting the armed 
struggle as a new tactic, the ANC further incorporated new social forces into the 
liberation struggle. Initially, these were the intelligentsia, the unemployed youth and 
workers in the urban areas, but were later they were joined by students and schoolleavers 
in the post-Soweto period. The ANC also began including and involving school and 
youth groups into the struggle, as well as the trade union movements. It also began to 
acknowledge the presence of other civil society organizations in South Africa, such as the 
BCM, and was later to call for a united front, which saw the emergence of the UDF, a 
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front comprising several civil society organizations representing diverse social interests 
in the 1980s. This period also witnessed the emergence of COSATU as an ally of the 
ANC and UDF, intensifying trade and labour union involvement in the struggle. In exile, 
the AN C also managed to incorporate international non-governmental organizations, such 
as the anti-apartheid movements that brought to world attention the plight of the 
oppressed in South Africa. 
It was by controlling diverse social interests or forces along ethnic, racial, class 
and professional lines that the ANC mobilized the domestic and international 
communities in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. The ANC also managed to 
mobilize these diverse social forces for electoral purposes, on a platform of non-
racialism, leading to its assumption of political power in 1994 as a majority party. 
Dominant movements are founded and based upon broad or diverse social interests and 
not on narrow sectional interests. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE KENYA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF 
PARTY DOMINANCE IN KENYA 
4.0 Introduction 
Kenya's post-1990 multiparty polity has been classified as a dominant party 
system (Freedom House, 1999: I). The ruling party KANU meets the criteria of what is 
referred to as a dominant party under a multiparty system. A one-party dominant system 
is in effect a competitive party system. The party system need not be undemocratic if the 
dominant party is democratic or pursues strategies aimed at enhancing democratization, 
or if the polity under which such a system operates well developed democratic and 
democracy-promoting institutions. However, in countries where the dominant party is 
authoritarian and political institutions are weak, such a system is undemocratic. This is 
the case in Kenya. Though the restoration of multi-partyism is a significant step toward 
democratization and democracy in the country, KANU has, in the post-1990 period, 
achieved its dominance largely by undemocratic means. The party exhibits electoral, 
chronological, bargaining and governmental dominance. This chapter examines KANU's 
strategies aimed at achieving par1y dominance in the post-1990 period. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is a general historical 
account of the period from 1990 to 1992. It looks at the main domestic and international 
factors that led to the restoration of multi-partyism and at the ruling party's attempts at 
forestalling such changes. The second section examines KANU's tactics and strategies 
aimed at establishing and consolidating party dominance in the post-1992 multiparty 
period. This section pays particular attention to the ruling party's strategies of 
establishing dominance in the party and political system by attempting to control both 
state and civil society by way of parliamentary, bargaining, and governmental 
dominance. 
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4.1 The Restoration of Multi-Partyism in Kenya, 1990 to 1992 
4.1.1 The Internal Context of Pressure for Multi-Partyism 
Kenya was initially a multi-party state in the early 1960s. However, in 1969 the 
country was transformed into a de facto one-party state. In 1982, the country became a de 
jure one-party state with KANU as the sole legal political party following the 
introduction of Section 2A of the Constitution. The restoration of multi-partyism in 1991 
was as a result of several domestic and international factors. These ranged from rising 
domestic political pressure due to KANU's authoritarian and repressive tendencies to 
external pressures emanating from global political trends and donor conditionalities. The 
ruling party was, therefore, forced, under prescribed terms to re-introduce multi-partyism 
in the country. 
The introduction of political and economic reforms, Glasnost and Perestroika by 
Mikhael Gorbachev in the former Soviet Union in 1985-1986, had a significant impact on 
global political trends, particularly in the developing countries. Not only did these 
reforms lead to the "collapse" of the Soviet Union, but also lead to the introduction and 
implementation of political and economic liberalization measures in East and Central 
Europe and thereafter Africa, leading to the demise of authoritarian party systems. Kenya 
was not spared from sweeping reforms and by early 1990 the multiparty debate had been 
re-introduced in the country. The debate was set off by individuals and institutions of 
civil society. In January 1990, the Reverend Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church 
of East Africa (PCEA), triggered off the multiparty debate by saying that one-party 
structures had completely failed to be democratic in East and Central European countries. 
Several senior politicians in the KANU regime responded immediately by attacking 
Njoya (Maina, W. et ai, 1990:8; Finance, 15 Sept. 1992:12; Macharia and Maina, K. , 
1992:4). In mid-February 1990, President Moi contributed to the debate by saying that 
"things happening in Eastern Europe had no relevance to Kenya whatsoever" (Maina, W. 
et ai, 1990:8). 
Govemment criticism and intimidation did not, however, deter or stifle the multi-
party debate. Martin Shikuku, a former MP for Butere constituency, joined the debate and 
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called for the repeal of Section 2A, the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of free 
and fair elections. Shortly afterwards outspoken Anglican Bishop, Henry Okullu of the 
Church Province of Kenya (CPK), made similar calls adding that the presidential tenure 
should be limited to two terms. Okullu who said that "let us accept change or change will 
change us" received a scathing response from the regime with KANU politicians 
accusing him of serving foreign masters and interests. Prominent human rights lawyers 
and members of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), Kiraitu Murungi, Gitobu Imanyara 
and Rumba Kinuthia backed Okullu, calling for the re-introduction of multipartyism and 
the dissolution of Parliament (Maina, W. et ai, 1990: 8; Klopp, 2000:16). 
The entry of two former Cabinet Ministers, Kenneth S. Matiba and Charles W. 
Rubia, into the debate stepped up the multi-party campaign significantly. At a press 
conference on 3 May 1990, Matiba and Rubia called for the re-introduction of multi-party 
politics, the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of free and fair elections, arguing 
that the one-party system had outlived its usefulness in Kenya (Bratton and van de Walle, 
1992:35). In their press statement, Matiba and Rubia said that: 
... we believe that the time is ripe for change .. . and positively advocate 
for (sic) a multi-party system ... our single party system is the major 
single contributory factor and almost solely the root cause of the political, 
economic and social woes we now face ... the single party system must go 
now and not tomorrow ... (Matiba and Rubia, 1990a: 55). 
In keeping with KANU's style since independence, Matiba and Rubia were 
dismissed as ethnic chauvinists and puppets of foreign masters. Responding to these 
accusations, the two former Ministers reiterated their call for the re-introduction of multi-
party politics at a press conference held on 15th May, insisting that the one-party system 
was not conducive to democratic practices since those in power easily manipulated it. 
They also emphasized that "if that system has gone in most ofthe countries of the world, 
Kenya leaders had better accept the inevitable changes which are bound to come." At a 
later press conference on 13 June 1990, Matiba re-iterated his call (Matiba, 1990: 1 00-
103; Matiba and Rubia, 1990b: 70). Their appeals were, however, ignored prompting 
them to organize countrywide mass rallies to air their views and allow Kenyans also to 
express their views on the subj ect, since the government had ruled out the possibility of a 
national referendum or convention. In compliance with the laws of Kenya, the two 
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fonner ministers officially applied for a license to hold their first public meeting on 7 
July 1990, at the historic Kamkunji grounds in Nairobi, placing the government in a 
dilemma. In as much as it wanted to crack down on multi-party proponents, the 
government was at the same time not willing to appear before its critics as curtailing 
freedom of expression. Nevertheless, it denied the two a license, President Moi stating at 
a rally, that the two would not be granted the license as wananchi (the public) had already 
declared their stand. Moi was referring to public meetings in key centres of the country 
where he had solicited public support for the one-party system. In effect, Moi's remarks 
pre-empted the issue of any license. The government declared the meeting illegal and 
warned Kenyans against attending it (Matiba and Rubia, 1990c: 104; Maina W. and 
Mburu,1990:13). 
Both Matiba and Rubia came under heavy criticism from the KANU leadership 
and government officials, who called for the detention of the two fonner ministers. They 
were dubbed as traitors who needed to be detained for their own safety. On 4th July 1990, 
three days before the planned meeting, both Matiba and Rubia were arrested and placed 
in detention. They were accused of participating in subversive activities aimed at 
undermining and overthrowing the government; organizing an illegal meeting; and of 
failing to respect the Head of State. Matiba's detention order concluded, "because of these 
anti-Government activities and in the interests of preservation of public security your 
detention has become necessary." He and others were detained under the Preservation of 
Public Security Act (Finance, \6-3\ May, 1990:50; The Standard, 21 March, 1990:1 ; 
Maina, W. and Mburu, 1990: 20). Several other multi-party advocates were thereafter 
also arrested and detained, heightening the tense political situation in the country. 
On 7 July 1990, thousands of Kenyans turned up at Kamkunji grounds for the 
public meeting. The meeting became popularly known as Saba Saba, the Kiswahili direct 
translation of seven seven signifying the seventh day of the seventh month of the year. 
The government deployed its security forces in and around the grounds, setting the stage 
for confrontation between the public and the government. Consequently, clashes, riots 
and demonstrations occurred against the government and the one-party system and in 
favour of multi-party politics. These mass protests spread to many parts of Nairobi, 
outlying districts and other parts of the country, prompting the government to contain the 
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situation. By the time the protests were over, several people had been killed and hundreds 
of others injured. The official figure put those killed at twenty, but unofficial figures put 
the number of the dead at more than five times the official figure (Maina, W. , et ai, 
1990: 11; Bratton and van de Walle, 1992:34; Macharia and Maina, K., 1992:xxiv). 
The mUltiparty debate and the government's repressive response to it further 
heightened political pressure and tension in the mid-1990s. Consequently the ruling party 
formed the KANU Review Committee in June 1991 to ease the mounting political 
tension. The Committee made up of presidential appointees and headed by Vice-
President George Saitoti became widely known as the Saitoti Review Committee. Its 
aims and objectives were to review the party's nomination, electoral and disciplinary 
procedures. Specific issues included the queue-voting system that required voters to line 
up behind contestants for parliamentary seats instead of a secret ballot vote and the 70 
percent vote rule providing that any candidate who received more than 70 percent of the 
votes cast in the queue-voting nomination exercise was automatically elected to the 
National Assembly (Maina, W. and Mburu, 1990:18; Maina, W., et al , 1990:15). 
Though the Committee was primarily meant to shift the political focus from 
political pluralism to KANU and to pre-empt the ruling party's promised national 
convention, Moi claimed that its purpose was to allow Kenyans to participate in the 
country's political welfare. The Committee injected new life into the debate, by providing 
a government-sponsored forum for wananchi's grievances without any substantial threat 
to the goverrunent itself. However, from its very first session on 25 July, the Committee 
faced a barrage of criticisms with regard to the ruling party's policies (Maina, W. , et aI. , 
1990:9; Maina, W. and Mburu, 1990:18; Bratton and van de Walle, 1992:36). Several 
individuals and civil society groups, who presented oral and written submissions, 
criticized the Committee and called for the repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution and 
the re-introduction of multi-partyism in the country. Religious groups, such as the 
Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, pointed out that the Committee was partisan and 
therefore inadequate and unrepresentative of the Kenyan society (Okoth, 1990: 19). 
Members of the LSK also presented their views and comments on the Committee and the 
multi-party debate. Lawyers, Gibson K. Kuria and Murungi, in exile following a 
government crackdown on multi-party proponents, had this to say about the Committee: 
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It is sad that the KANU Govenunent has chosen the Committee to be the 
instrument for obstructing the great clamour for the restoration of 
multiparty democracy in Kenya ... KANU has drawn the Rules of the 
Review Conunittee, it is the only player in this political game, it is the 
goalkeeper, the linesman, the referee, and the spectator ... the basic aim of 
the Committee is to hoodwink both Kenyans and the aid giving agencies 
and Govenunents of the West that Kenya is slowly and methodologically 
involved in a process of democratization, while in fact retaining KANU's 
one party dictatorship intact ... (Kuria and Murungi. 1990:25-26). 
Former Vice President Oginga Odinga's sentiments were similar to those of many 
who presented their oral and written submissions. He argued that the formation of the 
Saitoti Review Committee would not bring about positive and desired changes in the 
party and electoral process, since it was constituted of the same people who had made 
and approved the very same draconian rules it was seeking to review. Odinga 
reconunended, inter alia, the restoration of multi-partyism; a two-term limit of the 
president's tenure; the release of political detainees; and prisoners, the dissolution of 
parliament and the formation of an interim Govenunent of National Unity (Odinga, 
1990a: 27-29). 
When the Committee's public sittings began, it became clear from the 
submissions that Kenyans' grievances ran beyond and deeper than the limited scope of 
the party's terms of reference. Many submissions revolved around the multi-party debate; 
constitutional amendments, political patronage, nepotism and corruption in the 
government; queue voting and expulsions from the country's sole political party, the 70 
percent rule, and state institutions and accountability. By the time the Committee 
concluded its countrywide hearings on August 1990, it was clear that the support for pro-
KANU reforms had eroded. The Committee compiled a report that was never made 
public, and made recommendations that were to be the backbone of discussions at the 3rd 
to 4th December 1990 KANU Delegates Conference held at Kasarani, Nairobi. At the 
conference, the Committee recommended that Kenya remain a "one-party democracy" a 
recommendation that was swiftly adopted (Maina, W., et aI., 1990:9-15). 
On the eve of the 3rd to 4th December 1990 KANU Delegates Conference, Oginga 
Odinga, in a press statement, once again emphasized the ills and shortcomings of KANU 
and the one-party system, saying that he and unnamed others were calling for an open 
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democratic process and KANU was resisting this. He added that they had, therefore, 
decided without equivocation, to launch a political party that would safeguard democracy 
in Kenya. The police thereafter questioned him and he reiterated his stand on the question 
mUlti-party politics. Later, Odinga re-emphasized, "The entire world is going plural and 
multi-racial. Kenya must accept multi-partyism without being coerced into it" and 
concluded by saying, "It has been established that a one-party system is dictatorial, 
oppressive and corrupt." (Odinga, 1990b: 21; Maina, W. et ai, 1990:9). 
The KANU Delegates Conference held on 3rd to 4th December 1990, at which it 
was resolved that Kenya remain a "one-party democracy" saw the year end, displaying 
KANU's lack of political interest in restoring multi-partyism. The ruling party claimed 
that it was not in principle against the idea of political pluralism, but insisted that this 
would not be restored immediately, since the country was not yet ready for multi-party 
politics. This position, once again, did not deter multi-party activists and proponents from 
forming and attempting to register political parties and other political organizations. In 
early 1991, Oginga Odinga declared that 1991 would be the year of multi-party 
democracy in Kenya and he and others announced the formation of the National 
Democratic Party. They presented their party's application for registration to the 
Registrar-General on 13 March 1991. Attempts to register the party were, however, 
frustrated by the government when the Registrar-General refused the party's registration, 
arguing that Kenya was constitutionally, a one-party state. Odinga and the unregistered 
party's leadership were forced to seek court redress, but the process took several months 
before they realized the futility of seeking redress through a compromised judicial 
system. Determined to pursue his ideals and principles, Oginga Odinga and five others, 
Ahmed Barnhariz, Phillip Gacoka, Masinde Muliro, George Nthenge and Martin Shikuku 
formed the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). FORD was initially a 
pressure group consisting of less than ten persons and as such by law did not require 
registration. Its principle objective, at the time, was to pressurize for the repeal of Section 
2A (Maina, W. and Mburu, 1991 ; Macharia and Maina, K, 1992: 54). 
FORD's first action was to apply for a license to hold a public meeting at 
Karnkunji grounds on 4 October 1991. The government refused to grant the license and 
declared the meeting illegal under the Public Order Act, forcing the FORD leadership to 
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call it off. However, they made another attempt to hold a meeting on 16 November 1991 , 
declaring this time that it would go ahead with or without a license, since it was their 
constitutional right. Section 80 of the Constitution of Kenya guarantees freedom of 
assembly and association. Once again, the government denied the group a license, 
declared the meeting illegal and warned Kenyans not to attend it. Meanwhile FORD 
leaders urged Kenyans to attend the meeting in thousands, urging them to be peaceful and 
disciplined. On the day, the government mobilized its security forces and stationed them 
at and within the surrounding areas of Karnkunji grounds. Like Saba Saba day, the 
previous year, thousands of Kenyans turned up for the meeting. The FORD leaders were, 
however, arrested on their way to the venue. Those activists and leaders arrested during 
or before 16 November 1991 were repatriated to the districts of origin where they were 
charged with organizing and participating in an illegal meeting. The aborted 16 
November meeting was followed by mass demonstrations in the capital city of Nairobi 
and outlying districts that were repressively quelled by the state. The indictment of 
FORD leaders in district courts also caused mass demonstrations of support countrywide. 
Realizing that it would face a major political crisis, the government dropped all the 
charges and set the activists and leaders free. FORD leaders resumed their political 
activities of pressurizing the government to restore multi-partyism (Finance 16-31 Dec., 
1991 :40-41 ; Kenya, 1 992a: 53-54; Macharia and Maina K, 1992:55-56). 
4.1.2 The External Context of Pressure for Multi-Partyism 
Political liberalization in Kenya was also facil itated by pressure from the 
international community in the early 1990s. The donor community, especially bilateral 
and multilateral aid-giving agencies and Western governments, played a leading role in 
ensuring that KANU under prescribed terms implemented political and economic reforms 
in the country. These political and economic liberalization measures were aimed at 
effecting democratization in Kenya. The international community expressed concern at 
the detention of pro-democracy activists, demanding to know the reasons behind their 
incarceration. The US, which had increasingly begun demanding democratic changes in 
aid recipient countries, expressed its concern about the political situation in Kenya, 
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particularly the flagrant abuse of human rights. In a letter addressed to the US Secretary 
of State, James Baker, five influential congressmen - Howard Wolpe, Chairman of the 
House Sub-Committee on Africa, Dante Fascell, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Gus Yatron, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights and International 
Organizations, William H. Gray III, Majority Whip and Paul Simon, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on African Affairs - asked the US Government 
to freeze aid to Kenya because "private dialogue and public diplomacy both seem to 
encourage the Kenya Government to respect internationally recognized human rights of 
its citizens and to consider democratic reforms". They further added "it is extremely 
important for the US Government to immediately freeze current assistance to Kenya and 
to reconsider its overall assistance for the 1991 Financial Year (FY 1991)" (Maina, W 
and Mburu, 1990:15). 
Donor conditionality for foreign assistance, particularly "quick-disbursing" aid, 
contributed much to the implementation of political liberalization measures in the 
country. Donor conditionality basically entails the use of pressure by the donor to reduce, 
suspend, terminate or threaten to terminate aid if the recipient does not meet certain 
conditions. The resumption of aid is made conditional on firm evidence of an 
improvement in areas such as human rights, democratic reforms, economic reforms and 
greater accountability in government. Conditionality is, therefore, not an aim in itself, but 
an instrument by which other objectives are achieved (Robinson, 1994: 47; Stokke, 1995: 
12-13 ; Adar, 2000 : 2-7). "Quick-disbursing" aid consists primarily of cash transfers by 
bilateral and multilateral donors to subsidize budget deficits and current account deficits 
incurred by the recipient country. At the annual meeting of the Consultative Group (CG) 
for Kenya, held in Paris in November 1991, the donor community, led by democracy-
minded bilateral donors, suspended US$ 350 million in "quick-disbursing" aid pending 
macro-economic and political reforms by Kenya. Although "quick-disbursing" aid was 
suspended, project lending was not. The "democracy-minded" donors are those donors 
that provide some form of programmatic support to countries making a transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule (IFES, 1997: 2). Many of these donors co-ordinate their 
activities in those countries where they seek to assist democratic transitions. Donors with 
the most comprehensive bilateral programmes to support democratization included 
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Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the US. Some 
countries as well as several multilateral donors, or example, Japan, the United Kingdom 
(UK), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the World Bank, refer to these programs in terms of supporting "good governance" 
rather than democratization. Good governance basically deals with the practice of good 
government, emphasizing the nature of interactions between the state and civil society 
actors and among such social actors themselves. Democratization, on the other hand deals 
with the shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime, through the deliberate 
construction of democratic and democracy-promoting institutions. In Kenya, the 
aforementioned donors co-ordinate their activities in this area as participants in the 
Donors Development Democracy and Governance Group (DDDG) (IFES, 1997:2; 
Klopp, 2000: 16-17). 
The suspension of quick-disbursing aid triggered significant political reforms, but 
not a full transition to democracy. In an apparent bid to restore critical aid flows, coupled 
with rising domestic political pressure, President Moi fmally conceded to political 
liberalization. On 2 December 1991, at a stormy meeting of the KANU Delegates 
Conference, Moi proposed the repeal of Section 2A, a proposal that was accepted and 
recornmended (Finance, 15 March 1992:16-17; Holmquist and Ford, 1992:97-111; IFES, 
1997:3; Klopp, 2000:17). Four days later, Oginga Odinga and a lawyer Paul Muite, 
launched FORD as a political party signaling the end of the one-party state. On 10 
December, Moi told a Central Bank of Kenya luncheon he believed Kenyans were 
headed for an uncertain future following KANU's decision to legalize mUltiparty politics. 
He said, "I see chaos ahead of us. This decision [to allow plural democracy] may not 
benefit Kenyans" (Karanja, 1998:23). That same afternoon, Parliament repealed Section 
2A of the Constitution thereby allowing for the registration of other political parties. 
Kenya was no longer a de jure one-party state. During the celebrations marking the 
country 's Independence Day two days later, Moi in his official speech, however, said: 
"The political changes taking place in our country are intended to enhance our 
democratic practices . .. The KANU Government has, since independence, been receptive 
and responsive to the needs of Kenyans" (Daily Nation, 13 December 1991 :4). On 25 
December, the Minister for Health, KANU founder member and a former Vice-President 
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Mwai Kibal<i resigned from the government and with others, launched another political 
party, the Democratic Party (DP) (Karanja, 1998:23). 
The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 1991, which reinstated 
multi-party politics, by repealing Section 2A of the Constitution, also amended those 
sections of the constitution that gave effect to Section 2A, such as those requiring 
nomination of parliamentary candidates by KANU. Parliamentary candidates, therefore, 
were no longer required to be nominated by KANU to qualify for the national assembly 
and presidential elections. Also brought into operation was Section 40, which required an 
MP to vacate his or her seat if he or she resigned from the party with whose support he or 
she had been elected (Kenya, 1992a: 20-25). Other amendments regarding multi-partyism 
were introduced by the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No.6 of 1992, which 
required under Section 5 of the Constitution that a successful presidential candidate 
gamer at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in at least five of the eight provinces. There 
was also provision for a run-off between the two top presidential candidates in the case of 
no decisive winners in the general elections. Also introduced, under Section 9 of the 
Constitution, was a limited presidential tenure of two five-year terms. The constitutional 
amendments reinstated security of tenure for judges, the Attorney General, Controller and 
Auditor General (Kenya, 1992a: 6-9). Subsequently, several political parties applied for 
registration to the Registrar-General. By 12 November 1992, ten parties including KANU 
had been registered (see Appendix 4) (Kenya, 1992b: 1). 
The year 1992 saw the intensification of KANU' s state-sponsored terrorism under 
the guise of ethnic clashes on ethnic communities seen to be sympathetic to the 
opposition, particularly those residing in the so-called KANU zones. The "ethnic 
clashes", which were in effect ethnic cleansing began in late 1991, at Metetei farm in 
Nandi District of the Rift Valley Province. In what appeared to be a land dispute, 
violence was aimed at members of the farm who were not originally from the district, 
marking the beginning of a series of "ethnic clashes" that emerged in many parts of the 
country leaving thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. 
The "ethnic clashes" were sparked off by utterances and statements from 
prominent KANU politicians, calling for the re-introduction of majimboism (federalism) 
and the eviction of non-KANU supporters from KANU strongholds, in response to calls 
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for the re-introduction of multi-partyism. Consequently, this led to a series of violent 
attacks targeted at those ethnic groups considered as opposition supporters, particularly 
the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kisii communities residing in KANU strongholds in the Rift 
Valley Province and areas adjacent to such strongholds in the Nyanza and Western 
Provinces. Hundreds were killed and thousands displaced by these "ethnic clashes." The 
Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western 
and Other Parts of Kenya 1992, put the death toll at 779 and those displaced as more than 
50,000 people (Kenya, 1992: 8-10 & 85). As President Moi and the KANU government 
placed the blame on the opposition, particularly FORD, civil society organizations and 
opposition politicians accused the government of failing to take appropriate action 
against the perpetrators. The KANU Government was accused of instigating the 
"clashes" in a bid to derail the democratization process. In its report, a task force of the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) appointed to investigate the root causes 
and perpetrators of the "ethnic clashes" placed the blame squarely on the state. 
Interestingly, the Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee, which consisted of 
KANU members, also accused and placed the blame on high-ranking KANU politicians 
(Kenya, 1992: 74-76; Finance, 15 Sept. 1992:20-26; Weekly Review, 18 September 
1992: II). The KANU government also received international condemnation for its role in 
ethnic cleansing. In the US, Congressman Joseph Kennedy II told the Congress that the 
violence was prut of a carefully orchestrated campaign by the Kenya Government to 
forestall openly contested elections and to ensure that President Moi maintained his grip 
on power (Finance, 15 November, 1992:13-14). 
Throughout the year, the ruling party continued making use of positive and 
negative sanctions to enforce political obedience and loyalty. Many KANU MPs who had 
defected or had announced their intent to defect to FORD were forced though rewards or 
punishment to defect back to the ruling party. State patronage resources such as financial 
loans were recalled or such persons were rewarded with ministerial appointments or 
prime government land. As part of its electioneering strategy, the ruling party begun 
using famine relief food as a political instrument to solicit political support in famine 
stricken areas. In parts of Eastern Province, victims of famine were pressurized to join 
KANU and to display the party's membership cards to qualify for famine relief. The 
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party also made extensive use of the provincial administration to prevent opposition 
political parties from holding public meetings and campaigning in many parts of the 
country (Finance, 15 March 1992:36-38; 15 November, 1992:18-20; AC, 19 March, 
1993:7). 
During the nomination process for parliamentary and civic candidates in the run-
up to the general elections of December 1992, opposition candidates were harassed, 
intimidated, terrorized, kidnapped and barred from presenting their nomination papers in 
the so-called KANU zones by the police, provincial administration and KANU youth 
wingers. This was observed and noted by various organizations monitoring the 1992 
elections. The Chairman of the National Election Monitoring Unit (NEMU), Reverend 
Samuel Kobia, noted that, "It is ". our view that most of the incidents on nomination day 
would not have occurred if there had been no connivance or timidity or even actual 
participation on the part of the police and provincial administration" (Finance, 30 
December, 1992:2). Presidential nomination day, 14 December, saw the largest 
demonstrations against Moi and KANU, including the most vehement attacks and abuses 
against the person of the President (Finance 30 December, 1990: 3). Fifteen days later the 
country held its first multi-party general elections in the post-1991 multi-party period. 
4.2 The Consolidation of Party Dominance, 1992 to 1997 
The 1992 elections ushered in a multi-party parliament with KANU retaining its 
ruling status in the country. Like in the mult-iparty elections of the 1 960s, the ruling party 
emerged as the dominant party in the political process. For a party to be dominant it must 
at least gain an electoral plurality; win elections at least with a plurality for a consecutive 
number of elections; and it should be in a dominant bargaining position vis-a-vis other 
parties. It must also dominate governmentally (Pempel, 1990:3-4). The dominant party 
must dominate both the state and civil society in order to influence and transform society. 
This section examines the factors that contribute to KANU's dominance and the tactic 
and strategies it uses to strengthen its dominance as a party in the political process in the 
post-1992 election period. This will be examined within the context of the party 's 
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parliamentary, bargaining and governmental dominance. It also examines the ruling 
party's relationship with civil society. 
4.2.1 Party-State Society Relations and Dominance 
4.2.1.1 Parliamentary Dominance 
KANU's dominance as a party in the post-1990 period is a function of its 
parliamentary and chronological dominance in terms of electoral outcomes. The 
country's electoral system is that of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and the ruling party won 
the 1992 and 1997 multi-party elections with a plurality of votes, thus managing to retain 
its ruling position. 
Though the focus of this study is the post-1990 period, it is interesting to note that 
the ruling party, KANU, initially emerged as a m~ority party in the 1960s during the 
multi-party period of 1963 to 1964 and that of 1966 to 1969. As indicated in Chapter two, 
during the 1963 multi-party general elections, contested among KANU, KADU, APP and 
Independent candidates, KANU won with a majority by obtaining 62 per cent of the 
National Assembly seats, while the remaining 34 per cent were shared between 
opposition parties and independent candidates. In the Little General Election of 1966, 
which was contested between KANU and the newly formed KPU, the ruling party won 
with a majority of 77 per cent of the National Assembly seats up for election, whereas the 
KPU captured only 23 per cent. Though these were brief multiparty periods, the ruling 
party nonetheless enjoyed electoral dominance. 
The re-introduction of multi-partyism in December 1991 consequently led to 
multi-party general elections in December 1992. In all, 8 parties, including KANU, of 10 
political parties that had been registered by 12 November 1992 participated in the 
national assembly and presidential elections. These were KANU, FORD-A, FORD-K, 
DP, KNC, KSC, KENDA, and PICK. SDP and LPD though registered, did not participate 
in the elections (Kenya, 1992b: 1). FORD-A and FORD-K emerged following the split of 
FORD caused by factional rivalry between Matiba's faction and Oginga Odinga's over 
the procedure of party presidential nominations. 
139 
In an election that saw a turnout of 67.4 per cent of registered voters, KANU 
retained its ruling position by winning 100 of the 188 parliamentary seats with an 
electoral plurality of 53 per cent, hence obtaining a dominant position. The remaining 47 
per cent were shared among six other political parties, with KANU's closest rivals being 
FORD-A and FORD-K both of whom captured 31 seats thus, each obtaining only 16 per 
cent of the seats. In other words, KANU's closest rivals each managed to capture only 30 
per cent of what the ruling party obtained (see Table 4.0 below). 
Table 4.0 1992 and 1997 Multiparty General Elections Results in Kenya(Elected 
MPs Only) 
1992 1997 
Party Seats Percentage Party Seats Percentage 
KANU 100 S3 KANU 107 51 
FORD-A 31 16 OP 39 21 
FORD-K 31 16 NDP 21 10 
OP 23 12 FORD-K 17 8 
KSC 1 I SOP 15 7 
KNC 1 I Safina 5 2 
PICK 1 I FORD-P 3 I 
FORD-A I -
KSC I -
Shirikisho I -
Total 188 100 210 100 
Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Fmal Results 1992 Parliamentary Scores and 
Final Results 1997 Parliamentary Scores 
By the end of 1996, the ruling party, KANU had acquired extra II parliamentary 
seats as a result of by-elections following defections, deaths or the disqualification of 
opposition parliamentarians. This gave KANU a total of 118 elected seats out 210, 
boosting the party's majority to 56 per cent. By 1997 the party's number of parliamentary 
seats had risen to 122 giving it a majority of 58 per cent (National Assembly, 2001:1). In 
the following multiparty elections of December 1997, KANU once again retained its 
electoral plurality and hence its ruling position and dominance. This time, 27 political 
parties contested the civic, national assembly and presidential elections (see Appendix 5 
for the participating political parties in the 1997 General Elections). A total of 15 parties 
participated in both parliamentary and presidential elections whereas 4 participated only 
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in the national assembly elections (ECK, 1997:1-2; lED et al, 1998:227). National voter 
turnout in the 1997 elections stood at 65.36 per cent, a figure slightly higher than for the 
preceding election. In these elections, KANU captured 107 of the 210 parliamentary 
seats, thus obtaining an electoral plurality of 51 per cent. The remaining 103 seats were 
shared among 4 opposition and 5 existing and newly registered political parties. KANU's 
closest rival this time was the DP, which won 39 seats obtaining 21 per cent of the seats. 
The DP acquired only 36 per cent of what KANU captured (see Table 4.0 above) . 
KANU's electoral dominance is also evident in terms of its parliamentary 
strengths according to province following the 1992 and 1997 elections. In the 1992 
elections, KANU won with a plurality in 5 of the eight provinces in Kenya with an 
average of 72.5 per cent. In these five provinces KANU obtained more than 50 per cent 
of the seats per province. In the 1997 elections it won 4 out of the 8 provinces with an 
average of 78.4 per cent. KANU in this case managed to acquire more than 60 per cent of 
the seats per province. In other words, the ruling party captured over 50 per cent of the 
provinces with a plurality of more than 70 per cent in both elections (see Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 below). 
Table 4.1 Parties' Parliamentary Strength, 1992 
Province KANU FORD-A FORD-K DP KSC KNC PICK 
Nairobi 1 6 I 0 0 0 0 
Coast 17 0 2 I 0 0 0 
North Eastern 8 0 1 0 0 0 I 
Eastern 21 0 1 9 0 I 0 
Central 0 14 1 10 0 0 0 
Rift Valley 36 4 2 2 0 0 0 
Western 10 7 3 0 0 0 0 
Nyanza 7 0 20 1 I 0 0 
Total 100 31 31 23 1 1 1 
Source: ECK Final Results 1992 Parliamentary Scores 
Though FORD-K managed to win at least one seat in all 8 provinces in the 1992 
elections compared to KANU, which failed to secure a seat in Central Province, FORD-
K's parliamentary strength was nonetheless weaker than that of the ruling party. The 
opposition party managed to secure only 16 per cent of what KANU obtained. The 1992 
results also indicate that the ruling party, KANU, had approximately 12.5 seats per 
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province while the combined opposition parties had approximately 11 seats per province 
whereas the 1997 results indicate that KANU had approximately 13.4 seats whereas the 
combined opposition parties had 12.9 seats per province. 
Table 4.2 Parties' Parliamentary Strength, 1997 
Province KANU DP NOP FORD- SD Salina FORD-P Others 
K P 
Nairobi 1 5 1 0 1 0 0 
Coast 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 (Shirikisho) 
North Eastern 9 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Eastern 17 8 0 1 9 0 0 1 (FORD-A) 
Central 0 17 1 0 5 3 3 
Rift Valley 39 7 0 3 0 0 0 
Western 15 0 0 9 0 0 0 
Nyanza 8 0 19 4 0 0 0 I (KSC) 
Total 107 39 21 17 15 5 3 3 
Source: Compiled from ECK and Institute of Education in Democracy (lED) et al. Report on the 
1997 General Elections in Kenya 29-30 December, 1997 (Nairobi: lED, CJPC & NCCK, 1998) P 
88 and ECK Final Results 1997 Parliamentary Scores. 
KANU's chronological dominance is also evident in tenns of electoral outcomes. 
Party dominance also begins to be established when a party wins elections consecutively 
over a number of years. Though KANU has been in power for more than three decades, 4 
of the 9 general elections held in post-colonial Kenya have been multi-party elections. In 
each of these multiparty elections in the 1960s and 1990s, KANU won with a majority, 
obtaining 66 per cent in the 1963 elections and 95 per cent in the elections that followed 
in 1966. It also won chronologically in the mUlti-party elections of the 1990s. Its electoral 
dominance has to a large extent been institutionalized due to its chronological dominance 
under non-competitive and competitive electoral conditions (see Table 4.3 below). 
Table 4.3 Multi-party General Election Results in Post-Colonial Kenya (%) 
Year KANU(%)of 
Seats 
1963 66 
1966" 95 
1992 53 
1997 51 
* Includes Independent Candidates 
** Little General Election 
Opposition Parties (%) 
of Seats 
34' 
5 
47 
49 
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KANU's governmental dominance also stems from its dominance over the 
legislature. This is not only due to its majority of seats, but also due to the constitutional, 
institutional and financial weaknesses of the Parliament. As the head of KANU, which 
controls more than 50 per cent of the parliamentary seats, President Moi and the ruling 
party, influence significantly the legislative agenda (United States, 1997: 11). 
According to Kiraitu Murungi, an opposition MP and a leading human rights 
lawyer, Kenya's Parliament, even in the multi-party era has been severely limited in 
terms of its constitutional framework, institutional and fmancial independence. This had 
made Parliament in the multi-party era, " a fayade for masking and legitimizing KANU's 
de Jacto one-party dictatorship" (Murungi, 1997 :9). The constitutional roots of 
Parliament are weak and precarious. It exists and operates at the absolute discretion of the 
President. Sections 58 and 59 of the constitution empower the President to summon, 
prorogue, and dissolve Parliament. For example, on 27 January 1992, hardly a month 
after he was declared and sworn in as President and one day after the swearing in of the 
Speaker of the National Assembly and MPs, including himself, Moi prorogued 
Parliament. In other words, Parliament's life or life span is under the mercy of the 
President since it does not have a fixed schedule or calendar and Sections 58 and 59 have 
limited the scope of deliberation on controversial political issues. MPs are entitled to 
introduce legislation, but in practice it is the Attorney General who normally does so 
(Kenya, 1992a: 34-35; Finance 15 May 1993:31-32: Murungi, 1997:9 United States, 
1997:11). 
The institutional independence of the Parliament is also limited. Though the 
government of Kenya is founded on the doctrine of separation of powers, with the 
executive, legislature and the judiciary acting as checks and balances, the reality is that 
the executive has supremacy over the legislature. The Clerk of the National Assembly 
and members of his staff are not employees of Parliament since the Public Service 
Commission (PSC), which falls under the executive, hires them. Thus they owe their 
loyalty to the executive, not to Parliament. In budgetary allocations, Parliament is merely 
one of the government's departments. The executive through the Minister of Finance 
tightly controls its expenditure. Thus, although Parliament is supposed to control 
executive expenditure, the executive controls parliamentary expenditure. This ultimately 
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determines the effectiveness of Parliament. The executive has also always directly and 
indirectly controlled Parliament through the office of the Speaker of the National 
Assembly and KANU plays a key role in the election of the Speaker (Finance 15 May 
1993 : 31; Murungi, 1997 :9;). 
The institutional weaknesses of the Parliament of Kenya stem from the 
shortcomings of the constitution, which in itself is a function ofKANU 's domination. As 
one constitutional lawyer put it "Our Constitution is a mongrel law. It combines the 
predations of the American presidential system and the weaknesses of the British 
parliamentary system. The result is a presidency without checks and a Parliament without 
teeth" (Maina, 1997 a: 8) As a result, the impact of KANU' s dominance on the legislative 
process manifests itself in the way opposition parties are to a large extent ineffective in 
the day-to-day workings of parliamentary proceedings. KANU's control of axes of power 
that is, the speaker, leader of government business, Parliamentary Group and 
parliamentary committee system has placed constraints upon opposition parties. The 
parliamentary committee system, which in effect is supposed to ensure accountability and 
transparency in government and public participation in the legislative process, is 
controlled by the executive thereby rendering it largely ineffective. By imposing financial 
control upon parliament through the executive, KANU has ensured that parliament 
remains institutionally weak. In addition, the parliamentary committee system in Kenya 
is largely ineffective. It consists of only 15 committees, only two of which are watchdog 
or investigatory committees. These are the Public Accounts and Public Investment 
Committees. The rest are six House-Keeping Committees and seven Departmental 
Committees. KANU chairs eight of the 15 committees, thus controlling more than 50 per 
cent of the committees (National Assembly, 2001 : 1-3) (see Table 4.4 below). 
Table 4.4 Number of Parliamentary Committees Chaired by KANU as at 2001 
Type of Committee No. of Committees No. Chaired by KANU 
WatchdoglInvestigatory_ 2 
House-Keeping 6 
Departmental 7 
Total 15 
Source: National Assembly of Kenya Eight Parliament-Fifth Session. Membership of Select 
Committees 2001 
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Many of the parliamentary committees, for example, such as the Implementation 
Committee and the Foreign Regulations Committee were destroyed in 1980 after they 
were accused of trying to usurp the powers of the Executive. Others such as the General 
Purposes Committees are not operational as they have been captured and paralyzed by 
the executive. Committees such as the Public Accounts and Public Investment 
Committees, though active in their roles, are usually ignored by the executive. On 
occasion, these committees also lack the finances to enable them to perform their duties 
effectively (Murungi, 1997:9). Other than being ineffective due to the predominance of 
KANU, these committees have also been accused of being corrupt. In spite of the 
numerous revelations of corruption in the public sector by the Public Accounts and 
Private Investment Committees over the years, the government takes little action to bring 
the culprits to book (Odinga, 1996:22-23; Anyang-Nyong'o, 2000:16). 
Though KANU is the dominant party in Parliament, it does not take advantage of 
its parliamentary majority to utilise question time and ask many questions. It is the 
opposition parties that have taken the initiative to utilise question time to their advantage. 
Between 1993 and 1997, KANU asked 850 (16 per cent) of the 5413 questions asked in 
Parliament (see Table 4.5 below). 
Table 4.5 Questions by Party in Kenya, 1993-1997 
Party No. of Questions Asked 
KANU 850 
FORD-K 1471 
FORD-A 1881 
DP 854 
KSC 334 
KNC 09 
PICK 10 
NDPK 04 
Total 5413 
Source: National Assembly of Kenya Submission of Questions by Parties-7th Parliament 1993-97 
2001 
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The ruling's party failure to ask questions can be attributed to a number of factors. 
Firstly, many MPs including those of KANU, do not have the capacity to play their roles 
effectively due to the fact that they lack the necessary resources and support staff to assist 
in research and legislation. They have no system for seeking background information, 
quick references, facts and statistics. Secondly, many MPs do not have time to study and 
make resourceful contributions in parliament because of the heavy social burdens 
imposed upon them by the society. In most cases they are attending social functions in 
their constituencies (Murungi , 1997:9). Thirdly and most important is the fact that for a 
long time many KANU MPs have been wary of asking questions or being critical of 
government for fear that they might be accused of being disloyal to the party or the 
executive. On many occasions the party chairman has lashed out at those members of the 
KANU Parliamentary Group who are critical of government policies as well as party 
policies, accusing them of being disloyal and urging them to leave the party. 
4.2.1.2. Bargaining Dominance 
A dominant party must have a dominant bargaining advantage and position vis-a.-
vis other political parties in order to stay in government on a regular basis. KANU 
realized this prior to the 1997 elections and took advantage of its parliamentary majority 
to establish a dominant bargaining position vis-a.-vis the opposition parties. Since the 
1992 multi-party elections, the ruling party, KANU, initially refused to initiate any talks, 
bargains or negotiated settlements with opposition parties. Three days after he was sworn 
in as President, Moi said that he would meet the opposition party leaders on his own 
terms and at his own convenience. Three years later, on 1 March 1996, he met the 
opposition party leaders and he pledged his commitment to politico-legal and 
administrative reforms, a pledge that he did not honour. Attempts were also made to 
establish party co-operation between KANU and FORD-K under the chairmanship of 
Oginga Odinga, but this fell apart following the death of Oginga. In 1997, KANU agreed, 
out of political expedience, to talks with the opposition parties. This culminated in the 
Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) settlements. The IPPG talks were KANU's fust 
meaningful attempts at bargaining with the opposition parties in a bid to secure political 
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mileage prior to the 1997 general elections (Finance, 15 May 1993 :31; AC, 8 September, 
1995:4-5; United States, 1997:8; Mutunga, 1999:205). 
The Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) was formed in August 1997 
through the initiative and backing of President Moi and KANU. It was an attempt to 
derail the popular push for comprehensive constitutional reforms by the National 
Convention Assembly (NCA) and its plenary session, the National Convention Executive 
Council (NCEC). The NCAINCEC, a civil society lobby group, created to push for 
meaningful comprehensive constitutional reforms, posed a threat to the regime as it 
appeared to control public opinion on political change. In an apparent effort to diffuse the 
looming political crises that threatened the regime due to the constitutional stalemate 
between KANU and the opposition parties regarding the method of selection and number 
of commissioners to be appointed to the Constitutional Review Commission, Moi gave 
the go-ahead to some KANU MPs to initiate talks with opposition MPs. Their first 
meeting called for a further meeting of MPs from all parties to discuss the welfare of the 
nation. This was then set for August 26, 1997, through a memorandum circulated in 
Parliament. Subsequently, though the initial participants were few the meeting formed the 
IPPG. The IPPG was not an overnight creation. Parliamentary structures and initiatives 
such as the Inter-Parties Committee (IPC) and Inter-Parliamentary Group (IPG), created 
earlier as a result of the opposition-backed National Alliance, played a crucial role in the 
establishment of the IPPG. Following its formation, the IPPG immediately came under 
criticism from civil society groups such as the NCEC. During the Second Plenary of the 
National Convention, held from August 26 to 28, the NCEC criticized the establishment 
of the IPPG. It also refused to allow MPs to represent it on the IPPG and even to state the 
conditions upon which it would participate in its meetings. More than 18 MPs also 
refused to join the IPPG. However, some individual NCEC politicians joined the IPPG 
resulting in it consisting of moderate KANU and Opposition MPs (Kiai and Mutunga, 
1999:19, Kibwana, 1998:8; Mutunga, 1999:205-218; Onyango, 1999:12; Southall, 
1999:99-102; Barasa, 2000:2). 
The Moi-KANU-backed IPPG was primarily designed to implement minimum 
constitutional pre-election reforms in order to derail the comprehensive constitutional 
reform process in the country. The IPPG set out to achieve some minimum constitutional 
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reforms, which it claimed were conducive and necessary for a free and fair general 
election. Though the IPPG reform proposals were broader than the July 1992 proposals, 
there is a consensus among critics in civil society such as the Catholic Church, the 
NCCK, the NCEC and the LSK among others, that these proposals were inadequate, 
since they did not directly address the question of dismantling the Constitution's one-
party structure and enhancing the rights of Kenyans (Kibwana, 1999: 9). On 4 September 
1997, the IPPG formed three technical committees aimed at working out reform 
proposals, namely, the Constitutional/Administrative and Legal Committee, consisting of 
10 KANU MPs and 10 Opposition MPs; the Electoral Code (Process) Committee 
consisting of 7 KANU and 7 Opposition MPs; and the Peace and Security Committee, 
too comprising of 7 KANU and 7 Opposition MPs (see Table 4.6 below). 
Table 4.6 Party Representation in IPPG Technical Committees 
Party No.ofMPs (%) 
KANU 23 5l.l 
DP 7 15 .6 
FORD-A 7 15 .6 
FORD-K 7 15.6 
KSC I 2.2 
Source: Daily Nation, Friday, September 5, 1997 p.1 
KANU controlled 50 per cent of the three technical committees, placing it in a 
dominant bargaining position vis-a.-vis the opposition parties that had to share among 
themselves the remaining 50 per cent. At the close of the session, the IPPG unanimously 
endorsed a two-fold resolution calling for a commitment to dialogue, reform, peace and 
security and the continuation of the co-coordinating committee work until the IPPG 
completed its work. The emphasis was "that the entire work be completed before the 
forthcoming General Election" (Daily Nation, S Sept. , 1997:1-2; Kibwana, 1998:8; 
Murungi, 1998:12; Southall, 1998). 
Seven days later, the IPPG plenary meeting overwhelmingly adopted wide-
ranging reforms proposed by the three technical committees. The 38 KANU and 36 
Opposition legislators present agreed to amend or repeal, within a month, 12 colonial-era 
laws, which reformists insisted, gave President Moi a competitive edge in seeking a fifth 
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five year tenn. These included, among others, the Chiefs Authority Act, the Vagrancy 
Act and the Societies Act. Major constitutional refonns, including a provision to allow 
coalition governments, would be discussed after the General Election. The group 
resolved unanimously that the proposed changes in the constitutional, legal and 
administrative systems, the electoral code (process) and peace and security should be 
immediately be translated into Bills by the Attorney General and brought to Parliament 
for enactment before the General Election. According to the NCEC, the 
recommendations of the IPPG Sub-Committee "". apparently achieved everything Moi 
wanted, probably beyond even his wildest dreams, and certainly beyond our own 
nightmares" (NCEC, 1997:1; Daily Nation, 12 Sept., 1997:1). 
The administrative, constitutional and legal refonns agreed on by the IPPG 
became law on 7 November 1997 when Moi signed the Bills. The three Bills became the 
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1997, the Statute Law (Repeals and 
Miscellaneous Amendment) Act 1997 and the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission Act 1997. The Constitution of Kenya Review Act of 1997 gave the 
President a major role in directing the then envisaged organs of constitutional review. 
Happy with the outcome, Moi congratulated and thanked the MPs for their contribution 
to what he called important changes. The diplomatic community also welcomed the 
passage of the reform Bills and said it hoped "the changes will be faithfully, thoroughly 
and promptly implemented nationwide" (Daily Nation, 8 Nov., 1997:1-2; CLARION, 
1999: 12). 
The reform package, proposed by the IPPG and approved by the President, 
received widespread criticism by various stakeholders in the constitutional review 
process. They emphasized that some aspects of the minimal or facilitative refonns were 
inadequate. The Catholic Bishops of Kenya, for example, pointed out that the refonn bills 
were inadequate for a free and fair General Election, and called for extension of the life 
of Parliament to enact further refonns including limiting the powers of the President. 
They also questioned the Attorney General's sincerity in drafting the three reform bills as 
he had ignored specific requests put forward by the Kenya Episcopal Conference, the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the NCEC and the Law Society of 
Kenya (LSK) (Daily Nation, 8 Nov., 1997: 1-2). 
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The NCAINCEC, too, criticized the IPPG reforms. In earlier statements issued on 
11 September on the Report of the Sub-Committee of the IPPG on Constitutional, Legal 
and Administrative Reforms, as well as the resolutions passed during the Third Plenary 
Session of the National Convention Assembly, the NCAINCEC pointed out and criticized 
the inadequacies and shortcomings of the IPPG proposed reforms. Later, in its 
declarations and resolutions of the National Convention Assembly Fourth Plenary 
Session held from February 26 to 28, 1998, the NCAINCEC emphasized that the IPPG 
reform package had hijacked the NCAIReligious sector reform programme. The civil 
society organization argued that the subsequent reform did not exhaust NCEClReligious 
group packages that would have ensured that a proper environment was created which 
would establish a people-driven constitution-making process (NCEC, 1997:1-6; NCA, 
1997:1-8; NCA, 1998:1-2). 
Despite criticisms, the IPPG did manage to propose and approve some crucial 
reforms. The reform package contained some significant changes to Kenya's laws, which 
if implemented meaningfully, would change the country's democratization trends. 
According to Willy Mutunga, amongst the most crucial of the reforms that the IPPG 
passed was the amendment of the constitution of the Electoral Commission, increasing 
the number of Commissioners. This was a noble idea. On the recommendations of some 
of the political parties, the President appointed ten more Commissioners, though this did 
not make the Commission more independent and impartial. Mutunga also points out that 
the Centre for Governance and Development in Kenya has emphasized that the IPPG 
reforms opened some political space and formed part of a small democratic opening in 
the country (Kibwana, 1999:9; Mutunga, 1999:217-219). The reforms were, however, not 
tested, experienced and implemented, for as soon as they became law, the President 
dissolved Parliament. It is interesting to note that at the time Parliament was dissolved, 
one of the main architects of the IPPG, George Anyona, was busy collecting signatures 
from MPs to support his motion for the postponement of the dissolution of Parliament 
until January 25, 1998 (Mutunga, 1999:217&233). 
The IPPG received support from both KANU and the opposition for several 
reasons. According to Mutunga, some MPs allied to the NCEC defected to the IPPG at a 
time when the Moi-KANU regime was faced by options of violence or settlement for to a 
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number of reasons. The NCEC, he points out, was accused by some MPs of committing 
several blunders. One of the MPs, who did not quit the NCEC, argues that there were 
three major reasons why some MPs defected. Firstly, the MPs felt that the NCEC had 
hijacked their agenda and were thus looking for an excuse to take back the initiative. 
Secondly, the ruling party KANU gave promises and gifts to such MPs as an inducement. 
Thirdly, some MPs genuinely believed that KANU was ready to settle the political crisis. 
Once again, the opposition parties and Kenyans as a whole mistook KANU's tactical 
retreat as a sign of submission. However, as Mutunga correctly points out, if anything, 
the IPPG proved that after four and a half years the opposition parties could not form an 
alliance among themselves, yet at KANU's beckoning they were ready to forge alliances 
with KANU (Mutunga, 1999:222; Barasa, 2000:2). In his analysis of the defections of 
NCEC allied legislators to the IPPG, Scott Strauss (cited in Mutunga) argues that the 
mainstream opposition had as much interest in contesting elections as KANU did and 
shared some class and ideological interests as KANU. Strauss also argues that neither the 
mainstream opposition nor KANU supported the call by the radical sections of the NCA 
to democratize and decentralize the powers of the executive. In his opinion, the IPPG 
reforms were not an immediate threat to the status quo (Mutunga, 1999:225). 
The IPPG's support from foreign interests was due to the policy of gradualism it 
adopted toward the constitutional review process. The policy of gradualism advocated by 
foreign interests meant that slow reforms were more likely to be implemented and prove 
effective. These interests did not find the call for comprehensive reforms by the 
NCAINCEC and its programme properly articulated or convincing. Under a 
comprehensive programme of constitutional reform, the presence and dominance of 
foreign interests would be a subject of discussion. This discussion would be a basis for 
agitation against foreign interests, and as an all-inclusive constitution-making programme 
would, in the opinion of foreign interests, destabilize the country. As Mutunga correctly 
points out, their support for the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act of 1997 
is based on the same argument. The Act is an extension of the IPPG and can be said to be 
gradual in its approach. Though the international community praised the KANU/IPPG 
initiative, it did not give its assessment, at the time, of the KANU/IPPG reform package, 
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nor did it take into account that some of the KANU/IPPG architects criticized the reform 
package (Mutunga, 1999:219 &232; Daily Nation, 8 Nov., 1997: 1-2). 
Following the dissolution of Parliament, the General Election was held in 
December 1997 in which KANU won by obtaining 51 percent of the elected 
parliamentary seats, re-establishing its dominance. The faulty rpPG agreement paved the 
way for KANU's triumph in the 1997 General Election and in a way legitimized Moi and 
KANU's leadership. The eighth parliament came into being through the IPPG-brokered 
electoral machinery and has led critics to point out that it will never be seen by the entire 
Kenyan people as an institution fully capable of approving let alone writing a constitution 
on their behalf. In the post 1997 election period, KANU, through the Attorney-General, 
initiated the "transformation" of the IPPG into the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Committee 
(IPPC), primarily with the same motives as those of the IPPG (Barasa, 2000:2; Opanga, 
1998:8; Southall, 1999: I 02-1 03). The KANUIIPPG minimal pre-election reforms, 
arguably legitimized KANU's post-1997 election victory, as the pre-election reform 
package was the result of an elite consensus between the ruling party and the opposition 
. parties. However these pre-election reforms undermined the credibility of opposition 
parties, since they lost elections in an electoral process to which they had been party. The 
opposition parties participated in the designing of flawed reforms that were largely in 
favour of the ruling party, and as such are seen by critics, as partial in the constitutional 
reform process. 
A significant aspect of the IPPG is its contribution to the constitutional reform 
process. Though it introduced minimal constitutional, legal and administrative reforms, 
its significance cannot be overlooked. The reforms, to some extent, as pointed out by 
some constitutional lawyers (Kibwana, 1999; Murungi; 1998), managed to open some 
political and democratic space. The IPPG reform proposals were much broader than the 
1992 KANU proposals. For instance, Parliament passed the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission Act of 1997 as part of the IPPG package. According to Kibwana, a 
constitutional expert, despite its numerous flaws, the Act attempted to chart a process of 
constitution making which would have accommodated a large segment of Kenya's 
population. He also emphasizes that following the 1997 elections, the clamouring of 
Kenyans for a people-driven constitution review process led to the Bomas and Safari 
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Park negotiations resulting in substantive amendments to the 1997 Act (Kibwana, 1999:9; 
CLARION, 1999:12; Southall, 1999:102-103; Ajulu, 2001:202-205). 
4.2.1.3 Governmental Dominance 
One of the factors that leads to the establishment of party dominance is when the 
ruling party becomes dominant governmentally. The party carries out a historical project, 
a series of interrelated and mutually supportive public policies that give shape to the 
national political agenda. The dominant party seeks to enhance its dominance by using 
state apparatuses so as to isolate its opposition and strengthen its own electoral position. 
It is in this latter context that this subsection seeks to demonstrate KANU's use of state 
apparatuses and resources so as to isolate the opposition and subsequently enhance its 
dominance in the electoral and political process. Particular attention is paid to the ruling 
party's use of the executive, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and the state 
owned electronic media. 
On 4 January 1993, KANU was declared the Willner of the 1992 multiparty 
elections by the ECK Chairman Justice (Rtd) Zacheus R. Chesoni, and Moi was 
immediately sworn in as Kenya's president for the next five years . His victory allowed 
him and KANU, to continue dominating the political process and the government, 
particularly the executive, legislature and the judiciary in the newly reintroduced 
m ul ti party era. 
Executive political power in Kenya is vested in the Presidency. The President is 
both Head of State and Government. According to Section 4 of the Constitution of 
Kenya, the President is the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces 
of the country (Kenya, 1998: 6). The President is entirely responsible for the appointment 
of top members of the executive. The President appoints the Vice-President of the 
country and Cabinet Ministers under Sections IS and 16 of the Constitution respectively 
(Kenya, 1998: 14). Permanent Secretaries are also appointed by the occupant of the office 
under Section 22. Section 23 of the Constitution states that executive authority of the 
Government of Kenya vests in the President, and that the occupant may exercise this 
authority directly or through officers subordinate to him or her (Kenya, 1998: 16-17). 
This executive authority empowers the President to appoint other high-ranking members 
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of the executive and the judiciary. The President appoints, among others, the 
Commissioner of Police, the Attorney-General, the Controller and Auditor-General and 
Ambassadors or High Commissioners, under Sections 108, 109, 110 and III of the 
Constitution respectively (Kenya, 1998: 76-80). He or she also appoints service 
commanders of the armed forces and chief executives of state corporations. Members of 
the ECK and Public Service Commission (PSC) are also appointed by the President under 
Sections 41 and 106 respectively (Kenya, 1998: 25 & 73). The Chief Justice and High 
Court Judges are also appointed by the President under Sections 60 and 61 of the 
Constitution (Kenya, 1998: 35-36). These constitutional provisions, therefore, give the 
President immense power, authority and influence over the state and its apparatuses. 
Many of these appointments are carried out on the basis of party political and/or ethnic 
loyalty. In other words, many high-ranking members of the executive, jUdiciary and the 
armed forces are patronage appointees (see Appendix 7 for the power structure of the 
Presidency in Kenya) . 
4.7 Regional Distribution of Executive Posts in the First Post-1992 Multiparty 
Government 
Province No. of %of Cabinet %of Permanent %ofP. 
Seats Seats Posts Cabinet Secretaries Secretaries 
Posts 
Nairobi I 0.5 0 0 0 0 
Coast 17 9 2 8 3 14 
North Eastern 8 4 I 4 I 4 
Eastern 21 II 7 28 3 14 
Central 0 0 1 4 4 18 
Rift Valley 36 19 7' 28 4 18 
Western 10 5 4 16 3 14 
Nyanza 7 4 3 12 4 18 
Total 100 53.5 25 100 22 100 
* Includes the President who IS a member of the Cabmet. 
Source: Compiled from Daily Nation 14 January 1993 pp 1-4. 
Though Section 16 (2) allows the President to appoint Cabinet Ministers from 
among any members of the National Assembly and not necessarily from the ruling party, 
the new executive appointed by President Moi on 13 January 1993, clearly reflected 
patronage rewards to regions that voted heavily in favour of KANU. All Cabinet 
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Ministers were KANU elected and nominated MPs while Permanent Secretaries 
appointed were also largely drawn from ethnic groups and areas that voted for the ruling 
party (see Table 4.7 above). The President under Section 22 of the constitution appoints 
Permanent Secretaries, whose responsibility is to supervise government ministries and 
department, (Kenya, 1992a: 14-16). 
As indicated in Table 4.7 above, the Rift Valley and Eastern provinces, which 
delivered the highest number of parliamentary seats to KANU, were rewarded with the 
highest number of cabinet posts, each receiving 7 members, constituting 28 per cent of 
the Cabinet. Nairobi Province, which delivered one seat, did not get a full cabinet post 
but was rewarded with an Assistant Ministerial post. Central Province, which did not 
deliver any seat, saw one of its former MPs, Joseph K Kamotho, KANU' s Secretary 
General nominated as an MP and appointed as a Cabinet Minister. In Nyanza Province, 
the Luo ethnic community did not deliver a seat to KANU, but it too had one of its 
former MPs, Dalmas Otieno, nominated and appointed as a Cabinet minister. The other 
two Cabinet Ministers appointed from Nyanza Province were from the Kisii ethnic 
community that voted heavily in favour of KANU. With regard to the permanent 
secretaries, patronage played a key role in appointments as even those from Central and 
Nyanza provinces were re-appointees from the single-party executive who had 
demonstrated their loyalty to Moi and KANU (Daily Nation, 14 January, 1993:1 -4). The 
table shows a fairly high correlation between electoral results and patronage rewards, 
indicating KANU' s strategy of enhancing governmental dominance through a patronage 
appointed executive. 
The post-1992 multiparty period has and continues to witness, KANU's 
dominance over the executive, through its persistent use of the provincial administration 
to augment and maintain its political power. President Moi exercises sweeping power 
over the political structure at the provincial, district and local level, by appointing 
provincial and district commissioners. These administrators derive their authoritarian 
politico-administrative powers from various Acts of Parliament such as the Public Order 
Act and the former Chiefs Authority Act renamed the Chiefs Act. The Public Order Act 
dealt mainly with control of public gatherings and it severely restricted the freedoms of 
association, assembly and expression of the people. Though freedom of assembly and 
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association is enshrined in section 80 of the constitution, the Public Order Act gave the 
authorities power to control public gatherings. The Act prohibited meetings or 
processions of 10 or more persons without a license from the district commissioner. The 
Chiefs' Authority Act gave chiefs and their assistants immense powers with respect to 
persons under their jurisdiction. Under the Act, a chief or an assistant chief could give 
orders as far-reaching as restriction of the freedoms of movement and association of their 
subjects (NCCK, 1997:12-13; United States, 1997:8). 
During this period, the government continued to restrict the right of peaceful 
assembly by refusing to license or by physically disrupting opposition political meetings, 
despite a promise made by President Moi during a meeting with opposition political party 
leaders on I March 1996. For example, in 1996, opposition parties reported that the 
government had blocked 26 public meetings of opposition parties, FORD-K, FORD-A, 
DP and Safma in the first nine months of the year. Government officials also occasionally 
denied license to KANU, but almost always denied them to those groups critical of the 
national party leadership or those politicians considered to be party rebels. Unnecessary 
restrictions of the freedom of movement and right of assembly of opposition political 
leaders and representative of opposition political parties using the provincial 
administration, police and party youth wingers continued, particularly in selected rural 
areas or the so-called "KANU zones" (IFES, 1997:8-10; United States, 1997:8; Adar, 
1999:353-354). 
The government also restricted freedom of association by using the Societies Act. 
The Societies Act states that every association must be registered or exempted from 
registration by the Registrar of Societies. Political parties in Kenya are currently 
registered under the Societies Act. After the repeal of section 2A of the constitution, 
which allowed for the registration of other political parties under multi-partyism, the 
discretionary power of the Registrar of Societies to register or deny registration to 
political parties was increasingly questioned. The law regarding registration, refusal to 
register or deregistration was broad and vague. It was at the discretion of the Registrar to 
decide on what grounds to register, deny registration and deregister a political party. One 
result of this was that out of the political parties that applied for registration in 1992, 
seven were denied registration on flimsy or vague grounds, such as that the interests of 
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peace, welfare, or good order would suffer if they were registered (lED et al, 1998: 49-
51). One of the parties, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was denied registration on the 
grounds that it was a religious not a political organization. However, as part of the IPPG 
package, the Societies Act was amended, requiring the Registrar to inform a party of its 
registration status within one hundred and twenty days of receipt of the application. The 
IPPG also recommended that political parties whose registration was pending be 
promptly registered or informed why they would not be so. Consequently in the run-up to 
the 1997 elections, 16 new parties were registered bringing the total number of registered 
parties to 27 by the time of the elections. Both the Public Order Act and the Societies Act 
seriously restrict free political organization in the country (United States, 1997:9; lED et 
ai, 1998: 49-51). 
Government leaders in the country continued to smudge the distinction between 
the government and the ruling party, KANU. KANU officials and candidates repeatedly 
use state resources for party purposes while opposition leaders and parties are denied 
access to these resources. No formal rules or codes of conduct or legislation exist that 
delineate the boundaries between the ruling party and the state. No informal rules or 
customs have emerged that specify what is not in this area. President Moi continues to 
discourage civil servants from joining opposition parties and encourages them to be 
partisan. For instance, on 14 February 1992, he ruled that civil servants had to show their 
allegiance to the ruling party KANU, emphasizing that Kenya was not a West European 
country where civil servants ran governments when political parties lost power. In the 
1992 elections KANU repeatedly made use of state apparatuses and resources, especially 
the administrative and security machinery to declare various constituencies in the country 
as its exclusive political zones. In 1997, massive use of state patronage and harassment of 
the opposition to promote his candidacy and that of the ruling party ensured Moi ' s re-
election and that of KANU. KANU, for example, flagrantly used government vehicles 
during the nominations, campaigns and even on polling day (Finance 15 May, 1993:32; 
IFES, 1997:11 ; United States, 1997:9; lED et ai, 1998:62-63; Freedom House, 1999:1). 
As in the previous multi-party era, KANU has systematically sought to undermine 
the opposition in various ways. The ruling party has openly urged opposition MPs and 
local councillors to defect to KANU. On 15 February 1992, a day after warning civil 
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servants that they owed their allegiance to KANU, Moi promised to assist defectors and 
would be defectors to win back their parliamentary seats on KANU tickets. KANU also 
continued to intimidate and pressurize prominent personalities to cease their support for 
opposition parties. The ruling party also sought to undermine the opposition by initially 
preventing or limiting any attempts at meaningful dialogue between government and 
opposition (Finance, 15 May, 1993:32; IFES, 1997:10-11). 
As discussed earlier in the Chapter, a party can be identified as a dominant party 
if it achieves an electoral plurality or parliamentary majority. This plurality or majority 
can be achieved by manipulating the electoral process through state apparatuses or 
institutions that are concerned with such processes. In the post-1990 mUlti-party era, 
KANU has managed as a result of governmental dominance to manipulate the electoral 
process particularly through the ECK, a body that lacks statutory independence. 
The ECK is a public body created under Section 41 of the Constitution, primarily 
to manage and conduct elections. Prior to 1992, elections in Kenya were conducted under 
the Supervisor of Elections, who was an officer in the Attorney General ' s chambers. 
When Kenya reverted back to a multi-party state in 1991, the constitution was amended 
to give the ECK powers to oversee the conduct of elections as an autonomous body. The 
office of the Supervisor of Elections was abolished and new offices of the Director of 
Elections and Deputy Director of Elections were created under the National Assembly 
and Presidential Elections Act of 1992 (Kenya, 1998: 4). The ECK, therefore, arguably 
lacked statutory independence since its members were political appointees. In 1992, 
Section 41 (I) of the Constitution of Kenya stated that: "There shall be an Electoral 
Commission, which shall consist of a chairman and not less than four other members 
appointed by the President" (Kenya, 1992a: 25; 1998:4; lED et aI, 1998:38). Due to this 
lack of independence, the ECK was and is still considered the most important and 
fundamental flaw in the electoral system. At the time of the 1992 elections, there were 
eleven commissioners appointed by Moi, with Justice (Rtd) Chesoni as its chairman. The 
appointment of Chesoni received nation-wide criticism since he had been declared 
bankrupt several years earlier and consequently dismissed from the judiciary in the public 
interest. When the tenure of these commissioners expired in September 1996, most were 
re-appointed including Chesoni as chairman. The re-appointment of Chesoni among 
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others and the "selection of members from backgrounds essentially similar to those who 
had served before did not favourably impress the donors or observers from across the 
political spectrum of Kenya" (IFES, 1997: 11-12; lED et aI, 1998:39; Matiba, 1998:17). 
The government manipulated the ECK to suit KANU's political interests, 
primarily through the process of gerrymandering. KANU's electoral victories in both 
1992 and 1997 were secured by undemocratic means, notably by gerrymandering of the 
FPTP electoral system, as well as Moi's shrewd exploitation of cleavages amongst his 
opponents. The delineation of electoral areas is a controversial issue in working out and 
assessing any electoral system and in Kenya this is so, because of diverse social, 
economic, political, and geographical issues. Section 42 of the Constitution of Kenya 
gives the ECK powers to divide Kenya into constituencies; delineate their boundaries; 
and assign names to them (Kenya, 1998: 27). The Constitution states that all 
constituencies should contain as nearly equal numbers of inhabitants as appears to the 
ECK to be reasonably practical. The objective here is to retain the fundamental 
democratic principle of "one person-one vote" while also providing for special factors 
(Fox, 1996:607; IFES, 1997: 17; lED et al, 1998:39-40; Southall, 1999:94; May, 2000: 
175). The principle of political equality balanced by consideration of other factors is 
established in Section 42 (3) of the Constitution (Kenya, 1992a: 27). 
For both the 1992 and 1997 elections, Moi through his appointees in the ECK, 
established constituency boundaries that favoured the areas where he and KANU had 
more support. The number of parliamentary constituencies was increased from 158 to 
188 in 1987 prior to the last election held under one-partyism in February 1988. They 
were increased again in September 1996, when the number of constituencies went from 
188 to 210, the maximum permitted by the constitution. The number and boundaries 
established prior to the 1988 elections were retained for the multi-party elections of 1992, 
significantly violating the principle of equal numbers of inhabitants and greatly favouring 
the ruling party, KANU. The 1996 demarcations also favoured regions that had supported 
the ruling party in the 1992 elections. For example, the Rift Valley province which had 
1,919,672 registered voters had 44 parliamentary seats compared to the Central and 
Nyanza provinces, which were opposition strongholds, with 1,224,981 and 1,205,132 
registered voters respectively, and which had only 25 and 29 parliamentary seats 
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respectively. When the ECK went round the country collecting VIews regarding the 
delineation of constituencies in 1996, several factors dented the credibility of the 
exercise, casting doubts about the ECK's independence. First, President Moi announced 
the review exercise, an announcement that was supposed to be made by the ECK. He 
went further and created 8 new districts, a development that was related to the creation of 
22 new constituencies. Secondly, the whole exercise was flawed, as it did not follow the 
principle of demographic equality. Had demographics been the main factor, the 
distribution of the 22 new constituencies per province would have been as follows: 
Nairobi 8, Coast 3, North Eastern 0, Eastern 0, Central 3, Rift Valley 5, Western 1 and 
Nyanza 0 (Fox, 1996:600-607; IFES, 1997:18; lED et ai, 1998:40-42) (see Table 4.8 
below). 
Table 4_8 New Parliamentary Constituencies Created in 1996 
Province New Constituencies Appropriate Number of 
Created Constituencies 
Nairobi 0 8 
Coast I 3 
North Eastern I 0 
Eastern 4 2 
Central 4 3 
Rift Valley 5 5 
Western 4 I 
Nyanza 3 0 
Total 22 22 
Source: Compiled from lED et al. Report on the 1997 General Elections in Kenya 29-30 
December, 1997 (Nairobi : lED, CJPC & NCCK, 1998) pp 41-42. 
Out of the 22 new constituencies, 8 were in the new districts of Eastern, Central, 
Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces. 12 of the 22 new seats, that is, 55 per cent went to 
KANU, while the remaining 10, that is 45.5 per cent, were shared among the following 
opposition parties: DP 4, NDP 3, FORD-K I , FORD-P I and SDP I in the 1997 
elections. Due to physical and psychological state and party harassment, intimidation and 
violence and the declaration of KANU zones in Moi's stronghold in the Rift Valley 
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province, over 41 per cent of the candidates were returned unopposed, that is a total 
number of 18 out of 44 MPs (lED et ai, 1998: 43; Adar, 1999:351). 
Following the IPPG recommendations in 1997, Moi appointed ten more 
commissioners nominated by the opposition parties that had participated in the talks. This 
brought the number of commissioners to 21. It was assumed that the inclusion of 
opposition nominated commissioners would ensure the independence of the ECK. 
However, given the results of the 1997 elections, the inclusion of these commissioners in 
the ECK seemed to have had no significant impact on its independence and conduct of 
elections. Likewise the departure of Chesoni in November 1997 to become Kenya's new 
Chief Justice seems too to have made little difference. By the time these changes were 
effected, except for the nomination of canclidates, the whole structure and machinery for 
the 1997 elections was already in place (lED et ai, 1997:39). It is interesting to note that 
the disgraced Justice Chesoni was sworn in as the country's new Chief Justice barely two 
month's prior to the announcement of the 1997 election results. It is the responsibility of 
the Chief Justice to swear in as President, the declared winner of a presidential election, a 
duty that Chesoni duly performed on 5 January 1998. 
One of the ways in which a political party can influence and reshape a country's 
national political agenda or landscape and hence strengthen its dominance is through the 
media. Political parties are increasingly turning to the meclia not only for electoral 
purposes, but also for mobilization and socialization purposes. KANU continues to make 
use of the media to enhance its dominant position. Though the ruling party disseminates 
its views through its sponsored, daily newspaper, the Kenya Times, and also through the 
East African Standard, owned by an investment group with close ties with KANU and 
the government. The East African Standard is owned by, among others, President Moi' s 
sons, Vice President George Saitoti, Cabinet Minister Nicholas Biwott and a top official 
in Nairobi's State House. In September 1995, these KANU notables had acquired 57 per 
cent ownership of the newspaper (Africa Confidential, 5 January, 1996:4; Mwangi C, 
2000: 2-3). It is the state-owned electronic media, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation 
(KBC), however, that KANU utilizes as a political instrument for disinformation, 
mobilization, socialization and electoral purposes. 
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The government and KANU's tight control of the broadcast media has fostered 
biased reporting. KBC normally neglects to give equal reporting to opposition activities. 
Consequently, in a bid to correct the anomaly, it was agreed as part of the pre-election 
IPPG reform deal, that KBC would provide equitable access to all political parties. The 
ECK was given the responsibility for maintaining this. However, the ECK did not take 
this responsibility seriously and in the end, the goal of free and fair coverage on the state-
owned television network was not achieved. The KBC, in line with the IPPG agreement, 
produced a timetable allocating television and radio airtime to all registered political 
parties. However, the way in which coverage was given fostered biased reporting. The 
government maintains its monopoly control of the electronic media through tight control 
of broadcasting, particularly radio, the principal nation-wide and popular news medium 
in the country. It controls the KBC, which operates the country's premier radio and 
television stations. KBC's stations do not criticize the Government, and reflect an 
obvious bias toward the ruling party. According to the Media Institute and Kenya Human 
Rights Commission (KHRC), which conducted media monitoring exercises in the run-up 
to the 1997 elections, KANU received considerably more coverage than the opposition in 
terms of both the allocated time and general news coverage, and was presented in a 
consistently more favourable light. According to the reports of the monitoring exercise, 
99 per cent of KANU's activities were covered positively and only 1 per cent negatively 
by KBC radio and television news; only 4 per cent of opposition activities were covered 
positively while 96 per cent were covered negatively; and defections from KANU went 
unreported or were mentioned in passing while defections from the opposition got 
extensive coverage (Finance, 15 November, 1992:18; lED et aI., 1997:94-95). 
The negative coverage of the opposition did not always mean that KBC was 
telling untruths. But, its selection of what opposition matters to highlight indicated clear 
bias toward the negative. KBC also, by political design, proved unable to distinguish 
between the activities of government officials and party campaigning. Coverage given to 
the President and cabinet ministers as government officials in this election period proved 
largely beneficial to their campaigns. Politicians without government portfolios, 
particularly those in the opposition, were placed at a considerable disadvantage by this 
practice (IED et aI. , 1998:95-96). 
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With regard to the privately owned electronic media, KANU supporters own a 
television station, the Kenya Television Network (KTN), which airs news programs with 
more balanced political coverage. This television station is allegedly owned by KANU 
personalities, including President Moi himself, Nicholas Biwott, and Abraham Kiptanui, 
a former Comptroller of State House (Kadhi and Rutten, 2001: 249). KANU supporters 
also opened another television network, Stellavision in June 1996 and a private FM radio 
station in September the same year (United States, 1997:8). Stellavision is owned by a 
prominent journalist, Hilary Ng'weno, who is "stridently pro-KANU" (Africa 
Confidential, 5 Jan. 1996: 5). 
4.2.2 Party-Civil Society Relations and Dominance 
Party dominance is not only conceived within the narrow scope of dominating 
state society and political society, but rather within the broader context of the dominant 
party's relationship with the wider society, namely civil society. Dominant parties 
normally attempt to control and influence state and civil society in a bid to enhance their 
dominance, not only in the party system, but also in the political process and polity. It is 
in this context that the ruling party KANU has also made strenuous efforts at controlling 
and dominating civil society in the post-1990 period. 
Since the repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution, there has been a remarkable 
resuscitation and vibrancy of civil society in Kenya. Civil society organizations, ranging 
from civic organizations to formal NGOs, became actively involved in the political 
liberalization and democratization process leading to the restoration of multi-party 
politics. Many of these were professional and religious organizations mainly based in 
urban areas and were part of the pro-democracy movement that called for the restoration 
of multipartyism in the country. The political and development space created following 
the liberalization of the political system and consequently the end of political 
monolithism was largely filled by civil society. 
The relationship between KANU and civil society in the post 1992 period has 
largely been antagonistic. Civil society organizations have taken the role of an extra-
parliamentary opposition in providing some degree of accountability and transparency in 
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the democratization and political process. Unlike the prevIOus political dispensation 
during single party rule, where KANU controlled civil society through existing statutes 
and coercion, under political pluralism, the ruling party finds it increasingly difficult to 
control and influence such organizations through similar methods. Instead it has 
attempted, with little success, to control and influence, certain groups and organizations 
of civil society using elites, through negotiated settlements. 
Prior to 1990, many civil society organizations confmed themselves, under 
prescribed terms, to socio-economic development activities rather than to governance and 
political issues. This was largely due to the authoritarian nature of the political system. 
NGOs and CBOs constructively engaged with the state by playing a complementary role 
in providing basic social services. However, with increasing authoritarianism and the 
subsequent shrinking of the developmental and political space, during the late 1980s, 
some organizations began to criticize the regime on various political issues. Prominent 
among these were the NCCK, which openly criticized and opposed the queue-voting 
method and the Green Belt Movement, which also criticized the government on various 
environmental issues. Consequently, Moi began making calls for more state coordination 
and monitoring of NGOs arguing that some were engaged in subversive activities. In 
November 1990, the NGO Coordination Bill was published and introduced in Parliament. 
It was suddenly withdrawn without any reason being given, but was re-introduced the 
following month and within two days it underwent the required procedures and was 
passed as the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination Act of 1990, following 
presidential assent in January 1991. Essentially the Act was aimed at increasing 
government's control of NGOs (Ndegwa, 1993:11-17). Despite the introduction of the 
Act, various civil society organizations went ahead to call for political reforms in the 
country. By early the 1990s, the media, professional and religious organizations were 
calling for the restoration of multi-partyism and democracy. These included, inter alia, 
the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), NCCK, and the Church Province of Kenya (CPK). 
Other civil society organizations actively involved were drawn from the media, 
particularly the alternative press. These included, the Nairobi Law Monthly, Society, and 
Finance magazines. Several pressure groups, such as FORD and the Moral Alliance for 
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Peace (MAP) also emerged during this period to pressurIze the goverrunent (NLM, 
1991 :12-17). 
In as much as civil society played an integral role in pressurizing the goverrunent 
to restore multi-party politics in the early 1990s, its role in the democratization process 
became largely significant in 1994. This was as a result of efforts by civil society 
movements, which called for the implementation of meaningful constitutional reforms 
that had been ignored prior to the 1997 general elections. Such reforms were intended to 
facilitate free and fair elections. Most of these civil society organizations were civic 
organizations led by lawyers and usually existed as "projects" in order to avoid being 
captured and controlled or deregistered by the state. Initially they set up seminars, 
produced plays and released public statements. Ultimately they engaged in mass political 
action in a bid to socialize and mobilize for reform. Prominent among these were the 
Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change (4Cs), itself a conglomeration of, among 
others, the LSK, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the International 
Federation of Women Lawyers, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the 
NCCK, and some other unregistered organizations. The NGO Council, though created by 
the NGO Act of 1990 as an organization of NGO self-goverrunent, enjoyed some 
autonomy and played a significant role in the reform process. The 4Cs and the NGO 
Council drew together several participants from the civic and religious sectors to create 
the NCA, the first attempt at a people's constitutional convention in Kenya. The NCA's 
daily operations and its most pointed political manoeuvers were vested in its executive 
organ, the NCEC. Though the 4Cs, NCA and NCEC did not exist legally, they were de 
facto forces by virtue of their funding, operational secretariats, and engagement with the 
government and political parties (Ndegwa, 1998a: 195-196; NCA, 1998A: 1-6). 
Despite the significant role of civil society in the democratization process by 
pushing for meaningful constitutional reform, KANU has managed to sideline civil 
society through a series of elite pacts with opposition parties thereby derailing the 
democratization process and diffusing rising political tensions. As previously argued, the 
IPPG inter-party elite sidelined civil society's attempts at calling for the implementation 
of more radical changes, rendering it to a large extent functionally ineffective. In essence, 
KANU's dominance was made evident by the fact that civil society was unable to 
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effectively provide meaningful check and balances in the reform process prior to 1997, 
despite the end of political monolithism. The ruling party, aware that it did not capture 
and hence control civil society organizations, opted to use its parliamentary and 
bargaining dominance to settle for an elite pact with the opposition parties. By doing so, 
it ensured that constitutional reform and the democratization process became a privilege 
of the elite and not a people-driven process. 
The ruling party also made some attempts at co-opting sectors of civil society 
through negotiated settlements. These attempts were primarily by means of a series of 
inter-ethnic talks organized by the political class from various ethnic communities. 
Initially, it was reported that the talks were aimed at easing mounting ethnic tensions 
following the ethnic clashes that occurred during the early 1990s, but in essence they 
sought to establish inter-ethnic political settlements among etlmic groups considered 
dominant in a democratic setting. In 1993, with Moi' s approval, senior KANU leaders 
from the regime, sought a rapprochement with the so called Kikuyu elders, many of 
whom were politicians representing the old guard and had served in the Kenyatta regime, 
while others had been key players in GEMA. These talks between the KANU political 
elite and the Kikuyu old guard became known as Kikuyu-KAMATUSA (the latter an 
acronym for the Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana, and Samburu minority ethnic groups). 
Arguably, the KANU elite, predominantly drawn from the KAMATUSA, felt that it was 
necessary to seek a political settlement with those ethnic communities that resided in the 
country's two corridors of power, namely the Central and Rift Valley Provinces that 
produced the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. According to Ndegwa, these talks were 
exclusive in at least three ways. First, in class terms, they involved only the wealthy 
among the Kikuyu leaders. Secondly, in ethnic tenns, they excluded other communities 
that had also suffered greatly from ethnic clashes in the early 1990s. Finally, in outlook, 
they included only politicians who were willing to discuss reconciliation in terms of 
group rights rather than individual rights and who made no pretensions of being 
accountable to the groups they purported to represent. The talks, however, abated in late 
1994 with no decisive outcome (Africa Confidential, 2 July, 1993 : 5-7; Ndegwa, 1998b: 
362; Steeves, 1999:77). Attempts were further made in 1997 to woo the Kikuyu elite in a 
bid to solicit electoral support from the community. By offering state patronage awards to 
166 
the Kikuyu elite, Moi hoped to guarantee the Kalenjin future economic and political 
support and access to the state (Ndegwa, 1998b: 362-363). 
The ruling party has met with little success at controlling and influencing civil 
society in the democratization process in the post-1992 period. It has, however, managed 
to dominate the political process to the extent that no radical changes have taken place as 
a direct consequence of civil society action. KANU attempts at influencing civil society 
through elites in the state, political and civil society continue with the hope that it will 
eventually capture and control what it considers as a viable alternative opposition or 
political outlet. It hopes to control civil society in a bid to shape and re-defIne the 
political landscape of the country as part of its agenda of enhancing dominance. This is 
not to say that the ruling party has no direct links with society at the grassroots. The party 
does indeed have links with its supporters at the grassroots through its established party 
structures at the regional and local level. It is these structures that it often uses when it 
wants to mobilize its supporters for electoral or other political purposes (see Appendix 6 
for a figure on the hierarchical structure of KANU). 
Conclusion 
Following the repeal of Section 2a that made Kenya a de jure one-party state and 
the subsequent holding of multi-party elections in 1992, the ruling party, KANU, has 
exhibited the characteristics of a dominant party. It has managed to achieve 
parliamentary, chronological, bargaining and governmental dominance. In other words, it 
has achieved dominance over the state while at the same time, the ruling party is 
attempting to exert more control and influence over civil society in order to shape the 
political landscape of the country. 
The nature of party-state relations and dominance is evident by KANU's 
parliamentary dominance, in terms of electoral plurality and its control over the 
legislative process. The ruling party won with a majority of more than 50 per cent of the 
parliamentary seats in the general elections of 1992 and 1997, also indicating 
chronological dominance. As a result, the party has a significant influence over the 
legislative process and this is further compounded by the institutional weakness of the 
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country's parliament. The parliament lacks institutional and financial autonomy as its 
day-to-day administrative and financial proceedings are to a large extent controlled by the 
executive. The ruling party controls the main axes of power in parliament, though these 
are in themselves functionally ineffective largely due to administrative and financial 
constraints. Thus, although government is supposed to be based on the concept of 
separation of powers, in reality the legislature has become subordinated to the executive. 
A related issue is that of bargaining dominance. A dominant party must have a 
dominant bargaining advantage and position vis-it-vis other political parties in order to 
stay in government on a regular basis. The ruling party has now come to realize, out of 
political expediency, that this strategy is a political necessity for it to maintain political 
power. Its bargaining dominance over other parties was manifest in the IPPG elite pact 
reforms prior to 1997 elections. These inter-parliamentary party settlements, dominated 
by KANU, saw the implementation of minimal constitutional reforms, largely in favour 
of the ruling party. Consequently, the ruling party won the elections via half-baked 
reforms thereby legitimizing KANU's victory as the governing party. 
The ruling party has also managed to establish governmental dominance. This is, 
arguably, to a large extent a function of its long-term rule, both as a single and dominant 
party. KANU continues to make use of the state and its apparatuses to enhance its 
dominance in the party and political system. It makes use various politico-administrative 
and legal channels, such as the civil service, Acts of parliament and statutes to 
delegitimise opposition parties in a bid to render them functionally ineffective. The ruling 
party has manipulated the provincial administration, the state-owned media and the 
electoral process to suit its own political interests. As such there is no distinction between 
the party and government. Party leaders continue to insist that the party is supreme over 
government, despite the fact that the country is constitutionally a mUlti-party state. 
One of the primary motives for parties striving to achieve dominance over the 
state society, that is the state and its apparatuses or instruments, is so that they can also 
influence and transform civil society. KANU is striving to achieve this in the country. 
However, unlike during the period one-party rule when the ruling party had firm control 
over civil society, during the multi-party era, KANU has to a large extent lost that firm 
control. The demise of political monolithism has opened up developmental and political 
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space that the resuscitation of civil society organizations has been able to fill. There has 
been a resurgence of civil society vibrancy, as is made evident by its active role in the 
democratization process, performing the roles of agents of change and extra-
parliamentary opposition. Despite its continued use of coercive politico-administrative 
and legal methods, the ruling party has met with little success in controlling and 
influencing civil society in the democratization process in the post-l 992 period. It has, 
however, managed to dominate the party and political process to the extent that no radical 
changes have taken place as a direct consequence of civil society action. KANU attempts 
at influencing civil society through elites in the state, political and civil society continue 
with the hope that it will eventually capture and control what it considers to be a viable 
alternative opposition or political outlet. It hopes to control civil society in a bid to shape 
and re-define the political landscape of the country as part of its agenda of enhancing 
dominance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND PARTY DOMINANCE IN POST-
AP ARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
5.0 Introduction 
The South African polity can be described as a dominant party system. Party 
dominance in South Africa dates back to 1948 when the National Party (NP) took over 
power and was to remain a dominant party until 1994, when the country held its fust 
democratic non-racial mUlti-party elections. The dominant party system was re-made 
when the African National Congress CANC) emerged as the winner and dominant party in 
this as well as in the 1999 election. The post-I 990 period was crucial and significant for 
South Africa, as it ushered in the demise of apartheid. Liberation movements were 
unbanned, apartheid laws repealed, political prisoners released and those in exile were 
allowed to return home. This chapter examines the emergence and consolidation of party 
dominance under the hegemony of the ANC in the post-1990 period. It is divided into 
two sections. The fust section is a general historical account of the period from 1990 to 
1994. It looks at the ANC's role in the negotiation and transitional processes, such as the 
agreements, peace accords and talks that occurred in this period, which eventually 
culminated into the drafting and ratification of an interim constitution in December 1993. 
The second section examines the consolidation of the ANC's dominance in the post-I 994 
democratic non-racial multi-party elections. Particular attention is paid to the ruling 
party's attempts to achieve dominance through arrangements and processes such as 
consociationalism, constitutionalism, corporatism and transformation of the public 
service, in order to implement its historical agenda of creating a democratic non-racial 
and non-sexist society in South Africa. 
5.1 The Negotiation Process and Transition to Power, 1990 to 1994 
A necessary condition for democracy is the willingness on the part of the elite to 
compromise, by subscribing to democratic rules . Decisions are taken to come to terms 
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with the situation by agreeing to peaceful competition for power. This requires the 
adoption of democratic rules, including the appropriate checks and balances, and the 
protection of rights. Once such a framework is in place, it may be consolidated by 
subsequent generations of politicians, elites and voters, and may be adapted to bring 
previously excluded groups into the political process. Democracy or democratisation J 
emerges when elites in the political system agree to the rules of the game, through 
compromises and settlements, rather than risk national disintegration. This is precisely 
what happened during the negotiation process from 1990 to 1994. The two major 
antagonists, the ANC and the NP became the main protagonists, with the ANC emerging 
from the negotiated settlement as the leading and dominant actor (Sommer, 1996:58). 
The unbanning of political organisations and the release of political prisoners in 
1990 was followed by a marked increase in political violence in the townships, 
culminating into the death of more than 2900 people in 1990. In March that year, troops 
were deployed in Bophuthatswana, and later in Ciskei, following a coup in the latter 
homeland. During the same month, police opened fire on a peaceful demonstration of 
50,000 ANC supporters in Sebokeng, killing 17 and wounding over 700. The ANC 
accused the government of the unprovoked killing and maiming of defenceless 
demonstrators, an accnsation which the government denied. Consequently, after 
consulting the NEC, and speaking on behalf of the ANC, Mandela announced that the 
ANC was suspending the first formal "talks about talks" scheduled to take place on 11 
April 1990 (ANC, 1991a: I ; Mandela, 1993: 18; 1996: 693; Constitutional Assembly, 
1997:16). 
Despite the explicit bitterness amongst the concerned parties, secret discussions 
nonetheless continued to take place and on 2 May 1990, they succeeded and the 
govemment and the ANC met for their first round of talks at Groote Schuur in Cape 
Town (Constitutional Assembly, 1997: 16). The ANC delegation consisted of Walter 
Sisulu, Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki , Ahmed Kathrada, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Archie 
Gumede, the Reverend Beyers Naude, Cheryl Carolus and Nelson Mandela. The three-
day meeting identified obstacles to formal negotiations and worked out a modus operandi 
for overcoming them. At the end, De Klerk and Mandela announced that they had 
reached a broad agreement, which they named the Groote Schuur Minute. This was the 
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first agreement on the talks about talks between the government and the ANC. Its main 
features were: firstly, the establishment of a working group to define political offences, as 
well as the mechanisms and time scales for the release of political prisoners and the 
return of exiles. Secondly, the decision that the NEC members, together with certain 
senior cadres of the ANC, would be allowed to return home to begin the process of 
establishing ANC offices inside the country. Thirdly, there was to be an undertaking by 
the government to lift the State of Emergency. Fourthly, there was also to be an 
undertaking by the government to review all security legislation and to bring it in line 
with internationally acceptable standards. Finally, communication channels were to be 
created between the government and the ANC. The Groote Schuur Minute made it clear 
that "The government and the African National Congress agree on a common 
commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and intimidation 
from whatever quarter, as well as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of 
negotiations" (ANC, 1991b: 1-3; Constitutional Assembly, 1997:16; Mandela, 1996:693-
694; Buntman, 1998; 248). Though these were talks about talks, their historical 
significance cannot be overlooked, as Mandela pointed out: 
... the meeting represented not only what the ANC had been seeking for 
so many years, but an end to the master/servant relationship that 
characterized black and white relations in South Africa. We had come to 
the meeting not as supplicants or petitioners, but as fellow South Africans 
who merited an equal place at the table (Mandela, 1996:693). 
An integral aim and objective of the ANC, as outlined in the Groote Schuur 
Minute, was the desire to define political offences as well as the mechanisms and time 
scales for the release of political prisoners and the return of exiles. This was to be 
achieved through the establishment of a working group as set out in Paragraph I of the 
Minute. For its part, the ANC nominated Jacob Zuma, Penuel Maduna, Joseph Nhlanhla, 
Essop Pahad, and Mathews Phosa among others, as its representatives on the group. The 
government on the other hand, nominated Minister Kobie Coetsee, Deputy Minister 
Roelf Meyer and Messrs Van der Merwe, Swanepoel, Louw and Viall, Major General 
Knipe and Brigadier Kok. At the end of its meetings and deliberations, the working group 
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produced a report that was adopted by both the government and the ANC on 6 August 
1990. The report dealt with the definition of political offences, the question of the release 
of political prisoners and the return of exiles CANC, 1991 b). 
The report of the Working Group established under the Groote Schuur Minute and 
adopted by both the government and the ANC on 6 August 1990 at Pretoria was to form 
the basis of the Pretoria Minute. The Pretoria Minute, adopted the same day, was the 
second most important agreement between the government and the ANC. Its main 
features included, firstly, the suspension of armed action by the ANC. Secondly, an 
undertaking by the government to release all political prisoners by 30 April 1991 and 
allow all exiles to return home. Thirdly, the intention to form national, regional and local 
structures to address situations of conflict at all levels. Fourthly, an agreement for the 
commencement of constitutional exploratory talks between the govenunent and the ANC. 
Fifthly, the establishment of a Working Group to deal with the implementation of the 
suspension of armed action. The Pretoria Minute reaffirmed both the government and the 
ANC's commitment to the Groote Schuur Minute CANC, 1991b; Mandela, 1996:702). 
The functions of the Working Group established under Paragraph 3 of the Pretoria 
Minute were to resolve outstanding questions arising out of the decision to suspend 
armed action and related activities. After more than six months of extremely lengthy and 
difficult discussions, the Working Group produced the DF Malan Document. The main 
features of this document were as follows: firstly, there was to be an undertaking by the 
ANC to stop attacks by means of armaments, firearms, explosives or incendiary devices; 
the infiltration of men and material; creating military as opposed to political underground 
structures; statements inciting violence; threats of armed action; and military training 
inside South Africa. Secondly, the government agreed to accept the following: that MK 
was a legal organization and that membership of MK was neither a crime nor in violation 
of the Pretoria minute; the historical fact that MK placed arms caches within the country; 
that MK could continue recruiting and training its cadres; that mass action was a 
legitimate form of protest; that MK's non-automatic firearms would be legalized for self-
defence; that the ANC would continue maintaining its existing military underground 
structures; and that the security forces would take cognizance of the suspension of armed 
action and related activities, and that all unauthorized activities by them be addressed. 
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The final feature of the Malan document pointed out the need to create within the 
Document a Liaison Committee to deal with the implementation of the DF Malan 
Document. The Liaison Committee met on several occasions but failed to reach a 
substantial agreement. The regime's representatives sought to turn the suspension of 
armed action into a complete termination of armed action. However, the ANC's 
representatives rejected this CANC, 1991b). Later, on 12 February 1991, delegations of 
the government and the ANC met and the state president, De Klerk and the deputy-
president of the ANC, Mandela, issued a joint statement in which they said that the 
problems experienced by the Working Group dealing with Paragraph 3 of the Pretoria 
Minute had been resolved and agreement had been reached with regard to the most 
pertinent points. They further stated that there was a need for the maintenance of 
consultations with the Working Group CANC, 1991 b). 
Political violence, largely between the ANC and the IFP supporters, continued in 
the townships throughout 1990. Consequently, Mandela met with the IFP leader 
Buthelezi on 29 January 1991 and both parties agreed to measures to end township 
violence. The violence, however, did not stop and on 5 April 1991 the ANC announced 
that it would pull out of the constitutional talks unless the government took steps to end 
the violence in the townships. On 12 May 1991 , hostel dwellers organized by the IFP 
attacked the Swanieville squatter camp near Krugersdorp, killing 27 people. Six days 
later, the ANC broke off talks with the government, insisting that Pretoria take the 
necessary measures to stop violence in the townships (Mandel a, 1993:19; Buntman, 
1998:248). Secret government funding to the IFP, a scandal that was to be known as 
"Inkathagate," was later revealed on July 19, 1991. Consequently, Law and Order 
Minister Adriaan Vlok and Defence Minister Magnus Malan were relieved of their posts 
but retained in cabinet ten days later. A National Peace Accord was signed between the 
government, ANC, IFP and other forces on 14 September the same year. More than forty 
organizations signed this Accord as a pledge of their commitment to peace. This 
represented all major political grouping except for the far-right wing groups who refused 
to sign CANC, 1991c: 25; Mandela, 1993 :19; Buntman, 1998 :248). 
By mid 1991, most discriminatory laws had been scrapped. Though the tricameral 
parliamentary system remained, the intention was to replace it with a new non-racial 
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political system once the negotiations were complete. On 5 June 1991, the Group Areas 
Act of 1950, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, and the Black Communities Act, among 
others, were repealed. Two weeks later, the Population Registration Act, which classified 
South Africans along racial lines, was also repealed. Meanwhile, the ANC held its 48th 
National Conference on 2 to 7 July and Mandela was elected as its President. The repeal 
of these laws, coupled with the signing of the National Peace Accord in September 1991, 
paved the way for a new constitutional negotiation process. This became known as the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) (Mandela, 1993:19; CA, 
1997: 17). 
The first CODES A meeting in which 17 political parties participated took place at 
the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park on 20 December 1991. Conspicuously absent 
were the Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO), the PAC and the Conservative Party 
(CP). After two days of negotiations, the delegates signed a Declaration of Intent that 
incorporated the guiding principles of a new democratic order. The IFP and the 
Bophuthatswana government, however, refused to sign the document (Constitutional 
Assembly, 1997:17; Buntrnan, 1998:248). The Declaration of Intent stated in part that: 
We, the representatives of political parties, political organizations and 
administrations, further solemnly commit ourselves to be bound by the 
agreements of CODESA and in good faith to take all such steps as are 
within our power and authority to realise their implementation (ANC 
199Id). 
Throughout the first part of 1992, almost 400 delegates from 19 political 
organizations met every week in a committee-based negotiating process. Several working 
groups were set up to negotiate five sets of issues, namely the principles and structures of 
a new constitution; the establishment of a transitional or interim government; the creation 
of a climate conducive to peaceful political participation; the constitutional future of the 
homelands; and the implementation of agreements reached at CODESA (Constitutional 
Assembly, 1997:17). 
A few months after CODESA was convened, the NP called a referendum for 17 
March 1992 to obtain a mandate for its political initiatives. President De Klerk called the 
unexpected referendum, after the right-wing Conservative Party (CP) defeated the NP 
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decisively in an important by-election in Potchefstroom, an NP stronghold. De Klerk 
hoped to stun opponents into silence, and consolidate his power base, by securing a large 
referendum majority for change (Waldmeir, 1997: 198). The results showed a 68.7 per 
cent endorsement of continued government negotiations on the country's future. This 
success lured the NP into a sense of control and the party began to make impractical 
demands in the negotiating process. The NP and the ANC could not agree on an 
acceptable majority for binding decisions. The NP insisted on a three-quarters majority 
and the ANC on two-thirds. The NP broke an original compromise of 70 per cent for the 
adoption of the constitution and 75 per cent for the Bill of Rights, by insisting on 75 per 
cent for constitutional changes and equal legislative powers for the Senate. The ANC, on 
the other hand, insisted on 70 per cent, and added that if this were not achieved, the 
matter should be settled after six months by a simple majority in a national referendum 
(Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 563). Technical issues such as the period needed by a 
transitional power-sharing government also marred the negotiating process. Consequently 
the CODES A talks collapsed in mid May. The NP had overplayed its hand by demanding 
a power-sharing veto for the white minority. The ANC withdrew when it recognized that 
the NP wanted a constitutional order that would prevent the ANC from gaining control 
even if the ANC had a democratic mandate to rule. Furthermore, the ANC constituency 
had begun to rebel at the top-down nature of negotiations and political violence in the 
country was on the increase. To many black South Africans, political violence had been 
instigated or at least tolerated by the NP and its government (Mandela, 1993 :20, CA, 
1997:17; Friedman, 1995:549; Buntman, 1998:248-249). 
The political situation in the country deteriorated in the following four months. 
On 17 June 1992, over 45 people were massacred at Boipatong, an ANC-aligned squatter 
camp. Much evidence indicated security force complicity in the attack, leading to a 
conviction amongst most black South Africans that this was a government ploy to 
weaken the ANC (Kasrils, 1993: 363-364). The ANC, SACP and COSATU Alliance 
suspended talks with the government on 23 June 1992, over Pretoria's involvement in 
violence against township residents and announced a three-month plan of mass action. 
The impasse in negotiations and tlle frustration of the ANC's constituency led the ANC 
to walk out of CODESA. In August 1992, there were several peaceful mass 
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demonstrations and rallies throughout the country. However on 7 September the same 
year, troops in the Ciskei opened fire on an ANC march of 70,000 in Bisho, killing 28 
people and wounding nearly 200. This was to prove a turning point in the political 
stalemate. With the political situation in the country tense, bilateral talks between the 
ANC and the government resumed, culminating in the signing of a Record of 
Understanding by Mandela and De Klerk on 26 September 1992. This broke the deadlock 
in the negotiations and multi-party talks were resumed (ANC, 1992a; Mandela, 1993 :20; 
Friedman, 1995:549; Buntman, 1998:249-250). 
The Record of Understanding resolved some of the issues that had prevented the 
continuation of negotiations. The Record of Understanding was notable because, by 
effectively going into a bilateral agreement with the ANC, the NP realigned the IFP. The 
deal between the two parties was denounced by all outsiders, including the IFP, the 
homeland leaders of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana and the CP, which set up the Concerned 
South African Group (COSAG) (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 565; Harvey, 2001: 
238). Buthelezi' s refusal to participate in many negotiating and transitional structures, 
and his insistence that agreements be on his own terms, made him a liability for the NP. 
Since 1990, the NP had had Buthelezi as a potential ally and, therefore, to the IFP, any 
pact between the ANC and the NP was a sign that the two groups were making common 
cause against it. Furthermore, the Record of Understanding bound the parties to actions 
that affected the IFP's core interests without consulting them (Friedman, 1995:549; 
Buntrnan, 1998:249-250). 
Unlike CODES A and various other agreements and forums of the transition, the 
Record of Understanding was a bilateral agreement, and as such began a period where the 
ANC and the NP sought political solutions together, often behind closed doors. Both 
parties made significant concessions designed to demonstrate their good faith. The 
previous negotiations had broken down in significant part because the NP wanted a 
power-sharing formula of government that would avoid the loss of power involved in the 
majority rule that the ANC sought. Slovo; the Chairperson of the SACP, proposed a 
compromise solution. In an article entitled "Negotiations: What room for Compromise?" 
that appeared in the African Communist, 1992, Slovo argued that, because the ANC was 
not dealing with a defeated enemy, it had to make certain concessions to firstly achieve 
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an agreement that would facilitate a constitution and elections, and secondly ensure that a 
new ANC government would have the bureaucratic and institutional levels of power at its 
disposal. The ANC could offer the NP limited, but compulsory power sharing, a 
government of national unity, a general amnesty, and security for the predominantly 
white civil service. Thus in February 1993, the NP and ANC proposed power sharing and 
an interim government of national unity for five years after the first democratic election 
(Slovo, 1992:1-4; Buntman, 1998:250). 
Multi-party negotiations resumed 111 March 1993 . They included 26 political 
parties and organisations covering much of the South African political spectrum. 
Tragedy, however, struck on 10 April 1993 when a white ultra-rightist cadre assassinated 
SACP leader Chris Hani, threatening to destroy the talks. The tragedy, however, became 
a foundation stone. Two weeks later, the ANC National Chairperson Oliver Tambo died. 
By June, the political parties were talking about a two-phased transitional process which 
would begin with the installation of a Transitional Executive Council, effectively making 
parliament a rubber-stamp, and the election of a constitution-making body to draft an 
interim constitution. On 4 June 1993, a meeting of political parties and organisations set 
27 April 1994 as the tentative date for South Africa's first non-racial elections, despite 
the Freedom Alliance having withdrawn from the negotiating process. During the same 
month, armed right-wing members of the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (A WB), led by 
Eugene Terreblanche, broke into the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg where the 
multi-party negotiations were taking place, but the police and security forces made no 
attempt to halt the attack. From then on the venue became a no-go zone. Security guards, 
checkpoints, passes and razor wire turned it into a modem fortress (Constitutional 
Assembly, 1997: 19). Despite this incident, the 27 April 1994 election date was ratified 
by a multi-party meeting in July 1993 and in August 1993 several transitional bills were 
passed, among them the Transitional Executive Council Bill, and the Independent 
Electoral Commission Bill, which allowed for the drafting of an interim constitution and 
the conducting of the first democratic non-racial election. Finally by November 1993, 
after turbulent political events, over three and a half years of starting, withdrawing from, 
and restarting negotiations, and the uneven participation of various parties, an agreement 
on an interim constitution was reached and the Bill was passed in Parliament in 
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December 1993 (see Appendix 10 for a list of the Members of the Transitional Executive 
Council from December 1993 to January 1994) (Mandela, 1993:21; CA, 1997:18-19; 
Buntman, 1998:251). 
5.2 ANC Dominance in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
The debate around party dominance in South Africa has become topical and as 
such is central and significant. It revolves around two main traditions. On the one hand, 
there is the optimistic assessment of the ANC's dominance, which argues that dominance 
is likely to stabilise the new order and guarantee democracy, and, on the other hand, there 
is the diametrically opposite view, which argues that party dominance is rather more 
likely to close down opposition and, in effect transform democracy into elective 
dictatorship (Southall, 200 I a: 13). 
As noted earlier, the fundamental point about party dominant systems is that they 
are democracies, in that they meet three essential conditions, namely: meaningful 
political competition between individual and organised groups; political participation in 
the election of leaders and policies; and the existence of civil and political liberties. In 
such a system, however, one party monopolises power. Since 1994, party dominance in 
South Africa has re-emerged and re-established itself under the hegemony of the ANC. 
The ANC in essence meets many of the criteria advanced for dominant status. As a 
liberation movement it has a powerful "founding myth" on which to rely. Since its 
formation in 1912, the ANC has established itself as the dominant movement of majority 
aspirations for liberation. Like many dominant parties that were initially liberation 
movements, the ANC relies on the symbolism accrued in the struggle against colonial 
and minority rule. The ANC's role in spearheading the demise of apartheid and the 
creation of a non-racial and non-sexist democratic state makes the electorate perceive it 
as an expression of a nation 's or group's desire for self-determination. Such liberation 
movements usually insulate themselves from electoral challenges for very long periods 
(Pempel, 1990:5; Friedman, 1999: 98-105). 
While the ANC sought to achieve its dominant status as a liberation movement by 
controlling a diverse number of social forces in the apartheid era, the party has in the 
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post-apartheid era sought to enhance its dominance as the governing party through a 
process of institutionalism. This section examines factors that contribute to the ANC's 
dominance in the post-1994 period. Particular attention is paid to arrangements and 
processes such as consociationalism, constitutionalism, corporatism and transformation 
of the state and public service, among others. 
5.2.1 The ANC, Electoral and the Legislative Process 
South Africa held its first non-racial democratic elections from 26 to 29 April 
1994 and the second non-racial elections from 31 May to 1 June 1999 under an electoral 
system based on national list proportional representation. 19 and 16 political parties 
contested the National Assembly elections of 1994 and 1999 respectively (see Appendix 
11 for a list of all organizations registered as political parties). In both elections, the ANC 
won with a majority and managed to obtain an electoral majority by capturing 62.7 and 
66.36 per cent in the 1994 and 1999 National Assembly elections respectively (Table 5.0 
below outlines the national results) . 
Table 5.0 1994 and 1999 National Assembly Election Results 
1994 1999 
Party Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Votes Votes 
ANC 62.70 252 66.36 266 
DP 1.73 7 9.55 38 
IFP 10.54 43 8.59 34 
NNP 20.39 82 6.87 28 
UDM - - 3.42 14 
ACDP 0.45 2 1.43 6 
UCDP - - 0.78 3 
PAC 1.25 5 0.71 3 
FF 2.17 9 0.80 3 
FA - - 0.54 2 
MF - - 0.30 I 
AEB - - 0.29 I 
AZAPO - - 0.17 1 
Total 400 400 
Source: Compiled from the Independent Electoral Commission (lEC) http://www.elections.org.za 
The 1994 elections saw a voter turnout of86.87 per cent. The ANC won with 62.7 
of the total vote, thus acquiring 252 of the 400 National Assembly seats. The other parties 
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together attained approximately 37.3 per cent of the votes. The NP, the ANC's closest 
rival, which achieved 20.4 per cent and thereby acquired 82 seats, became the official 
opposition. 19 parties contested the elections at the national level and 13 of these were 
recognized as minor parties. Only 7 of the 19 parties that contested the National 
Assembly elections managed to win seats in the National Assembly (Southall, 1994:636; 
EISA, 1999:3-4). 
The fundamental feature of these results was that the ANC had won a decisive 
majority. Mandela, elected President by the new Parliament, appointed two Deputy 
Presidents, Mbeki of the ANC and De Klerk of the NP. Under the terms agreed to for the 
formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) (discussed later in the Chapter), 
Sections 84 and 88 of the interim Constitution of 1993, provided for the appointment of 
an Executive Deputy President from the winning party, as well as opposition parties and 
a multi-party Cabinet respectively. Section 84(1) of this Constitution stated "Every party 
holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly shall be entitled to designate an 
Executive Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly" (RSA, 
1993: 48). Section 88(2) stated that: 
A party holding at least 20 seats in the National Assembly and which has 
decided to participate in the government of national unity, shall be entitled 
to be allocated one or more of the Cabinet portfolios in proportion to the 
number of seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number 
of seats held by other participating parties (RSA, 1993: 50) 
The Cabinet comprised 18 members drawn from the ANC, 6 from the NP and 3 
from the IFP. The AN C contested the 1994 election well aware that it represented the 
hopes of a substantial majority of South African and hence the key question about the 
election was not whether the ANC would win, but by how much it would win. These 
elections saw "the ANC transform itself from a movement of liberation into the 
predominant party of power", thereby setting itself to become the dominant party of 
government for the foreseeable future (Southall, 1994:639-640; 1997:9). The outcome of 
the 1994 general elections and the subsequent local government elections indicate that 
political parties are primarily characterised by the racial identity of their support. 
Africans predominantly support the majority party, the ANC, with less than 5 per cent of 
whites supporting it. Likewise, less than 5 per cent of Africans support parties that are 
181 
collectively supported by most whites (Lodge, 1995:475; Seekings, 1997:297-300; Habib 
and Taylor, 1999:262; Schlemmer, 1999:282). In the 1999 elections, the ANC, retained 
and managed to enhance its electoral majority and hence its parliamentary dominance. 
National voter turnout stood at 89.30 per cent. The ANC captured 66.36 percent of the 
votes, thereby winning 266 seats in the National Assembly. Its closest rival the DP, 
captured 9.55 per cent of the votes and 38 seats, and was declared the official opposition. 
The ANC had acquired an additional 14 parliamentary seats (EISA, 1999:37-41). 
International observers dubbed the 1994 election as generally free and fair and 
reflecting to a large extent the will of the people (Lodge, 1999b: 7-8). Nonetheless, the 
electoral process was characterized by irregularities and the use of force. The 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which organized and supervised the elections, 
managed to facilitate these elections in about four months. Irregularities in the 1994 
elections, such as missing voter lists, were mainly the result of administrative 
shortcomings and "the calculation of results was a very opaque process" (Buntrnan, 
1998:251; Lodge, 1999b: 2). These elections were marred by political and electoral 
violence. Pre-election violence between the ANC and the IFP occurred in the run-up to 
the 1994 elections, especially in Natal and on the East Rand. Parties also identified and 
declared their "zones" and in many instances denied their political competitors access to 
these zones. The IEC report referred to 165 such ' no-go ' zones. Of these zones, 39 per 
cent were controlled by the ANC, 27 per cent by the IFP, IS per cent by tribal authorities, 
12 per cent by the 'white right' , and one each by the NP, the PAC and the African 
Christian Democratic Palty (ACDP) (Lodge, 1999b: 6-7). Though the ANC was not yet 
the governing party, as the major liberation movement and vehicle for the aspirations of 
the black majority, controlling wide social diversities, it was the dominant actor in the 
political process and had a controlling influence in the black townships. In as much as 
political zoning was, to some extent, a function of coercion, particularly in areas 
predominantly ANC, according to the IEC report, such zoning and coercion did not 
significantly affect the electoral outcome. 
The 1999 election was far better conducted than its predecessor. However, there 
were complaints concerning 'no-go zones', political violence and intimidation. During 
this year, the IEC recorded 1032 complaints and in many instances these were of 
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harassment and poster removal (Lodge, 1999b: 197-199). Apart from its historical role as 
a liberation movement and the fact that racial identities have characterized the South 
African polity, the ANC's electoral dominance is a function of the electoral system of the 
country. Indeed the list PR electoral system has made a significant contribution to the 
emergence of a dominant party system in South Africa. During the negotiations, political 
parties were greatly concerned with the choice of electoral system, as uncertainty and 
unpredictability surrounded the electoral outcome. At the launch of a democracy, the 
political elite are aware that the choice of electoral system is important because it 
transforms gradually and slightly, thereby, "largely shaping the ruling alliance, the nature 
of the dominant party 's control over its representatives, the extent of its hold over society 
and the type of opposition that will emerge" (Sisk, 1995:168-169; Southall, 1997: 6; 
Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:13 ; Pottie, 200\:\53). The ANC initially preferred a 
constituency-based system during the negotiations and it did not support list PR since it 
feared that it would necessitate government coalitions by over-representing minority 
interests. It was assumed that the ANC preferred a constituency-based electoral system 
on the basis that its wide electoral support would win as other parties split across the left 
and right of the political continuum. The ANC adopted list PR partially as a compromise 
with the other political parties in favour of the system. The ANC became aware that such 
a choice would not be politically detrimental. Decades of ideological commitment by the 
ANC to non-racialism also encouraged it to select list PR rather than a constituency-
based system. Under list PR, the ANC could choose 'correct' demographic proportions of 
candidates. The choice of such a balanced state of candidates under the FPTP or 
constituency system would have been much more difficult. The ANC was also concerned 
that racial and ethnic politics should be undermined as far as possible without 
authoritarian regulations or limits on party organization (Sisks, Friedman, Mattes quoted 
in Pottie, 2001 :154; Welsh, 2001:26-27). The list PR in the 1994 and 1999 elections 
managed to give more than 60 per cent to the largest party and secured the minorities' 
representation in Parliament. It also greatly contributed to the ANC's success in 
managing its constituency by making it possible for the organization to mobilize Africans 
as a compact majority (Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:13-16). 
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The remaking of the constitution as a legislative process provided the governing 
party with opportunities to enhance its dominance. The interim constitution, which was 
written by unelected political actors, stipulated that a democratically elected 
Constitutional Assembly (CA) comprising the 400 MPs and 90 senators sitting together, 
should draft a new constitution within two years of the post-apartheid parliament's first 
meeting. This would then [mally be certified by a newly established Constitutional Court 
as conforming to the 34 principles underlying the interim constitution. Though the 
remaking of the constitution proved a troublesome and tedious exercise, the 
Constitutional Court, nonetheless finally approved a revised text on 4 December 1996. 
The enabling Act was signed six days later, and came into effect in early February 1997. 
The ANC, by virtue of its electoral majority, had the highest percentage of seats in the 
Constituent Assembly (See Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Party Representation in the Constituent Assembly 
Party Seats in CA (%) 
ANC 312 63.7 
NP 99 20.2 
IFP 48 9.8 
FF 14 2.8 
DP 10 2.0 
PAC 5 1.0 
ACDP 2 0.4 
Source: Strand, P "Finalizing the South African Constitution: the Politics of the Constitntional 
Assembly" Politikon, Vol.28, No.1 , 2001, pA8. 
The passage of the new constitution provided a basis for firmer control over the 
machinery of the state by the ANC. The new constitution, unlike its predecessor, is more 
favourable to the ANC's centralizing project. There are three significant changes in the 
constitution that contribute the ANC's dominance. The new constitution (as demonstrated 
later in the Chapter) makes no provision for enforced coalition. Among other things, the 
provision made by the interim constitution for the leader of the second largest party in 
parliament to become Deputy-President fell away, thus increasing political power for the 
presidency and the majority party. Since 1996, ANC members have occupied the posts of 
President and Deputy President. Furthermore, whereas the size of the cabinet was 
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formerly restricted to 27, later by amendment, 28, the new constitution, provides the 
President with complete discretion to appoint any number of Ministers or Deputy-
Ministers he or she chooses. It also provides for up to two Ministers to be appointed from 
outside the National Assembly. This makes it easier for the majority party to centralize 
political power and dominance through patronage rewards based on political loyalty. 
Thus as long as a government has a majority in Parliament, it can exercise majority rule 
though within the limits set by the constitution. The second change favouring 
centralization is the introduction of the concept of 'Cooperative Government', associated 
with which is the replacement of the Senate by the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP). Provision for the Senate fell under Sections 36 and 48 to 54 of the interim 
Constitution of 1993. The Senate was composed of 10 senators for each province 
nominated by the parties represented in a provincial legislature (RSA, 1993 : 28). This is 
clearly in favour of the ANC, since the party controls seven out of the nine provinces. 
The effective working of cooperative government will be such as to secure its ultimate 
control over the NCOP. Finally, a change in the constitution, which furthers ANC central 
control, is the elevation of local government to an independent tier of authority. Local 
governments are now no less subject than the provinces to financial discipline, rendering 
them subject to national government intervention if they are deemed to be failing in their 
responsibilities (Southall, 1998b: 447-450). 
The ANC's dominance in the political process IS further enhanced by its 
parliamentary dominance. As the majority party in parliament, the ANC has a 
domineering control and influence on the legislature, as it controls the five main axes of 
power in parliament namely: the Speaker; the Secretariat; the Chief Whip of the majority 
party; the ANC caucus, which consists of MPs; and the Chairs of the parliamentary 
committees, which wield significant power. These five axes of power, although 
interlinked, operate independently, with different styles and priorities (CDE, 1998:28). 
The Chief Whip of the majority party is a key feature and position in any Westminster-
type system. Each party in parliament elects a Chief Whip to run its affairs and the 
organization of its members within. The Chief Whip of the majority party, the ANC, is 
the most influential. The office of the ANC's chief whip represents the crossroads 
between the ruling party in the executive and its majority in parliament. The ANC chief 
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whip probably has more power than the leader of the house in terms of the day-to-day 
management of government business. The Chief Whip initiates and responds to 
procedural reforms such as the system of parliamentary questions, and ministers who do 
not attend caucus or are absent from the National Assembly consistently receive a written 
reproof from the Chief Whip. This improvement in efficiency has helped the ANC to 
operate more effectively and efficiently thereby improving the parliamentary system 
generally (CDE, 1999:28). Given that the speaker, the leader of government business and 
the chief whips together determine parliament's programme, and these are predominantly 
ANC members, it is clear that the ANC has steering influence over the legislative 
assembly. 
The ANC caucus, as one of the main axes of power, is also important in the 
configuration of political power. The caucus meets more regularly than the main ANC 
party structures and it is the place where the executive and the legislative arms of the 
party meet. It is also the place where key policy decisions are sanctioned (CDE, 1999,28-
29). The caucus therefore strengthens the dominance of the ANC in parliament, since 
once policy decisions are sanctioned by it, the ANC acts as a bloc in key parliamentary 
decisions. The ANC caucus is, however, not formally part of the organisation's 
constitutional structure and since the caucus is so large, with 312 MP and National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP) members during 1994-1999, there is little scope for the 
substantive discussions that take place elsewhere, such as the various ANC study groups, 
which shadow the parliamentary committees. Given the intimidating atmosphere and the 
presence of so many political heavyweights in the caucus, it is argued that there is little 
scope for participation by backbenchers (CDE, 1999:28-29). 
The parliamentary committee system is an important mechanism for ensuring 
accountability and transparency in government and public participation in the law-
making process. The National Assembly and the NCOP have committees that oversee 
government departments and consider legislation produced by and related to those 
departments. In the National Assembly, the committees are called portfolio committees 
and in the NCOP they are called Select Committees. The chairpersons of the 
parliamentary committees, particularly the portfolio committees, therefore have an 
important role to play in parliament. Since 1994 parliament has reorganized the way in 
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which the committee system operates. Parliamentary committees are now subject to 
public scrutiny unlike prior to 1994, when under the NP, committee proceedings were 
kept secret (Southall, 1998:453-454). There are now 50 committees of which 27 are 
portfolio committees. As at 2001, 94 per cent of the total number of committees were 
chaired by the ANC (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Number of Parliamentary Committees Chaired by the ANC as at 2001 
Committee Total Number of Number of % of Committees 
Committees Committees Chaired Chaired by ANC 
l>yANC 
Ad Hoc 3 3 100 
Joint Standing 8 8 100 
Portfolio 27 26 96 
Standing 2 1 50 
Select Comms.ofNCOP 10 9 90 
Total 50 47 94 
Source: Compiled from the websites of the Parliament of South Africa and the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. 
The parliamentary committee system is one important mechanism whereby MPs 
keep an eye on and monitor the work of the executive. Committees may summon any 
person to appear before them to give evidence. Rule 138 (a) of the National Assembly 
states that for the purposes of performing its functions , a committee may "summon any 
person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or affirmation, or to produce 
documents" (RSA, 2000c: 33). Ministers and public service officials can therefore be 
required to account for their work before a parliamentary committee (CDE, 1999:26). In 
short, the committee system is meant to act as a check on the executive. 
The ANC's dominance of the committee system, has, on the contrary, 
strengthened the executive. In the committees many ANC MP's are hesitant to use their 
influence and power to critically evaluate the performance of the executive mostly due to 
fear of political harassment or party discipline. Where ANC members of the 
parliamentary committees have criticized andlor scrutinized individuals and policies, the 
recipient has always "been a 'soft target' politically" (CDE, 1999:26). There are 
indications that in some cases, to save ministers and their projects from embarrassment, 
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the party has placed pressure upon ANC MPs in some committees. There are other signs 
that ministers themselves are attempting to steamroller committees. This situation can be 
attributed to fact the ANC, as a liberation movement operated, in an environment of 
secrecy and loyalty and thus it is finding it difficult to adapt to the new political 
environment, in which transparency and accountability are entrenched in the constitution 
and as government policy (Southall, 1998b: 454; CDE, 1999:26). ANC dominance in the 
parliamentary committee system and the apparent loyalty of its committee members to 
the party is in effect strengthening the executive wing of the party and government. 
As the ANC controls over ninety per cent of the parliamentary portfolio 
committees, and as the executive arm of government appears not to regard parliament as 
relevant and as a serious site for policy formulation, the ruling party does not, 
paradoxically, dominate when it comes to parliamentary questions and motions. 
Questions and interpellations, apart from work on committees, provide opposition parties 
with opportunities to articulate their interests and influence the policy-making process. 
They provide the most reliable indication of the substance and content addressed in 
Parliament. In most instances opposition parties pose questions and interpellations, in 
order to challenge or dispute ANC policy thus holding the executive accountable. For 
example between 1994 and 1999, a total of 1, 379 questions were asked in parliament 
(Calland, 1999:11). Only 216 of these were posed by the ANC, representing only about 
16 per cent (Table 5.3 below indicates socio-economic question progress by party, 1994-
1999). 
Despite its dominance in Parliament, the ANC posed only about 16 per cent of the 
total number of questions asked. Lia Nijzink advances three reasons as to why the ANC, 
despite its large majority, rarely asks questions. Firstly, the ANC seems to regard 
parliament as above all a venue for passing laws initiated by the government and for 
facilitating policy implemented by the executive. Secondly, as a former liberation 
movement, the ANC does not have a strong history of individualized and independent 
behaviour. Finally and probably most importantly, there is the inexperience of many of 
the ANC MPs in the workings of parliament, though this factor should have diminished 
over time. In practice, tlle ANC acknowledges that opposition parties dominate question 
time (Nijzink, 2001:110). However, its limited use of question time is not an indicator 
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that the ANC's dominance in the legislative process does not impose constraints upon 
opposition parties. The parliamentary opposition parties operate within the political 
constraints imposed by the dominance of the AN C. It has been argued that in all but one 
case, that of the DP, their inexperience dilutes their impact even further (CDE, 1999:32). 
5.3 Questions Posed by Political Parties in South Africa, 1994-1999* 
Party No. of Questions Asked 
ANC 216 
NP 606 
IFP 179 
DP 250 
ACDP 22 
PAC 20 
FF 86 
Total 1379 
* Soclo-economlc questIOns 
Source: Richard Calland (ed) The First Five Years: A Review oj South Africa's Democratic 
Parliament (Cape Town: Idasa, \999) p. 11 . 
Arguably, the ANC's inability to dominate question time is healthy for democracy 
in that it gives the opposition parties an opportunity to challenge ANC policy and hold 
the executive accountable, while at the same time articulating their interests and 
influencing the public policy-making process. 
The ANC's ability to maintain tight organizational control over its parliamentary 
representatives through its highly hierarchical party caucus, standing committee study 
groups and its ability to prevent its MPs from questioning their own ministers is aided by 
two factors: the list PR electoral system and the anti-defection clause in the Constitution 
(Jacobs, 1998:9; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999: 17-18). Representation in both the National 
Assembly and the NCOP is dominated by the ANC due to the list PR. This gives the 
ANC as a political party extensive influence over voting on bills in the National 
Assembly and the NCOP. The National Assembly is party-dominated, with the chief 
whip and party caucuses playing a decisive role in voting. In the NCOP, ANC dominance 
is also strong, but the party influence on bills that require provincial mandates, that is, 
Section 76 bills is somewhat mediated by whether the ANC dominates a province or not. 
The ANC controls seven of the nine provinces and a majority of five provinces is needed 
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to pass Section 76 bills. The party already has a decisive influence on bills on which MPs 
may vote as individuals in the NCOP (Jacobs, 1998:9). 
Party control of MPs is further maintained through an anti-defection clause, 
retained from the interim constitution. Party discipline is ensured by Section (43) b of the 
interim constitution, which prevents MPs from crossing the floor of the house and 
changing party. This anti-defection clause means that an MP loses his or her seat if he or 
she, for whatever reason ceases to be a member of the party that nominated him or her as 
a member of the National Assembly (RSA, 1994:26). In other word, the seat in 
parliament is owned not by the individual MP, but by the party. This measure, while 
ensuring a stable democracy and maintaining the choices voters make at elections, also 
increases the power of political party officials, especially party whips, to ensure strict 
party discipline. This system enables party leaders to impose homogeneity on a caucus 
and it also serves to freeze allocations of seats and inter-party strengths as determined by 
the results of the election. Such tight party discipline further fuses the legislative and 
executive arms of government. The ANC's enforced political homogeneity, therefore, 
acts as a bridge between the executive and the legislature. This means that many ANC 
MPs are simply voting provisions as the ANC chief whip becomes increasingly effective 
and organized (Jacobs, 1998 :10; CDE, 1999:27). A fusion of the legislative and executive 
arm of government only serves to enhance the dominance of the ANC in the political 
process. 
5.2.2 The ANC, Transformation and the Public Service 
The ANC IS establishing party dominance by seeking to dominate 
governmentally. It is attempting to fulfil its historical project of creating a non-racist and 
non-sexist democratic society through a series of interrelated and mutually supportive 
public policies that will give shape to the national political agenda. In so doing the 
ANC's dominance is now being further entrenched by a growing centralization and 
control of its policy-making process, transformation of the public service and political, 
administrative and financial control of the provinces. 
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The ANC is also enhancing its dominance by attempting to exert its control and 
influence over the state and society. The party argues that for South African society to be 
meaningfully transformed, it is necessary for the state, as a prerequisite, to be 
transformed. In other word, transformation of society must begin with the transformation 
of the state. The ANC believes that a transformed state will bolster the transformation of 
the wider society. According to the organization, the strategic challenge of the current 
phase is to transform South African society to become truly non-racial, united, non-sexist 
and democratic. In order to achieve this, it is trying to control and influence the functions 
and responsibilities of state. The methods of achieving transformation of the state are 
outlined in its discussion document entitled The State, Property Relations and Social 
Transformation: A Discussion Paper towards the Alliance Summit CANC, 1998). 
There are two interrelated questions that form the basis of the ANC's approach to 
transformation. Firstly, political power is not attained for its own sake, but to pursue 
given political and socio-economic objectives. Thus for the ANC, the state cannot be a 
neutral, non-partisan entity; rather it is an instrument that is used to pursue class interests. 
Secondly, political power, in the final analysis, is all about resource allocation and 
reallocation. Thus, at the basis of any revolution is the issue of property relations: how 
classes or groups relate to capital, in particular, and resources in general. The ANC 
argues that it is a multi-class organization representing the interests of all those who stand 
to gain from transformation and as such they share a common interest in the advancement 
of the cause of social transformation. The objective is not, therefore, to create a classless 
society. The ANC aims to reshape these property relations in line with its non-racial and 
non-sexist principles, and at the same time to configure them in such a way that they 
serve the interests of the overwhelming majority of the people, most of whom are poor 
To the ANC, the state and its instruments represent class interests and therefore it is part 
of, and a player in defining, social relations. It is therefore part of and not above society 
CANC, 1998). Power is therefore not only located in the state, but also within society. 
The ANC believes that the state guarantees and regulates property relations and 
the rules of political, economic and social engagement in society. In doing so, it promotes 
specific social interests. Therefore, it should in its composition and outlook, reflect these 
interests, and afford the classes and strata it represents the means to carry out their 
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objectives. It is in this context that the party examines the South African state in the 
current period and argues that it inherited a state that was illegitimate and structured to 
serve the interests of a white minority and therefore it cannot use the apartheid state 
machinery and hope to realize its aims. Thus the apartheid state has to be destroyed in a 
process of fundamental transformation. The ANC argues that the achievement of 
democracy ushered in a legitimate government based on a democratic constitution, with 
elected representatives as the main determinants of policy. The new democratic 
constitution guarantees democracy by ensuring meaningful political competition, 
participation and the existence of civil and political liberties. However, despite the 
introduction of a new democratic constitution, the instruments of state such as the army, 
police and judiciary, which should be the mechanisms and institutions of implementing 
the new democratic order and safeguarding democracy, remain largely in the hands of 
forces that were, and in some cases still are, opposed to social transformation. Hence, 
much transformation of the state itself is still required for it to become a true 
representative of the classes and strata that have brought about democratic change. The 
South African state is, therefore, currently in transition. The kind of state that the ANC 
wants to build is one in which the democratic forces have the capacity to use state 
instruments for purposes of social transformation CANC, 1998). 
Transformation of the state entails, first and foremost, extending the power of the 
ANC over "all levers of power: the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence 
structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public 
broadcaster, the central bank and so on" CANC, 1998). In other words, the ANC is 
attempting to establish political party control and influence over the strategic instruments 
of the state. Though the ANC argues that this is not "in contradiction to the provisions of 
the constitution, which characterise most of these bodies as independent and non-
partisan" CANC, 1998), it becomes increasingly clear that the ANC does not believe in 
the distinction between party, state and government. Such levers of power become 
subjected to political party influence as the party augments its political power through 
such institutions. In as much as it is necessary for these institutions to owe allegiance to 
the new order so as to ensure democratic consolidation, there is the possibility that such 
institutions may end up owing their allegiance to the party rather than the democratic 
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order. 
Transformation of the state is also aimed at introducing systematic preventative 
and contingency measures dealing with counter-revolution, which include "measures 
aimed at thwarting attempts aimed at establishing "a parallel state" in the form of private 
security companies, parallel intelligence agencies and so on" (ANC, 1998). This is an 
indication that the ANC is attempting to create a strong state, by ensuring that it will be in 
a position where all individuals and organizations in society are under the control of the 
government. For the ANC, this is necessary, as it has to grapple with the issue of 
governing an unruly society as is evident from the high rate of crime and violence. 
The ANC argues that it is committed to a strong and efficient state that is resolute 
in its loyalty particularly to the poor. Transformation of the state is not "synonymous 
with the dismantling of the state, rendering it irrelevant or redefining its role in such a 
way that the democratic movement ends up with a diffuse system of social cohesion and 
coercion" (ANC, 1998) This implies that in as much as the ANC acknowledges that there 
should be a diffusion of political power in society, such power should nonetheless be 
controlled by a central agency, indicating the party 's commitment to centralism. 
The public service in any country can be used as an instrument of political control 
and power over society as long as the party in power is able to exert its control and 
influence over such an agency. As part of transforming the state and as part of its 
objective of exerting its control and influence over the state and society, the ANC is 
engaged in a process of transforming the public service. The public service that the new 
government inherited in 1994 was designed to support the apartheid order, and was 
largely geared to serving the interests of the white minority. According to the White 
Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, the public service inherited by the 
new government was 
... characterised by a number of problematic policies and practices which, 
if left unchanged, could seriously compromise the ability of the new 
government to achieve its major goals of reconstruction and development, 
nation-building and national reconciliation, and community empowerment 
and democratic participation (RSA, 1995: 17). 
According to the White Paper, these problematic areas include: (a) lack of 
representativeness (b) lack of popular legitimacy ( c) lack of service delivery (d) 
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centralised control and top down management (e) lack of accountability and transparency 
(f) absence of effective management information (g) low productivity (h) poorly paid and 
demoralised staff (i) conflicting labour relations U) lack of professional ethos and work 
ethic (RSA, 1995: 17-18). 
The new government's task was to transform the public service from an 
instrument of control, domination, segregation and patronage into an enabling agency 
serving the ends of nation-building, reconstruction and development, and democracy. The 
ANC makes a clear distinction between transformation and reform. Whereas 
transformation is defined as a "dran1atic, focused, and relatively short-term process 
designed to fundamentally reshape the public service for its appointed role in the new 
dispensation" reform, on the other hand referred to administrative reform, involving "a 
broader, longer-term and continuing process that would ensure that the South African 
public service is kept in step with the changing international and domestic context" 
(CDE, 1999:66). 
The new government identified the following areas for the transformation 
process: (a) rationalisation and restructuring to ensure a unified, integrated and leaner 
public service (b) institution-building and management to promote greater accountability 
and organisational and managerial effectiveness (c) representativeness and affumative 
action (d) transforming service delivery to meet basic needs and redress past imbalances 
(e) the democratisation of the state (f) human resource development (g) employment 
conditions and labour relations (h) the promotion of a professional service ethos (RSA, 
1995 :25) 
The ANC has made significant progress toward achieving some of these goals, 
despite setbacks. The huge task of fusing the previously segregated racial/ethnic 
administrations and creating new structures in line with the new constitution has been 
completed. Personnel practices that were discriminatory and inequitable have been done 
away with, and legislation has been drafted to create an entirely new human resources 
and management framework. The government has implemented right -sizing as a means 
of fast-tracking appropriately qualified blacks into managerial posts (Southall, 1997:24-
25). The White Paper emphasizes that representativeness is one of the main foundations 
ofa non-racist, non-sexist democratic society, and as such is one of the new principles of 
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the new government. It points out that this is to be achieved through affirmative action, 
the beneficiaries of whom are black people (in reference to Africans Asians and 
Coloureds), women and people with disabilities. Affirmative action measures have been 
spelt out in the Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998 (RSA, 1995 :52-53; 1998b: 18). 
Table 5.4 Profile of the Management Echelon (Director to Director-General) of the 
former Republic of South Africa Public Service by, Population Group and Gender, 
1994 (%) 
African Coloured Asian White Male Female 
% of Management Echelon 2.0 1.0 3.0 94.0 95 .0 5.0 
National Population (eSS 76.0 8.0 3.0 13.0 49.0 51.0 
mid 1995 estimate) 
Source: Republic of South Africa, Developing a Culture of Good Governance: Report of the 
Presidential Review Commission on the Reform and Transformation of the Public Service in 
South Africa 27 February 1998. (PRC) (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1998) p. 124 
Table 5.5 Distribution of the South African Public Service, by Race and Skills Level 
1999 C%) 
African Asian Coloured White % of overall 
pu blic service 
Lower Skilled 88 2 9 2 19 
Skilled 74 4 9 13 22 
Highly Skilled Production 66 4 9 21 55 
Highly Skilled Supervision 42 6 6 47 3 
Management 28 5 6 61 0 
Senior Management 47 7 9 37 0 
Proportion of Population 77 3 9 11 
Source: Public Service Review Report 199912000. Department of Public Service and 
Administration hltp:llwww.dpsa.gov.za 
The ANC has achieved a significant goal with regard to affirmative action. In 
1994, for example, 94 per cent of the public service's management echelon, that is, 
director to director-general, was white. By 1999, this had changed radically, with 37 per 
cent of senior management being white compared to 47 per cent African (see Tables 5.4 
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and 5.5 above) . Table 5.5 must be interpreted against the overall distribution of public 
servants against skills levels. The Table shows that the overall composition of the public 
service over these six skills levels is so bottom heavy, that the real numbers in the three 
highest categories together hardly show up on the graphs when they are expressed as 
proportions of the overall public service (RSA, 2000). 
However, as part of transformation, the public service has become a source of 
patronage and political power for the ANC. Understandably, the ANC has, appointed 
new senior public servants from within its political loyal ranks. In its report, Developing 
a Culture of Good Governance: Report of the Presidential Review Commission on the 
Reform and Transformation of the Public Service in South Africa 27 February 1998, the 
Presidential Review Commission (PRC) notes that many provincial appointments, for 
example, have not been based on skill alone. In national departments, it found senior 
public service appointments generally reflecting the ethnic or racial composition of the 
minister concerned. The report of the PRe stated that 
While we understand the rationale for political appointments into the 
public service, we feel that this should be an interim and not permanent 
feature of the service, and wish to emphasise that skill and competence, 
rather than political loyalty, should be the guiding nonn in future, 
especially as the threat of political sabotage diminishes (PRC, 1998a: 16). 
Party officials elected to public office such as Members of Executive Council 
(MECs) in the provinces appear to believe that appointed public servants with ANC party 
membership cards owe their allegiance first to the party and then only to the constitution. 
The then ANC National Chairperson, Jacob Zuma, in November 1996, for example, was 
reported to have said that ANC leaders in government should not regard South Africa' s 
constitution as being more important than the AN C, because once they began feeling 
above the ANC they would be in trouble. The ANC is nonetheless, already making 
substantial progress toward the control of the state machinery at the central and 
provincial level. It is already creating and developing a distinctive bureaucratic class 
whose goals, via affirmative action and the declared aim of redistribution, will be linked 
to the furtherance of its own agenda (Southall , 1997: 24-25 ; CDE, 1999: 73). 
Another lever of power that is currently being used to enhance the ANC's 
dominance in the political process through transformation is the South African National 
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Defence Force (SAND F). In 1994, about 50 per cent of the personnel of the old Defence 
Force consisted of blacks. Out of this, less than one per cent were commissioned officers. 
By 1999, over 71 per cent the personnel of the new National Defence Force was black. 
Blacks comprised 32 per cent of the commissioned officers. By the same year, the Force 
had appointed 19 black generals from major-general and above, 14 of who were currently 
in the service. It had also appointed over 250 black colonels and lieutenant-colonels and 
over 1000 black majors and captains. Almost 20 per cent of the Department of Defence 
personnel were women, of whom 13 per cent were uniformed, representing an increase 
since 1994. A quarter of these were officers. Between 1997 and 1998, a 24 per cent and 8 
per cent increase in the promotion of former MK and APLA members respectively was 
recorded. Similarly tl1ere was an increase of 20 per cent in the promotion of Africans 
(RSA, I 999f: cols. 1553-1555). This is an indication of the ANC's stated desire to 
control and influence all levers of power in the polity so as to achieve its desired 
historical agenda or project of transforming the state and society. 
Though it is often pointed out that in dominant party systems and where 
corporatist arrangements exist, the influence of the party in the public policy-making 
process is usually limited, as a dominant party the ANC still has a controlling influence in 
this process. The transformation of the civil service to reflect representativeness in the 
senior echelons has witnessed the appointment of ANC cadres as demonstrated earlier in 
the chapter. In effect, many of these appointees who owe their allegiance to the 
governing party are largely responsible for policy formulation and implementation. 
Though now located in government, they are nonetheless party members who largely 
subscribe to the ideals, objectives and organisational discipline of the party. In other 
words members of the new executive in South Africa are predominantly drawn from the 
ANC and therefore the policy formulated will still reflect to a large extent that of the 
party. The party, however, has its own policy-making structures. 
The extent to which the ANC is trying to influence policy-making in government 
and hence the public policy agenda, is reflected in the party's policy-making 
establishment. There is centralization of the ANC's policy-making process. Formally, 
party structures in the ANC make policy, and the government turns this into legislation 
and implements it. In reality, however, there is far more of a top-down process in which 
197 
I 
I 
much policy originates In government, often with the help of external experts. The 
ANC's policy-making capacity is largely concentrated in the ANC's national policy 
department and the NEC's sub-committees on economic transformation, social needs and 
governance. There are complementing structures in the provinces, where the party has 
policy departments and policy units in various fields headed by provincial executive 
committee members and comprising representatives from the provincial caucuses, 
regions and branches. To a large extent the provinces are implementing policy formulated 
at the national level. In theory, the ANC's policy-making establishment consists of three 
sets of processes : those focused around the NEC's subcommittees; those based on the 
ANC's parliamentary study groups; and the permanent or professionally staffed policy 
units or departments at the party headquarters. In practice, however, the most important 
individuals influencing policy formulation are cabinet ministers and their deputies, who 
constitute more than half of the NEC; their director-generals in the public service; the 
chairs of NEC subcommittees, who are often ministers; and some ANC parliamentary 
caucus study groups and portfolio committee chairs (CDE, 1999: 116-132). Many of 
these are ANC members and as such policy formulated by them and implemented by 
government clearly reflects the organization's agenda. 
Other processes and bodies that ensure policy discussion and formulation within 
the ANC include the National Consultative Forum that brings together Alliance 
representatives, provincial ministers, and delegates from student and teacher 
organizations. The Alliance (discussed in detail later in the Chapter) consists of the ANC, 
COSATU and the SACP. This Forum makes recommendations, which can be forwarded 
to the ANC's NEC or National Working Committee (NWC). The NWC is elected by the 
NEC and is supposed to meet every two weeks. There are also the Alliance Summits and 
more routinely, fortnightly meetings of the Alliance Secretariat at the party headquarters, 
and monthly meetings of national office bearers of the Alliance partners also provide 
opportunities for policy discussion. The Alliance Summits function as arenas of debate 
and criticism of government policy. As large delegate meetings involving 60 or more 
people, they provide at best, fonrms for discussion of policy rather than for decision-
making about policy (Lodge, 1999c: 22). 
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Transformation of the state and public service at all levels of government has in 
essence enhanced party dominance, since political power resides in the state and its 
organs. The ANC has realized that political power resides in the state and its organs and 
not in the party per se, and therefore its desire to control and transform all spheres of 
government to gain effective dominance. In South Africa, government is constituted as 
national, provincial and local spheres of government, which are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated. The ANC is also attempting to expand and increase its 
dominance by imposing political and financial controls upon the provinces, particularly 
the provincial governments. To this extent the party is making use of constitutional 
provisions, government policies and party political procedures. 
The character of the post-apartheid South African polity can be described as a 
quasi-federal structure consisting of nine provinces. Control of the provinces is first and 
foremost compounded by constitutional provisions, which give the national government 
powers to monitor the affairs of provinces. The Constitution provides for direct national 
monitoring of provincial affairs under prescribed conditions. National government 
intervention is permitted in order to maintain national security, economic unity, national 
norms and standards, or to avoid prejudicial activities by any provincial government. 
Section 100 and Sections 146-150 of the Constitution govern such national supervision in 
specific instances (RSA, 1999a: 20; 1997b: 2.2). Section 100(1) in part states "When a 
province cannot or does not fulfill an executive obligation in terms of legislation or the 
Constitution, the national executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to 
ensure fufilment of that obligation" (RSA, 1997a: 57). Financial control of the provinces 
by national government, is also a direct manifestation of constitutional provisions such as 
Section 227 which states that each province is entitled to an equitable share of revenue 
raised nationally to enable it provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to 
it. The section does however, emphasize that there is no obligation on the national 
government to compensate provinces that do not raise revenue commensurate with their 
fiscal capacity and tax base (RSA, 1997a: 126). 
Political control of most of these provinces by the ANC is a result of the party's 
electoral victories both at the national and provincial levels in the 1994 and 1999 
elections. Whereas in the 1994 elections, the ANC won an outright majority in six 
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provinces and a plurality in a seventh, in the 1999 elections it won an outright majority in 
seven of the nine provinces, thus giving the party control at the national and provincial 
levels. Coupled with such constitutional provisions, the ANC has strengthened its 
political and governmental positions at the provincial level. While this has served to 
augment its political power as the party smudges the distinction between party and 
government, it has also in effect weakened the institutional capacity of the provinces to 
deliver services. This has further been compounded by inadequate funding and a lack of 
clear-cut government policies on the relationship between national and provincial 
governments that have left the latter faced with numerous administrative and financial 
problems. 
The political, administrative and financial crises affecting the provinces, largely 
as a result of politico-administrative problems, have been acknowledged and highlighted 
in various government documents. Notable among these are, the Provincial Review 
Report of August 1997, the Report of the Presidential Review Commission on the Reform 
and Transformation of the Public Service in South Africa of 27 February 1998, and the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review of September 1999. The Provincial Review Report 
points out that political interference particularly from the Members of the Executive 
Council (MECs) hampers the administration of departments. The Report states that: 
In the majority of the provinces, the relationship between the political 
leadership and the administration is not well defined .... in many cases 
MECs have become involved in the administration of departments and 
undermined the role of Heads of Departments. MECs bypass normal, and 
appropriate chambers of management and become involved in recruitment 
and in the day-to-day running of departments .... they even see themselves 
as accounting officers. The problems are made more severe when the 
political environment in the province is unstable, and especially if public 
servants are aligned with different political factions (RSA, 1997b: 25). 
This is a clear indication of the ANC's attempts at controlling the provincial 
governments, by blotting out the distinctions between party and government. MECs, the 
majority of whom are ANC members, run departments on the basis of personal rule. 
Personal rule leads to an increase in political power while at the same time weakening the 
capacity of institutions to perform their roles effectively and efficiently. Consequently as 
political patronage appointees, some public servants owe their allegiance or loyalty 
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directly to MECs, thus undermining the administrative and decision-making process. This 
has been acknowledged in the Provincial Review Report, which points out that Heads of 
Departments in some provinces often bypass the Director-General (DG) and instead refer 
administrative issues and decisions to the political leadership in the province, thereby 
seriously weakening the authority of the DG, as well as causing lack of coordination 
within the provincial administration. Such Heads of Departments tend to take 
submissions to provincial Cabinet through their MECs without it having been submitted 
to the DG (RSA, 1997b: 25). To this extent the ANC is enhancing its dominance. 
The provinces also lack complete autonomy since policies affecting them are 
normally formulated at the national level. The Provincial Review Report and the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review pointed out that many new policies are decided on at 
the national level without due consideration to the organizational, financial and service 
delivery implications in provinces. This tends to paralyze many programmes in the 
provinces (RSA, 1997b: 14; 1999b: 2.5-2.6). Furthermore, national government is meant 
to playa key role in determining the extent of fiscal redistribution between the provinces. 
There is direct national government with regard to budgets and financial management of 
provinces. National requirements for budgeting do not allow efficient management of 
services. National formats exist for the presentation and compilation of budgets, which do 
not allow managers to take independent decisions on how best to utilize their financial 
resources. Costs of individual activities are not reflected, rather the costs of the provision 
of specific kinds of goods or services to institutions and departments. Hence managers 
are unable to prioritize and have great difficulty managing expenditure. Staff are 
confused as to the real degrees of financial authority that provinces and departments have 
(RSA, 1997b: 20). Also the national government's adoption of the financial tenets ofneo-
liberal policies is leading to the imposition of strict financial controls upon the provinces, 
which is severely inhibiting their operational autonomy. The national government clearly 
feels that unless it imposes strict financial constraints upon provinces, it will lose control 
over the economy, and that its wider objectives will be lost. In broad terms, "the loyalty 
of the ANC to democratic ideals and institutions, which the new order entrenches, cannot 
be faulted" (Southall, 1998b: 456-468, 1998c: 11). 
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The ANC's is attempting to contain provincial autonomy within the party in a bid 
to consolidate political power and dominance. The party has begun to turn around a 
declining economy, to reorganize itself by consolidating its structures internally and 
addressing the numerous needs and expectations of its supporters. The party leadership 
has attempted to impose a semblance of order upon the political landscape by asserting its 
authority, using the mechanism of deployment and redeployment to achieve its desired 
objectives. This approach views the highest levels of the state and the party machinery, 
and the different levels of the government, as but one employment matrix. For example, 
as part of transforming the public service in order to render it more representative in 
terms ofrace and gender, and simultaneously willing to implement the new government's 
agenda, there has been the movement of personnel by the AN C from one sphere or level 
to another according to the dictates of the moment. This has resulted in a blurring of the 
distinction between politics and administration, notably when some newly appointed high 
profile civil servants are intimately connected to their ministers (Southall, 1998: 451; 
PRC, 1998). List PR facilitates deployment and redeployment as it allows the movement 
of personnel from one sphere to another. Any member of the National Assembly, 
Provincial Assembly, or the NCOP can resign from that body and be replaced by another 
representative of hislher party without any reference to the electorate. The ANC 
leadership has made particular use of this practice to curb in attempts by its new 
provincial organs to establish their autonomy, by trying to ensure that its choice of 
provincial premiers or leaders are appointed, as was the case in the Free State, Eastern 
Cape and Gauteng Provinces in the mid-1 990s (Southall, 1998:451-453). 
As emphasized in the foregoing chapter, one of the ways in which a political party 
can influence and reshape a country' s national political agenda or landscape and hence 
strengthen its dominance is through the media. The ANC has been accused of using the 
media, particularly the state-owned electronic media, to enhance its dominant position, 
especially during election periods. By doing so, it has negatively impacted upon the 
elections and the electoral process. In the run up to the 1999 elections, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation was accused of biased coverage in favour of the ANC. Reports 
produced by media monitoring groups such as the Independent Broadcasting Authority 
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(IBA) and the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) indicate that the ANC received more 
coverage than any other parties. 
Table 5.6 SABC's Coverage of Political Parties in the 1999 General Election 
Political Party Time % of Total 
ANC 23736 26.1 
IFP 13152 14.5 
DP 10655 11.7 
NNP 9722 10.7 
UDM 7191 7.9 
PAC 6329 7.0 
FF 3854 4.2 
Government 3414 3.8 
AZAPO 1955 2.2 
FA 2115 2.3 
ACDP 1965 2.2 
UCDP 795 0.9 
GPCP 945 1.0 
MUM 800 0.9 
Opposition Parties 795 0.9 
ULA 325 0.4 
AITUP 340 0.4 
SOPA 570 0.6 
AEB 340 0.4 
MF 570 0.6 
DPF 180 0.2 
LP 255 0.3 
NACOPA 150 0.1 
PLP 70 0.1 
SPP 70 0.1 
AMP 110 0.1 
WIVL 180 0.2 
XP 290 0.3 
Total 90873 100 
Total time per Party in seconds 
Source: IBA Elections 1999 Report on Coverage of the 1999 General Elections July 
1999 p.26. http://iba.org.za/monitoLhtm 
According to the IBA report, the SABC was at fault in allowing inadequate time 
for free party election broadcasts. The IBA's Report on Coverage of the 1999 General 
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Elections July 1999, points out that, with regard to the quantitative assessment of news 
covered by the SABC, the party that received the most coverage was the ANC topping 
the list at 26 per cent. This was followed by the [FP, DP NNP, UDM and PAC. The small 
provincial parties like Ximoko PP, received very little coverage (IBA, 1999: 23) (see 
Table 5.6 above). 
Coverage of the AN C, whether favourable or unfavourable, tended to 
predominate over other parties (Lodge, 1999b: 202-204). Towards the end of the 
campaign on 28 May, the MMD points out, that the only party to receive coverage on 
SABC was the ANC. Generally, the DP suffered from under-reportage on SABC radio 
and television stations and coverage of this party by election day was much more critical 
than it had been at the beginning of the campaign. A series of staff changes at the SABC 
in early 1999 effectively placed journalists with strong ANC affiliations in charge of the 
news. The impartiality of public broadcasting was therefore, much more open to criticism 
than it had been in 1994 (Lodge, 1999b: 202-204). 
The ANC's dominance in state and state institutions such as the SABC had begun 
taking its toll and its subsequent effect upon the electoral process had begun to have a 
negative impact. Using its governn1ental dominance the ANC, attempted through the 
SABC, to influence voter perceptions to its advantage by discrediting opposition parties. 
Though some scholars such as (Lodge, 1999b) argue that although the SABC's biased 
coverage may not have influenced electoral outcomes significantly, the ANC's use of the 
SABC to influence voting patterns was wrong since the latter, as a media institution is 
primarily meant to safeguard and promote democracy in the country. 
5.2.3 The ANC, Consociationalism and Corporatism 
Democratization partly involves the establishment of democratic and democracy-
promoting organizations and procedures that will eventnally lead to a democratic order. 
Such procedures may include among others, consociationalism and corporatism. The 
transition to democracy in South Africa has partly been sustained by these two 
institutional an·angements. 
204 
Consociationalism or consociational democracy has been defined in terms of four 
basic principles. Firstly, it involves government by ' grand coalition' that is by a broadly 
representative coalition of all significant groups in the political process. Secondly, it 
recognizes group autonomy by means of territorial and or non-territorial decentralization 
and federalism. Thirdly, it involves proportionality, especially with regard to political 
representation. Finally, there is the existence of minority veto powers concerning issues 
of vital and fundamental importance to minorities (Lijphart, 1998: 145-146). There is 
therefore, meaningful political competition between individuals and organized groups; 
political participation; and the existence of civil and political liberties, in the polity. 
South Africa was arguably a democracy based on consociationalism between 
1994 and 1996. This was primarily a function of the 1994 interim constitution, which 
embodied all the basic principles of consociationalism. Firstly, government by a 'grand 
coalition' was evident in the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), 
provided for under the interim constitution. Secondly, group autonomy particularly in the 
critical area of education was guaranteed. Thirdly, proportionality became the leading 
principle of election and representation in the National Assembly and provincial 
legislature as well as in the composition of the GNU. Finally the minority veto power 
appeared in the form of the two-thirds majority requirement for amending the constitution 
and for adopting the permanent constitutional text by the Constitutional Assembly 
(Lijphart,1998:146). 
Consociationalism during this period helped the ANC establish its dominance in 
the political process. The GNU was one of the outcomes of the negotiated settlement, 
between the two major protagonists in the negotiations, namely the popular alliance led 
by the ANC and its allies on the one hand and the former lUling party, the NP and an 
assortment of its associates on the other. During the negotiations, phrases such as 
"power-sharing, "sunset clauses" and "horse-trading" entered the national vocabulary. It 
was believed that these sunset clauses would open the way to tlle new political 
dispensation since they would guarantee minority rights, among others. There was 
common acknowledgment that the pragmatism of Siovo, who had introduced the concept 
of sunset clauses, had led the ANC to accept the principle of a GNU that would be phased 
out after a five-year period (CA, 1997: 19; Southall, 1998b: 444-445). The election of 
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1994 provided the basis for the ANC to emerge as the dominant force within a coalition 
GNU. The outcome provided the basis for the ANC, NP and IFP to take proportionate 
shares within the GNU, which the interim constitution envisaged as guiding South Africa 
through the first five years of its democracy. The ANC's control of the Presidency and its 
majority position of 67 per cent within the cabinet resulted in its domination of the 
government's agenda and process. The new cabinet was one of national reconciliation 
and brought together leaders of these three parties. All races and ethnic groups were 
significantly represented. The installation of the GNU and the new democratic parliament 
presented tile ANC with new challenges. Though it won the 1994 elections, the ANC was 
still primarily concerned about the elections of 1999. Party strategists argued that the 
1999 elections were important because the party that would win, would not be obliged to 
accommodate other parties, as required by the GNU (Guelke, 1996:92-93; Adams, 1997: 
239-240; Gall, 1997: 203; Saul, 1997: 220-222; Southall, 1998: 444-445; Rantete, 
1998:251). 
The resolution to choose a GNU and power-sharing for South Africa's first years 
of democracy was a political necessity for the ANC in its pursuit and consolidation of 
political power. On the one hand, the ANC was not yet a victor in the liberation struggle 
and had limited bargaining power, as it was negotiating with an enemy it had not 
defeated, and therefore had to make certain concessions to win a negotiated agreement. 
On the other hand, there were certain practical, moral reasons for a GNU. As Slovo had 
pointed out, winning political office in an election would not automatically translate into 
being able to use the levers of political power. A GNU and guaranteeing civil servants' 
jobs were the best option to help ensw'e that the ANC would be able to govern if it won. 
Furthermore since reconciliation and unity was the moral call of the new government, 
there was a powerful ethic in the cooperation between the former oppressors and the 
oppressed (Buntman, 1998:264-265). In 1996, the NP opted to leave the GNU. Although 
a proportionate share of the posts, which it had occupied in government, were now 
reallocated to the IFP, the latter remained very much defined as the junior partner, whilst 
to all intents and purposes the ANC was confirmed as the ruling party (CA, 1997:40-55; 
Southall, 1998:446-447; CDE, 1999:74). 
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Though consociationalism has declined since 1996 with the adoption of the 
permanent constitution, which no longer prescribes a GNU. This does not indicate 
conclusively that the polity under majoritarianism is likely to end up authoritarian. There 
remain arrangements and mechanisms in the social, political and economic system that 
still guarantee, to a large extent some form of power-sharing or decentralization. First of 
all, with the inclusion of the IFP as a junior partner in government, the cabinet is still not 
a one-party type such as those found under majoritarian rule and this indicates a 
semblance of broad government. Secondly, the multi-racial and multi-ethnic character of 
the ANC, particularly among the ranks of its cabinet ministers and MPs demonstrates a 
broad representation of all the major racial and ethnic groups in the country. Thirdly, in 
as much as the ANC may dominate the party and political system, power in the political 
system may be cOlmterbalanced by power in the economic system predominantly 
controlled by non-blacks. Power may also reside in those echelons of government that the 
ANC has yet to dominate effectively. Finally, the mechanisms that safeguard democracy 
such as the list PR electoral system, a quasi-federal system of government, and a 
constitution that can be only amended by a two-thirds majority and a constitutional court 
sill exist (Lijphart, 1998: 148-149; Maphai , 1999:95-98). 
Party dominance in South Africa has also been enhanced by corporatism. 
Corporatism is a mechanism that safeguards democracy and political stability, since it 
ensures that all the major actors in the social, economic and political system advance and 
safeguard their interests. It is basically a policy arrangement based on consultations and 
negotiations between government, business and organized labour in a bid to address key 
socio-economic and political issues facing a country. Corporatism in South Africa has 
largely manifested itself in the establishment of the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NED LAC). 
NEDLAC's origins can be viewed in the context of the struggle against apartheid, 
against unilateral decision-making, and demands by society for a more inclusive and 
transparent decision-making process. It recognizes the importance of consensus in 
decision-making as a way of ensuring the success of major economic, social and 
development policies. NED LAC draws on international experience in tripartite decision-
making, as well as the experience of its predecessors, the National Economic Forum 
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(NEF) and the National Manpower Commission. It also has unique features relevant to 
the South African situation, which include the traditional social partners involved in 
corporatism, namely, government, business and labour, but also organizations that 
represent community interests in the country. NED LAC is therefore a special type of 
corporatism. It represents a fourth constituency, namely, community and development. 
Parties to it seek to reach agreement through negotiation and discussion based on proper 
mandates. Hence, it is "an agreement-making body rather than an advisory body, and 
serves as an instrument for ongoing "accord-making" " (Webster, 1995: 25, NEDLAC, 
1997: I). 
NEDLAC is currently involved in a number of various programmes under the 
chambers representing the four constituencies. The current and completed projects fall 
under the following programmes; HIV / AIDS, public transport, public education, local 
government, poverty eradication, international migration, labour laws, and pension funds, 
among others (NEDLAC, 2001). Despite the politico-administrative problems facing it, 
largely as a result of the socio-economic divisions inherited from the apartheid era, as 
well the dianletrically opposed interests that the organization seeks to contain, at times 
resultantly inhibiting consensus in the short-term, NEDLAC has nonetheless recorded 
some achievements. By September 1998, NEDLAC had negotiated 35 agreements. It 
played a central role in negotiating consensus around the provision of the Employment 
Equity Bill, the Skills Development Bill, the Competition Bill and codes on picketing, 
retrenchment and sexual harassment. NED LAC was also involved in preparations for the 
Presidential Jobs Summit and the common programme that the summit produced 
(Cawthra and Kraak, 1999: 69-71). In 2000, NED LAC successfully dealt with seven 
cases under Section 77 Notices. Section 77 of the Labour Relations Act allows registered 
trade unions or federations of trade unions to undertake protest action to promote or 
defend the socio-economic interests of workers. Before embarking on protest action, the 
Act requires the trade union concerned to serve notice to NED LAC stating the reason for 
the protest action. NEDLAC parties then met with the trade union and other interested 
parties in an attempt to resolve the dispute. Should the NEDLAC be unable to solve the 
dispute, workers are entitled to participate in protected protest action (NED LAC, 2001). 
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While corporatism m apartheid South Africa was aimed at ensuring political 
stability at the expense of a democratic order, in the post-apartheid era it has been 
established as a means of ensuring political stability and democracy. During the apartheid 
era, it was established by the state to curtail the popular resistant activities of the vibrant 
trade union movement in the mid-1980s. As a result, popular resistance and the political 
activities of the Congress movement were to some extent quashed (Habib, 1997:62-63; 
Lewis and Naidoo, 1999: 217-218). Corporatism in the post-1994 period has ensured 
political stability, but in this case within a democratic context. Political elites in the new 
dispensation have established corporatist arrangements as a means of ensuring political 
order and stabi lity in the transition toward democracy in the country. To forestall any 
political crises arising from the implementation of new economic and political 
programmes and strategies, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) and the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the ANC found 
it necessary to form corporatist arrangements with the key social forces in the country, 
namely government, business, labour and civil society. Under such arrangements, various 
class and race interests would be represented in the new political dispensation, such as 
the beneficiaries of the apaltheid regime, cautious of the socialist inclination of the RDP, 
and the previously disadvantaged groups who were disappointed by the ANC's adoption 
of the neo-liberal GEAR. 
The formation of the Tripartite Alliance among the ANC, COSATU and the 
SACP, arguably represents some form of quasi-corporatism, as it is an arrangement 
between political parties and the labour movement. The Tripartite Alliance not only 
sought to represent broad socio-political and economic interests at its formation, but also 
later sought to capture political power and to form the government. The electoral victory 
and consequent formation of government by the ANC, the major component of Alliance 
has not only ensured political stability in democratization, but has also enhanced the 
dominance of the ANC in the political process. The ANC's ability to bargain with other 
organizations so as to remain in and at the core of government, as evident in the 
formation and sustenance of the Alliance (albeit showing signs of strains), indicates its 
bargaining dominance as a dominant party. 
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After the unbalming of several political organizations In 1990, the ANC 
formalized the Tripartite Alliance, comprising the party, SACP and COSATU on the 
common commitment to nationalism and substantial redistribution from the previously 
advantaged to the previously disadvantaged communities of society. Over the next one 
year, the Alliance carefully began to distance itself from the armed struggle and radical 
elements in its ranks. During the CODESA talks, the ANC, as one of the key actors, 
formally established its dominance within the Alliance, and COSA TU was reduced to a 
secondary role, influencing ANC policy through lobbying and pressure rather than 
wielding a share of direct power over decisions. From this point, political parties, not the 
civil society organizations, which took on the role internal resistance to apartheid during 
1980s, were to be the centre of the transition (Adler and Webster, 1998:20; Giliomee and 
Simkins, 1999:29; Webster, 2001:84). 
Despite the growing strains within the Tripartite Alliance, it is important to start 
with a clear understanding of what binds this alliance together. These three organizations 
are bound by several factors. The ANC, SACP and COSATU share a history of common 
struggle against the apartheid regime and the strong African nationalist sympathies of the 
labour movement and communists often override their class perspectives. The ANC relies 
on these organizations for mass mobilization and electoral support. These organizations 
are also bound by a common heritage of the language and ideas of revolutionary 
opposition and socialism and a lasting shared conception of 'them' and 'us', enemies 
against whom they must be vigilant and united, even ifnow the ANC is in government. It 
is also important too, to understand that the three organizations in the Alliance have 
overlapping membership (Adam, 1997:237; CDE, 1999: III) 
The South African transition is founded on the nonnative principle of national 
unity and this principle is the basis on which the ANC forms political relationships with 
both foe and friend. The political relationship among the ANC, SACP and COSATU, as a 
corporatist arrangement, is based on the principle of national unity aimed at strengthening 
the ANC's position in the formation of government. As Habib puts it: 
. .. the strategic alliance among the ANC, COSATU, and the SACP, prior 
to, as well as following the 1994 election fostered a co-operative 
relationship on all sides. The overlap of membership, and the presence of 
senior COSA TU figures on the electoral slate of the ANC and in the 
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cabinet of the GNU, meant that a repressive response could not be realized 
without debilitating divisions and tensions within the ruling party itself 
(Habib, 1997 :71). 
COSA TU, which proved to be by far the best organized component of the ANC 
electoral machine in the run-up to the 1994 election, gave its support on the condition that 
the ANC implement an ambitious policy of job creation and social welfare called the 
RDP, as the new hegemonic national project. The RDP was an integrated coherent socio-
economic policy framework, which sought to mobilize all the people and resources of 
South Africa toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, 
non-racial and non-sexist future . To ensure that such a socio-economic programme would 
be adhered to, COSATU further demanded that its officials be included in the ANC 
election list. The 1994 elections, however, cemented the ANC's leadership within the 
Alliance and since then the Alliance has come under growing strain following the 
govemment's abolition of the RDP office and acceptance in 1996 of a liberal macro-
economic framework, GEAR, which emphasizes fiscal discipline, privatization, abolition 
of exchange controls and lowering of tariff walls . Unlike the RDP's radical redistributive 
orientation, GEAR served to provide confirmation of the shift to a liberal capitalist, 
growth-first framework, thus in essence annoying the Alliance partners who were more 
committed to a radical programme. Despite its adoption of GEAR as a macro-economic 
framework, the ANC has neveliheless remained firmly committed to the social 
transformation of society (Lodge, 1995:479; Adams, 1997: 244-246; Gall, 1997:204-215; 
Saul, 1997: 223-225; Adler and Webster, 1998:24; Maree, 1998:49; Rantete, 1998:89; 
ANC, 1999: 13; Giliomee and Simkins, 1999:29; Habib and Taylor, 1999: 266; Mckinley, 
2001: 67; Bond, 2000:53-85). An interesting point to note is that, although the RDP's 
radical redistributive orientation was committed to the social transformation of society as 
envisioned largely by COSA TU and the SACP, there was no direct Soviet influence in 
the formulation of this socio-economic programme (Shubin, 2002). 
The forging of the Tripartite Alliance with the SACP and COSATU raises 
important questions about the Alliance and its effectiveness. A close analysis of events in 
the early mid-1990s, particularly, the adoption of GEAR and the abandonment of the 
RDP by the ANC, show an increasing marginalisation of working class interests and the 
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emergence of severe strains to which the partners in the Alliance were subjected to 
maintain their independence. Despite rhetoric about the role of the workers in shaping the 
content of, and leading the struggle toward a new political dispensation, in practice this 
was clearly not the case. The crosscutting leadership within the Alliance served to 
strengthen the fledgling structures of the ANC, while weakening COSATU by 
diversifying the energies of its leaders. Nonetheless, in spite of the ANC's dominant role 
in the Alliance, COSA TU was never subordinated. It retained its separate leadership, 
finances and policy orientations. Furthermore, as it claimed a right to participate in the 
political process of transition, so it also sought to intervene in the process of restructuring 
the economy (Gall, 1997: 204-205; Adler and Webster, 1998: 20; Rantete, 1998: 50; 
Habib and Taylor, 1999:265). 
Notwithstanding strains within the Alliance, the ANC has to govern the country 
as a whole and in thaLcapaci ty-has-to-think- abol:lt, accommodate, ancnustTryits actions 
in terms of the many different interests throughout the country. According to the Centre 
for Development and Enterprise (CDE), running the government has exposed the ANC's 
leaders to many new influences. Critical among these have been exposure to new 
international realities and the thinking of international leaders of stature, and the harsh 
reality of the weakness of the South African state as an instrument for effective action. 
These have pushed the ANC leadership towards a new approach to economic issues, the 
strength and role of the state and the market, respect for representative democracy, and 
the limitations of direct popular democracy. The result has been an increasing difference 
of opinion in worldview between the ANC in government and its political allies CCDE, 
1999: III). In spite of tensions, the Tripartite Alliance between the ANC, SACP and 
COSATU is likely to continue. Trade union membership has and continues to supplement 
the ANC election machine. 
The extension of corporatism in post-apartheid South Africa was facilitated by a 
number of factors. Firstly, it was based on the consensual approach to state-society 
relations in a bid to achieve national unity. This has been part of the ANC's historic and 
national agenda or project of achicving a non-racial and non-sexist democracy in South 
Africa. Secondly, given the strategic role of COSATU as the ANC's electoral machine 
prior to and after the 1994 elections, there was the need by the latter to avoid intensifying 
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divisions and strains within the Tripartite Alliance. Thirdly and relatedly, there was also 
the desire not to antagonize COSATU, given that it represented the largest social 
movement in the country and whose constituency was most vulnerable to political 
mobilization or discontent. Mass discontent among the populace would have disrupted 
the transition process (Habib, 1994:71). 
Critics of corporatism argue tbat the arrangements are too cumbersome and time-
consuming and undermine the ability of government to deliver on time and effectively on 
its commitments. They also argue that policy cannot be effectively formulated through a 
collective bargaining process and that the smudging of distinction the between the 
functions and powers of NEDLAC and Parliament undermines the sovereignty of the 
latter. Critics further emphasize a system dominated by a powerful national institution 
like NED LAC stifles local institutions and duplicates the functions of specialized multi-
partite bodies (Lewis and Naidoo, 1999:220). 
Some commentators point out that the system of corporatist and quasi-corporatist 
arrangements such as NED LAC and the Tripartite Alliance respectively have to a large 
extent guaranteed stability in the democratization process in South Africa. Key socio-
economic and political forces in the country have exhibited their political willingness to 
maintain a democratic and stable order, through such arrangements, rather than risk 
national disintegration. Th~ ANC, as the dominant actor in government, the party system 
as well as the political process, relies on such arrangements to maintain its dominance in 
order to achieve its desired historic and national agenda. By incorporating labour into 
government and the decision-making process, the ANC ensured continued dominance 
and stability in the political process. Likewise by incorporating business in such 
arrangements and the adoption of neo-liberal macro-economic policies, the ANC has 
ensured that such key extra parliamentary economic forces can continue to safeguard and 
advance their interests in the new dispensation in a market society characterized by 
minimal state intervention. Corporatism in South Africa has therefore reduced potential 
political and economic challenges facing the ANC. 
Conclusion 
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South Africa can be described as a dominant party polity under the hegemony of 
the ANC, by virtue of exhibiting the required characteristics of such a system. The 
condition of party dominance normally develops as a result of several factors ranging 
from historical to electoral, governmental and bargaining factors. In the historical 
context, party dominance is a product of liberation movements that controlled social 
diversities as a means of achieving national independence in various countries. In South 
Africa as argued in Chapter 3, party dominance in the post apartheid period is partly due 
to the social diversities the ANC controlled dw-ing the liberation struggle as a means of 
achieving the demise of apartheid. The process of achieving dominance is not yet fully 
complete and has been uneven. 
Party dominance in post-apartheid South Africa has been largely a result of 
institutionalism. While the AN C sought to achieve the status of a dominant liberation 
movement through a process of social control and engineering dw-ing the apartheid 
period, it has and continues to achieve dominance, though unevenly, through 
institutionalism 111 the post-apartheid era. This has been achieved through 
constitutionalism, consociationalism, corporatism, and transformation of the state and 
public service. Through constitutional engineering, the "re-making" of the constitution 
was largely in favour of the ANC's consolidation of power. The formation of the GNU as 
a result of a negotiated settlement likewise was to the advantage of the ANC as it ensw-ed 
a smooth transition and legitimized the new political order. Corporatism too, is enhancing 
the ANC's dominance, since it offers the opportunity for key actors in the political 
process to safeguard and protect their interests, without challenge to the ANC. 
Transformation of the public service is also ensuring the ANC's control of the levers of 
power and consequently governmental dominance. 
By doing so, the ANC is managing to control and contain the major social, 
economic and political actors of the state and civil society, thereby enhancing its 
dominance in the party and political system. Party dominance has not confined itself 
narrowly to party-state society relations, but more interestingly on a wider scale with 
regard to its relationship with state and civil society. By seeking to contain potentially 
disintegrative forces through dominance, despite to some extent weakening institutions, 
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the ANC has so far managed to ensure political order and stability in the democratization 
process. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COMPARING THE EVOLUTION OF PARTY DOMINANCE IN POST -1990 
KENYA AND POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
6.0 Introduction 
The condition of party dominance as explained in Chapter One develops due to a 
number of factors , of which one is historical. Party dominance results when liberation 
movements that controlled social diversities as a means of achieving national 
independence or ending minority rule come to power. Kenya and South Africa share a 
common history: that of liberation movements and a liberation struggle. In both 
countries, the dominant liberation movements managed to control social diversities by 
advocating African nationalism, and a commitment to policies of non-racialism, in order 
to end white minority rule. Hence they were able to represent the aspirations of the 
majority of the population in their respective countries. Other factors stem from the ruling 
party 's electoral, parliamentary, bargaining and governmental dominance in the polity. 
KANU and the ANC have both achieved tlllS status. 
This chapter is a comparative analysis of the evolution of party dominance in 
post-colonial Kenya and post-apartheid SOUtll Africa. It is divided into two sections. 
Though the focus of tltis study and chapter is the post 1990 period in Kenya and South 
Africa, the first section provides a background to the evolution of party dominance by 
comparing and contrasting the history of the dominant liberation movements in both 
countries. This section focuses on the colonial and apartheid era with a view of 
demonstrating the similar and different trajectories each movement took to gain control 
of social diversities with the aim of ending minority rule. Historical factors, such as 
liberation struggles do contribute to the emergence of party dominance, particularly, in 
developing countries. Particular attention is paid to KANU's and the ANC's 
transformation from elite organizations to mass movements; their role in the armed 
struggle; and their dominant roles in the constitutional negotiations of both countries. The 
second section examines the emergence and consolidation of party dominance in post-
colonial Kenya and post-apartheid South Africa, with emphasis on the post-1990 period. 
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This section also attempts to demonstrate the similar and different course the parties have 
pursued in their attempts to enhance and maintain party dominance. 
6.1 A Comparative History of the Dominant Liberation Movements in Kenya and 
South Africa 
6.1.1 From Elite Organisations to Mass Movements 
The history of KANU, which dates back to its predecessor the YKA in the early 
1920s, is similar to that of the ANC, which dates back to the SANNC during the early 
1910s. Both organisations were very much the product of repressive racist policies 
imposed upon Africans by white minority rule. Prior to the 1940s, the aims and 
objectives of these organisations initially centred mainly upon trying to advance several 
African socio-economic rights, such as the land question and pass system. These 
grievances later transformed into political grievances. The settler state was viewed as 
oppressive, as were its policies. KANU's predecessors, the YKA, EAA and KCA, and the 
ANC during this period also sought, with little success, to seek support from the British 
government for the African cause in Kenya and South Africa respectively. The 
organisations also made extensive use of the limited channels of constitutional action 
made available to Africans within the settler state. However, these organisations were 
faced with many problems from the onset. They were initially not mass organisations. 
They were formed by a small group of African educated elite and for several years their 
membership consisted of this small group. The organisations were also characterised by a 
lack of organisational coherence. They consisted of older conservative moderates and 
young radical militants, the former of whom believed in the use of constitutional means 
to achieve their objectives whereas the latter believed in militant action. This on many 
occasions paralysed the effectiveness of the organisations. In the pre-1940 period, 
KANU's predecessors and the ANC leadership were mainly conservative moderates who 
believed in constitutional means and hence adopted a cautious approach in trying to 
achieve their objectives making these organisations appear moderate. These conservative 
leaders believed in a less militant and more constitutional approach to the African 
217 
question. 
It was not until the 1940s that African political organizations in Kenya and South 
Africa began having a significant impact in the political process. This period witnessed 
the emergence and transformation of these organizations into mass movements. Both the 
KAU and the ANC, while advancing their positions, through constitutional channels, 
began organizing Africans into authentic mass political movements by raising national 
political consciousness and creating a sense of unity among the Africans already deeply 
divided along ethnic, class and racial lines. The KAU was the first serious attempt to 
form a national political party with nationalistic ambitions in Kenya, while in South 
Africa, the ANC resuscitated, adopting a clear programme for a common action, since it 
was through a strengthened organization that Africans could achieve their rights and 
establish harmonious coexistence with other races. Towards the late 1940s both 
organizations had in essence transformed themselves into mass movements. 
The 1950's witnessed liberation movements in Kenya and South Africa adopt 
radical and militant approaches against the colonial and apartheid state. While in Kenya, 
the radicalization and militancy of the KAU eventually led to the adoption of the armed 
struggle, in South Africa the ANC also stepped up its militancy by adopting extra-
constitutional strategies and tactics, such as mass actions, to achieve its desired 
objectives. In Kenya, the KAU became more militant and active following the party 
electoral victory of its militants at the party branch level in 1951 . Frustrated by the 
inability to achieve their objectives by constitutional means, the militant leaders of KAU 
began organizing the Mau Mau, which sought to remove the colonial order through 
armed struggle. However, following some acts of sabotage and the assassination of a 
colonial loyalist chief, 187 of its leaders were arrested and a state of emergency declared 
in 1952. Its top leaders were charged in what culminated in the famous Kapenguria Trial. 
KAU was proscribed in 1953. The armed struggle under Mau Mau began in 1952 and 
was to continue until 1954 when the colonial and British governments militarily defeated 
the movement. The Declaration of the Emergency led to the banning of formal African 
political parties between 1953 and 1955. As a result, trade unions were at the forefront of 
industrial conflict and political action. However, following the military defeat of the Mau 
Mau, the colonial government eased the ban on African political organizations, allowing 
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the formation of district based political associations in 1955. The Lancaster House 
Conference at London in 1960 opened a new chapter in African politics with the lifting of 
the ban on national African parties. Due to the basic divisions among African leaders, a 
shifting pattern of alliances ensured that eventually crystallized into the formation of two 
national African parties: the KANU and KADU. In South Africa, mass actions 
established that the liberation of the oppressed people in South Africa could only come 
about as a result of extra-constitutional struggle. The ANC's character was transformed; 
its leadership and membership turning it into a strong mass movement. Mass actions also 
stimulated the growth of militancy within other black organizations and transformed the 
nature of the struggle into a non-racial one. The adoption of the Freedom Charter also 
transformed the nature of the struggle in that it became the common programme 
enshrining the hopes and aspirations of all the progressive people of South Africa, 
because it prescribed the abolition of racial discrimination and the achievement of equal 
rights for all, calling on all who embraced freedom to participate in the making of a 
democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa. Subsequently, as in Kenya with KAU 
leaders and the Kapenguria Trial, 156 people constituting almost the entire executive of 
the ANC leadership and the Congress Alliance were arrested in 1956, and subsequently 
charged in what culminated as the famous Treason Trial. 
Though both countries had similar experiences lI1 their struggle against 
colonialism and apartheid they, nonetheless had differences as a result of the nature of 
white minority rule. In the case of Kenya, colonial authority resided in London, and thus 
the colonizer was located externally, whereas in South Africa, the colonizer shared the 
same country with the colonized making it a colonialism of a "special type." A major 
difference in both countries is apparent in the fact that the development of a political or 
ruling elite aimed at ensuring a smooth political transition took different trajectories. 
Prior to the end of colonial rule in Kenya, the British government began implementing a 
series of political and economic reforms aimed at producing a stable indigenous middle 
class that would eventually take over power in Kenya without much disrupting the status 
quo. The reforms included among other things, the unbanning of firstly district-based 
political parties and subsequently of African national political parties. The idea was 
supposed to produce "sensible and stable" persons who would work their way up from 
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the local level, gradually asswning greater responsibility in the affairs of the country at a 
pace controlled by the colonial authorities. The British Government also undertook 
counter-insurgency economic reform such as the Land Consolidation Programme the 
aims of which were to create a stable African landowning class with access to capital and 
income derived from the growth and sale of cash crops that had previously been the 
preserve of white farmers. The assumption was that this new rural-based middle class 
would have a modest influence on African politics. These measures were also aimed at 
ensuring that political power at the end of colonial rule did not fall into the hands of the 
Mau Mau and KANU radical militants, many of who were perceived to be radical 
socialists who would disrupt the status quo, particularly with regard to property rights. In 
contrast, the apartheid government in South Africa, did not institute any national political 
or economic reforms aimed at creating a national black bourgeoisie that would eventually 
take over power in a post -apartheid era, (even though there were attempts to develop a 
black leadership in the Bantustans and at the local level through local government in the 
early 1980s, just as some sectors of white business selectively encouraged black entry 
into previously forbidden territory) (Slovo, 1988:1-13). This fell short of success, since 
such black leaders were viewed as beneficiaries of apartheid by participating in the new 
apartheid institutions. Furthermore, the development of this local level black bourgeoisie, 
like the black leadership in the Bantustans or homelands, was not aimed at creating a 
national leadership, but primarily an ethnic leadership of black polities under the policies 
of separate development. 
Several factors can account for the apartheid ' s government unwillgness to 
develop an indigenous bourgeoisie. First and foremost, apartheid was a special type of 
colonialism, since both the colonizer and the colonized shared the same territory. The 
perpetuation and maintenance of white minority rule in South Africa, as in many other 
colonized countries, was based on the control and use of various social, economic and 
political resources by such a minority. To maintain white minority rule, resources were to 
be distributed on racial grow1ds under the policies of apartheid. Furthermore, the white 
settlers had become "natives" making the country their permanent home. To many whites 
therefore, particularly those in the NP, apartheid was here to stay, since it would ensure 
separate development for all races in the country. African nationalism was the antithesis 
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of Afrikaner nationalism as, for the apartheid government, the development of a national 
black leadership was never necessary since it initially did not visualize the formation of a 
black government in South Africa. The development of a black leadership in South 
Africa was largely as a result of the activities of local and international movements and 
organizations involved in the struggle against apartheid. Key among these were ANC 
leaders drawn from Robben Island, the UDF and exile traditions. 
The development of a stable and moderate political elite in Kenya by the colonial 
elite was also influenced by the nature of the struggle against colonialism in the post-Mau 
Mau period. Unlike South Africa, Kenya did not witness mass political mobilization or 
actions in the form of campaigns, demonstrations or strikes. The new political elite, 
unwilling to disrupt the status quo, became cautious and wary in their approach to the 
struggle. Emphasis on the struggle shifted from extra-constitutional means to 
constitutional means, as the new elite took up various positions in the Legislative Council 
and political parties and started making demands for the end of colonial rule through 
constitutional means. Following their failure to achieve meaningful change through the 
Legislative Council, these leaders began sending delegations to London to demand a 
constitutional conference. In the case of South Africa, the apartheid government, in spite 
of the tricarneral parliament, did not put such transitional mechanisms into place to the 
extent that the emergent and emerging political elite continued to rely on extra-
constitutional measures to achieve their desired objectives. From the late 1940s to the 
early 1990s the liberation struggle in South Africa continued to be characterized by mass 
political action consisting of, for example, mass campaigns, boycotts, strikes and 
demonstrations. Political socialization and mobilization through extra-constitutional 
means, created a culture of defiance among the black majority, the aim of which was to 
make the country ungovernable. Partly as a result of this defiant ungovernable culture, 
political violence coupled with crime continued through to the run up of the 1994 
elections. 
Another major difference in the trajectories that affected the pace of change in 
both countries was the location of the dominant liberation movements and their leaders. 
In Kenya, the dominant liberation movement, KANU, and its predecessors were located 
inside the country throughout the struggle, while in the case of South Africa, the 
221 
dominant liberation movement, the ANC was forced into exile, almost fifty years after its 
formation. As a result of its banning and subsequent adoption of the armed struggle, most 
of its key leadership was either imprisoned or forced into exile. This slowed the pace for 
change in South Africa, since the organization had to conduct its struggle largely from 
exile. Conditions in exile were to prove hostile to the ANC's operations, resulting in a 
relative decline in its operations during the 1970s and a resurgence following re-
organization in the mid-1980s (Barber, 1999: 204-205; Seekings, 1993 : 21; Mbeki, 
1996:69). The 1980s witnessed a resurgence of ANC or ANC-related activities in South 
Africa, such as the resumption of the armed struggle, mass action with organizations and 
movements such as COSATU, the UDF and latter the MDM. Unlike the South African 
experience, only a few of the key leaders of the liberation movement in Kenya were 
detained or went into exile. KANU and its predecessor's bases of operations were 
confined within the country 's borders, except for the occasional delegations sent to 
London to press for constitutional changes. Legal provisions aimed at ensuring a smooth 
transition largely facilitated it operations as an internal movement. 
6.1.2 The Armed Struggle: MAU MAU and Umkbonto we Sizwe 
Following similar development from elite organizations to mass organizations the 
mam liberation movements in Kenya and South Africa also underwent a similar 
experience of the armed struggle. The Mau Mau movement in Kenya was an offshoot of 
radical militants of the proscribed KCA and KAO. The militants had come to the 
conclusion that the armed struggle was inevitable and hence necessary, since the colonial 
government had repressed the limited constitutional means avai lable to Africans. 
Likewise, the MK in South Africa was an offshoot of radical militants of the ANC and its 
emergence was as a result of the banning of the ANC in 1960, following the Sharpeville 
massacre and subsequent demonstrations. Like the yOlUlg militant leaders of KCA and 
KAU, the young and militant leaders of the ANC, particularly those of the ANCYL, 
carne to the conclusion that the time was ripe for an armed struggle in South Africa as a 
result of the apartheid government' s repressive policies. MK was formed as a special 
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organisation; formally separate from the ANC, but in practice subordinate to its political 
leadership. 
Initially both guerrilla movements shared a similar organizational structure. The 
Mau Mau was initially directed by a Central Committee that administered oaths and 
coordinated the activities of local leaders in the reserves and townships. The Study 
Circle, which was composed of KAU and non-KAU members, some of the latter of 
whom were non-Africans, also advised the Mau Mau leaders. This advisory committee 
prepared background research on policy matters that the Central Committee might 
require. Initially, a War Council, primarily made up of civilians, was responsible for 
overall military planning, but as time passed, the military leaders became increasingly 
independent of the War COlmcil. This was replaced by the Kenya Defence Council 
(KDC), which became the Mau Mau's High Command. The military leaders decided that 
direct confrontations with the government forces would be avoided and attacks would be 
aimed at the weak points of the enemy. Areas of operation were assigned to divisions of 
the Land and Freedom Army. The structure ofMK on the other hand, mirrored that of the 
parent organisation. Tbe National High Command was at the top. Like the Study Circle, 
which initially advised the Mau Mau Central Committee, the MK High Command too 
opened its ranks to non-blacks. Below it were the Regional Commands in each of the 
provinces, and below that there were local commands and cells. Regional Commands 
were set up around the country. Like the KDC, the High Command determined the 
general targets and was in charge of training and finance. Within the framework laid 
down by the High Command, the Regional Commands had authority to select local 
targets to be attacked (see Appendices 2 and 9 military structures of the Mau Mau and 
MK respectively). Though in later years it engaged in guerrilla warfare, for MK sabotage 
was at the time the best option since this form of violence that inflicted the least harm 
against individuals. The strategy was to engage in acts of sabotage on carefully selected 
military installations, power plants, telephone lines and transportation links with the aim 
of hampering the military effectiveness of the state. 
Both guerrilla movements suffered the fate of having almost their entire 
leadership arrested, following crackdowns by the colonial and apartheid governments. 
The Mau Mau's political leaders such as lomo Kenyatta, Bildad Kaggia, and Paul Ngei , 
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among others were arrested prior to the declaration of Emergency. Whereas the political 
leaders were tried and imprisoned in remote maximum security detention camps in the 
Northern Frontier District, such as Lodwar, its military leaders, such as Kimathi were 
arrested, tried and some subsequently executed, culminating into the military defeat of 
the movement. Almost the entire leadership of MK, such as Nelson Mandela, Walter 
Sisulu and Govan Mbeki, were also arrested and tried during the Rivonia Trial and 
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment in maximum-security prisons such as that on 
Robben Island. This almost completely destroyed the underground movement. 
Nonetheless, MK operations resumed, though sporadically, in the late 1960's, 1970s and 
1980s. Although the Mau Mau and MK did not militarily defeat the colonial and 
apartheid governments respectively, they still had a significant impact, which led to these 
minority governments instituting certain counter-insurgency socio-economic and political 
reforms aimed at weakening the social diversities that such movements controlled. 
The guerrilla movements in both countries too had their differences. The socio-
economic composition of the Mau Mau was different compared to that of MK. The Mau 
Mau largely consisted of dispossesed, desperate and impoverished squatters, peasants, 
and ex-soldiers who had fought in the Second World War, and the unemployed in the 
urban and rural areas of the White Highlands, mainly drawn from the GEMA 
communities. Its political leaders were mainly drawn from the proscribed KAU while its 
military leaders were mainly former soldiers who had served in the Second World War. 
MK consisted of urban workers and a high number of students and school leavers 
following the Soweto crisis of 1976. MK cadres, like the ANC, were mostly urban people 
due to increasing urbanization in South Africa. MK also drew support from the 
intelligentsia (Shubin, 2002). Unlike the Mau Mau, which was by and large a peasant 
movement, MK was an urban movement comprising urban dwellers. Whereas the Mau 
Mau was perceived along ethnic lines, the MK attracted membership on a national basis. 
The armed struggle against colonialism in Kenya was therefore largely perceived as an 
ethnic undertaking. In contrast, the armed struggle against apartheid in South Africa is 
viewed as a national liberation movement. 
The physical and financial conditions upon which the movements operated were 
also different. The Mau Mau was an internal movement operating mainly in the White 
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Highlands and surrounding areas. The forested areas where its soldiers were based 
provided the appropriate terrain for guerrilla warfare. It operated with no external 
financial and military support. Military training was conducted locally and weapons had 
to be obtained mainly through robbery, as well as being manufactured locally. Its limited 
financial support was drawn largely from money contributed by peasants. For example in 
1954, the movement's income was Kshs 6,637.66 of which Kshs 5,309 were 
contributions from peasants (Kinyatti, 1987: 115-116). MK, on the other hand was an 
external movement whose operations were based inside the country. It operated under 
difficult geographical conditions since the telTain was inappropriate for guelTilla warfare. 
Military training was conducted externally, mainly in other African countries, Eastern 
Europe, and the Soviet Union. Through the ANC, it also relied heavily for financial and 
humanitarian support on the Soviet Union, the Nordic cOlmtries, the Organization of 
African Unity Liberation Committee, the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA), and the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (SAASC), among others. 
Limited financial support continued to decline steadily in the case of some of these 
organizations while from others it increased. For example, whereas in the early 1960s, the 
ANC received £ 35 000 from the OAU Liberation Committee, in 1974 this had been 
reduced to £ II 000 (Shubin, 1999: 68 & 109). In the case of Norway, financial 
assistance to the ANC in 1977 was NOK 2 million and by 1986 this had risen to NOK 37 
million. During the same year, the ANC received SEK 57 million from Sweden (Reddy, 
1987: 1-8). By the mid-1980s, the ANC was reportedly receiving some US$ 24 million 
per annum in kind from the Soviet Union (Southall and Wood, 1998: 211). In December 
1990, the ANC's income comprised 86 per cent grants, 5.3 per cent membership fees, 3.8 
per cent other income, 3.7 per cent donations and 0.5 per cent sales. Thus, out ofa total 
ofR 11,341,598, R 9, 824, 569 came from grants, R 598, 420 from membership fees , R 
422, 307 from donations, R 240, 089 from other income, R191, 799 from interest and R 
64, 414 from sales. Sweden contributed a total of SEK 120 million through the SIDA for 
1991192. The Finnish Government allocated FIM 7 million to the ANC for 1991, while 
the Australian Government allocated A$ 15 million for the period 1990-1993 (Rantete, 
1998: 23-24). Most of the funding channeled through the ANC was external. Funding 
from domestic sources was very minimal (Shubin, 2002). 
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6.1.3 Constitutional Negotiations and Advance to Power 
The unbanning of African political parties and organizations in Kenya and South 
Africa in 1960 and 1990 respectively, led to the formation of new political parties, as 
well as a return to overt political activities by the existing political parties and 
organizations. As part of democratization, the early 1960s witnessed a series of multi-
party constitutional conferences held in the United Kingdom to map out the new 
constitutional order and future for Kenya. The early 1990s also witnessed a series of talks 
and multi-party constitutional talks held in South Africa to drawn up a new non-racial 
and non-sexist constitution and future for South Africa. In both situations, the dominant 
liberation movements, KANU and the ANC, played leading roles in these constitutional 
talks, subsequently emerging as the dominant actors and beneficiaries. 
Serious political reforms aimed at the transfer of political power from white 
minority rule to an African majority, were first discussed during the Constitutional 
Conferences held in the United Kingdom. These included among others, the unbanning of 
national African political parties, a programme for political independence, and 
agreements on the framework of a new Kenya Constitution. As a party, KANU had the 
highest number of participants. Throughout the sessions, KANU reassured the 
participants of its commitment to a successful outcome. It also emphasized that its 
constitutional proposals were intended to provide for constitutional guarantees that would 
uphold democracy in a united Kenya. However, the entire process was nearly marred by 
KADU insistence on regionalism as a necessary precondition for settlement. The multi-
party Working Party formed under the request of the Colonial Secretary of State to 
resolved some of these disagreements through negotiated compromises and settlements, 
finally agreed at the Conference that both patties KANU and KADU form a coalition 
government to pave the way for fresh elections under the new Constitution. The coalition 
government remained in power until May 31, 1963, when Kenya gained internal self-rule 
status with Kenyatta as Prime Minister. 
In South Africa, although informal talks about talks between ANC leaders and the 
apartheid government began in the mid 19805, formal talks only began in the early 1990s, 
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following the tmbanning of the ANC. The process was constantly marked and marred by 
a high level of political violence and disagreements among key political actors, which led 
to the suspension of negotiations from time to time. Despite the continued violence in 
1990, two significant Minutes were signed between the ANC and the Goverrmlent as 
result of these talks. These were the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes of 2 May and 6 
August 1990 respectively. A Working Group was also established under the Pretoria 
Minute, to resolve outstanding questions arising out of the decision to suspend armed 
action and related activities. This Group later produced the DF Malan Document. During 
this period, both parties agreed on a common commitment to conflict resolution, as well 
as a commitment to stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations. Political violence, 
largely between the ANC and the IFP supporters continued in the townships in 1991. 
Attempts by both sides to end the violence did not succeed, forcing the ANC to pull out 
of the constitutional talks in May 1991. On 14 September, a National Peace Accord was 
signed between the government, the ANC, the IFP and several other socio-political 
forces , pledging their commitment to peace and paving the way for the CODES A. The 
first CODESA meeting in December 1991 witnessed the signing of Declaration ofIntent. 
Throughout the first part of 1992, delegates met every weekly in a committee-based 
negotiating process. However, like in Kenya's constitutional conferences of the early 
1960s, the CODESA talks in South Africa were also marred, when the NP began making 
unrealistic demands, such as an acceptable majority for binding decisions with regard to 
constitutional matters. Consequently the CODESA talks collapsed in mid-May. As with 
KADU, the NP was demanding ce11ain constitutional provisions such as a power-sharing 
veto for the white minority, forcing the ANC to withdraw. Furthermore, the ANC 
constituency was becoming increasingly intolerant of the negotiations and the NP 
government due to the latter's fai lure to prevent political violence in the country. 
The political situation in the country deteriorated in the following months. The 
ANC, SACP and COSA TU Alliance suspended the negotiations with the regime of 
President De Klerk in June 1992, over the government' s involvement in violence against 
township residents forcing, the ANC to walk out of the CODESA negotiations. However, 
bilateral talks between the ANC and the government resumed in September 1992 leading 
to the signing of the Record of Understanding, which resolved some of the issues that had 
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prevented the continuation of negotiations. Consequently negotiations and multiparty 
talks resumed. This bilateral agreement heralded a period during which the ANC and the 
NP sought political solutions together. The Record of Understanding failed to recognize 
the interests of the IFP and as a result, the IFP formed a right wing alliance, COSAG, 
with the white right and two homeland governments. MUlti-party negotiations resumed in 
March 1993 and this time participants represented much of the South Africa's political 
spectrum. By June 1993, political parties were discussing the idea of establishing a two-
phased transitional process that would firstly, install a Transitional Executive Council and 
secondly elect a constitution-making body to draft an interim constitution. The tentative 
date for South Africa's first non-racial elections set for 27 April 1994 was ratified by a 
multi-party meeting in July 1993. This meeting also passed several transitional bills, 
which allowed for the drafting of an interim constitution and the conducting of the first 
democratic non-racial election. After three years of negotiations, an agreement on an 
interim constitution was agreed upon and passed in Parliament in December 1993. 
The democratic initiatives during Kenya and South Africa's constitutional 
negotiations were apparently taken by KANU and the ANC respectively. Not only did 
KANU present comprehensive and detailed views on a constitution that would enhance 
democracy, but it also accepted compromises through a series of negotiations and 
settlements. KAND, from the outset, had pointed out that it would be flexible during the 
proceedings of the Conference. The party also agreed to form a coalition government 
with the minority party KADU. Its leaders were arguably, more charismatic and more 
skilful negotiators than those of KADU. It was apparently that KANU was out to ensure 
that there was a smooth and stable transition process towards independence, rather than 
risk national disintegration, since it was sure of winning elections and forming 
government. Likewise, the ANC agreed to compromises on realising that it was not yet a 
victor in the liberation struggle and had limited bargaining power as it was negotiating 
with an enemy that it had not defeated, and therefore certain concessions were necessary 
in order to win a negotiated agreement. The resolution to choose a GNU and power-
sharing for South Africa's first years of democracy was, therefore a political necessity, 
for the ANC in its pursuit and consolidation of political power. Furthermore in pursuit of 
its goal of creating a non-racial and non-sexist democratic society, it was necessary for 
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the ANC to institute a policy of national unity and reconciliation. The ANC leadership 
was not willing to risk national disintegration. 
Though there were similarities with regards to constitutional processes and the 
advance to power in both countries, there were also differences. In the first instance, there 
were no infonnal or formal talks about talks of South Africa' s nature within any existing 
legislative and extra legislative process in Kenya. Constitutional negotiations to end 
white minority rule were basically carried out during the Lancaster House Constitutional 
Conferences in the early 1960s. In South Africa, informal talks about talks began 
between Mandela and the govenunent in the mid-1980s and between the ANC and white 
business outside South Africa more at the same time. This put the ANC at a disadvantage 
with regard to negotiations, since it was a banned organization negotiating with the 
oppressor. Secondly, other than the first Kenya Constitutional Conference of 1960, which 
did not allow for the participation of African national parties, since they had not yet been 
fomled, the following Conferences saw the participation of a cross-section of African 
political parties. In other words, the constitutional-making process began with the 
participation of a cross-section of various political interests representing Kenya. In South 
Africa's case, initially the negotiators were primarily the ANC and the NP, thus 
excluding diverse political representation from the process. The constitution-making 
process involved constitutional conferences in the case of Kenya, while the process in 
South Africa involved talks, agreements and conferences, resulting in the production of 
various arrangements for the latter, ranging from the Groote Schuur Minute to those of 
the Transitional Arrangements that culminated in the introduction of the Interim 
Constitution of 1993. Though the process took about three years in both countries, the 
South African situation was characterized by several different and more complicated 
procedures. The constitution-making process and advance to power by KANU in Kenya 
was marked by less political violence and fewer disagreements among the key political 
actors, as compared to South Africa. The South African process was accompanied by the 
deaths of thousands of people as a result of political violence, particularly between the 
IFP and ANC supporters. The constitutional process was also marred by many political 
disagreements amongst the various political actors in the country. Political violence of 
this magnitude did not occur in Kenya. KANU therefore inherited a society that was 
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more governable compared to that of South Africa, where the ANC had called for civil 
disobedience in the mid- I 980s. 
6.2 The Emergence and Consolidation of Party Dominance in Kenya and South 
Africa in the 1990s. 
The emergence and consolidation of patty dominance under KANU in Kenya and 
under the ANC in South Africa in the post-I 990 period is characterised by a number 
similarities and differences. In both countries, the ruling parties strive to enhance their 
dominant positions in the patty system and political process by seeking to strengthen 
their electoral, parliamentary, governmental and bargaining dominance. This section 
compares and contrasts KANU's and the ANC's tactics of enhancing party dominance in 
the political process. 
6.2.1 Party Dominance and the Legislative Process 
KANU and the ANC have in the post-I 990 period achieved legislative dominance 
through the electoral and parliamentary processes in Kenya and South Africa 
respectively. The post-1990 multi-party elections in both countries have seen both parties 
win with parliamentary majorities in successive elections. Though KANU has won its 
majority of parlianlentary seats with an electoral plurality with regard to the percentage 
of votes cast, the ANC has won its majority of seats with an electoral majority in the 
percentage of total number of votes cast. 
In each country, two successive multi-party elections have been conducted in the 
post-1990 period. Whereas Kenya conducted her elections in 1992 and 1997, South 
Africa conducted her non-racial mUlti-party elections in 1994 and 1999. In both elections, 
KANU won more than 50 percent of the parliamentary seats in Kenya, while the ANC 
won more than 60 per cent. KANU won its seats by obtaining an electoral plurality of 36 
and 40 per cent of the total number of votes cast in the 1992 and 1997 elections 
respectively. The ANC on the other hand obtained an electoral majority of 62.7 and 66.36 
per cent of the total number of votes cast respectively (see Table 6.0). 
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Table 6.0 National Assembly Election Results of the Post-1990 Period in Kenya and 
South Africa 
KENYA SOUTH AFRICA 
1992 1997 1994 1999 
Party Seats % Seats % Party % Seats % Seats 
Seats Seats Votes Votes 
KANU 100 53 107 51 ANC 62.70 252 66.36 266 
DP 23 12 39 21 DP 1.73 7 9.55 38 
NDP - - 21 10 IFP 10.54 43 8.59 34 
FORD-K 31 16 17 8 NNP 20.39 82 6.87 28 
SDP - - 15 7 UDM - - 3.42 14 
Safina 
-
- 5 2 ACDP 0.45 2 1.43 6 
FORD-P - - 3 I UCDP - - 0.78 3 
FORD-A 31 16 1 - PAC 1.25 5 0.71 3 
KSC 1 I I - FF 2.17 9 0.80 3 
KNC I I - - FA - - 0.54 2 
PICK 1 I - - MF - - 0.30 I 
Shirikisho - 1 - AEB - - 0.29 1 
AZAPO - - 0.17 1 
Total 188 100 210 100 99.23 400 99.1 400 
The post-1990 electoral outcomes are due to a number of factors in both 
cOlmtries. In both countries, historical events play a key role. Both parties were the 
dominant liberation movements in the struggle against white minority rule, controlling 
diverse social forces engaged in the liberation struggle. Furthermore, in the case of 
KANU, the party had become institutionalized in the political process as a powerful 
instrument due to its long-term rule as a single party. KANU ruled Kenya as a single 
party for more than twenty years managing to control key socio-political and economic 
forces in the country. The nature of the electoral system, arguably, also played a key 
factor. Kenya and South Africa do not share a similar electoral system. Kenya's electoral 
system is that of FPTP with single member geographical constituencies and has been 
subjected to gerrymandering in favour of the ruling party. This helps explain why 
KANU, wins with a majority of seats but with a plurality of votes. In South Africa, it is 
the list PR system where the country forms a single electoral district. This electoral 
system is less subject to a process of gerrymandering. The fact that political parties were 
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identified with certain racial aspirations may explain the ANC ' s electoral majority in an 
electoral system that rarely produces such a majority. The list PR system in South Africa 
does not allow an MP to claim a particular geographical constituency as his or her focus 
of representation. In other words, whereas the parliamentary seat in Kenya belongs to an 
individual, a parliamentary seat in South Africa belongs to the party. Both countries do, 
however, have anti-defection clauses enshrined in their constitutions that serve to protect 
parties in parliament. These are outlined in Section 40 and 43 (b) of the constitutions of 
Kenya and South Africa respectively. These anti-defection clauses have helped KANU 
and the ANC maintain their electoral majority in parliament, by preventing their MPs 
from defecting to other parties. 
KANU's and the ANC's dominance in the legislative process is also a function of 
their control and influence upon the day-to-day operations, proceedings and workings of 
their countries ' parliaments. By virtue of their majority of seats, both parties have to a 
large extent managed to control and influence the main axes of power in parliament. In 
both countries, members of the respective ruling parties occupy the key post of speaker. 
In Kenya, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Moses ole Kaparo, is a member of 
KANU, whereas in South Africa, the Speaker, Frene Ginwala, is a member of the ANC. 
Other than this key post, in both cOlmtries, KANU and the ANC control and influence the 
parliamentary committee systems. In Kenya the parliamentary committee system is 
ineffective due to party dominance and the institutional weaknesses of the Parliament. 
Kenya's Parliament, even in the multi-party era is severely limited in terms of its 
constitutional framework and institutional and financial independence, making it easy for 
KANU to exert its control and influence over the Parliament. Many of the parliamentary 
committees were destroyed in 1980 after they were accused of trying to usurp the powers 
of the Executive. Others are not operational since they have been subdued, paralyzed and 
often ignored by the executive. Such committees al so occasionally lack the finances to 
enable them to perform their duties effectively. Compared to Kenya, the parliamentary 
committee system is an important mechanism for holding govemment accountable and 
safeguarding democracy in South Africa. It is one important mechanism whereby MPs 
keep an eye on and monitor the work of the executive, since committees can summon 
Ministers and public service officials to account for their work to a parliamentary 
232 
committee. Despite the fact that they are more effective than those of Kenya, they, too, 
have served to enhance ANC dominance by strengthening the executive, since many 
ANC MPs are hesitant to use their influence and power to critically evaluate the 
performance of the executive, due mostly to fear of political harassment or party 
discipline. At 15, the number of parliamentary committees in Kenya's National Assembly 
is small compared to the 50 in South Africa. 
Party dominance in the legislative process is also being enhanced through changes 
made to the constitution. As majority parties, KANU and the ANC are in a position to 
influence the constitution-making processes in their respective countries. This was 
evident in the re-making of the constitution wlder the CA in the mid-1990s in South 
Africa and the constitution reform process in late 1997 during the IPPG talks in Kenya. In 
both exercises, the respective ruling parties had an upper hand. The exercise in South 
Africa saw the final Constitution of 1996 re-made largely in favour of enhancing the 
dominance of the ANC in the political process. This was to a large extent due to the high 
number of ANC members in the CA compared to the rest of the parties in parliament. 
Many of the resolutions made and passed, particularly those enhancing democratic 
centralism, reflected the political objectives of the ANC. In the case of Kenya the 
minimal constitutional reform exercise under the IPPG in late 1997 also reflected the 
political objectives and interests of the ruling party, KANU. The minimal constitutional 
refonns adopted served to pave the way for KANU's electoral victory and legitimacy in 
the multi-party elections held at the end of that year. As in the case of South Africa, this 
was largely due to the fact that the membership of the IPPG technical committees aimed 
at working out refoTIn proposals was weighted in favour of KANU. The South African 
exercise was broad-based, comprising more than 400 representatives drawn from seven 
political parties compared to only 55 persons drawn from five parties in the case of 
Kenya. The constitutional reform exercise in Kenya took only three months compared to 
the more comprehensive South African process that took two years. 
Although both parties enjoy parliamentary dominance in terms of their majority 
of seats as well as their control of the daily workings and proceedings of parliament, 
neither KANU nor the ANC take advantage of this majority to utilise question time. 
Mostly, it is the opposition parties that pose questions and interpellations, getting a 
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chance to challenge or dispute the ruling parties policies, with the objective of holding 
the executives accountable. KANU's and the ANC's infrequent questions can be 
attributed to aforementioned historical, administrative, technical and political factors 
facing both parties, which impact upon their roles in parliament in a detrimental way. The 
rarity of questions and or inability to dominate question time can be healthy for 
democracy in a dominant party system in that where the opposition parties are vibrant, it 
gives them more opportunities to challenge the dominant parties policies and hold their 
executives accountable in both countries. 
6.2.2 Party Dominance and the Executive 
KANU and the ANC seek to dominate governmentally in Kenya and South Africa 
respectively. Both parties argue that they have a historical agenda to achieve and this can 
only be realized if they dominate the polities governmentally. KANU claims that its 
historical and national agenda, despite the fact that it has been in power for over thirty 
years both as a single and dominant party, is among others, to "promote national 
consciousness" and to "serve as the vigorous conscious political vanguard for removing 
tribal, racial , social and economic discrimination and exploitation, and all other forms of 
oppression" (KANU, 2001 : I) . The ANC' s historical agenda is to "transform South Africa 
as rapidly as possible into a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic country" 
CANC, 1997). Their similar agendas aimed at creating national unity and a sense of 
nationalism, stem from the fact that both parties were initially the dominant liberation 
movements struggling against minority rule in Kenya and South Africa. 
In the case of Kenya, though KANU claims the use of the necessary state 
machinery to achieve its agenda, in reality the party is exerting its control and influence 
over the government to enhance its dominance in a bid to pursue parochial interests. 
Unlike the ANC, which is a mass party, KANU has gradually begun degenerating into a 
sectional party whose interests are primarily to maintain political power as opposed to 
implementing its original agenda of achieving national unity or a sense of nationalism, as 
espoused in its name. KANU no longer represents the aspirations of the majority as it did 
during the 1960s. It represents sectional elite interests under the guise of minority 
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interests. While the party sought to transform the state and society, in particular the civil 
service, through Africanization as expressed in the government's Sessional Paper 
Number 10 of 1965 during the 1960s, the party now uses the state and its apparatuses, 
like the civil service and public institutions for patronage purposes, as well as to 
delegitimise the opposition. For example, in the post-1990 multi-party period, the party 
chairman repeatedly called upon public servants to shun opposition parties arguing that 
the public service ought to show its allegiance to the ruling party. In other words KANU 
insists that government and party are the same and as such the former should be partisan. 
KANU officials in the government continue to use the state, its apparatuses and resources 
for party purposes. No formal rules or codes of conduct or legislation exist that delineate 
the boundaries between the ruling party and the state. No informal rules or customs exist 
which that what is not in permissible. 
The ANC on the other hand, is also trying to exert its control and influence over 
the state and society by controlling the state and its apparatuses in a bid to transform 
society. Unlike KANU, the ANC's process is more transparent. The ANC openly 
acknowledges that in order for it to implement and achieve its agenda of transforming 
society, it must first of all transform the state. For the ANC, apartheid and its structures 
were immoral and therefore for moral reasons as well, they have to be transformed. 
Unlike KANU, the ANC argues that political power is not pursued for its own sake, but 
to pursue given political and socio-economic objectives. This requires controlling the 
state and all its levers of power, which includes public service transformation. The 
process is party political. Transformation is partly being implemented via affirmative 
action programmes to reflect representivity. Though the focus of this section is the post-
1990 period, KANU also embarked on a similar programme of transforming the civil 
service in the 1960s in a bid to reflect representivity. This was carried out via 
Africanization programmes. While the target group of KANU's programme was Africans 
(read blacks), the ANC's target group has been much broader as it also incorporates 
Asians and Coloured, who were also previously disadvantaged. KANU's Africanization 
programme of the 1960s entailed the appointment of persons to senior position in 
government on the basis of ethnic and political party loyalty. The ANC's transfonnation 
progranune also entails in part, the appointment of party members and loyalists to senior 
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positions of government. Hence for the ANC too, there is little difference between party 
and government indicating its progress towards governmental dominance. Though in the 
ANC's case, there are political and moral reasons for doing so, both parties nonetheless 
smudge the distinction between party and government in as much as both polities are 
based on the concept of a separation of powers. However, while KANU does not have a 
clearly laid down programme of achieving its agenda, the ANC's prograrnme is outlined 
in its various discussion and policy papers, which acknowledge that it is only through a 
controlled state that the party can achieve its objectives. KANU was quick to point out 
that Africanization should not be in contradiction of constitutional provisions that 
guarantee equal treatment for all citizens, while the ANC points out that transformation 
should not be in contradiction of the provisions of the constitution, which characterize 
institutions of the state as independent and non-partisan. 
Transformation of the state and public service in effect has enhanced KANU's 
and the ANC's dominance, since political power resides in the state and its organs in both 
countries. Political parties per se do not wield much political power and as such both 
parties have decided to control and influence all spheres of government, which has 
involved the capturing and transforming all spheres of government to gain effective 
dominance. While, Kenya can be described as a unitary state, it is nonetheless divided 
into eight administrative provinces that constitute the national government. South Africa 
on the other hand can be described as a quasi-federal state. The Government is 
constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government, which are distinctive, 
interdependent and interrelated. In both countries, the ruling parties continue to impose 
politico-administrative and financial control upon the provinces with the aim of not only 
controlling state stmctures, but also diverse social, economic and political forces across 
the polity. KANU controls the administrative provinces primarily through the provincial 
administration. The ANC is also attempting to expand and increase its dominance by 
imposing political and financial controls upon the provinces, particularly the provincial 
governments. To this end the party is making use of constitutional provisions, 
goverrunent policies, and party political procedures. 
In Kenya, the provincial administration system is normally used to monitor, 
control or regulate social, economic and political activities in the provinces. It serves as a 
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control link between the political centre and the people at the periphery. Provincial and 
district commissioners are appointed by the President normally on the basis of party and 
lor ethnic loyalty and as such are answerable to him. President Moi exercises sweeping 
powers over the political structure at the provincial, district and local level, through such 
members of the provincial administration. These administrators obtain their authoritarian 
politico-administrative powers by virtue of various Acts of Parliament. In South Africa, 
control of the provinces is first and foremost compounded by constitutional provisions, 
which give the national government powers to monitor the affairs of the provinces. The 
Constitution provides for direct national monitoring of provincial affairs under prescribed 
conditions, for the sake of national interests. Financial control of the provinces by 
national government is also a direct manifestation of constitutional provisions. With such 
constitutional provisions, the ANC 's electoral victories both at the national and provincial 
levels in the 1994 and 1999 elections strengthened the party's political and governmental 
position at the provincial level. While this has increased its political power, it has at the 
same time weakened the institutional capacity of the provinces to deliver services. This 
has further been compounded by the lack of clear-cut government policies on the 
relationship between national and provincial governments that have left the latter faced 
with numerous administrative and financial problems. The politico-administrative 
problems facing the provinces have been acknowledged and highlighted in various 
government documents. The Provincial Review Report, for example, pointed out that 
politico-administrative problems facing many departments in the provincial governments 
were a result of political interference, particularly from the MECs. Public servants at the 
provincial level have also become party political partisan. At the provincial level , the 
ANC is also fudging the distinction between the party and the government. Many of the 
ANC MECs run departments on the basis of personal rule. Consequently political 
patronage appointees, in these departments owe their allegiance or loyalty directly to 
MECs, thus weakening the administrative and decision-making process. To this extent, 
the ANC is enhancing its dominance. Whereas in Kenya there is often a conflict of 
interests between the provincial administration and elected MPs or party officials, at the 
provincial or district level , in the case of South Africa, the conflict is between politicians 
from the provincial legislatures and public servants in provincial departments. This 
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makes it easier for MECs to manipulate public servants at the provincial level, compared 
to Kenya where politicians are to a large extent are unable to directly interfere with 
public servants at the provincial level , since the latter are answerable to the parent 
Ministry and not to politicians. 
The provinces also lack complete autonomy smce policies affecting them are 
normally formulated at the national level. Many new policies are decided upon at the 
national level without due consideration to the organizational, financial and service 
delivery implications the in provinces. Furthermore, strict financial controls upon the 
provinces, due to the government's adoption of neo-liberal financial policies, are severely 
inhibiting their operational autonomy. This financial control of the provinces is an 
integral part of the ANC's political programme to achieve its desired political objectives. 
The ANC's move towards centralization and the consolidation of political power and 
dominance is evident in its bid to contain provincial autonomy within the party. To curb 
provincial power struggles within the provinces, the party is appointing, through practices 
such as redeployment, premiers who are considered to be loyal and will thus toe the party 
line (Khosa, 1998: 123-126; Southall, 1998 :451-453). 
The transformation of the state and its apparatuses has not only enhanced 
KANU's and the ANC's dominance in the executive, it has also helped both parties 
achieve dominance in the electoral process by using such state instruments. A case in 
point is the use of the state-owned electronic media to achieve electoral dominance. The 
media is one powerful instrument through which political paJ.1ies influence and change 
the political agenda of a country in order to achieve their political objectives. This has 
been the case in Kenya and South Africa. While KANU has tended to use the state-
owned KBC for electoral purposes, the ANC has used the SABC for such purposes. 
KANU utilizes the KBC as a political instrument for disinformation, mobilization, 
socialization and electoral purposes. Media monitoring exercises in the run-up to the 
1997 elections pointed out that KANU received considerably more coverage than the 
opposition in terms of both the allocated time and general news coverage, and in a 
consistently more favourable way. The KBC also did not distinguish between the 
activities of the government officials and the party, KANU, during campaigns. Coverage 
given to the President and cabinet ministers as government officials, during this election 
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period proved largely beneficial to their campaigns. Similarly in South Africa, the ANC 
has been accused of using the media, particularly the state-owned electronic media, to 
enhance its dominant position, especially during election periods. By doing so, it 
negatively impacted upon the elections and the electoral process. During the 1999 
election period for example, the SABC was accused of biased coverage in favour of the 
ANC. Media monitoring groups indicated that the ANC received more coverage than any 
other party. Towards the end of the campaign the only party to receive coverage on the 
SABC was the ANC. The DP, the ANC's most vocal opposition party, tended to suffer 
from under-reportage on the SABC radio and television stations and coverage of this 
party toward the election day was much more critical than it had been at the beginning of 
the campaign. Some commentators have attributed this to a series of staff changes at the 
SABC in early 1999 that effectively placed journalists with strong ANC connections in 
charge of the news (Lodge, 1999b: 202-204). By controlling, influencing and 
subsequently weakening such state institutions that are supposed to be non-partisan, both 
KANU and the ANC are undermining the very same institutions that are supposed to 
promote and safeguard democracy. 
6.2.3 Party Dominance and Civil Society 
Party dominance, as argued in chapter one, is not only conceived of within the 
nan·ow scope of dominating the state, but also within a broader context of the dominant 
party' s relationship with the wider society, namely civil society. The question of party 
dominance and civil society in Kenya provides a very interesting scenario in that KANU 
and the ANC share a similar objective of enhancing party dominance, but their 
trajectories towards achieving this with regard to civil society differed significantly in tl1e 
1990s. On the one hand, the ANC sought to achieve dominance and control over the 
wider society using specific arrangements such as consociationalism and corporatism; 
KANU, on the other hand, made no such formal arrangements. The ruling party has only 
made some half-hearted attempts at holding infonnal talks with some groups of 
individuals in civil society. This is due to its authoritarian nature compared to the pro-
democracy nature of civil society. Its relationship with civil society has been to a large 
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extent antagonistic. Its measures for controlling civil society have largely been repressive 
Following the repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution, there was a resurgence of 
vibrant civil society organizations in Kenya. These were actively involved in and 
continue to be actively involved in the democratization process in Kenya. Many of these 
were professional and religious organizations based mainly in urban areas that took up 
the political and development space created by political liberalization and consequently 
the end of political monolithism. Civil society organizations have taken on the role of an 
extra-parliamentary opposition in providing some degree of accountability and 
transparency in the democratization and political process. Due to political liberalization 
and pluralism, KANU now finds it increasingly difficult to control and influence such 
organizations through coercion and repression. Instead it has with little success, made 
attempts at controlling and influencing certain groups and organizations of civil society, 
using elites, through negotiated settlements. In contrast, the ANC's relationship with civil 
society, in its attempts to establish party dominance, is best viewed within the context of 
consociational and corporatist alTangements. The stable transition to democracy in South 
Africa has partly been sustained by these two institutional anangements. The ANC's 
approach to party-civil society relations has been one of constructive engagement rather 
than destructive disengagement. The ANC has attempts to establish a harmonious 
relationship based on mutual cooperation and co-existence. 
The role of civil society in democratization has become increasingly significant in 
the post-1992 period in Kenya. Several civil society organizations began calling for the 
establislunent and tl1e implementation of meaningful constitutional reforms aimed at 
facilitating free and fair elections prior to the 1997 general elections. Despite its 
significant role in the democratization process, KANU has sidelined civil society through 
a series of elite pacts with some opposition parties thereby derailing the democratization 
process and diffusing rising political tensions. The IPPG members sidelined civil 
society'S attempts to call for the implementation of more radical changes, rendering it, to 
a large extent, functionally ineffective in the process. By doing so, it ensured that the 
constitutional and democratization processes became a privilege of the elite and not a 
people-driven process. The ruling party also made some attempts to co-opt sectors of 
civil society through informal negotiated settlements. These were a series of inter-ethnic 
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talks organized by the political elite drawn from various ethnic communities in order to 
establish inter-ethnic political settlements among ethnic groups considered dominant in a 
democratic setting. The ruling party has met with little success in curbing civil society in 
the post-1992 democratization process. However, it has managed to dominate the party 
and political process to the extent that no radical changes have taken place as a direct 
consequence of civil society action. To this extent, one can argue that, as a result of the 
ruling party's authoritarian posture towards civil society, KANU has rendered the latter 
functionally ineffective in the democratization process. 
In South Africa, consociationalism as a power-sharing arrangement among key 
socio-political actors in society has enhanced the dominance of the ANC in the political 
process. By agreeing to form a GNU as prescribed by tlle interim constitution of 1993, on 
the basis of political prudence rather than political will, the ANC also ensured that while 
the key actors in the political process were part of government, it would dominate on the 
basis of representation. Furthermore the political elite of the ANC was not willing to risk 
political disorder at the expense of excluding such key actors with powerful 
constituencies that might pose a potential threat. The GNU legitimized the ANC's 
governing status, as it was an inclusive process unlike apartheid, which was an exclusive 
process. In other words, all major socio-political and economic forces represented by the 
ANC, NP and IFP on the basis of proportionality felt themselves to be part of 
government. The acceptance and incorporation of eleven different languages as official 
languages in the constitution, as well as their acceptance for use in official governmental 
or parliamentary matters also instilled a sense of group autonomy amongst all the major 
socio-cultural groups in the country. The recognition of diverse cultural interests in any 
polity is healthy for democracy since it is also recognition of third generation rights, 
normally associated with communities or community issues, particularly minorities. The 
continued inclusion of the IFP as a junior power in government is also healthy for 
democracy in that it continues to reflect the ANC's call for national wlity and 
reconciliation and it has also helped to reduce the political violence that occurred in the 
early 1990s between supporters of the two parties. 
Unlike South Africa, the ruling party in Kenya did not attempt to make any 
fo rmal or informal consociational or even quasi-consociational arrangements prior to or 
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after the 1992 mUltiparty elections. Though the pmiy did fonn a short-lived coalition 
government with KADU to pave the way for fresh elections under the new constitution in 
the early 1960s, the party made no attempts to do so in 1992. KANU made no serious 
attempts at forming a GNU, despite repeated calls to do so from opposition pmies and 
civil society organizations. The pmy claimed that coalitions tend to enhance disunity 
rather than national unity. As claimed by its pmy chairman, Moi, "only unity, 
cohesiveness m1d nationalism can give coalition meaning and not the other way round. 
Coalition does not necessarily lead to unity, nationalism or cohesiveness. In fact, it is 
possible for a coalition to lead to divisiveness" (Moi, 1997:8). Like other civil society 
organizations, the party's relationship with key opposition parties has been antagonistic. 
KANU bargains with other political pmies and organizations only when there is a 
looming political crisis it wants to diffuse. The ruling pmy has also refused to recognize 
group autonomy and the question of proportional representation in government, under 
consociational arrangements. Pacts with other political parties or groups in society are 
temporary. In short, Kenya has not yet been a consociational democracy and thus 
consociationalism, unlike South Africa, has in no way enl1anced KANU's dominance in 
the pmy or political system. 
The ANC has also taken up corporatism as a route to enl1ancing its bargaining 
dominance with key social and economic actors. Corporatism safeguards democracy and 
political stability, since it ensures that all the major actors in the social, economic and 
political system advance ll11d safeguard their interests. Corporatism in South Africa has 
largely mll11ifested itself in the establishment of NEDLAC while quasi-corporatism 
mll11ifests itself in the formation of the Tripmite Allill11ce. Both corporatism ll11d quasi-
corporatism in post-apartheid South Africa have, arguably, to a large extent ensured 
political stability and democracy. Political elites in the new dispensation have established 
corporatist arrangements to forestall any political crises that may be as a consequence of 
implementation new economic ll11d political progrrunmes and policies, such as the RDP 
ll11d GEAR. The ANC found it necessary to form corporatist arrangements, whereby 
various class and racial interests would be represented in the new political dispensation, 
such as beneficiaries of the apartheid regime, wary of the socialist inclined RDP, and the 
previously disadvantaged groups and organized labour who were disappointed by the 
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ANC' s adoption of the neo-liberal macro-economic policy GEAR. Under such an 
arrangement, the ANC, as the party in power enjoys a harmonious relationship with 
business, labour and civil society. In short, the greatest potential political threats to the 
ANC in South Africa are, the predominantly black organized labour force, and the 
economically powerful predominantly white big businesses. However, for the time being, 
these potential threats appear to be content with the existing corporate arrangements 
despite their class and ideological differences. The Alliance, on the other hand, represents 
a broad array of social, economic and political interests in the country. It is also political 
in nature as it is part of goverrunent. Its membership of goverrunent, has ensured political 
stability in democratization, but has also strengthened the dominance of the ANC. The 
ANC's ability to bargain with other organizations so as to remain in and at the core of 
government, as is evident in the formation and sustenance of the Alliance albeit growing 
strains, indicating its bargaining power as a dominant party. 
The ANC's national agenda or historic project is based on the concept of national 
unity, since it seeks to transform a deeply divided society into a non-racial and non-sexist 
democratic society. As witl1 other consociational and corporatist arrangements founded 
upon this principle, so is the formation of the Alliance. This too makes it a strategic 
arrangement for the ANC, since it also serves to embed the political power of the 
governing patty. By incorporating COSATU into the government, the ANC has not only 
made sure that the interests of labour are represented, but has also subjected the labour 
movement, one of its greatest potential political threats to the principle of collective 
responsibility. This makes it difficult for COSA TU members in government to challenge 
or criticize the government, thereby undermining the strength of the labour movement. 
To this extent, worker or labour interests are compromised. For exatnple, despite the 
ANCs failure to pursue vigorously the implementation of the COSATU-backed RDP and 
its adoption instead of the neo-liberal GEAR policy, COSATU is still pm of the 
Alliance. Its continued presence in the Alliance only serves to legitimize the ANC's neo-
liberal economic policies, which appear to be in contradiction to those radical social 
transformation policies of the Alliance pmners. The involvement of non-Africans 
through the SACP has strengthened the commitment to non-racialism in the ANC, and 
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trade union membership has and continues to supplement the ANC election machine. 
This nlrther enhances the ANC's dominance in the bargaining process. 
As with consociationalism, there are no such corporate arrangements in Kenya. 
Prior to and following the 1992 elections, KANU made no attempts at organizing and 
making such arrangements with business or labour at the policy level in a bid to enhance 
its dominance. Nor did it make such arrangements at the political level so as to form a 
strategic alliance that would seek political power. This may be attributed to a number of 
factors. Firstly, labour movement in Kenya is institutionally weak. Due to political 
interference, it lacks principled and good leadership, and has poor doctrines and 
programmes. It also lacks adequate financial resources and skilled human resources to 
enable it develop good doctrines and programmes. The labour movement also lacks the 
necessary societal linkages to strengthen its institutional capacity. In short, it lacks the 
institutional capacity to do many things such as mobilizing for electoral purposes. As 
such it is of no political value as an electoral machine to KANU and other political 
parties. Secondly, KANU may have not been in a position to enter into any alliance with 
business, due to the associations that represent their various concerns. Many 
organizations representing various big business concerns such as the Kenya Association 
of Manufacturers (KAM) and Kenya Federation of Employers (KFE), among others have 
occasionally called upon KANU to improve its governing record so as to create an 
enabling socio-economic and political environment that will build investor confidence 
and attract more investments. Though they do not openly criticize KANU, their 
statements indicate that KANU would not be the appropriate choice for a strategic 
partner. Unlike in South Africa, corporatism in Kenya does not exist and as such the 
ruling party does not use such alTangements to strengthen its dominance in society and 
the political process. 
Conclusion 
The historical and political development of KANU and the ANC as liberation 
movements in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid are more or less similar, 
with the exception that the latter had to spend thirty years in exile following its banning 
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In 1960. By virtue of controlling wide social diversities as a means of ending minority 
rule, they emerged as the dominant liberation movements in their countries, and this 
partly paved the way for the emergence of party dominance under KANU and the ANC 
in Kenya and South Africa respectively. 
The establishment of party dominance under KANU and the ANC in the post-
1990 period has taken similar and different trajectories. While similarities occur in the 
way the parties have and continue to enhance their dominance in the legislative process 
and the executive, a number of disparities exist in the way in which they attempt to 
enhance their dominance on a wider scope with regard to civil society. With respect to 
the legislative process, both parties have won the elections with a majority of 
parliamentary seats in two successive post 1990 elections. Both parties have also 
managed to enhance their dominance in the operation of parliament by virtue of having a 
majority of seats. KANU and the ANC have also had an upper hand in constitutional 
development, in effect producing constitutions that suit their own political objectives, 
thereby strengthening their dominance. 
Party dominance over the executive is more or less similar in both countries. This 
occurred in Kenya, though in the 1960s, following the country's independence. KANU 
began assetting its dominance via Africanization in the civil service, which saw senior 
appointments being made on ethnic and political party terms. Likewise in South Africa, 
the ANC is exerting its dominance through the transformation of the public sector. This is 
being carried out by way of affirmative action programmes that have led to the 
appointment of ANC loyalists in senior positions of government. Following the 1992 
elections appointments to senior posts in the civil service were made on political patty 
terms in Kenya. Those appointed to cabinet and senior positions of government were 
from the areas that voted heavily in favour of KANU. In short, as both parties extend 
their control and influence over the public service, the more opportunities they open up 
for patronage and the more partisan it becomes. Despite the fact that Kenya is a unitary 
state and South Afi"ica a quasi-federal state, both ruling parties are attempting to impose 
politico-administrative and financial controls upon the provinces, as a means of 
controlling diverse social, economic and political resources. The aim of this is to extend 
their control and influence over the state and society. 
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Most interesting are the trajectories both paliies are taking with regard to their 
relationship with civil society in an attempt to impose their dominance over a wider scope 
than the state and its apparatuses. While the ANC has made attempts to create a 
harmonious relationship with civil society through arrangements such as 
consociationalism and corporatism, KANU's relationship with the civil society IS 
becoming more and more antagonistic. The ANC has to a large extent managed to 
contain political discontent and avoid political disorder by entering into consociational 
and corporatist arrangements with foes and friends such as predominantly white business 
and predominantly black organized labour as it pursues policies that are seen to be 
antagonistic to such key actors. The formation of the Tripartite Alliance and the GNU, as 
well as the establishment of NED LAC, are such examples. KANU has made no such 
alTangements that affect governance or policy matters. Organized labour in the country is 
institutionally weak, while big businesses have no confidence in KANU track record of 
governance. Instead the party has often made temporary agreements with opposition 
parties, only when it is politically expedient to do so or when it wanted to avert a political 
crisis. To this extent KANU is making no effort to establish a harmonious and working 
relationship with civil society as a means of enhancing party dominance and political 
stability in the country. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PARTY DOMINANCE AND ITS IMPACT UPON DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
7.0 Introduction 
Democracy is a system of government that entails three essential conditions. 
These include, political competition between individuals and organized groups, a highly 
inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and a 
level of civil and political liberties in the polity (Diamond et ai, 1995 :6-7). 
Democratization is the process of development towards democracy. It basically involves 
the shift from an authoritarian regime to the installation and consolidation of a 
democratic regime. It requires the careful and deliberate construction of strong functional 
democratic and democracy-promoting institutions that will support and safeguard 
democracy. Democracy is, arguably, therefore, an end in itself and democratization is the 
means towards this end. Transitional democracies are therefore political systems 
undergoing democratization. 
Kenya and South Africa are transitional democracies, undergoing democratization 
processes towards mutli-ethnic and non-racial multi-party political systems respectively. 
Both polities can be described as dominant party systems to the extent that the ruling 
parties in both countries meet the essential characteristics of a dominant party. However, 
while South Africa has been described as a democracy under party dominance, Kenya has 
been described as a psuedo-democracy (Diamond et ai , 1995 :7-9; Freedom House, 
1999a; 1999b). Tllis indicates that to a large extent, party dominance and its impact upon 
democratization is taking different trajectories in both countries. 
This chapter compares and contrasts party dominance and its impact upon 
democratization in post-1990 Kenya and South Africa. It looks at how party dominance 
has impacted upon the institutions established to support democracy in both countries. 
Attention is paid to those institutions that ensure good governance as an indication of 
democratization and subsequently democracy. 
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For any meaningful democratization to occur in a country, certain functional 
institutional arrangements or mechanisms must be put in place that will ensure good 
governance and political stability, since these are pre-requisites for democratic 
consolidation. Political stability, arguably, occurs when there is a high level of political 
institutionalization, which ensures that there are enough such arrangements or 
mechanisms in place to accommodate or serve as alternative outlets to various social, 
economic and political aspirations. 
Good governance, as a signal of democratisation is essential for strengthening 
democracy in any country. Good governance is the exercise of political power through 
constitutional means that establishes the rules of political conduct to manage a country's 
affairs in an accountable and transparent manner. It entails the practice of good 
government. Party dominance can impact positively or negatively upon political 
institutions that ensure good governance leading to a condition of either political stability 
or instability. Establishing strong functional mechanisms or institutions that guarantee 
transparency and accountability in government, conflict resolution and or prevention in 
society, a strong electoral process, and a genuine transformation of state and society can 
enhance good governance and stability. This ensures effective policy implementation 
and, arguably, reduces socio-political and economic divisions in society. It is in this 
context that the impact of party dominance upon the mechanisms or institutions that 
support good governance and political stability in Kenya and South Africa are compared 
and contrasted. 
Kenya and South Africa have more or less similar institutions that are supposed to l L,"'" 
ensure transparency and accountability in government. These are primarily located in the 
executive, legislature and the judiciary. Though the structure and functions of such 
institutions are more or less similar in both countries, their experiences in terms of 
performance, due to effects of party dominance, differ to some extent. While comparing 
and contrasting the effects or impact of party dominance, attention is focused on specific 
institutions, procedures or organizations of the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government that are supposed to ensure accountability and transparency. 
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7.1 Party Dominance and its Impact Upon Institutions of the Executive in Kenya 
and South Africa 
This section exammes those bodies or institutions of the executive that are 
supposed to ensure transparency and accountability in government and hence good 
governance. While they are enshrined under different circumstances, due to the different 
nature of the constitutions of Kenya and South Africa, they are nonetheless categorised 
here under the executive. These are, constitutionally, state institutions, that do not fall 
under the legislature, nor are they directly involved in the administration of justice. These 
include the Offices of the Attorney-General and Controller and Auditor-General m 
Kenya, and the Public Protector and the Office of the Auditor-General in South Africa. 
The powers and functions of these institutions are enshrined and spelt out in the 
constitutions of each country. In Kenya, although the Attorney-General is the principal 
legal adviser to the government, the incumbent's executive powers and the Office of the 
Attorney-General are enshrined in Section 26 (1) of the Constitution of Kenya. This 
Section fall under Chapter II of the Constitution, which deals with the Executive. Section 
26 (I) states "There shall be an Attorney-General whose office shall be an office in the 
public service" (Kenya, 1998a: 17). The executive powers of the Attorney-General are 
outlined in Section 26, which among other things, states that the Attorney-General is the 
legal advisor to the Government of Kenya and that such a person has the powers to 
initiate and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court, other 
than a court martial. This is in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by 
that person. The Attorney-General also has the powers to take over and continue criminal 
proceedings that have been introduced or undertaken by another person or authority, as 
well as to discontinue at any stage before judgment is delivered, any such criminal 
proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority (Kenya, 
1998a: 17). In other words it is at the discretion of the Attorney-General to give consent 
to prosecute or withdraw a case against a person charged with any offence, subjecting 
him or her to external influences, despite the fact that Section 26 (8) states that while 
performing the functions vested in him or her by subsections of this section and other 
sections of the Constitution, the incumbent of the office shall not be subject to the 
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direction or control of any other person or authority (Kenya, 1995a: IS) . Section 109 (I) 
states that the Attorney-General is appointed by the President (Kenya, 1995a: 77). In 
South Africa, similar functions are carried out by the Office of the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions, whose duties and powers are enshrined under Section 179 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. However, this Office falls under Chapter S 
of the Constitution, which deals with Courts and Administration of Justice (RSA, 1996). 
This Office can, therefore, be classified under the judiciary. 
The powers and functions of the Controller and Auditor-General in Kenya are 
defined in Section 105 (2) of the Constitution. This subsection states that the duty of the 
Controller and Auditor-General, is, to satisfy himself or herself that any proposed 
withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund is authorized by law, and, if so satisfied, to 
approve the withdrawal. He or she should also be satisfied that all moneys that have been 
appropriated by Parliament and disbursed have been applied to the purposes for which 
they were appropriated and that the expenditure conforms to the authority that governs it. 
The Controller and Auditor-General must audit and report on the public accounts of the 
goverrunent annually. This also applies to the accounts of all officers and authorities of 
that government, and the accounts of all courts in Kenya, other than courts of which no 
part of the expenses are defrayed directly out of moneys provided by Parliament. Finally 
this also applies to the accounts of every commission established by the constitution and 
the accounts of the Clerk of the National Assembly. Like with the Attorney-General, 
Section 105 (5) points out that in the exercise of his or her functions under certain 
subsections of Section 105, the Controller and Auditor-General is not to be subject to the 
direction and control of any other person or authority (Kenya, 1998a: 72). According to 
Section 110 (1), the Controller and Auditor-General is appointed by the President 
(Kenya, 1995a: 78). Tenure provisions relating to the offices of the Attorney-General and 
Controller and Auditor-General are outlined in Sections 109 and 110 of the Constitution 
respectively (Kenya, 1995a: 77-79). In South Africa, the Auditor-General ' s functions are 
spelt out in Section IS8 of the Constitution. These state in part that the incumbent of the 
office must audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial 
management of all national and provincial state departments and administrations, all 
municipalities , and any other institution or accounting required by national or provincial 
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legislation to be audited by the Auditor-General. In addition, the Auditor-General may 
audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial management of any 
institution funded from the National Revenue Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund or by a 
municipality; or any institution that is authorized in terms of any law to receive money 
for a public purpose (RSA, 1997a: 103). 
The Public Protector in South Africa falls under the executive. The functions and 
powers of the Public Protector are outlined in Sections 182 (1) to (5) . These state in part 
that the Public Protector has the power to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the 
public administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be 
improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice, as regulated by national legislation. 
He or she should report on that conduct and subsequently take appropriate remedial 
action. Section 183 emphasizes that the incunlbent is appointed for a non-renewable 
period of seven years (RSA, 1997a: 100). Both the Public Protector and the Auditor-
General are appointed by the President, on tlle recommendation of the National Assembly 
as stated in Section 193 of the Constitution. This section also outlines their tenure 
provisions (RSA, 1997a: 104-105). 
While the functions and powers of these institutions as enshrined in the 
constitutions of each country are similar, it is interesting to note that whereas the 
Attorney-General and the Controller and Auditor-General are appointed by the President, 
in South Africa the appointment of the Public Protector and Auditor-General by the 
President is subject to the recommendations of the Parliament. The incumbents of the 
office in Kenya are, therefore, more likely to be subjected to undue political influence, 
since they are answerable to and owe, to a large extent, their allegiance to the President. 
In South Africa, allegiance to the President is less likely since they are also accountable 
and answerable to the Parliament. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of party 
political allegiance in a dominant party system, particularly to the dominant party. 
Party dominance has had its effects upon institutions in Kenya and South Africa. 
As KANU and the ANC continue to exert their control and influence over the state and 
its apparatuses in order to enhance their governmental dominance or dominance over the 
executive, these institutions are increasingly compromising their roles as instruments for 
strengthening transparency and accountability in government. Party dominance impacts 
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upon institutionalization, thereby strengthening or weakening institutions. 
Institutionalization is the process in which procedures and organizations acquire value 
and stability (Huntington, 1968: 12). These values need not be positive for such 
procedures and organizations to stabilize, but can be negative, leading to the 
institutionalization of bad or negative procedures and organizations. Where party 
dominance strengthens such values and stability, institutions become stronger. Where it 
weakens such values and stability, institutions become weaker. Party dominance can 
therefore strengthen bad or negative procedures or organizations while at the same time 
weakening good or positive ones. Institutions such as the offices of the Attorney-General , 
Auditor-General and Public Protector are useful institutions for upholding democracy, 
since their role is to ensure transparency and accountability in government. Party 
dominance can impact negatively upon such institutions, weakening them and 
subsequently leading to a situation whereby the net effect is the institutionalization of 
lmdemocratic practices or procedures, for example, corruption, patronage, nepotism and 
ethno-centrism among others. This is the trend in Kenya that is also beginning to emerge 
in South Africa. 
Corruption in government has been institutionalized in Kenya. This is as a result 
of long-term rule by a single party and a dominant party under KANU . In the case of 
South Africa, though corruption dates back to the apartheid era, it is now increasingly 
being exposed due to the transparent manner in which democratic and democracy-
promoting institutions are operating in the new political dispensation. Corruption in post-
apartheid South Africa has also become a function of the transformation process. In 
Kenya, the offices of the Attorney-General and Controller and Auditor-General are, to a 
large extent, institutionally weak in the sense that they have been unable to take the 
appropriate measures to curb corruption in government. Though they continue to expose 
corruption, they nonetheless lack the political will to ensure that those engaged and 
exposed in corruption at high-levels of government are appropriately prosecuted and 
incarcerated. The annual repOt1s of the Controller and Auditor-General continue to 
highlight corrupt malpractices at high levels in government, but the Attorney-General 
lacks the political capacity to prosecute high-ranking politicians and government officials 
involved in corruption. This is largely due to the fact that the Attorney-General is a 
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political appointee. Where prosecuted, the courts usually dismiss such cases. A case in 
point in the post-1992 period was what became known as the Goldenburg and 'political 
banks ' scandal. The Goldenburg International Company was at the centre of a racket 
based on 'ghost exports' of gold and diamonds to Switzerland and Dubai. Through a 
series of fake papers, for over two years, the Treasury under the Vice-President of the 
country and KANU, George Saitoti, and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), under the 
Governor, Eric Kotut, also a political appointee since the Governor is a presidential 
appointee, authorized and paid funds in excess of US$ 30 million in export compensation 
to the Goldenburg Company for fictitious gold and diamonds from Kenya supposedly 
sold to Dubai and Switzerland. A Kenyan Asian Kamlesh Pattni and James Kanyotu, a 
former Director of the Directorate of Security Intelligence, were named as directors of 
Goldenburg. From May to March 1993 , four 'political banks' with links to Goldenburg 
and the KANU high command, namely, Exchange, Post Bank, Pan African and Delphis, 
acquired approximately US$ 860 million in credit from their respective Goldenburg 
accounts. Payments were made outside the formal clearinghouse mechanism controlled 
by the CBK. A month later, the four banks jointly received approximately US$ 107 
million from the CBK supposedly in spot exchange of US$ 116 million which they did 
not remit to the Bank. In the fo llowing tlu·ee months, the four banks used the free cash 
advance to purchase Treasury bills with a yield of 55 per cent per year. Due to increasing 
domestic and donor pressure, the Attorney-General instituted criminal proceedings 
against some of the persons involved. However, the prosecution of these high-ranking 
political and business leaders accused of misappropriation was halted when the case was 
dismissed by the court (Africa Confidential, 19 March, 1993:7; 8 October, 1993 : 4-6; 
Barkan, 1998:218). 
There are several reported cases of cOn"uption involving high-ranking government 
official and KANU politicians in the post-1992 period. Among others, these include the 
plundering of public resources from parastatals. Employee pensions in the National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF), for example have found their way into banks run by 
families of the KANU hierarchy. The Kenya National Assurance Company (KNAC), 
which had insured all state property as well as the property of many individuals and firms 
seeking official favour, went bankrupt in 1994 after being headed by a succession of 
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politically active chief executives, including Henry Kosgey, who was Minister of 
Transport at the time. Other forms of corruption that increased sharply during this period 
include the exemption of politically well connected individuals from paying import and 
custom duties on goods, most notably sugar, that were then dumped on local markets . 
The country's budding sugar industry was unable to compete with these cheap imports, 
forcing many sugar factories to shut down. Politically correct merchants working in 
collusion with the Treasury, key Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants, evade taxes 
running into billions of shillings by pretending to be importing commodities for eventual 
sale to relief agencies. Corruption reached such appalling depths in the 1990s that 
Transparency International ranked Kenya the third most corrupt country in the world 
(Africa Confidential, 2 April, 1993: 6-7; Finance, 31 December, 1995 : 8-9; Kiai, 1998: 
187-188). 
Corruption in all spheres of government in post-apaltheid South Africa continues 
to be exposed by opposition parties and civil society organizations such as the media. 
Cases of financial irregularities and corruption have also been highlighted in various 
repOlts such as those of the Auditor-General and that of other bodies such as the Heath 
Special Investigating Unit. This Unit, for example, is established in terms oflegislation to 
investigate cases of corruption, fraud and maladministration that have been referred to it 
by the President. The Unit can institute civil action in the Special Tribunal, upon 
completion of an investigation, in order to recover, protect or save state assets and monies 
that have been or could have been misappropriated or misused. It works closely with 
other anti-corruption bodies such as the South African Police Services Commercial 
Branch, the Public Protector, the Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences, 
the National Prosecuting Authority and the Office of the Auditor-General (SIU, 2000:4). 
In its Annual Report of 1998/99, the Unit points out that during this period 128 
new cases were referred to it resulting in 161,633 individual cases having to be opened. 
Allegations were received from various sources in state and civil society. High profile 
investigations conducted during this period, included among others: investigation into 
ghost pensioners and theft of pension monies and subsequent recovery of monies in the 
Eastern Cape Province; investigation and recovery of approximately US$ 718,000 stolen 
from the Department of Justice in Mpumalanga; investigations into alleged fraud and 
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corruption within the housing subsidy schemes in KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape 
Province; and investigation into and recovery of state-owned farms where lease 
agreements had lapsed, where tenants had abandoned the farms or where the lessees has 
sub-let parts of the farms contrary to the lease agreement (SIU, 2000:6). Despite its 
relative success, the Unit has, however, had its share of political interference. During this 
period, the Unit subsequently came under fire from the Minister of Finance, Trevor 
Manuel , when he accused Judge Heath, its head, of wanting to be the "Don Quixote of 
South Africa" saying that he had not seen the "billions the Unit claims to have 
recovered". The Unit was, however, saved by the Auditor-General who confirmed in his 
report that it had recovered and saved a total of approximately US$ 230 million in state 
funds between January 1998 and January 1999. Opposition parties were quick to criticize 
the Minister for refusing to recognize the success of the Heath Unit (Daily Dispatch, 22 
July, 1999: 1; 23 July, 1999: II) . The ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama also accused 
the Unit of blackmailing the party over the arms deal (discussed later in this Chapter) and 
reiterated that the party would oppose the appointment of the Unit to probe the arms deal, 
since the Unit was "hobnobbing with other political parties" (Daily Dispatch, 12 January 
2001 :2). This was in an apparent reference to opposition political parties 
The Office of the Public Protector in South Africa has begun exhibiting signs of 
party political partisanship, while discharging its duties or performing its functions. 
Evidence suggests, that in many cases, the findings and recommendations of the Public 
Protector have been largely in favour of the executive and the ANC. Prominent and 
controversial among such investigations are, allegations of nepotism in the government, 
and the joint investigation into the strategic defence packages. In his Report on the 
Investigations of Allegations of Nepotism in Government, the Public Protector, pointed 
out that the Executive Director of the New National Party (NNP) Federal Council 
submitted a letter to his office on 29 October 1997 that referred to an earlier motion 
tabled by the NP in Parliament in connection with ANC nepotism in government. The 
essence of the motion was a contention of the occurrence of nepotism based on 
appointments at different levels of government and the public service of persons that are 
related as family or friends. Examples were quoted in this motion, and his office was 
requested to investigate the extent of new appointments since May 1994 that have family 
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connections In political parties (read ANC), Parliament and/or the Cabinet. The 
investigation was to look comprehensively at all three levels of government, as well as 
parastatals to ascertain the extent of this massive problem (RSA, 1999d: 4). 
While the NNP cited 20 cases of alleged nepotism, the Public Protector, however, 
emphasized that the allegations of nepotism by the NP, unfortunately gave no substance 
to the examples quoted and that there were no specific references made of any evidence 
of favouritism or impropriety. Furthermore, the request by the NNP that his office 
conduct a general investigation could not be adhered to due to logistical problems. He 
also emphasized that most importantly, such a request did not conform to his brief which 
was clear on not investigating general complaints against government, but rather specific 
issues of improprieties and prejudice (RSA, 1999d: 7). In his findings and 
recommendations on these 20 cases, except for one case, the Public Protector argued that 
they were unfounded, without merit, baseless, unsubstantiated, and not supported by 
facts. With regard to the other case, the Public Protector, expressed some concern 
regarding the appointment of the wife of the Minister of Defence, Major-General Mduli-
Sedibe in the SANDF. However, he was quick to point out that taking into account her 
experience and qualities, her appointment and promotion seemed to be justified. General 
Sedibe was previously a prominent commander in the MK since the early 1980s and and 
later appointed Chief of Comminications in 1983 (RSA, 1999d; 20-26). The Public 
Protector concluded by saying that the failme hy the NNP to provide any substance for 
the allegation of nepotism left him, in the light of the investigations, with the 
"unavoidable impression that the allegations made by the National Party were merely 
assumptions based on the mentioned relationships" (RSA, 1999d: 37). The Public 
Protector had in essence, with regard to these particular cases, cleared the ANC of alleged 
nepotism in government, despite the fact that various other government documents (as 
pointed out in Chapter 5) have acknowledged political appointments and nepotism, at all 
levels of government. 
The controversial joint investigation into the strategic defence packages by the 
Office of the Public Protector, Auditor-General, and the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, indicates to a large extent, the way in which these agencies have 
compromised their role relative to the ruling party and the executive. With the challenges 
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of transformation, the government decided in the mid-1990s, to re-equip the SANDF by 
replacing obsolete equipment. This decision, viewed by the government as a major 
necessity, was initially estimated to cost approximately US$ 5 billion. The government 
claimed that the process of re-equipping the SANDF would add value to the country's 
economy. In return for this relatively high expenditure, the economy was to benefit by an 
estimated US$ 18 bill ion in new investment, industrial participation programmes and the 
creation of approximately 65,000 jobs. The then Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, told 
Parliament in 1999, that teams from the Departments of Finance, Trade and Industry, and 
Defence were evaluating the proposals. With regard to the transparency and 
accowltability of the process, the Minister assured Parliament that the bids had been gone 
over with "a fine-tooth comb to ensure an ethical outcome, and this process will 
continue". He also emphasized "We will ensure that these bids are clean and above any 
suspicion" (RSA, 1999d: col. 1559). 
However, over time, the arms deal increasingly came under public scrutiny, 
mainly from civil society organizations and opposition parties, for the way in which the 
procurement process was riddled with cOlTuption and fraud, as well as the flawed 
governmental contracting position. As a result of the increasing and widespread pressure 
from sectors of state and civil society, the three agencies set up a joint investigation. In 
their lengthy Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Packages of 15 
November 2001, these three agencies reported that they received numerous allegations 
most of which were of a criminal nature, referring to issues such as cOlTuption and 
conflict of interests. The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) conducted preliminary 
investigations into these allegations and found that some were unsubstantiated and as 
such required no further investigation. These allegations were those: accusing Mr. L 
Swan, a senior official at Armscor of becoming a director of BAe systems, which was 
one of the prime contractors; alleging that the Chief of Acquisitions of the SANDF, Mr. 
Shamin Shaik, Messrs. Max Sisulu, M Scott and N Mashimbye received motor vehicles 
from the prime contractors/bidders; linking the arms procurement under investigation 
with the Mpumalanga Parks board promissory notes; and those accusing the former 
Minister of Defence Joe Modise, of paying for shares in Conlog with a bribe received 
from a successful prime contractor (RSA, 2001b: 19). 
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There were other substantial allegations that appeared and are currently being 
investigated. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) 
raised the major allegations and concerns requiring extensive investigation by the three 
agencies. These were related to; firstly, the costs of the entire arms deal to the state. 
Secondly, the selection of prime contractors. Thirdly, the selection of subcontractors. Of 
relevance to this point was the suggestion that a potential conflict of interest in respect to 
the Chief of Acquisitions and the Department of Defence (DoD) could have had an 
improper influence on decisions pertaining to tenders. Fourthly, a review of the arnlS 
procurement process, and fifthly , an examination into the contracts themselves (RSA, 
200 I b: 20-21). The Report pointed out that persons involved in the overall acquisition 
process, some of whom were high-ranking officials, received various gifts. In conducting 
these investigations, the DSO subteams mainly used the provision of Section 28 of the 
National Prosecution Authority Act (RSA, 2001 b: 22-23), which outlines the powers, 
duties, and functions of the Investigating Director with regard to the conduct of 
investigations (RSA, 2000b: 14-16). By the time the Report was released, an excess of 
102 summonses had been issued. Consequently, more than 57 statements from witnesses, 
statutory records in excess of 193 entities and numerous documents had been obtained. 
Subsequently Yengeni, then ANC Chief Whip and a former Chairperson of the 
parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, and Mr. Woerful were brought before 
court on charges of corruption, fraud and forgery (RSA, 200 I b: 23). 
The key findings and recommendations of the joint investigation were quite 
contentious, raising serious doubts about the impartiality of the three agencies as 
mechanisms of ensuring transparency and accountability in government. The key 
findings were, among others that no evidence was found of any improper or unlawful 
conduct by the government. The irregularities and improprieties referred to in the 
findings pointed to the conduct of certain officials of the government departments 
involved and could not, in the view of the three agencies be ascribed to the President or 
the Ministers' Committee or Cabinet. As such, there were "no grounds to suggest that the 
Goverrunent's contracting position is flawed" (RSA, 200 I b: 373). The joint investigation 
also found out that fair and competitive procurement procedures for the selection of 
subcontractors were not followed in all cases where strategic considerations played a 
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significant role. There was a conflict of interest with regard to the position held and role 
played by the Chief of Acquisitions of DoD, S Shaik, by virtue of his brother, Shabir 
Shaik's interests in the Thompson Group and African Defence Systems (ADC), which he 
held through Nkobi. Shamin Shaik, in his capacity as Chief of Acquisitions declared this 
conflict of interest in December 1998 to the Project Control Board (PCB), but continued 
to take part in the process that led to the ultimate awarding of contracts to the Thomson 
Group and ADS. He did not recuse himself properly. Furthermore, during the course of 
the investigation, Shamin Shaik did not apply for and did not receive the military security 
clearances required by law (RSA, 2001b: 376-379). 
Despite the Report's length and controversy, with regard to irregularities and 
improprieties in the entire arms deal , the key recommendations of the tlu'ee agencies were 
not very strict and serious. Among the recommendations were that DoD should take the 
necessary steps to ensure that good procurement practices are adhered to and that 
compliance with the prescribed tender procedures is strictly enforced. Parliament was 
requested to take urgent steps to ensure that high ranking officials and office bearers, 
such as Ministers and Deputy Ministers, are not allowed to be involved, whether 
personally or as part of private enterprise, for a reasonable period of time after they leave 
public office, in conh'acts that are concluded with the state (RSA, 2001b: 379-380). Apart 
from the controversial ANC Chief Whip, Yengeni, all the other high-ranking government 
officials, the government and by extension the ANC as the ruling party, were cleared of 
any irregularities and improprieties by the three agencies conducting the investigation. 
This has led some commentators to accuse such agencies of being party political partisan 
or partial. Colm Allan, the Director of the Public Service Accountability Monitor 
(PSAM), had this to say about such agencies "All, at some point have been closely 
aligned to the ANC political establishment. Surely for the sake of preserving public 
confidence in these bodies, this is a set of perceptions that the government cannot allow 
to become entrenched" (Daily Dispatch, 23 January 2001 :9). 
Though the Public Protector can arguably be said to conduct his investigations 
with partial ity or in a party political partisan way, as is evident in the findings and 
recommendations of some of his controversial reports, financial irregularities in 
government, continue to be exposed by agencies such as the Office of the Auditor-
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General. For example, in his Reports on the Accounts of National Government for 1995-
96 and 1997-98, the Auditor-General revealed unauthorized expenditure totalling 
approximately US$ 25 million and US$ 127 million respectively (RSA, 1997e: 38; 
1999c: 31). While the Department of Corectional Services falls under an IFP Minister, in 
his Report on Findings Arising from a Specialised Investigation into Alleged 
Irregularities Among Senior Officials of the Department of Correctional Services 1999, 
the Auditor-General revealed that irregularities did occur, in respect of two awards 
amounting to R \09,292, which were paid to the Commissioner of Correctional Services. 
Voluntary severance packages were also granted to 44 members of the previously 
disadvantaged groups that did not meet the set criteria, to accommodate redundant staff 
(RSA, J 99ge: 9). 
While corruption continues to be exposed in Kenya and South Africa, there are 
still some differences in the outcome. Whereas in South Africa, those exposed and found 
guilty by such agencies are normally relieved of their duties or forced to resign and 
thereafter prosecuted, as in the case of Tony Yengeni, who resigned as the ANC's Chief 
Whip and was later charged in cOill1, in Kenya, such high-ranking government or party 
oflicials are rarely relieved of their duties or prosecuted. When prosecuted, the courts 
tend to dismiss their cases. Corruption in Kenya has been institutionalized as a result of 
long-term rule by KANU as a single party and a dominant party and South Africa under 
the ANC is beginning to acquire values, and if not checked these values will soon 
stabilize leading to a condition where corruption will also become institutionalized. 
7.2 Party Dominance and its impact upon the Legislature in Kenya and South 
Africa 
The legislative authority in any country is supposed to play an integral role in 
promoting democracy. It is an important institution that ensures political participation in 
the decision-making process, as well ensuring accountability and transparency in the 
public policy-making process. This section examines the impact of party dominance upon 
the parliaments of Kenya and South Africa. The composition of Parliament, legislation 
and procedure in the National Assembly, and summoning, prorogation and dissolution of 
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Parliament in Kenya, are outlined in Chapter III of the Constitution. This Chapter of the 
Constitution specifically deals with the Parliament (Kenya, 1998a: 20-35). The powers 
and functions of the Parliament of South Africa are enshrined and outlined in Chapter 
Four of the cOlmtry' s Constitution. This Chapter of the Constitution outlines the 
composition, functions, rules, proceedings and authority of the National Assembly and 
the NCOP (RSA, 1997a: 27-51). The Parliament of Kenya consists of the President and 
the National Assembly whereas the Parliament of South Africa consists of the National 
Assembly and the NCOP (Kenya, 1998a: 20; RSA, 1996). This section focuses on the 
impact of party dominance upon the parliamentary committee system and its impact upon 
parliamentary opposition parties. 
Parliamentary committees are mechanisms for ensunng transparency and 
accountability in government and hence good governance. They also ensure public 
participation in the legislative process. Party dominance in Kenya and South Africa has 
manifested itself in the way opposition parties are to a large extent ineffective in the day-
to-day workings of the parliamentary committees. Many of these committees have been 
subjected to undue influence and frustration by KANU and ANC majoritarianism. 
KANU's control of axes of power that is, the Speaker, the Leader of Government 
Business, Parliamentary Group, and the parliamentary committee system has placed 
constraints upon opposition parties. The parliamentary committee system has been 
captured by the executive rendering it largely ineffective. By imposing financial control 
upon parliament through the executive, KANU has ensured that parliament remains 
institutionally weak, an indicator that it has become increasingly difficult to differentiate 
between the state and party in Kenya. In 1996 for example, the Speaker of the National 
Assembly, Francis ole Kaparo ruled that President Moi should not be referred to in the 
Public AccoLmts Committee report, since this contravened a parliamentary standing 
order. Opposition MP Martin Shikuku challenged the Speaker's ruling arguing that no 
one was above the standing orders of the House and urged fellow MPs to "resist such 
rulings from the chair." Shikuku was ordered to withdraw the remark by the Speaker, an 
order he refused to obey. As a result of refusing to withdraw the remark, the Speaker him 
expelled from the chambers (Weekly Review, 5 July 1996: 13). 
A case in point where the Executive and the Parliament downplayed the role of a 
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committee was that of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Anti-Corruption set up in 
2000 and chaired by Musikari Kombo of FORD-Kenya. On completion of its work, the 
Committee in its report compiled a corruption "List of Shame" in which it named several 
prominent Cabinet Ministers, high-ranking KANU politicians and public servants, 
recommending in most cases their investigation with a view to prosecution. These 
included among others, Vice-President Professor George Saitoti for his role in the 
Goldenburg Scandal. The Committee recommended that he be investigated and 
prosecuted. Cabinet Ministers Nicholas Biwott, Hemy Kosgey and Kipngeno arap 
Ngeny, and President Moi's son, Phillip Moi, were also named. In its report, the 
Committee also recommended that Vice-President George Saitoti and Nicholas Biwott be 
investigated for alleged fraudulent investment and abuse of office over a US$ 11.5 
million soya beans project in Kilifi, Coast Province. Cabinet Ministers Kipngeno arap 
N geny and Hemy Kosgey were recommended for the investigation and possible 
prosecution of over the fraudulent purchase of land and with the running down of the 
collapsed Kenya National Assurance Company. Other Cabinet Ministers referred to were 
Prof. Sam Ongeri , Francis Lotodo and Julius ole Sunkuli. They were mentioned in 
connection with land and propelty allocations but the Committee only urged that the land 
revert back to public ownership. Other prominent KANU politicians named included 
former Cabinet Minister Elijah Mwangale, Assistant Ministers Fred Gumo, Samuel 
Rotich and KANU MPs Simeon Mkala and Darius Mbela. The Committee also w'ged that 
the approximately US$ 30 million paid out to Goldenburg be recovered in the public 
interest. Other people who should be investigated with regard to the Goldenburg scandal 
include two former Permanent Secretaries for Finance, Charles Mbindyo and Dr. Wilfred 
Koinange, a former Governor of the CBK, Eric Kotut, former Accountant General, Mr. 
Kibunja, a former official of CBK, Eliphaz Riungu and the former Commissioner of 
Mines Collins Owayo, among others. President Moi's son, Phillip and an associate 
evaded duty on six Mercedes Benz cars they fraudulently imported. The Committee 
recommended that the duty be recovered (Daily Nation, 10 May 2000). The report 
containing the "list of shame" was later tabled in Parliament in order to facilitate the 
implementation of its recommendations. However, it was rejected by a simple majority 
vote by KANU and a loyal opposition party, the National Development Party (NDP). 
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Other than being ineffective due to the predominance ofKANU, these committees 
have also been accused of being corrupt. Members of the Public Accounts Committee, 
both opposition and KANU, were accused of receiving bribes from those involved in the 
Goldenburg scandal, so as to influence the recommendations of this committee. As an 
opposition MP and member of the Public Accounts Committee said in reference to this 
scandal: 
"There was no difference between the Opposition MPs in the Public 
Accounts Committee and the KANU crooks. Those MPs are unworthy of 
public trust and should be barred from seeking public office. On my part 
for exposing the fraud and bribery, I was thrown out of the Public 
Accounts Committee by my party ... (Odinga, R, 1996:22-23). 
Another opposition MP has also pointed out that in spite of the numerous 
revelations of accountab ility in the public sector by the Public Accounts and Private 
Investment Committees over the years, the government has taken little action to bring the 
culprits to book (Anyang-Nyong'o, 2000:16). 
Party dominance has also had its effect upon the parliamentary committee system 
in South Africa. Political party representation on the committees is proportional to the 
number of seats they have in parliament and as such the ANC dominates these 
committees. Its majority in these committees greatly affects their ability to perform their 
duties properly. These committees have therefore had to operate under certain political 
constraints. Opposition parties have only really made a difference in parliamentary 
committees that adopt a more consociational approach. In those instances and in cases 
where the opposition parties have individuals who have developed some expertise, the 
ANC has not only been willing to listen, but also to act on the proposals of opposition 
members. However, in the case of higher profile, more controversial issues, the scope for 
such participation is limited (CDE, 1999:32). Many ANC MPs are not willing to be 
critical of these committees lest they be accused of being disloyal to the party and 
subsequently face party disciplinary action. In many instances the ANC MPs are not 
critical and toe the party line when the time comes to vote (Calland, 1999:36-37). A 
glaring example of this is that of SCOP A and the arms deal. Despite lukewarm support 
from the ANC and its committee members, SCOP A under the Chairmanship of IFP MP, 
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Gavin Woods, played a significant part in questioning the role of the Government over 
the arms deal and also called for the SIU to be included as one of the investigating 
bodies. This was, however, rejected by the government. During the course of its work on 
the arms deals, SCOPA received a lot of support from the outspoken and independent 
ANC MP, Andrew Feinstein, who also happened to be the Chairperson of the ANC' s 
study group and party spokesperson on Public Accounts. On several occasions, he sided 
with opposition MPs in SCOPA with regard to some of the decisions made. However, the 
ANC eventually replaced him with Geoff Doidge, a move that was criticized by 
opposition parties. Democratic Alliance (DA) public accounts spokesperson Raenette 
Taljaard said that the removal of Feinstein could only be interpreted to mean tighter 
internal political control for the ANC over the arms probe, and over SCOP A in general. 
This she, argued, was bad news for a committee battling to remain non-partisan and 
immune to political interference (Daily Dispatch, 25 January 2001: 2; 30 January, 2001: 
2). As Patrick Laurence put it: 
Yengeni cracked the party whip to bring ANC members on Scopa back 
into line. Since then they have put patty political interests ahead of their 
obligation to taxpayers to act as independent watchdogs over government 
expenditure on the arms deal. In a move that has Stalinist undertones, they 
have rewritten the fourteenth Scopa report. It now supports the ANC's line 
that the committee did not agree to a multi-agency investigation into the 
arms deal (Laurence, 2001 :4) 
Following the release of the Report on strategic defence packages, opposition 
MPS in SCOPA refused to vote in favour of a motion tabled by the ANC calling for the 
adoption of the Report. The fact that the ANC chairs 94 per cent of the parliamentary 
committees, while KANU chairs 51 per cent of the committees which are dominated by 
the ruling party, indicates the undue political influence to which they are subject. In both 
countries party dominance is impacting negatively upon parliamentary committees. 
Pat1y dominance is also impacting negatively upon democracy as both dominant 
parties seek to delegitimise opposition parties. KANU and the ANC are attempting to 
portray opposition parties as intolerant. In other words both dominant parties argue that 
opposition parties lack tolerance and toleration. As both parties pursue their historical and 
national agendas, they are partly delegitimising opposition parties as ethnic and racist. In 
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both countries, leaders of the dominant partly constantly accuse the opposition parties of 
being stumbling blocks in the course of achieving national unity or the creation of a non-
racial and non-sexist democracy. In Kenya, Moi has on many occasions labelled 
opposition parties as ethnic and lacking a national agenda. In an exclusive interview with 
one of the leading dailies in Kenya, during the countdown to the 1997 election, Moi 
labelled opposition parties as ethnic-based with sectional interests and added, with 
respect to KANU, that: 
I am confident that we shall win the coming election because Kenyans are 
[an 1 enlightened people who will not vote because of euphoria, as many 
did in 1992. They will vote for the unity of all Kenyans ... . They will 
reject tribalism and tribalists. They will join us in the house-cleaning of 
KANU, the party that won our freedom and Independence, so that the 
party can be in a position to tackle the challenges facing us into the 21 Sl 
Century (Moi, 1997:8). 
In a bid to delegitimise opposition parties, KANU leaders constantly remind the 
electorate of the party's historical role in the liberation struggle against colonialism and 
its role in achieving national unity and political consciousness. Though the party has, 
since the country's independence, declined from a mass party to a sectional party, it still 
portrays itself as a mass movement by virtue of winning a majority of seats in parliament 
though only receiving about 40 per cent of the votes cast in the 1992 and 1997 elections. 
Many of the opposition parties in Kenya such as the DP, NDP, and FORD-K, have been 
portrayed as largely Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya ethnic entities respectively. These three 
ethnic groups combined represent approximately 49 per cent of the country ' s population, 
while KANU is an alliance of minority ethnic groups. 
The ANC likewise is attempting to delegitimise opposition parties as it pursues its 
historical agenda. The party and its leaders constantly accuse the mainly white opposition 
parties of being racist and serving narrow racial interests. The governing party justifies its 
dominance and racial claims on socio-economic and racial inequalities created by white 
minority rule during the apartheid era. At the 7th National Congress of COSATU on 8 
September 2001 , the president of the ANC and the Republic, Thabo Mbeki had this to 
say of the ANC and opposition parties: 
There are some people in our cowltry today who present themselves as 
being better democrats than you who belong to our historic Congress 
265 
Movement .... these newly born democrats ... tell us that unless they 
reduce our strength ... democracy will be threatened. They say that a strong 
ANC ... put the democratic system in our country in grave danger ... 
because big support for us would constitute a threat to the very democracy 
for which we ourselves had fought for many decades. They argued . .. that 
the best guarantee for democracy was that they should get more support ... 
so that they become a strong opposition. They had to be strong as an 
opposition because they were the best guarantors of democracy ... while 
we, if we became too strong, would introduce dictatorship and take away 
the democratic rights of the people (Mbeki, 2000:1-4). 
The president of the ANC was in essence justifying the party's dominance in the 
political process, while at the same time dismissing the idea of strong opposition. In a bid 
to delegitimise opposition parties, President Mbeki has, on several occasions, dismissed 
such parties as racist. For the ANC, party dominance is a guarantor of democracy and 
stability, while strong opposition is construed as a threat to political and social stability. 
Mbeki constantly gives opposition parties a tongue-lashing. He once described the DP as 
"our-horne-grown Tories" and the "offspring of Thatcherism" (Daily Dispatch, I July 
1999: 1). The DP leader on the other hand has accused the ANC of delegitimising the 
Official Opposition as racist in a bid to stifle parliamentary debates or questions on 
sensitive issues such as those of transformation or affirmative action (Daily Dispatch, 29 
July, 1999). In particular the DP and NP, have been described as intolerant of criticism 
and have been criticized for their lack of commitment to democratic transformation 
(Motlanthe, 1998b: I). As the party's Secretary-General puts it, 'They see themselves as 
opposition parties in the most literal sense of the word - oppose the ANC at all costs, and 
don't bother too much about developing a viable, sustainable alternative" and that, "The 
'swart gevaar' and 'rooi gevaar', now devoid of their previous menace, have mutated into 
the two-thirds gevaar" (Motlanthe, 1998a: I). Like KANU, the ANC has fallen back on 
its historical role in the liberation struggle as a vehicle for the aspirations of the black 
majority, portraying opposition parties as representing nan-ow sectional interests. While it 
has been acknowledged that dominant parties seek to isolate opposition in order to 
strengthen their own electoral position, the process, as in Kenya, may lead to a situation 
where opposition parties become functionally ineffective as mechanisms for providing 
checks and balances against a strong executive. 
The nature of the opposition parties in Kenya makes them subject to the ruling 
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party's dominance within and beyond parliament. Other than their continued ethnic 
fragmentation making them sectional, opposition parties in Kenya suffer from poor 
leadership, poor doctrines and programs, and lack of adeqnate financial resources . Most 
of all, many parties lack the financial resources to maintain their secretariat, to maintain 
party branches at the grassroots level and also funds to conduct regular party elections at 
grassroots level. Many of them have to rely upon funding from their leaders, thus 
subjecting them to manipulation by such leaders. The constitutions of these parties show 
that sources of funds include: membership fees, contributions, donations and grants, 
revenue from ftmdraising activities, publications, capital investment; and exploring 
possibi lities of state funding. The opposition political parties are tmable to raise adequate 
ftmds . For example, they receive relatively insignificant financial resources from 
membership dues, since party cards are usually sold immediately before patiy or national 
elections when it is necessary for members to participate in the nomination of party 
candidates. In other words, party cards are normall y used for electoral purposes and this 
ensures bogus party membership as thousands are normally given free membership card 
by those seeking party or elective party office. As for state funding, between 1994 and 
1999, parliament on four occasions passed motions and resolutions to provide for direct 
funding of political parties by the state. However the resolutions have not yet been put in 
place and implemented by the KANU Government (Holmquist and Ford, 1998: 235; 
Murungi, 1999:8; Wat·igi, 1999:9). These pat·ties lack organizational coherence and 
discipline and this manifests itself in the way party leaders give contradicting and 
inconsistent statements on party matters. They also do not seriously articulate their party 
programmes or policies and as such are not able to engage in any serious policy advocacy 
rather than ethnic advocacy. They are institntionally weak in terms of their capacity to 
offer meaningful opposition to KANU thereby further enhancing the dominance of the 
ruling pat1Y. As one political commentator put it: 
The Opposition paJ1ies like to moan about the fact that they are victims of 
a vicious KANU squeeze aimed at asphyxiating them. KANU would 
certainly not go into mourning if the Opposition perished. But harsh as it 
may sound, KANU is not in business to keep its opponents happy (Warigi, 
1999:9) 
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In contrast, both public and private funding of political parties is allowed under 
the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act No. 103 of 1997 in South Africa. 
Political parties obtain funding from their members, other sources both local and foreign, 
as well as civil society groups. With regard to public or state funding, the Act governs the 
eligibility of parties and the allocations they receive from the Represented Political 
Parties Fund. Public funding to political parties from this Fund for any financial year is 
allocated to parties that are represented in the National Assembly or in the provincial 
legislature or both. No allocations are made from the Fund to political parties that are 
only represented in municipal counci ls nor to those that have no public representative at 
all (RSA, I 997f: 4-6). Section 5 (I) b of the Act states "the moneys so allocated to a 
political party may be used for any purposes compatible with its functioning as a political 
party in a modern democracy (RSA, 1997f: 4). Unlike Kenya, parliamentary opposition 
parties in South Africa are therefore guaranteed some funding no matter how little it is, 
rendering them less vulnerable to the ruling party. 
7.3 Party Dominance and its impact upon the administration of justice in Kenya and 
South Africa 
A minimum condition of democracy in any country is the existence of civil and 
political libet1ies that are enshrined in the constitution and enforced by institutions 
involved in the administration of justice. Such institutions ensure that individuals and 
organizations are responsible and responsive in terms of adherence to the rule of law and 
responsive to societal needs respectively. By doing so, they strengthen the democratic 
process and subsequently democracy in a country. 
Institutions involved in the administration of justice in Kenya, are enshrined under 
Chapter IV of tlle Constitution of Kenya, which deals with the judiciary. This Chapter of 
the Constitution deals with the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and other Courts, as 
well as the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). It specifically looks at the establishment 
of these Courts, the appointment and tenure of judges and other judicial officers, among 
others (Kenya, 1998a: 35-42). In the case of South Africa, such institutions are enshrined 
under Chapter 8 of the country's Constitution, which deals with Courts and 
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Administration of Justice (RSA, 1996: 69). This section pays particular attention to the 
impact of party dominance upon the judicial system in Kenya and South Africa. 
The independence of the judiciary in Kenya, been compromised, due to long-term 
rule by a single-party and as a result of the impact of party dominance under conditions 
of what has been described in chapter four as pseudo-democracy. The Constitution of 
Kenya does not provide any specific constitutional guarantee of the independence of the 
judiciary, other than pointing out the tenure of offices of judges of the High Court in 
Section 61 (Kenya, 1998a: 37-38). In contrast, the judicial authority of South Africa is 
vested in the courts according to Section 165 of the Constitution. This Section, points out 
that the courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The 
courts are expected to apply the law impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
The Section emphasizes that no person or organ of the state may interfere with the 
functioning of the courts. Through legislative and other measures, the organs of the state 
must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness of the cOUlis. Court decisions are binding to all persons 
and organs of state to whom or which they apply (RSA, 1996a: 69). The independence of 
the judiciary authority in South Africa is therefore, enshrined in the constitution. 
A point of departure in this argument regarding the lack of independence 111 
Kenya is that the Chief Justice and judges of the High Court in Kenya are political 
appointees. Section 61 (1) of the Constitution points out that the Chief Justice is 
appointed by the President, while Section 61 (2) also states that the puisne judges are 
appointed by the President acting in accordance with the advice of the JSC (Kenya, 
1998a: 36). However, the JSC consists of presidential appointees. It consists of the Chief 
Justice as chairman; the Attorney-General; two persons designated by the President from 
among the puisne judges of the High Court and judges of the Court of Appeal; and the 
Chairman of the Public Service Commission (PSC), who is also appointed by the 
President (Kenya, 1998a: 40-41). In short, the Chief Justice, High Court judges and 
members of the JSC are all political appointees. 
In South Africa, Section 166 outlines the judicial system and points out that the 
courts are: the Constitutional Court; the Supreme Court of Appeal , the High Courts; the 
Magistrate Courts; and any other court established or recognized in terms of an Act of . 
269 
Parliament (RSA, 1996a: 69). The Constitutional Court consists of a President, a Deputy 
President and nine other judges, while the Supreme Court of Appeal consists of a Chief 
Justice, a Deputy Chief Justice and the number of judges of appeal determined by an Act 
of Parliament (RSA, 1996a: 69). The President, under prescribed terms, appoints the 
judges of the Constitutional Court. Section 173, points out that the President as the head 
of the national executive, appoints the President and Deputy President of the 
Constitutional Court, after consulting the Judicial Service Commission and leaders of 
parties represented in the National Assembly. The President also appoints the Chief 
Justice and Deputy Chief Justice after consulting the Judicial Service Commission. Other 
judges of the Court are also appointed by the President following consultations with the 
President of the Constitutional Court and the leaders of parties represented in the 
National Assembly. The President also appoints the judges of all other courts on the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission (RSA, 1996a: 72). Though these 
administrators of justi ce in Kenya and South Africa are appointed by the President acting 
on the advice of their respective judicial commissions, the South African process is more 
transparent as it further involves the leaders of parlianlentary parties. 
The appointment of Kenya's Chief Justice in the post-1990s on political grounds 
has exacerbated the problem of executive interference in the judiciary. Appointments in 
this period have been made on the basis of political loyalty The appointment of Justice 
Zacheus Chesoni as Chief Justice two months prior to the 1997 elections received 
widespread criticism. Prior to this appointment Justice Chesoni had served as the 
Chaimlan of the ECK since 1992. Several years earlier, Justice Chesoni had been 
dismissed from the judiciary in the public interest, after being declared bankrupt. The 
appointment of Justice Chesoni as the Chief Justice was to ensure continuity in the 
regime following Moi ' s electoral victory, since it is the duty of the Chief Justice to swear 
in the candidate who wins the Presidential Elections. As Chairman of the ECK between 
1992 and 1997, Justice Chesoni had served President Moi with dedication by ensuring 
that the ECK was manipulated by KANU in the multi-party era. The appointment of 
Chief Prosecutor Bernard Chunga as Chief Justice upon Jusice Chesoni's death in 
September 1999 was also widely criticised by the legal community who saw this as a 
deliberate attempt aimed at further reducing the independence of the judiciary. Chunga 
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was widely perceived as having been over zealous in prosecuting Government critics, 
especially since the demands for the restoration of multipartyism began. He was also 
perceived as having close loyalties to the President personally (United States, 2000). 
There have been several cases of executive interference in the judiciary in the 
post-1992 period. Several cases involving opposition MPs have been ongoing for several 
years, with the cOUlis repeatedly postponing the hearings, thereby requiring the MPs to 
appear periodically in court or risk fines or imprisonment. For example, the late 
opposition MP George Kapten was charged in September 1999 with defamation of a 
public official, and one month later with subversion for stating that President Moi was the 
prime suspect in the Goldenburg scandal (United States, 20000). Public statements made 
by President Moi have conflicted with the sub-judice rule on a number of occasions and 
he has pronounced on matters pending in a court. For example, the President commented 
on the case against the University Academic Staff Union (UASU), following the strike by 
academic members of staff at the public universities between 1993 and 1994. The court 
case was dismissed after this statement. President Moi also stated that the courts should 
not interfere or intervene in the affairs of public universities or issues relating to political 
parties. In July 1997, Mr William Mbaya, a retired judge, argued that the President's 
statements "can only be regarded as being intended to influence the decisions of the 
Courts" (Amnesty International, 1997). The Chairman of the Kenya Magistrates and 
Judges Association (KMJA), stated in March 1997 "These pronouncements clearly 
threaten the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the institutional doctrine of 
the separation of powers" (Amnesty International, 2000). There have been several 
instances in which judges have spoken out and sought to assert judicial independence. In 
May and August 1995, a number of magistrates and judges called for greater judicial 
independence, complaining about the frequency of executive interference in court cases, 
and urged that the presidential power to appoint judges be transferred to Parliament 
(United States, 1996: 6). 
The judiciary has been accused of corruption on several occaSIOns. In March 
1999, for example, Chief Justice Chesoni was accused of taking a US$ 450,000 bribe to 
rule in favour of a plaintiff in a case. Justice Richard Kuloba, was soon thereafter, 
accused of taking a US$ 75,000 bribe. In 1998, the Chief Justice appointed a special 
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judiciary commission chaired by Justice Richard K wach to report on the problems of the 
judiciary. The Kwach Commission cited "corruption, incompetence, neglect of duty, 
theft, drunkenness , lateness, sexual harassment, and racketeering" as conm10n problems 
in the judiciary. The Commission recommended amending the Constitution to allow for 
the removal of incompetent judges, introducing a code of ethics, improving the 
independence of the judiciary, overhauling the JSC, and shifting prosecutorial 
responsibilities from the police to the judiciary (United States, 2000). 
A significant way, in which party dominance has impacted upon the judicial 
system, is the way in which courts have handled election petitions in the country. This 
has become more significant in the multi-party era. The outcome of election petitions in 
the post-1992 multiparty period has largely been in favour of KANU. This is due to 
interference by the executive and has further strengthened the dominance of the ruling 
party. For example, following the 1997 General elections, 28 election petitions were 
filed. Out of these II were filed against KANU. The outcomes were in favour ofKANU, 
since 8 of the petitions were dismissed while 3 were withdrawn. The remaining 17 
petitions were filed against opposition candidates. Out of these 12 were dismissed, 3 
withdrawn and in one of the petitions a recount was ordered, but the incumbent MP still 
retained his seat following the recount. One case was nullified and the court made a 
ruling declaring the KANU candidate as the authentic MP (Rutte, Mazrui and Grignon, 
2001: 635-638). 
South Africa exhibits a contrasting scenariO. There has been little executive 
interference in the judicial system. Since the ANC took political power in 1994, the 
judiciary has to a large extent maintained its independence, despite party dominance. This 
is not to say that the ANC has not attempted to interfere with certain court cases. The 
party has done so but this has had practically no influence on the outcome of such court 
cases. In fact, in many significant cases involving its members or the governn1ent, it has 
lost. It has on occasion condemned the outcome of certain cases, which may interpreted 
as interfering with or questioning the integrity of the judicial system. This was the case in 
the trial of Dr Wouter Basson. Dr Basson headed South Africa' s apartheid-era germ 
warfare programme. In 1996, he was arrested to face charges of murder, conspiracy, 
fraud and drug possession. In April 2002, Judge Willie Hartzenberg acquitted Dr Basson 
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on all charges. While the prosecutor accused the presiding judge of favouring Dr Basson, 
throughout the trial stating that government would appeal the verdict before a panel of 
judges, the ANC condemned the verdict as completely outrageous and highly immoral. 
The ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama, said, "The justice system has let us down on 
this case" and described the verdict as " a clear case of the protection of an individual 
who has killed people" (BBC, 2000). Another significant trial in which the ANC 
expressed its disapproval was that of anti-apartheid activist and ANC member, Allan 
Boesak. In 1995, Allan Boesak was accused of theft and fraud. Following the 
accusations, the ANC, in solidarity, opened an internal inquiry headed by then Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki' s legal adviser, Mojanku Gumbi, which cleared Boesak even 
before the trial began. President Mandela also questioned whether the state should be 
prosecuting the case (Mai l and Guardian, 19 March, 1999). Following the Supreme Court 
of Appeal's judgment against Boesak in 2000, the ANC criticized the judiciary. The party 
spokesperson, Ngonyama, referred to the judiciary as totally biased. In response to the 
ANC's accusations, both Constitutional Court President Judge Arthur Chaskalson and 
Chief Justice Ismail Mahomed condenmed "as deplorable" attacks on the institution of 
the judiciary as opposed to criticism of individual judgments. Ngonyama subsequently 
sought to retract his comment, saying that he wanted to "make it abundantly clear that the 
[ANC] has never accused the judiciary of racism ... and could not question the decision 
of an institution of integrity such as the Appeal Court (Mail and Guardian, 6 May 2000). 
Conclusion 
The impact of party dominance upon institutions that support democracy 
manifests itself in different degrees in Kenya and South Africa. In Kenya, due to the 
authoritarian nature of the political system, party dominance has had a regressive impact 
upon the institutions of the executive, legislature and those invol ved in the administration 
of justice. In South Africa, evidence suggests that there has been no regressive impact of 
pllliy dominance upon these institutions. However, there are emerging incidences, 
particularly in the case of institutions of the executive, which indicate that they appear to 
be taking a similar trajectory to that of Kenya. Corruption in the institutions of the 
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executive in post-apartheid South Africa is slowly beginning to emerge, which is to a 
large extent of laxity on the patt of political patronage appointees. This fact has been 
acknowledged in various government documents. In the case of the legislature, in both 
countries patty dominance has taken a similar trajectory particularly with regard to the 
both dominant parties' attempts to de legitim ising opposition parties. While KANU 
continues to delegitimise opposition parties on ethnic lines, the ANC continues to do so 
on racial lines. However, unlike Kenya, patty dominance has had very little effect on the 
institutions that administer justice. The judiciary system, despite political criticism from 
the ANC, continues to be independent of the executive as well as of the party, a factor 
that may be attributed to the constitutional provision guaranteeing its independence. 
South Africa under the dominance of the ANC continues to be a democracy, 
unlike Kenya under KANU dominance, which is a psuedo-democracy. Democracy in 
South Africa, has to a large extent been upheld by institutions that support or uphold 
democracy, and as demonstrated, party dominance has not had as much of a regressive 
effect as in Kenya. Given that the impact of party dominance on the institutions of 
executive, that ensure good governance, transparency and accountability, is slowly 
beginning to have a regressive effect, then South Africa can be said to be heading in a 
similar direction with Kenya. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The evolution of party dominance in post-l 990 Kenya and South Africa has taken 
a more or less similar trajectory, particularly with regard to dominance of the state and its 
apparatuses. A significant difference has been with regard to the dominant parties' 
attempts to and success in enhancing their dominance over civil society. In the case of 
party dominance and its impact upon democratization and subsequently democracy, both 
countries have experienced similarities and differences. 
The connection between party dominance and democratization in different 
African countries presents a very interesting scenario in the sense that while the historical 
factors that contribute partly to the evolution of party dominance and its consolidation are 
more or less similar, its impact upon democracy differs . In many African countries, such 
as Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe, the dominant party was initially the dominant 
liberation movement. Due to their popularity and as vehicles for the aspirations of the 
majority of the oppressed people, these movements managed to control and influence 
diverse social fo rces and mobilize them in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. 
At the end of white minority rule, such movements also mobilized the same and new 
forces for electoral purposes, hence managing to win political power. Upon gaining 
political power, the dominant parties have taken the same trajectories with regard to 
enhancing their dominance, particularly over the state and its apparatuses. These 
dominant parties have taken different trajectories with respect to enhancing their 
dominance over civil society, thereby making tlle impact of party dominance upon 
democratization and subsequently democracy differ in these countries. 
In many developing countries party dominance initially had a positive effect upon 
the transition from white minority rule to black majority rule by ensuring political 
stability. Party dominance became a stabilizing mechanism whereby the dominant parties 
like KANU and the ANC, attempted to contain potential disintegrative forces by 
hegemonizing the political game and economy through elite settlements such as Kenya' s 
Constitutional Conferences of the early 1960s in the United Kingdom, and the formation 
of pol itical alliances, such as the Tripartite Allianc,e in South Africa. The political elite 
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became only too aware of the need to nurture the fragile democracies through 
compromises and settlements rather than ri sk national disintegration. During these 
transitions, the dominant parties allowed meaningful political competition and respected 
a large measure of civil and political liberties. Initially, democratic and democracy-
promoting institutions operated freely without much interference from the dominant party 
The post-independence periods of ma.ny countries under party dominance present 
a different state of affairs . In some countries, like Kenya, despite regular elections, party 
dominance continues to be maintained and enhanced in whole by undemocratic means. In 
South Africa, so far, it is to a large extent an accurate expression of the will of the people, 
expressed in democratic procedures. In many African countries, such as Kenya, party 
dominance has existed under conditions of social stagnation and political control. In 
those African countries considered to be democracies, like South Africa, party dominance 
exists under situations of social dynamics and political openness, something akin to 
industrialized democracies. However, a similarity in all African countries that are 
governed by dominant party systems is that the dominant party has at one time or the 
other reshaped its fo llowing through the use of state resources, enabling it to pursue its 
agenda, be this agenda be progressive or regressive. Dominant parties in African 
countries continue to delegitimise opposition parties on various grounds. This is because 
of the fact that many African countries are divided societies and therefore many 
conditions, such as ethnicity, race and class, exist in which the electorate is open to 
delegitimation. Delegitimising opposition parties has in effect weakened them, thereby 
rendering these organizations for safeguarding democracy, ineffective to a large extent. 
Dominant parties in Africa were or continue to be alliances of diverse social, 
economic and political interests. These alliances were formed as a result of reconciliation, 
reward or even pacification. These were partly as a result of the need to create a sense of 
national unity and political consciousness, a key pre-condition for meaningful 
democracy, and of the need for national integration. This has made it difficult for such 
parties to adhere to organizational coherence and discipline. Dominant parties in Africa 
are usually characterized by intra-party power struggles. Since they are not willing to lose 
any sections of their support base or political constituency, dominant parties do not 
enforce strict party discipline. This is evident in the post-1990 period in South Africa and 
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Kenya. Following the re-introduction of multipartyism in Kenya, KANU has not been 
enforcing strict party discipline, even among those considered to be party rebels, for fear 
of losing key sections of it support base. 
Since its independence, Kenya, under a single party and multiparty system has 
been conducting regular elections. The country has held 9 general elections. Despite these 
regular elections, party dominance in the country has been achieved on the whole by 
undemocratic means, primarily through the use of the state and its apparatuses. Making 
use of the executive, KANU has and continues to interfere and manipulate the legislature 
and the judiciary in order to augment its political power and dominance. It also continues 
to interfere in other state institutions that are supposed to uphold democracy, such as the 
ECK, in order to manipUlate the electoral process. The manipulation of these institutions 
of the executive, legislature and judiciary to suit KANU's political interests has led to a 
condition of bad or poor govemance. This has manifested itself in many ways, from a 
rampant corruption in the country to the ruling party's disrespect for the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals, organizations and the society. In other words, state 
institutions that are supposed to support democracy are institutionally weak and hence 
functionally ineffective. Although KANU has been unable to extend completely its 
influence over the civi l society, the latter's organizations lack effective leadership, 
doctrines, programmes, and resources, thereby rendering them ineffective as agents for 
providing a system of checks and balances for the system. Party dominance has had 
detrimental effects upon democracy in Kenya. The existence of formal democratic 
institntions such as regular multi-party elections, has masked the reality of authoritarian 
domination or rule. 
Party dominance in South Africa has not had much detrimental effect upon the 
democratization process and subsequently democracy. In South Africa, party dominance 
under the ANC is largely an accurate expression of the will of the majority, expressed in 
democratic procedures. The outcome of the 1994 and 1999 non-racial multi-party 
elections reflected an accurate expression of the will of the people. In both elections, the 
ANC captured more than 60 per cent of the votes cast setting the stage for the emergence 
of party dominance in the post-apartheid era. The ANC is now trying to enhance its 
dominance through various means, such as transfonnation and corporatism. The ANC 
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argues that in order for it to transform South African society into a non-racist and non-
sexist one, it needs to enhance its dominance over the state and society. Transformation 
has therefore taken on a moral dimension, thereby legitimizing the process. The ANC 
argues that this process is, therefore part of democratization. Forming corporatist and 
quasi-corporatist arrangements such as NED LAC and the Tripartite Alliance respectively 
so that the key social economic and political actors can safeguard and advance their 
interests is also healthy for democracy. This has helped contain potentially disintegrative 
forces . To this extent, transformation, as a moral process, and corporatism, as political 
prudence, are healthy for democracy in South Africa. Party dominance and its impact 
upon South Africa has also not had any detTimental effects upon institutions that 
administer justice. The judicial system continues to operate independently of individual 
and organs of the state as enshrined in the country 's constitution. This is despite the 
constant accusations and criticisms of bias and racism directed by the ANC against the 
judiciary. There are instances where high-ranking ANC officials, such as Allan Boesak, 
have been convicted in the courts and imprisoned for various offences. There are many 
instances where the government has lost significant cases in the Constitutional Court. The 
administration and application of fair justice is an integral component of democracy in 
any society. 
Though party dominance has had no major detrimental effects upon democracy in 
South Africa, there are emerging trends that indicate that this might happen in the near 
future. Party dominance is gradually beginning to have detrimental effects, particularly in 
the executive and to some extent in the legislature. Party dominance has begun 
weakening key institutions of the executive that are supposed to ensure accountability 
and transparency and hence good governance. This has manifested itself in the increasing 
number of cases of corruption, nepotism and political patronage. Various government 
reports, such as those of the Auditor-General and the SIU, point to rising corruption at all 
levels and in all spheres of government. Other reports such as that of the Presidential 
Review Commission, also highlight the increasing numbers of cases of nepotism and 
political patronage appointments. These reports also point out the detrimental effects of 
such appointments. Among the key institutions that appear to be weakening is that of the 
Public Protector. The Public Protector has on many occasions made decisions that 
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suggest or appear to suggest that he is party political partisan. On several occasions, the 
Public Protector has absolved high-ranking government and ANC officials as well as the 
government itself, of accusations of corruption and nepotism among others. A notable 
example is the findings of the controversial Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic 
Defence Packages, whereby other than Tony Yengeni, the ANC Chief Whip, all other 
high-ranking government and ANC officials, including the government as a whole, were 
cleared of accusations of COlTuption and fraud. To this extent, it can be argued that South 
Africa is heading in the same direction as Kenya and many other dominant party systems, 
such as Zimbabwe. If party dominance continues to have a detrimental effect upon the 
institutions that ensure transparency and accountability in the executive, then South 
Africa will eventually end up like Kenya. Kenya has functionally ineffective institutions 
that are supposed to ensure accountabi lity and transparency in the executive. This as 
mentioned earlier leads to a condition of bad governance. It is in effect, the beginning of 
authoritarian domination. 
Party dominance is also beginning to have detrimental effects upon the legislature 
in South Africa. This is to a large extent due to the ANC's majority in the National 
Assembly and not necessarily to the nature of the party itself. The ANC is so far by 
nature more democratic than KANU. As in Kenya, party dominance is beginning to have 
its harmful effects upon parliamentary committees. These committees, dominated by the 
ANC, operate under political constraints. Where there are cases involving high profile or 
controversial issues, many ANC MPs in these committees are not willing to be critical 
lest they be accused of being disloyal to the party. There have been instances where 
outspoken ANC MPs critical of government decisions, in such committees have been 
replaced by moderate ones. A case in point is that of ANC MP Andrew Feinstein who as 
Chairperson of the ANC's study group and patty spokesperson on public accounts in 
SCOPA was replaced by Geoff Doidge, as a result of the arms deal scandal. This 
emerging trend is not healthy for democracy as these parliamentary committees are also 
established to ensure transparency and accountability in government particularly the 
executive. Like in Kenya, parliamentary committees in South Africa may eventually be 
subordinated to the executive. 
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Dominant parties usually seek or strive to delegitimise and isolate opposition 
parties so as to strengthen their own electoral position. This is precisely what the ANC is 
doing in South Africa. Whereas KANU is delegitimising opposition parties on the 
grounds of ethnicity, the ANC is also doing so on the grounds of racism. The only 
difference between the two countries is that while ethnocentrism or ethnic politics is to a 
large extent a result of KANU's tactics of divide and rule, racism in South Africa is a 
function of apartheid. It can therefore be argued, that the ANC is delegitimising 
opposition parties since the moral conditions or grounds exist for delegitimation. This is 
not appropriate for democracy, since meaningful democratization and democracy requires 
robust and vibrant opposition parties that provide effective checks and balances. If the 
ANC continues to delegitimise opposition parties, there is the possibility that such parties 
will weaken, as in the case of Kenya, leading to a condition of authoritarian dominance. 
The nature of authoritarian party dominance in Kenya and the gradual trend 
towards this undemocratic party dominance in South Africa can be altered. There is a 
need to strengthen and institutionalize state and civil society organizations that will 
enhance greater transparency and accountability and hence good governance. There is 
also the need to formulate and implement good and sound economic policies that will 
accelerate the economic growth rate, as well as the development of a strong middle class 
that will safeguard democracy. Constitutional provisions should also be put in place so as 
to check or control excessive party dominance. 
In both countries, civil society must be strengthened and brought in to demand 
greater accountability and transparency in Government. The state, including all political 
actors, must create the necessary enabling political environment that will change 
structures that hinder the expression or potential of civil society organizations. Laws that 
inhibit the expression of potential organizations of civil society, such as the Non-
Governmental Coordination Act of 1990 in Kenya, should be amended or repealed, in 
order to strengthen the institutional capacity of these organizations. Both countries have 
vibrant civil societies as is made evident by their roles during the "second liberation" 
struggle of the early 1990s and the liberation struggle during the 1980s in Kenya and 
South Africa respectively. Civil society organizations, such as the NGOs and the 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) continue to playa significant role in socio-
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economic development. This vibrancy can be harnessed and civil society organizations 
made to playa greater role in ensuring transparency and accountability, both at the 
macro- and micro-level, or at all levels and in all spheres of government. Placing more 
emphasis on the nature of interactions between the state and civil society organizations, 
among civil society organizations themselves will also ensure good governance. Civil 
society capable of articulating its preferences and serving as a counterpoise to state power 
should be consolidated. In both countries, organizations of civil society can strengthen 
their institutional capacity in the political process by designing and implementing 
effective programmes aimed at enhancing good governance, accountability and 
transparency in the government. Such programmes, like civic education programmes, are 
already under way in both countries, despi te political interference in the case of Kenya. 
Strong opposition parties need to be developed in both countries. Compared to 
South Africa, Kenya's opposition parties are organizationally and financially weak, 
which affects their institutional capacity as mechanisms for safeguarding democracy. In 
both countries due to delegitimation, opposition parties are also becoming ineffective and 
are thus finding it difficult to perform their roles of ensuring accountability and 
transparency in government. Opposition parties should be strengthened to support good 
governance in both countries. In Kenya, there is the need for such parties to develop and 
improve on their leadership, through regular party elections. Like KANU most of the 
opposition parties do not conduct regular party elections as stipulated by their party 
constitutions. The leadership should also be elected in a manner reflecting a sense of 
nationalism in the parties rather than ethnocentrism. Opposition parties also need to 
develop their financial resources, by raising funds through membership dues, and 
contributions or donations from other interested individuals and organizations. The 
government should also enact legislation, like the Public Funding of Represented 
Political Parties Act No. 103 of 1997 of South Africa that will entitle all represented 
political parties in the National Assembly, to state funding. Opposition political parties in 
Kenya also need to improve on their doctrines and programmes if they to convince the 
electorate that they are viable alternative governments in waiting. Some opposition 
parties, like FORD-Asili in 1992, did not even have a serious election manifesto. These 
opposition parties also need to set up linkages with other organizations of civil society 
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and the business sector, so as to establish credible networks capable of acting as a check 
against the abuse of state power by the dominant party. In South Africa, one of the 
greatest problems facing the major parliamentary opposition parties is their racial 
composition and the interests they appear to represent. Opposition political parties such 
as the DP and the NNP are predominantly white and appear to represent white interests. 
They have thus been subjected to much delegitimation, given South Africa's past 
political dispensation. Any criticism directed by them at the ANC, be it constructive or 
not, is termed as racist. This has also rendered them, to a large extent, ineffective as 
organizations for safeguarding democracy. White South African opposition political 
parties should start articulating the interests of the majority of the population if they 
expect to strengthen their membership on non-racial lines. This will make them less 
subject to de legitimation. By strengthening opposition political parties in both countries, 
citizen influence upon the policy-making process is bound to increase since, there will be 
greater political participation and public accountability. Opposition parties need not be 
adversarial, they can be robust and effective at the same time. However, this is a difficult 
task for Kenya and South Africa since they are deeply divided societies on ethnic and 
racial grounds respectively. KANU and the ANC have grounds and conditions for 
continued delegitimation. Tolerance of opposition parties becomes the first step in 
strengthening these organizations. Democracy requires the development of strong 
opposition parties that can filter citizens' demands and thus facilitate compromise. 
Despite the relatively strong state institutions in South Africa and weak state 
institutions in Kenya, there is still the need to further strengthen them in both countries. 
This can be done through meaningful constitutional provisions that will limit excessive 
interference from the executive. In both countries, there is a need to transfer some of the 
executive powers of the President to the legislature. For example, the responsibility of 
appointing high-ranking government officials, such as the Attorney-General, the 
Controller and Auditor-General, the Public Protector and the Chief Justice, among others, 
should be vested entirely in the National Assembly. This will reduce the possibility of 
unlimited political interference from the dominant party and in turn will make the 
government more responsible in terms of adherence to the rule of law, and more 
responsive to the needs to the public. By making such offices completely independent of 
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the executive, the occupants of such offices will be in a position to perform their duties 
without fear or favour. In the case of Kenya, constitutional provisions that ensure the 
participation of parties represented in the National Assembly, in key political decisions, 
should be enacted. These institutions should be strengthened to the extent that the 
incumbents of such offices should not be in a position to influence them in a detrimental 
manner. In other words the institutional capacities of these institutions should be 
stTengthened in such a manner that they are not influenced by individual actions. 
Granting them greater autonomy and independence from the executive, backed by 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing this independence ought to be the first step in the 
process toward strengthening them. 
The detrimental effects of pruiy dominance can also be altered by the formulation 
and implementation of good or sound economic development policies. In other words, 
good economic development policies are to a large extent some of the pillars of 
democracy. Surplus resources are generated when meaningful economic development 
occurs. The surplus resources can be used for redistribution, further legitimizing the 
democratic process. Parties seeking to enhance their dominance will often attempt to 
implement good economic development policies. More important is the need to 
implement economic policies that will facilitate the rapid establishment and expansion of 
a strong bourgeoisie or middle class. This is particularly so in South Africa's case. There 
is the need to hasten the transformation process and black economic empowerment so as 
to create a strong black bourgeoisie middle class that is loyal to the new political 
dispensation and democracy. This ought to be a strong black middle class that is 
involved m industrialization, particularly, the manufacturing sector. Rapid 
industrialization can in tum contribute to meaningful democracy, since surplus resources 
are generated. Surplus resources generated as a result of industrialization and economic 
growth can be used for redistribution, further legitimizing the democratic process. A 
strong middle class can also act as a guarantor of democracy if its interests are 
safeguarded or protected by such a system. 
Finally, with regard to Kenya the authoritarian nature of party dominance can be 
altered through a meaningful constitutional process that is people-driven and therefore 
takes a bottom-up approach. A constitutional review process that is carried out in the 
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National Assembly, which is dominated by KANU, is unlikely to effect any meaningful 
reforms that will effectively democratize the political process. The country's new 
constitution ought as does South Africa's Constitution, to make provisions for the 
establishment of institutions that uphold democracy. It also ought to make provisions for 
the decentralization of political power by transforming the polity into a federal or quasi-
federal state, as is the case in South Africa. This will, to a large extent, limit the problem 
of too much centralization of governmental and political power. 
In as much as the dominant party system is in essence a democracy since there are 
regular elections, while opposition parties are free to organize and civil liberties are at 
least to some extent, respected, the condition can degenerate to that level where such 
formal institutions mask the reality of authoritarian dominance. Party dominance in both 
countries therefore needs to be checked. If not checked, it can lead to a condition of chaos 
where the dominant party goes to the extent of disregarding the rule of law and violating 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, organizations and the society as a 
whole. This has been evident in Kenya where, during the election period, the dominant 
party using state and security apparatuses instigates ethnic violence in a bid to achieve its 
desired political objectives of retaining or controlling political power in certain regions. 
While party dominance can be an effective mechanism for ensuring political stability, it 
can also, ifleft Lillchecked, lead to conditions of political instability and disorder. 
The comparative study of party dominance in African countries is important in 
that it develops the academic and policy debate on issues of good governance, 
democratization and subsequently democracy. Though the findings of this study 
demonstrate that South Africa is gradually taking a similar trajectory particularly with 
regard to the executive and legislature, the study itself is not conclusive and as such 
identifies further areas of research. There is need a for further research on the impact of 
party dominance upon the political economy of both countries or any other African 
country or countries, since there is also a controversial academic debate as to whether 
economic development should precede democracy or not. It will be interesting to study 
the effects of party dominance on key issues such as economic growth rates, the 
development of a middle class, industrialization, land reform programmes etc. Further 
research also needs to be done on party dominance and specific organizations of civil 
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society that are involved in democratization and democracy issues, such as human rights 
NGOs and CBOs. This will contribute knowledge in the key area of party dominance 
democracy and grassroots organizations in African countries 
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APPENDIX 1 
Emergency Statistics up to the end of 1956 
Killed Captured Captured in Arrested Surrendered 
Wonnded Action 
Mau Mau 11,503 1,035 1,550 26,625 2,7 14 
Casualties 
Killed Wounded 
SPECIAL FORCES CASUALTIES 
European 63 101 
Asian 3 12 
African 101 1,469 
LOYAL CIVILIANS 
European 32 26 
Asian 26 36 
African 1,819 916 
Total 2,044 2,560 
Source: Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Cor field Report) . Presented to 
Parliament by the SecretalY of State for the Colon ies by Command of Her Majesty May 1960 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1960), p. 316. 
Cost of Emergency up to 30th June 1959 
UK Pounds (£) 
Grants from Her Majesty' s Government 24,250,000 
Interest free loans from Her Majesty' s Government 5,250,000 
Borne by the Kenya Government 26,085 ,424 
Total 55,585,424 
Source: Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Cor field Report) ibid, p.3 16 
Income 
Expenditure 
Balance 
KENYA PARLIAMENT 
Income and Expenditure Record 
Year 1953 
Shillings iShsl 
47,622.51 
42,906.39 
4,756.12 
Source: KINY A ITl, M W A Kenya's Freedom Struggle: The Dedan Klmathl Papers (London: 
Zed Books Ltd, 1987), p.115 
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APPENDIX 2 
Military Structure of the MAU MAD Land and Freedom Army 
KENYA DEFENCE 
COUNCIL 
FOREST GUERILLA WING URBAN GUERILLA WING 
1 1 
Giku)'u Ituma Kenya MEl Kenya Mburu Gikuyu Townwatch 
lregi Ndemi Inooro Mathat Levellat Ngebo na Batallions 
Army Army Army hi ion Army Mumbi 
Army Army Army 
Batallions Commanders Areas of Operation 
Gikuyu Iregi Army General Kago Murang'a 
General Ihura 
Brigadier Njatl! 
Huma Ndemi Army General Kahiu-Itina Nyeri 
General Kitura 
Kenya Inooro Army Kiambu and Narok 
MEl Mathathi Army General Tanganyika Mt. Kenya 
General Ach ira 
General Kubukubu 
General Bamuingi 
General Mwariama 
Kenya Levellation Army General Kariba Nyeri countryside 
General Kamani 
General Mukura 
Mburu Ngebo Army General Gateru Rift Valley 
General Kimbo 
General Muraya 
Gikuyu na Mumbi Army 
Townwatch Batallions General Enock M wangi Urban Areas 
Source: Created from Kinyatti, M Wa Kenya's Freedom Struggle: The Dedan Kimathi 
Papers (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1987) pp. 6 
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APPENDIX 3 
Participants In The Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962 
I: MEMBERSHIP 
Kenya 
Elected Members Of The Legislative Council 
KADU Parliamentary Group 
Sheikh MA Alamoody 
Mr. RS Alexander 
Mr. MS Amalemba 
Sir Michael Blundell, KBE 
Mr. RP Cleasby 
Mr. WB Havelock 
Air Commodore EL Howard-Williams, MC 
Mr. AB Jamidar 
Mr. AM Jeneby 
Mr. EE Khasakhala 
Mr. A Kilelu 
Mr. JLN ole Konchellah 
Mr. RA Macleod 
Mr. RS Matano 
Mr. B Mate 
Mr. DT arap Moi 
Mr. PM Muliro 
Mr. WC Murgo!" 
Mr. RG Ngala 
Mr. PJH Okondo 
Mr. SS Patel 
Mr. JL Porter 
Mr. MJ Seroney 
Mrs. AR Shaw 
Mr. JK ole Tipis 
Mr. TTowett 
Mr. W Wabuge 
KANU Parliamentary Group 
Mr. JH Angaine 
Mr. SJ Anjarwalla 
Mr. P A Areman 
Mr. CMG Argwings-Kodhek 
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Mr. SA Ayodo 
Mr. TM Chokwe 
Mr. Zafrud Deen 
Mr. FRS de Souza 
Mr. DQ Erskine 
Mr. JS Gichuru 
Mr. AH Jamal 
Mr. J Keen 
Mr. J Kenyatta 
Dr. JG Kiano 
Mr. DB Kohli 
Mr. BR Mckenzie, DSO, DFC 
Mr. PD Man'ian 
Mr. FMGMati 
Mr. TJ Mboya 
Mr. Jan Mohammed 
Mr. HN Mulli 
Mr. D Mwanyumba 
Mr. EN Mwendwa 
Mr. G Nthenge 
Mr. JIM N yagah 
Mr. FW Odede 
Mr. A Oginga Odinga 
Mr. LG Sagini 
Mr. KP Shah 
Mr. C Singh 
Mr. V Wokabi 
Kenya Coalition 
Mr. DL Cole, MBE 
Mr. CW Salter, QC 
Mr. LRN Welwood 
Mwambao United Front 
Mr. OS Bassadiq 
Sheikh A N assir 
Cross Benchers 
Mr. AR Khalif 
Mr. AJ Pandya 
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Advisers 
Dr. E Zellweger (KADU PG) 
Mr. FM Bennet, M.P (KADU PG) 
Dr. B Malik (KANU PG) 
Mr. HBW Macallan (Kenya Coalition) 
Government of Kenya 
Sir Patrick Renison, KCMG, Governor 
Mr. AMF Webb, QC 
Mr. RE Luyt, CMG, DCM 
Mr. FA Loyd, CMG, OBE 
Mrs. PI Abwao 
United Kingdom 
The Rt. Hon. Reginald Maudling, M.P, Secretary of State for the Colonies 
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Perth, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs 
The Hon. Hugh Fraser, M.B.E, M.P, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Colonial 
Office 
Sir Hilton Poynton, KCMG 
Sir John Martin, KCMG, CB, OBE 
Mr. JC McPetrie, CMG, OBE 
Mr. WBL Monson, CMG 
Mr. FD Webber, CMG, MC, TD 
Mr. H. Steel 
Mr. P J Ki tcatt 
Mr. PR Noakes 
Mr. GW St. J Chadwick, CMG 
Mr. KA East 
Mr. CE Wool-Lewis, OBE 
Constitutional Adviser to the Conference 
Sir Ralph Hone, KCMG, KBE, MC, TO 
Secretariat 
Mr. AM MacKintosh, C.M.G, Secretary-General, Cabinet Office 
Mr. PJ Kitcatt, Assistant Secretary-General, Colonial Office 
Mr. WT I-lull, Secretary, Colonial Office 
Mr. GO Young, Secretary Colonial, Office 
Mr. ER Bright, Secretary, Colonial Office 
Mr. LTJ Stapleton, Secretary, Colonial Office 
Mr. R W Francis, Press Officer, Colonial Office 
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Mr. A W Cassey, Documents Officer, Cabinet Office 
Mr. AH Grey, Conference Officer, Foreign Office 
II: DELEGATIONS RECEIVED 
Masai Delegation 
Mr. JK ole Sein 
Mr. Pole Lemein 
Dr. Likimani 
Mr. Pole Nambaso 
Mr. J ole Tameno 
Mr. JK ole Tipis 
Mr. JKeen 
Mr JLH ole Konchellah 
Mr. P Rurumban (Observer) 
Mr. RL McEwen (Legal Advisor) 
Northern Frontier Delegation 
Mr. YH Abdi 
Mr.AFarah 
ChiefHG Dida 
Mr. Murgian 
Mr. A Kholkholli 
Sheikh Mohammed 
Mr. AR Khalif 
Mr. N Lawson, QC 
Source: Kenya National Archives (KNA), MAC/KEN/48/8 Confidential Report of the 
Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962, Appendix I pp 13-15 
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APPENDIX 4 
Registered Political Parties in Kenya (As at 12'h November 1992) 
I. Forum For the Restoration of Democracy Kenya (FORD-K) 
2. Forum For the Restoration of Democracy-Asili (FORD Asili) 
3. Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) 
4. Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
5. Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA) 
6. Kenya National Congress (KNC) 
7. Patty ofIndependent Candidates (PICK) 
8. Labour Party Democracy 
9. Kenya Social Congress (KSC) 
10. Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
Source: Republic of Kenya, Depattment of Registrar-General, Registrar-General 
RGIGEN Registered Political Parties, 12th November 1992 p.l 
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APPENDIX 5 
Participating Political Parties in Kenya (1997 General Elections) 
I. Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK) 
2. National Development Party of Kenya (NDP) 
3. UMMA Patriotic Party of Kenya (UPPK) 
4. Labour Party Democracy (LPD) 
5. Green African Party (GAP) 
6. United Patriotic Party of Kenya (UPPK) 
7. Liberal Party of Kenya (LPK) 
8. Safina (Safina) 
9. Fonml fo r the Restoration of Democracy for the People (FORD-P) 
10. Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
11. Economic Independence Party (EIP) 
12. Kenya Social Congress (KSC) 
13. Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA) 
14. Kenya National Congress (KNC) 
15. Democratic Assistance Party (DAP) 
16. Federal Party of Kenya (FPK) 
17. Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD Asili) (FORD-A) 
18. Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) 
19. Reform of Political and Kenya Union (RPKU) 
20. New Peoples Democratic Party (NPDP) 
21. Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD Kenya) (FORD-K) 
22. Kenya Nationalist Peoples Democratic Party (KNPDP) 
23. Social Democratic Party of Kenya (SDP) 
24. Kenya Socialist Party (KSP) 
25. Peoples Party of Kenya (PPK) 
26. Shirikisho Paliy of Kenya (SPK) 
27. Kenya Republican Reformation Party (KRRP) 
Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Party Codes and Symbols For 
Participating Political Parties (1997 General Elections) 12'h August 1998, pp.I-2. 
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APPENDIX 6 
KANU's Hierarchical Structure 
I Nat. Delegates Conference 
~ 
I National Governing Council 
~ 
I National Exec. Committee 
... 
... ... 
National Officials Party Branches (Districts) 
Committee (Branch Executive Committee.) 
~ 
Sub Branches 
Party Secretariat (Sub-Branch Working Comm.) 
+ 
Locations 
(Location Working Comm .) 
Sub Location (Villages) 
(Sub-Location Working 
Committee) 
Source: http ://www.kanu-kenya.org/hierarchychart.htm 
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APPENDIX 7 
The Power Structure of the Presidency in Kenya 
PRESIDENT 
PUBLIC JUDICIARY SECURITY 
SECTOR ORGANS 
Police 
Permanent KANU Paramilitary 
Secretaries 
Provincial Admin 
Military 
ECK 
State Corporations 
National KANU 
Assembly Branches 
Society (Grassroots Level) 
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I 
I 
APPENDIX 8 
The ANC's National and Regional Organizational Structure (1993) 
~ LJ 
National 
Conference 
I 
National Executive 
Committee 
I 
National Working 
Committee 
I 
President, 
Secretary, 
Treasury 
I 
Regional 
Executive 
Committees 
I 
IN.I ~ 
1Wl~~ ~~
I 
I So Natal I ~ ~ L'J 
Branches 
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I 
Orange Free State (OFS) 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) 
Natal 
Northern Cape 
Eastern Cape 
Western Cape 
North-West 
Eastern Transvaal (Tvl) 
Source: Rantete, J The African National Congress and the negotiated settlement in South 
Afi-ica (Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik Publishers, 1998) p.13 
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APPENDIX 9 
ANC and MK Structures, MK Camps and Commanders, Detention and 
Rehabilitation Centers, 1985 - 1994 
ANC AND MK STRUCTURES, 1985 - 1990 
The Kabwe Conference was held in May 1985. In response to the sharp increase in mass 
struggle inside the country, Pol itical HQ was replaced with a strengthened Internal 
Political Committee (lPC) in 1987. 
Operation Vula was launched in 1986, with Joe Slovo assisting the President. Mac 
Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils were among the leading figures in this project. By 1988, 
Mac Maharaj and Siphiwe Nyanda had been infiltrated into the country. 
MHQ was also extended, with the appointment of a number of deputies at HQ level. 
A Code of Conduct was adopted. In terms of the general (civilian) Code Of Discipline, 
three offices were established specifically to better regulate disciplinary procedures, and 
halt abuses that had been occurring. These were the Review Board, the Officer of Justice, 
and the National Peoples' Tribunal (NAT). 
A Provisional Directorate of Intelligence and Security was created to run NAT, and 
action was taken to clarify the command structures over NAT personnel deployed in 
Angola. A President's Council (also referred to as the National Security Committee) was 
established in the latter half of 1987, and was chaired by OR Tambo; this committee had 
the brief of overseeing the functioning of NAT and dealing with security issues in 
general. 
The NEC, 1985 - 1990 
For the first time the ANC had a fully-elected NEC, consisting of28 members. 
President: OR Tambo 
Secretary-General: Alfred Nzo 
Treasurer: Thomas Nkobi 
Other members: Johnny Makathini, Simon Makana, Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki, Chris 
Hani, Moses Mabhida (until his death in 1986), Tony Mongalo, Dan Tloome, John 
Motshabi , John Nkadimeng, Mac Maharaj, Cassius Make (until his assassination in 
Swaziland in 1987), Florence Moposho, Joe Nhlanhla, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Henry 
Makgothi, Pallo Jordan, Jacob Zuma, Joe Jele, Sizakele Sigxashe, Robert Manci, 
Gertrude Shope, Francis Meli , Reg September, Jackie Selibi, Hermanus Loots ("James 
Stuart"), Steve Tshwete, Zola Skweyiya. 
Other NEC members were co-opted in 1987: Ronnie Kasrils, Jackie Sedibe, Aziz Pahad, 
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and "Bra T" (Godfrey Ngwenya) and Sindiso Mfenyane. 
The Office of the President, 1985 - 1990 
The President's Committee 
This committee was establ ished in late 1987. 
Chair: OR Tambo 
Other members: The Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo; the Treasurer General, Thomas 
Nkobi ; the head of NAT, Joe Nhlanhla; Joe Modise. 
The Office of Justice 
This Office also reported to the President. 
Chair: Zola Skweyiya (appointed by the NEC in 1985.) 
The National Review Committee (the Review Board) 
The Review Board reported to the President and the NSC. 
Chair: Dan Tloome 
The National Peoples' Tribunal (the Tribunal) 
The Tribunal was appointed for a period of three years by the NEC. The President 
appointed the Chair from among the members of the Tribunal. The Tribunal would 
recommend sentences to the President, who would usually refer such cases to the Review 
Board. After the Board had dealt with a case, sentence would be confirmed by the 
President and carried out. 
Chair: Hermanus Loots ("James Stuart"): appointed in late 1985 
Other members: Shadrack Pekane; Z.N. Jobodwana. 
External Co-ordinating Committee, 1985-1990 
Chair: Alfred Nzo; also Thabo Mbeki, Johnny Makathini, and Hermanus Loots as 
Secretary. 
The PMC, 1985 - 1990 
Chair : OR Tambo 
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The Secretary ofthe PMC Secretariat was Joe "t\lhlanhla (1983/84-87), followed by Joe 
Jele (1987-90) 
MHQ representatives on the PMC: Joe Modise, Joe Slovo, Chris Hani, Steve Tshwete, 
Ronnie Kasrils, Job Tlhabane (until 1987) 
PHQ was replaced by the Internal Political Committee in 1987. PHQ/IPC representatives 
on the PMC during the period from 1985 - 1990 were: Mac Maharaj, Joe Je1e, Jacob 
Zuma, Ruth Mompati, Steve Tshwete, and Joel Netshitenzhe. 
NAT representatives on the PMC: Mzwai Piliso (until 1987); and then Joe Nhlanhla and 
Sizakele Sigxashe 
Other members 1984 - 1987 included Moses Mabhida and John Nkadimeng. 
The following structmes reported to the PMC 
Political HQ until 1987, when it was replaced by the Internal Political Committee in 
1987 
PHQ was led by Joe Jele, with Mac Maharaj, Jacob Zuma, Ruth Mompati, Steve Tshwete 
and Joel Netshitenzhe. 
Military HQ, 1985 - 1990 
Army Commander: Joe Modise 
Chief-of-Staff: Joe Slovo (1985 - 1987) Chris Hani (1985 - 1992) 
Commissar: Chris Hani (1985 - 1987) Steve Tshwete (1987) Godfrey Ngwenya (1987 -
1992) 
Chief of Operations : Lambert Moloi (J 983 - 1992) 
Deputy: Julius Maliba (1987 - 1994) 
Chief of Communications: Jackie Molefe (1983 - 1992) 
Deputy: Castro Bela (1987 - 1994) 
Chief of Military Intelligence: Ronnie Kasrils (1983 - 1989), Keith Mokoape (1989 -
1992) Mojo Motau (acting head as of 1992) 
Deputy: Keith Mokoape (1987 - 1989) 
Chief of Ordnance and Logistics: Job Tlhabane (1983 - 1987) 
In 1987 Ordnance and Logistics were separated into two separate sections: 
Logistics: Bogart Soze 
Ordnance: Aboobaker Ismail (1987 - 1994) 
Special Operations: Aboobaker Ismail until August 1987; then "Tommy Masinga" 
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The NAT Directorate, 1985 - 1990 
After the Kabwe Conference, the NEC appointed a Provisional Directorate of Intelligence 
and Security to run this Department. 
Director: Joe NhlanhJa (confirmed in 1987) 
Deputy Director and Head ofintelligence: Jacob Zuma (1988) 
Administrative Secretary: M. Timol 
Head of CIESI Processing and Analysis: Sizakele Sigxashe 
Head of Counter-Intelligence and Security: "Peter" Tshikari" (until 1986); then Jan 
Mampane 
Regional Politico-Military Committees (RPMC's), 1985 - 1990 
Swaziland RPMC, 1985 - 1990: 
Chair: ROMie Kasrils (chair, 1984); Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, until 1986 when he was 
abducted; Siphiwe Nyanda (1986 - 87/88); Silumko Sokupa (1988 - 1989) 
Other members: Sello Motau ("Paul Dikeledi") (1985 -1987); Thami Zulu (1985 -1988); 
Vusi Mavimbe1a (1985 -); Welile Nhlapo (1985 -) Shadrack Maphumulo (1985 -1987, 
when he was killed ). 
These committees reported to the Swaziland RPMC: 
Political Committee: 
"I van" chaired the Natal structure 
Billy Whitehead ("Archie") chaired the Transvaal structure 
Military Committee: 
Siphiwe Nyanda headed Transvaal structures 
Thami Zulu headed Natal structures 
Lesotho RPMC, 1985 - 1990 
The RPMC which had previously been working in Lesotho was structured as follows 
during this period: 
Chair: Charles Nqakula 
Chair of the Political Committee: Mzukisi Gaba 
Chair ofthe Military Committee: Skenjana Roji 
Chair of the Labour Committee: Tony Yengeni. 
In 1987 - 1988 this RPMC was restructured as follows: 
Chair: Charles NqakuJa 
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Chair of the Military Committee: James Ngculu 
Head of Special Operations: Edwin Mabitsela 
Security and Intelligence struchlres remained in place. Additional members taken on in 
this period were Lindinto Hlekani, Steve Tshwete, and Chris Pepani. 
Botswana RPMC, 1985 - 1990 
Botswana RPMC, mid-1 985 
After the Kabwe Conference, an RPMC was established to replace the Co-ordinating 
Committee. 
Chair: Thenjiwe Mthintso, Wltil 1987; then Thabang Makwetla 
Military representative: "Naledi" (Patrick Mavundla) 
Political representative: Wally Serote 
Structures resorting WIder the 1985 RPMC in Botswana included the following: 
Political Committee: chaired by Thabang Makwetla 
Military Committee: chaired by Thenjiwe Mthintso 
Botswana RPMC, 1986: 
In 1986, the RPMC had to change; Wally Serote was withdrawn to Lusaka .. 
Chair: Barry Gilder (temporarily), then Thenjiwe Mthintso 
Secretary: Thabang Makwetla 
Military representative: Dan Hatto and Patrick MaVWldla ("Naledi ") 
Structures resorting under the 1986 Botswana RPMC were as follows: 
Political machinery: Thabang Makwetla, Thabo Kubu, James Raditsela, Mapule 
Raditsela, Hassan Ebrahim, Kgomotso Jolobe. 
Military machinery: Patrick Mvundla ("Naldei Sehume", who was killed in the SADF 
raid of28/03/88); Boy Molokoane (who was killed in an ambush outside Francistown in 
January 1988); "ltumeleng" Tsimane, and Dan Hatto. 
Botswana RPMC, 1987 
After 1986, structures had to change again and the RPMC was composed of the following 
cadres: 
Chair: Thabang Makwetla 
Other members: January Masilela, Zakes Tolo, James Ngculu, Barry Gilder. 
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During this period a specialised structure concentrating on the Western Cape was set up 
and was composed of the following cadres: James Ngculu, Dick Ngomane, "Blah" 
Riekets, and later Miranda N gculu. 
Zimbabwe RPMC, 1985 - 1990 
This RPMC was only set up in 1985. 
Chair: Julius Maliba ("Manchecker") 
Secretary: Garth Strachan 
Other members: Ngoako Ramatlhodi , Linda Mti, Jabulani Nkabinde, and "Oliver" 
The Zimbabwe RPMC had three committees: 
Political Committee: 
Chair: Ngoako Ramatlhodi (1986 - 1987) 
Secretary: Garth Strachan 
Otller members: Derek and Trish Hanekom; Jimmy Corrigall; Pete Roussos 
Military Committee: 
Chair: Julius Maliba (1985 - 1986) Jabulani Nkabinde (1986 - 1992) 
Other members : "Ali", "Oliver", Benjamin Mongalo 
There were also NAT representatives. 
Ordnance: the head ofthe regional Ordnance structure was Benjamin Mongalo, who 
reported directly to Lusaka. An additional structure was set up under J. Modimo, tasked 
with infiltrating arms into the country, which also reported directly to Lusaka. 
London RPMC, 1985 - 1990 
Chaired by Aziz Pahad; also Wally Serote. 
Angola, 1985 - 1989 
Regional Command: 
Regional Commander: Timothy Mokoena (until 1987) 
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"Ali" Makhosini (1987 - 1989) 
Deputy Commander: Mike Sandlana (until 1989) 
Regional Commissar: January Masilela (until 1987/8) 
NAT representative: Dexter Mbona (1986 - 1989) 
Regional NAT structure: 
Head: Dexter Mbona (1985 - 1989) 
Deputy head: Gabriel Mthembu ("Sizwe Mkhonto"), (1984- 1986) 
Uganda, (1989 - 1991) 
Commander: Thabi Mofokeng 
Head of Regional NAT Directorate: Quesh D1amini 
ANC AND MK STRUCTURES, 1990 - 1994 
With the unbanning of the ANC, the release of the ANC leadership from prison and the 
return of exiles, many changes took place. A range of new structures had to be set up to 
meet the challenge of negotiations and the return of exiles. Tokyo Sexwale was tasked 
with attempting to take care of the need of MK cadres until MK HQ personnel arrived in 
the country. Key structures set up dW'ing this period included the Negotiations 
Commission. In response to the state-sponsored violence that took off in July/August 
1990, a Peace Desk was established. 
Political structures at HQ were re-organised into an internal re-organisation committee, 
which Ronnie Kasrils, Steve Tshwete and Sue Rabkin as key officials. 
Here we concentrate only on those structures that are of relevance to the mandate of the 
TRC. 
The NEC, 1990 - July 1991 
The NEC as constituted after the Kabwe Conference was reinforced by released leaders. 
The NEC, 1991 - 1994 
At the National Conference in July 1991, the following people were elected: 
President: Nelson Mandela 
National Chairperson: OR Tambo 
Deputy President: Walter Sisulu 
Secretary-General: Cyril Ranlaphosa 
Deputy Secretary-General: Jacob Zuma 
Treasurer-General: Thomas Nkobi 
304 
The rest of the NEe: 
Kader Asmal, Thozamile Botha, Cheryl Carolus, Jeremy Cronin, Ebrahim Ismail 
Ebrahim, Harry Gwala, Clu'is Hani, Pallo Jordan, ROlmie Kasrils, Ahmed Kathrada, 
Terror Lekota, Saki Macozoma, Mac Maharaj, Rocky Malebane-Metsing, Winnie 
Mandela, Trevor Manuel, Gill Marcus, Barbara Masekela, Thabo Mbeki, Raymond 
Mhlaba, Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew Mlangeni, Joe Modise, Popo Molefe, Ruth Mompati, 
Mohammed Valli Moosa, Elias Motsoaledi, Mendi Msimang, Sydney Mufamadi, Billy 
Nair, Sister Bernard Ncube, Joe Nhlanhla, John Nkadimeng, Siphiwe Nyanda, Alfred 
Nzo, Dullah Omar, Aziz Pahad, Albie Sachs, Reg September, Albertina Sisulu, Zola 
Skweyiya, Joe Slovo, Marion Sparg, Raymond Suttner, Steve Tshwete, Mcwayizeni 
Zulu. 
Office of the President, 1991 - 1994 
This was closed down after 199 1. 
Military HQ, 1990 - 1994 
Commander-in-Chief: Nelson Mandela 
Army Commander: Joe Modise 
Chief of Staff: Chris Hani (1985 - late 1992) Siphiwe Nyanda (1993-1994) 
Deputy Chief-of-Staff: Siphiwe Nyanda (until late 1992) 
Chief of Personnel : Godfrey N gwenya 
Deputy: Johannes Modimo 
Chief of Operations: Lambert Moloi (1983 - 1992) 
Chief of Communications: Jackie Molefe (1983 - 1992) 
Chief of Military Intelligence: Ronnie Kasrils (1983 - 1987) Keith Mokoape (1987-
1992) 
Logistics: Bogart Soze 
Ordnance: Aboobaker Ismail (1987 - 1994) 
(Note: most of these posts were no longer operational posts in accordance with the ANC's 
commitment to suspend armed actions in 1990.) 
The NAT Directorate, 1990 -1994 
Director: Joe Nh1anhla 
Head ofIntelligence: Jacob Zuma, until 1993 ; Terror Lekota, 1993; Alfred Nzo, 1993-
1994 
Head of Counter-Intelligence: Daniel Oliphanti 
Deputy Head, CI: Lizo Njenje 
Head of Security: J. Mampane 
Head of marshallsl 
Deputy head, Security: Nceba Sktm1buzo Radu, 1992 - 1994 
Administrative Secretary: Billy Masetlha (1991 - 1994) 
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MK CAMPS AND COMMANDERS 
During the period from 1976 - 1980, camps in Angola fell under the command of the late 
Mzwandile Piliso, at the time head of the department of Military Training and Personnel. 
In 1980, Simon Shekeshe ("Julius Mokoena") was appointed Regional Commander. He 
was succeeded by Gral1am Morodi ("Mashego") in 1982. Godfrey Ngwenya 
("Timothy Mokoena") was the next Regional Commander until 1985 when he was 
injured in a UNIT A an1bush, and then Ali Makhosini took over this post. The following 
MK camps were maintained by the ANC in Angola; all camps were closed down in 1989, 
when military structures were shifted to Uganda and Tanzania. 
Gabela Training Camp 
This was the fIrst training camp to be opened in Angola by the ANC, in 1976. It catered 
for the fIrst group of 40 MK cadres to receive military training in Angola, and was under 
the command ofFAPLA and Cuban instructors. Gabela Training Camp was merged with 
Benguela Can1p in 1977. 
Engineering Luanda (Transit Camp) 
This camp opened in late 1976 and was closed in mid-1977. It catered for only two 
intakes of cadres who were in transit to training camps. The average number of cadres 
present was 200. 
Commander: Simon Shekeshe, then "Castro" Ramokgopa 
Benguela Transit Camp 
This transit camp was established in mid 1977 for cadres who had been at Engineering 
Can1p and Gabela camp, and who were on their way to open Nova Catengue Training 
Camp. The numerical strength was around 300 cadres. The camp was closed in 1982. 
Commanders: Simon Shekeshe, followed by "Dlokolo. " 
Nova Catengue Training Camp 
Established in 1976, this camp accommodated around 500 cadres from the transit camps 
listed above. The camp was destroyed in an aerial bombardment in 1979, based on 
intelligence supplied to the apartheid regime by infiltrators within MK. 
Commander: Simon Shekeshe. 
Quibaxe Training Camp 
Originally a transit camp established in September 1977, it became a training can1p in 
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19? It accommodated around 200 cadres. The camp closed in 1989. 
Commaoders: Successively, Parker Tsie (1977 - 1980), Oupa G. Baoda, Seremane 
Kgositsile ("Kenneth Mahamba"), Livingstone Tom Gaza, Herbert Malinga, and Lloyd 
Mabizela, Sydney Mpila. 
Funda Training Camp 
Established in 1976, this camp usually had fewer than 100 cadres present at any time. It 
was closed in 1988. This camp provided specialised training. 
Commaoders: Zakes Tolo, then Seeiso Morapedi. 
Fazenda Military Camp 
Fazenda camp was established in 1978. It catered for trained cadres who were undergoing 
further training courses, including "survival" training. The numerical strength was around 
200 cadres at any time. It was closed in 1980 or early 1981 when it was merged with 
Quibaxe camp. 
Commaoder: Livingstone Tom Gaza 
Pango Camp 
Founded in 1979 after the destruction of Nova Catengue in April that year. The numerical 
strength was around 400 cadres at aoy time. It closed in 1989. 
Commanders: Successively, Thami Zulu (1979 - 1981), Seremane Kgositsile, Godfrey 
Ngwenya, Matthews Nkosi, Phillip Sebothoma, Dumile Thabekhulu, Ben Senokoanyane. 
Viana Transit Camp (also known as Camp 001) 
Established in 1979, this camp catered for newly recruited members ofMK on their way 
to other camps for military training. The average strength of the camp was around 400 
cadres. It closed in 1989. 
Commaoders: Sucessively, Dao Hatto, Golden Rahube, Steven Kobe, Johnson Laoga, 
Lawrence Madi, Leepo Modise. 
Hoji Ya Henda (also known as Camalundi) 
Founded in 1980, the camp was short-lived aod was closed in Jaouary 1981, when it was 
shifted to Caculama aod became known as Caculama Camp or Malaoje. It catered for 
around 300 - 400 cadres at any time. 
Commanders: Mzwakhe Ngwenya, then Godfrey N. Ngwenya 
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Caculama (Malanje) 
Established in January 1981, as described above. Around 400 cadres were accommodated 
at this camp. It was closed in 1989. 
Commanders: Successively, Godfrey N. Ngwenya, Sipho Binda, Thibe Lesole, Dumisane 
Mafo, Themba Nkabinde, Steven Kobe. 
Caxito Training Camp 
This camp replaced Funda camp in 1979. The number of cadres varied from time to time 
but more than 100 were seldom present. Caxito was in a malaria-infested area and was 
for this reason closed down in 1984. 
Commanders: Successively, Andile Ndzanga, Robert Mandita, Dumile Thabekhulu, and 
Ben Senokoanyane. 
Source ANC Flllther Submissions and Responses by the ANC to Questions Raised by the 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 12 May 1997 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/misc/trc .html 
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APPENDIX 10 
Members of the Transitional Executive Council (South Africa) 6 December 1993-21 
January 1994 
Member Alternate Member 
De Villiers, DJ Wessels, L 
Eglin, CW Andrew, KM 
Hendrikse, HJ Richards, I (later appointed member in 
January 1994 
Mahlangu, NJ Vilankulu, Q 
Meyer, RP Van der Merwe, SS 
Moeti, SE Makhuva, S 
Mokoena, LM Netshimbupfe, MA 
Monapi, T1 Moji,SOM 
Mpoeli, RH Mota, MB 
Ngobeni, EE Shilubana, PT 
Nonkonyana, M Gwadiso, G 
Rajah, DS Reddy, IN 
Rabansi, A Ganie, 0 (replaced later, by Govender, M 
with effect from I January 1994 
Ramaphosa, C Mharaj, M 
Ramodike, MN Mahlangu, MJ 
Ripinga, SS Bahoi, FS 
Siovo, J Mtintso, T 
Titus, Z Jajula, NB 
Gordhan, PJ Saloiee, C 
Source: Compiled from Republic of South Africa Government Gazettes, Vol. 342, No. 15320, 6 
December 1993, pp 1-2; Vol. 34, No. 15335, 9 December, 1993 , p.l ; Vol. 342, No. 15406, 24 
December, 1993 , p.l ; Vol. 343, No. 15462, 21 January, 1994, p.1 
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APPENDIX 11 
Registered Political Parties in South Africa as on 20th November 2001 
1. Abbottsdale CommlU1ity Development Forum (ACDF) 
2. Abolition oflncome Tax and Usury Party (AITUP) 
3. Action Committee (AC) 
4. Action Independent Peoples Party (AIPP) 
5. Africa Muslim Party (AMP) 
6. Africa Woman and Youth Party 
7. African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 
8. African Labour Party (ALP) 
9. African National Congress (ANC) 
10. African Transformation Efficiency and Affirmative Movement (A-Team) 
II. Afrikaner EenheidsBeweging (AEB) 
12. Askie Eenheid Belastingbetalers/Action Unity Ratepayers (AE/AU) 
13 . Alliance 2000+ (ALL2000+) 
14. Alliance for the Community (AFC) 
15. Alliance of Associated Residents ofKZ221 (AAR) 
16. Alliance ofIndependents Midvaal (AIM) 
17. Alliansie Noord (AN) 
18. Ascora (AS CORA) 
19. Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 
20. Barkly West Task Team (BWTT) 
21. Belastingbetalersvereniging (BBV) 
22. Bohlokong Civic Association (BOCA) 
23 . Breedevallei Onafhanklik (BO) 
24. Cape People's Congress (CPC) 
25 . Christian Protestant Party (CPP) 
26. Christian Democratic Party (CDP) 
27. Civic Alliansie (CIVIC) 
28. Community Initiative/Gemeenskap Inisiatief (CI/GI) 
29. Curriculum Vitae Party (CV) 
30. Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front (DPF) 
31. Davey ton Community Peace Committee (PC) 
32. Democratic Alliance (DA) 
33. Democratic Party (DP) 
34. Die Maquassi HilisfRante Gemeenskapssvereniging 
35 . Oikwankwetla Party of South Africa (OPSA) 
36. Displacees Rate-Payers Association (ORP A) 
37. Oube Civic Organisation (OCO) 
38. Eastrand ForurnlOosrand Forum (ERF/ORF) 
39. Employment Movement of South Africa (EMSA) 
40. Ethekweni Ecopeace (ECOPEACE) 
41. Federal Alliance (FA) 
42. Feta Kgomo 0 Sware Motho (FKM) 
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43. Forum 2000 (F2000) 
44. Gay and Lesbian Alliance (GLA) 
45. Gemini Movement (GEMINI) 
46. George Community Initiative/George Gemeeenskapsinisiatief (GGIIGCI) 
47. God's People's Party (GPP) 
48. Greater Brits Civic Organisation (CIVIC) 
49. Helderberg Community Civic Organisation (HECCO) 
50. Highvelds Residents Concerned Party (HRCP) 
51. Hoeveldrif Inwonersvereniging (INWO) 
52. Independent Civic Organisation of South Africa lCOSA) 
53. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
54. Isindiso Salvation Christian Voice (ISCVO) 
55 . Inwoners/Citizens Forum (ICF) 
56. JansenvillelKlipplaat Alliansie (JKA) 
57. Justice and Freedom Alliance (JAF A) 
58. Kayamandi Community Alliance (KCA) 
59. Keep it Straight and Simple (KISS) 
60. Khayalami Residents Association (KRA) 
61. Knysna Gemeenskapsforum (CxForum) 
62. Kouga 2000+ (K20+) 
63. Labour Party (LP) 
64. Mass United Movement (MUM) 
65. Merit Party (MP) 
66. Middelburg Residents Organisation (MRO) 
67. Middle Party (MiP) 
68. Minority Front (MF) 
69. Mosselbaai Gemenskapsforum (GF) 
70. Nasionale Kleuring Party (NKP) 
71. National Coalition Party (NACOPA) 
72. National United Peoples Organisation (NUPO) 
73. New Earth Party (NEP) 
74. New National Party (NNP) 
75. Noordwes Forum (NF) 
76. Oudtshoorn Askie 2000 (OA 2000) 
77. Pan Africanist Congress Of Azania (PAC) 
78. People ' s Forum (PF) 
79. People's Liberation Party (PLP) 
80. People's Party (PP) 
81. People's Progressive Party (PPP) 
82. Postmasburg-Olifantshoek Residents Association (POSRA) 
83 . Potchefstroom lnwonersvereniging (PlV) 
84. Ratepayers and Residents Party Simunye (RRP) 
85. Regte Party/Right Party (RP) 
86. Sakhile-Together (SAKHILE) 
87. Simunye in Christ Organisation (Simunye) 
88. Sindawonye Progressive Party (SPP) 
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89. Sofasonke Party 
90. South African Freedom Alliance (SAFA) 
91. South African Political Alliance (SAFPA) 
92. Super Party (SP) 
93. Thabanorth I wonersvereniging (TNI) 
94. The Green Party of South Africa (GP) 
95. The Socialist Party of Azania (SOP A) 
96. The South African Region ofIndependent Churches (SARIC) 
97. Thembilihle Masibambane Civic Organisation (T.M.C.O) 
98 . Thembisa Concerned Residents Association (TECRA) 
99. Ulundi Rate Payers Association (URP A) 
100.Unemployment Labour Alliance (ULA) 
101.United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) 
I 02.United Democratic Alliance (UDA) 
103.United Democratic Movement (UDM) 
104. United Independent Front (UIF) 
105.Verenigde Gemeenskap Organisasie (VGO) 
I 06.Vision-Visie 2000+ 
107. VryheidsfrontiFreedom Front (VF IFF) 
108.Vukani Utrecht Rate Payers Association (VURAPA) 
I 09.Vukuzenzele Sekusile Party (VSP) 
110. Witzenberg Onafhanklik Vereniging (WOV) 
Ill . Workers International Vanguard League (WIVL) 
I 12.Workers Party (WP) 
113 .ximoko Party (XP) 
114.Zibambeleni Development Organisation (ZDO) 
Source: Independent Electoral Conunission (lEC) Registered Political Parties as on 20 
November 200 I. http://www.elections.org.za/Registered-parties.asp 
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